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A History of the Modern Middle East
A History of the Modern Middle East examines the profound and often dramatic transformations of the region in the past two centuries, from the Ottoman and Egyptian reforms, through the challenge of Western imperialism, to the impact of US foreign policies. Built around a framework of political history, while also carefully integrating social, cultural, and economic developments, this expertly crafted account provides readers with the most comprehensive, balanced and penetrating analysis of the modern Middle East. The sixth edition has been revised to provide a thorough account of the major developments since 2012, including the tumultuous aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the sectarian conflict in Iraq and civil war in Syria that led to the rise of ISIS, the crises in Libya and Yemen, and the United States' nuclear talks with Iran. With brand-new timelines in each part, updated select bibliographies, and expanded online instructor resources, A History of the Modern Middle East remains the quintessential text for courses on Middle East history.
624 pages, Paperback
First published January 11, 1993
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December 4, 2015
An excellent, detailed book. I rate 4 stars because it's not quite complete. Yambert's The Contemporary Middle East: A Westview Reader fills in the gaps of some topics, such as coverage of the "Arab Spring" and other less studied Middle Eastern countries. Cleveland and Bunton's, however, explores the 19th century to earlier and the Ottoman Empire in depth while Yambert's doesn't, which is why Yambert's is "contemporary" history. Both books were published in 2013 on the same press. They are great complements to each other.
If you are new to Middle Eastern history and must choose only one, I recommend Yambert's first then Cleveland and Bunton's, because the former includes timelines and quicker reading of ancient to early modern history to get up to speed on the background before the book dives into the past hundred years, where it gets going around WWI. It also has similar enough essays for consistency, but also different enough essays to give multiple views on matters due to the 30+ contributors. Then pick up Cleveland and Bunton's book for the full modern treatment.
Both of these books are geared toward a US audience due to its focus at many times on US-Middle Eastern relations, but any English reader will benefit from the information.
It might be useful for those who are familiar with very recent Middle Eastern history to study backward in Cleveland and Bunton to see the connections grow. Otherwise, start with Yambert because of the Arab Spring coverage.
To sum:
Cleveland and Bunton - detailed, thorough, coverage of the 19th century to earlier history, but some gaps.
Yambert - get up to speed quickly, easier read, less details, broader coverage, multiple perspectives, past 100 years history.
Also recommended to supplement the prior two:
The Middle East: A History
If you are new to Middle Eastern history and must choose only one, I recommend Yambert's first then Cleveland and Bunton's, because the former includes timelines and quicker reading of ancient to early modern history to get up to speed on the background before the book dives into the past hundred years, where it gets going around WWI. It also has similar enough essays for consistency, but also different enough essays to give multiple views on matters due to the 30+ contributors. Then pick up Cleveland and Bunton's book for the full modern treatment.
Both of these books are geared toward a US audience due to its focus at many times on US-Middle Eastern relations, but any English reader will benefit from the information.
It might be useful for those who are familiar with very recent Middle Eastern history to study backward in Cleveland and Bunton to see the connections grow. Otherwise, start with Yambert because of the Arab Spring coverage.
To sum:
Cleveland and Bunton - detailed, thorough, coverage of the 19th century to earlier history, but some gaps.
Yambert - get up to speed quickly, easier read, less details, broader coverage, multiple perspectives, past 100 years history.
Also recommended to supplement the prior two:
The Middle East: A History
February 26, 2020
I found the prose of this book unbiased, detailed and coherent. The modern history of a middle eastern country can only be understood in the context of the larger narrative of its relation to the other movements in the region and this book does a good job of putting the story into perspective.
Perhaps the author could have improved on its documentation of the references and citations, but otherwise, the book did justice to the topic.
Perhaps the author could have improved on its documentation of the references and citations, but otherwise, the book did justice to the topic.
July 22, 2016
Edition reviewed: 2nd (applies to all editions)
10/10 Best furniture wedge ever used
William Cleveland hopes to paint a detailed picture of history in “A History of the Modern Middle East;” unfortunately, his picture is painted like a blind Picasso wearing a blindfold—poorly corresponding to reality.
Cleveland is detailed, explains foreign terms well, gives an accurate history of the Ottomans, and the book’s inclusion of maps would make Bilbo gleeful. Thus end the positives.
In the preface to the second edition, Cleveland views the terms 'modernization' and 'Westernization' as “hav[ing] taken on connotations that are either value-laden or culturally judgmental, or both" (pp xiv). He substitutes these words with ‘transformation,’ one he thinks better suited to describe the Western style changes of modernization that occurred in the Middle East (notice the easy use of the two words he decides to forego). It is unclear to this reader why he views the term ‘Western’ as culturally judgmental and uses the romantic ‘transformation;’ the term ‘reformation’ would have better suited Cleveland for accuracy.
Concerning accuracy, three claims of Cleveland’s will now be examined, all ringing pots and pans in the middle of the night. The first deals with Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem, who “appeared willing to cooperate with the British administration in preventing acts of violence,” and who “was more moderate than [the Zionists and Arab Nationalists] acknowledge[d]” (pp. 243-44). Cleveland continues by saying that “until the outbreak of violence in 1936, the mufti urged restraint on his followers and demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the British in seeking a negotiated solution to the question of Jewish immigrants.” Hajj Amin? The same one who “received less votes for [the position of mufti] than did three other candidates,” [1] was “an impassioned Arab xenophobe, a preacher of venom and destruction against his nation’s and his family’s enemies,” [2] who instated a pogrom against the Jews, evaded British arrest, and “was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment in abstentia”? [3] The same Hajj Amin who bolted to Nazi Germany, and who met and “sent Hitler 15 drafts of declarations he wanted Germany and Italy to make concerning the Middle East”? [4] The same Hajj Amin whose “henchmen also insured he would have no opposition by systematically killing Palestinians from rival clans who were discussing cooperation with the Jews?” [5] Yes, the same Hajj Amin proclaimed in songs of moderation by Cleveland, who mentions none of these facts.
The second concerns the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Cleveland writes that “[t]he legend of a defenseless, new-born Israel facing the onslaught of hordes of Arab soldiers” as “not correspond[ing] to reality” (p. 260). He makes a contrast between the amount of Arab soldiers and the Haganah (60,000 men, putting a 10,000 man difference in favor of the Haganah), but clarifies that “[n]umbers of course, do not tell the whole story” (p. 261). Truly, the whole story is omitted by Cleveland, because of the 60,000 trained fighters of the Haganah, “only 18,900 were fully mobilized, armed and prepared for war.”
Cleveland proclaims that Israel won because their soldiers believed it was a life-or-death fight. Again, he is right: On May 14, the night before war, chief of operations Yigael Yadin told David Ben-Gurion, “The best we can tell you is that we have a 50-50 chance.” As for the legend of a defenseless Israel, Cleveland makes no mention that Israel’s army had no cannon or tank, and its nine airplanes were all obsolete. [6] He offers no further claim, besides misrepresented numbers, why Israel won a war in the face of not five, but seven [7] Arab armies coming against it.
Cleveland also states that “each of the Arab states participating in the invasion in fact placed its own interests first” and “the invasion of Israel was hampered from the outset by inter-Arab political rivalries” that made ready a catalyst for “confusion on the battlefield” (p. 260). It is a wonder that the Arab League was unified to mobilize five nations to annihilate the newly founded, solitary state of Israel on the same day, especially with the rallying cry of Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab-League, boasting that "[i]t will be a war of annihilation. It will be a momentous massacre in history that will be talked about like the massacres of the Mongols or the Crusades." [8] Surely, the war a cooperative defeat for the Arabs, and not a defeat of each nation in its own interests. The collective and pinnacle interest was, first, to annihilate Israel.
The third concerns modesty for men and women. On page 34, Cleveland makes an interesting claim concerning modesty: “The Qur’an stipulates that women-and men-should dress modestly and comport themselves discreetly, but it does not require women to veil themselves.” Did Cleveland read surah 33:59? “Prophet, enjoin your wives, your daughters, and the wives of the believers to draw their veils close round them. That is more proper so that they may be recognized and not be molested. God is ever forgiving and merciful (NJ Dawood).”
Or: “Enjoin believing women […] to draw their veils over their bosoms and not to display their finery except to their husbands [and a long list of relations]” (Surah 24:31). Sahih Al Burkahi 60:282 declares, “After Muhammad issued the command (Quran 24:31) for women to cover themselves, the women responded by tearing up sheets to cover their faces.” Cleveland also states that this veiling led to segregation of women (p. 34) - possibly true, to due to my ignorance of pre-Islamic Arabia; however, it seems ludicrous that the practice of veiling led to segregation. Rather, segregation would be the cause and veiling, the effect.
These three glaring claims of Cleveland ring an alarm: If he can whitewash these details, I can only speculate what else he errs on in his text.
Concerning Cleveland’s citations, the number of them is a meager McDonald’s hamburger without any love. Most chapters contain only one to three cited sources listed at the end of the chapter (chapters 1-4, 7-10, 12, 17, 18, 23, and 24). These citations are usually direct quotations used to convey only one point and not the many ideas he lays out over several pages. Chapter 7 contains two sources but from only one book, Albert Hourani’s “Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age,” and chapter 18 only contains one cited source. The chapter with the most sources, “The Iranian Revolution” contains the most cited sources (12) and is perhaps the best written in the book. The 22 page Selective Bibliography details many sources in long paragraphs--it is a wonder he did not reference them more. For instance, on page 74 Cleveland names and paraphrases the historian Marshall Hodgson without referencing him in chapter four’s end notes. Instead, it must be ventured the original source is Hodgson’s “The Venture of Islam,” listed in the bibliography. On page 33, Cleveland makes the claim that “[p]olygamy was unlimited in Pre-Islamic Arabia” and that the Qur’an was thoughtful to have a sign stating, “Tut Tut! Only four wives, man!” He provides no source for this claim.
Often too, he cites groups of people and lists no one from the group, presumably since he forgot their phone numbers. For instance, on page 8, Cleveland says, "Historians have suggested that Mecca was in a state of transition between the vanishing tribal ways and a nascent urbanism spawned by merchant capitalism.” I have no doubt of this claim, but he names no historians which have suggested it. On page 26 he cites, "Some scholars..." and on page 28, "Certain modern Muslim writers...", but Cleveland fails to mention a name. This causes frustration for those who wish to delve more into the subjects presented, fact-check, or both.
Consequentially, this book reads more like a lecture with added citations than a well thought out paper. This would not detract from Cleveland’s writing if only he took the time to state where his information came from. Scholarly integrity implies knowing where information comes from and stating it; this has a glaring absence of it. To Cleveland’s credit, the chapters on the Ottoman Empire and Iran are accurate, though the all the other chapters would do well to be taken with a salt shaker.
Other than these injunctions, Cleveland's book is a knowledgeable half built house with a sandy foundation. Cleveland’s text is always sluggish but detailed; however, it is a bore to the eyes and a struggle for the average consciousness.
To readers with little to no knowledge of the Middle East, take a note from alcohol in Saudi Arabia and be absent from this book. To all other readers, do the same.
Notes
[1] Sachar, Howard. "The History of Israel." 170.
[2] ibid
[3] Bard, Mitchell. "Myths and Facts: A Guide to the Arab-Israeli Conflict." 26.
[4] "The Holocaust: The Mufti and the Führer." http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/j...
[5] Bard, Mitchell. "Myths and Facts: A Guide to the Arab-Israeli Conflict." 27.
[6] "Israeli War of Independence: Background & Overview." http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/j...
[7] Sachar, Howard. "The History of Israel." 315.
[8] "Israeli War of Independence: Background & Overview." http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/j...
10/10 Best furniture wedge ever used
William Cleveland hopes to paint a detailed picture of history in “A History of the Modern Middle East;” unfortunately, his picture is painted like a blind Picasso wearing a blindfold—poorly corresponding to reality.
Cleveland is detailed, explains foreign terms well, gives an accurate history of the Ottomans, and the book’s inclusion of maps would make Bilbo gleeful. Thus end the positives.
In the preface to the second edition, Cleveland views the terms 'modernization' and 'Westernization' as “hav[ing] taken on connotations that are either value-laden or culturally judgmental, or both" (pp xiv). He substitutes these words with ‘transformation,’ one he thinks better suited to describe the Western style changes of modernization that occurred in the Middle East (notice the easy use of the two words he decides to forego). It is unclear to this reader why he views the term ‘Western’ as culturally judgmental and uses the romantic ‘transformation;’ the term ‘reformation’ would have better suited Cleveland for accuracy.
Concerning accuracy, three claims of Cleveland’s will now be examined, all ringing pots and pans in the middle of the night. The first deals with Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem, who “appeared willing to cooperate with the British administration in preventing acts of violence,” and who “was more moderate than [the Zionists and Arab Nationalists] acknowledge[d]” (pp. 243-44). Cleveland continues by saying that “until the outbreak of violence in 1936, the mufti urged restraint on his followers and demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the British in seeking a negotiated solution to the question of Jewish immigrants.” Hajj Amin? The same one who “received less votes for [the position of mufti] than did three other candidates,” [1] was “an impassioned Arab xenophobe, a preacher of venom and destruction against his nation’s and his family’s enemies,” [2] who instated a pogrom against the Jews, evaded British arrest, and “was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment in abstentia”? [3] The same Hajj Amin who bolted to Nazi Germany, and who met and “sent Hitler 15 drafts of declarations he wanted Germany and Italy to make concerning the Middle East”? [4] The same Hajj Amin whose “henchmen also insured he would have no opposition by systematically killing Palestinians from rival clans who were discussing cooperation with the Jews?” [5] Yes, the same Hajj Amin proclaimed in songs of moderation by Cleveland, who mentions none of these facts.
The second concerns the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Cleveland writes that “[t]he legend of a defenseless, new-born Israel facing the onslaught of hordes of Arab soldiers” as “not correspond[ing] to reality” (p. 260). He makes a contrast between the amount of Arab soldiers and the Haganah (60,000 men, putting a 10,000 man difference in favor of the Haganah), but clarifies that “[n]umbers of course, do not tell the whole story” (p. 261). Truly, the whole story is omitted by Cleveland, because of the 60,000 trained fighters of the Haganah, “only 18,900 were fully mobilized, armed and prepared for war.”
Cleveland proclaims that Israel won because their soldiers believed it was a life-or-death fight. Again, he is right: On May 14, the night before war, chief of operations Yigael Yadin told David Ben-Gurion, “The best we can tell you is that we have a 50-50 chance.” As for the legend of a defenseless Israel, Cleveland makes no mention that Israel’s army had no cannon or tank, and its nine airplanes were all obsolete. [6] He offers no further claim, besides misrepresented numbers, why Israel won a war in the face of not five, but seven [7] Arab armies coming against it.
Cleveland also states that “each of the Arab states participating in the invasion in fact placed its own interests first” and “the invasion of Israel was hampered from the outset by inter-Arab political rivalries” that made ready a catalyst for “confusion on the battlefield” (p. 260). It is a wonder that the Arab League was unified to mobilize five nations to annihilate the newly founded, solitary state of Israel on the same day, especially with the rallying cry of Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab-League, boasting that "[i]t will be a war of annihilation. It will be a momentous massacre in history that will be talked about like the massacres of the Mongols or the Crusades." [8] Surely, the war a cooperative defeat for the Arabs, and not a defeat of each nation in its own interests. The collective and pinnacle interest was, first, to annihilate Israel.
The third concerns modesty for men and women. On page 34, Cleveland makes an interesting claim concerning modesty: “The Qur’an stipulates that women-and men-should dress modestly and comport themselves discreetly, but it does not require women to veil themselves.” Did Cleveland read surah 33:59? “Prophet, enjoin your wives, your daughters, and the wives of the believers to draw their veils close round them. That is more proper so that they may be recognized and not be molested. God is ever forgiving and merciful (NJ Dawood).”
Or: “Enjoin believing women […] to draw their veils over their bosoms and not to display their finery except to their husbands [and a long list of relations]” (Surah 24:31). Sahih Al Burkahi 60:282 declares, “After Muhammad issued the command (Quran 24:31) for women to cover themselves, the women responded by tearing up sheets to cover their faces.” Cleveland also states that this veiling led to segregation of women (p. 34) - possibly true, to due to my ignorance of pre-Islamic Arabia; however, it seems ludicrous that the practice of veiling led to segregation. Rather, segregation would be the cause and veiling, the effect.
These three glaring claims of Cleveland ring an alarm: If he can whitewash these details, I can only speculate what else he errs on in his text.
Concerning Cleveland’s citations, the number of them is a meager McDonald’s hamburger without any love. Most chapters contain only one to three cited sources listed at the end of the chapter (chapters 1-4, 7-10, 12, 17, 18, 23, and 24). These citations are usually direct quotations used to convey only one point and not the many ideas he lays out over several pages. Chapter 7 contains two sources but from only one book, Albert Hourani’s “Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age,” and chapter 18 only contains one cited source. The chapter with the most sources, “The Iranian Revolution” contains the most cited sources (12) and is perhaps the best written in the book. The 22 page Selective Bibliography details many sources in long paragraphs--it is a wonder he did not reference them more. For instance, on page 74 Cleveland names and paraphrases the historian Marshall Hodgson without referencing him in chapter four’s end notes. Instead, it must be ventured the original source is Hodgson’s “The Venture of Islam,” listed in the bibliography. On page 33, Cleveland makes the claim that “[p]olygamy was unlimited in Pre-Islamic Arabia” and that the Qur’an was thoughtful to have a sign stating, “Tut Tut! Only four wives, man!” He provides no source for this claim.
Often too, he cites groups of people and lists no one from the group, presumably since he forgot their phone numbers. For instance, on page 8, Cleveland says, "Historians have suggested that Mecca was in a state of transition between the vanishing tribal ways and a nascent urbanism spawned by merchant capitalism.” I have no doubt of this claim, but he names no historians which have suggested it. On page 26 he cites, "Some scholars..." and on page 28, "Certain modern Muslim writers...", but Cleveland fails to mention a name. This causes frustration for those who wish to delve more into the subjects presented, fact-check, or both.
Consequentially, this book reads more like a lecture with added citations than a well thought out paper. This would not detract from Cleveland’s writing if only he took the time to state where his information came from. Scholarly integrity implies knowing where information comes from and stating it; this has a glaring absence of it. To Cleveland’s credit, the chapters on the Ottoman Empire and Iran are accurate, though the all the other chapters would do well to be taken with a salt shaker.
Other than these injunctions, Cleveland's book is a knowledgeable half built house with a sandy foundation. Cleveland’s text is always sluggish but detailed; however, it is a bore to the eyes and a struggle for the average consciousness.
To readers with little to no knowledge of the Middle East, take a note from alcohol in Saudi Arabia and be absent from this book. To all other readers, do the same.
Notes
[1] Sachar, Howard. "The History of Israel." 170.
[2] ibid
[3] Bard, Mitchell. "Myths and Facts: A Guide to the Arab-Israeli Conflict." 26.
[4] "The Holocaust: The Mufti and the Führer." http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/j...
[5] Bard, Mitchell. "Myths and Facts: A Guide to the Arab-Israeli Conflict." 27.
[6] "Israeli War of Independence: Background & Overview." http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/j...
[7] Sachar, Howard. "The History of Israel." 315.
[8] "Israeli War of Independence: Background & Overview." http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/j...
January 2, 2019
I picked up this book a couple months ago at the behest of a friend. The latest Middle Eastern tragedy was still unfolding (hundreds of Palestinians being shot by Israeli snipers at the Gaza border), and while I had certain predispositions about how to feel based on the two decades or so of news I've followed since I was in high school, I finally wanted to buttress my modern understanding with a broad look at history.
This book turned out to be the perfect tool for the task.
I'm pleased to say that it expanded my view of the entire region, reinforcing certain predispositions I had while helping me to re-frame others. For instance, I long ago internalized the argument often made that much of the turmoil in the Middle East today comes as a consequence of capricious foreign policy on the part of the Brits after the peak of their global empire. Borders drawn haphazardly on a map with no consideration for the ethnic and sectarian communities that were being divided. Or, in certain cases, borders drawn in a deliberately obfuscating way to prevent countries from gaining regional primacy, as with the division between Iraq and Kuwait.
That's still true! But, because Cleveland starts his history all the way back with the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Empire, you actually get the context for the decision-making. So while the British did comport themselves with their special brand of Anglo arrogance, they were trying to fill a power vacuum left in the wake of the implosion of the Ottoman Empire. They weren't disturbing the region from a state of peace and plenty, they were figuring out how to parse competing power centers while also achieving their own material ends.
Another really important bit of context was Cleveland's focus on the means of political expression with a history of success in the region. From a contemporary American perspective, the idea of a political Islam is basically anathema. We treat it like an aberration designed for the express purpose of holding the region back from the natural course of secular liberalism. This is, needless to say, a huge joke.
Islam is one of roughly three tactics for political organization in the region in the last several centuries. It's a particularly potent one, since Islam is woven so deeply into the cultures of all the region's major players. Whatever the newest trends are that sweep the region's cities, the ulama in the countryside preserve the practice of Islam, so when all else goes wrong, it remains an important method for political expression and dissent.
More familiar from a Western perspective is nationalism of the kind expressed by Iraq or Nasser's Egypt. Nationalism tends to work really well as an organizing principle in the west, because it aligns with our pluralistic traditions. But it's really only a recent addition in the Middle East, and it doesn't have terribly deep roots because of the aforementioned capriciously-wrought borders. A Shia Muslim in eastern Iraq has more in common with a fellow Shia in neighboring Iran than he does a Sunni in Baghdad. So unless the state is generating enough revenue to buy people off with a generous welfare state, appeals to nationalism seem only so effective.
And since American global hegemony has relied for so long on the rule of nationalistic autocrats who often operate corrupt regimes that horde resources and hold down the will of the people, it seems only natural that people turn to other methods of political expression.
The third form of political organization never really stuck, but I found it pretty interesting: pan-Arabism. What WOULD happen if the Arab states were able to throw off their poorly-drawn borders and operate as a regional or global power? It's a vision only sporadically pursued, but to me it seems the model with the most long-term potential.
Back to the book. I really liked the way it was structured. It's chronological, but the chapters are also divided by theme and geography so you do kind of dip back into topics you've already covered, but they're explored through a new lens each time. It's the most effective form of historic storytelling and is particularly effective for a big historic synthesis like this one. Cleveland is a terrific writer and this work perfectly fulfilled the mission I set out for it. The fact that it ends at 1999 is honestly kind of perfect, because with all that's happened in the last 20 years, he'd need to double the page length.
That basically concludes my actual review, but I do want to stick some notes and ill-formed impressions of each country that he covers on here, because I know I will need something to jog my memory in the future when I think back on this book in light of future events.
Iran: I think I'm a little less critical of the Shah than I once was? Shia Islam and the legacy of the Safavids seems to lend Persian culture a natural affinity for monarchy that you sort of lose when you just read about the excesses of the last shah. I still find the Persian people sympathetic and I think American foreign policy that treats Iran like a pariah state is self-defeating and likely remains as it is because of concerns about Israel.
Israel: What can you say without being drawing the ire of Zionists on the web? It's hard not to be sympathetic to the plight of the Jewish diaspora in the wake of the Holocaust, but nothing about the way that the country has conducted itself since its creation lends it much sympathy to the student of history. The ill-conceived attacks by its neighbors justify the country's ruthless militancy in a way, but it's a straight-up apartheid state.
Iraq: I actually felt sympathetic for Saddam Hussein! How weird is that? Not in that he is an autocrat responsible for gassing large populations, but in the strategic sense. Attacking Kuwait makes a certain kind of sense when you take it in context, and he had every reason to believe the U.S. would support him. It's a shame what has happened to a country with such an incredibly rich history -- richer than almost any civilization on the planet.
Turkey: What a confounding mix of militancy, secularism and ambition. One wonders how different the region would be if a politician of the caliber of Ataturk was still around.
Egypt: It's easy to forget that Egypt was once one of the biggest power centers in the entire world. But with the wane of Nasser and its absorption into the American sphere of influence, they really abdicated their leadership role in the region to Iran, Turkey and Iraq. Learning about the Muslim Brotherhood was also particularly interesting in light of recent events.
Syria, Jordan, Lebanon: I still don't really understand them. Jordan is basically a fiction. And Syria should really be much larger. If only Palestine hadn't been lopped off for the sake of British expediency...
This book turned out to be the perfect tool for the task.
I'm pleased to say that it expanded my view of the entire region, reinforcing certain predispositions I had while helping me to re-frame others. For instance, I long ago internalized the argument often made that much of the turmoil in the Middle East today comes as a consequence of capricious foreign policy on the part of the Brits after the peak of their global empire. Borders drawn haphazardly on a map with no consideration for the ethnic and sectarian communities that were being divided. Or, in certain cases, borders drawn in a deliberately obfuscating way to prevent countries from gaining regional primacy, as with the division between Iraq and Kuwait.
That's still true! But, because Cleveland starts his history all the way back with the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Empire, you actually get the context for the decision-making. So while the British did comport themselves with their special brand of Anglo arrogance, they were trying to fill a power vacuum left in the wake of the implosion of the Ottoman Empire. They weren't disturbing the region from a state of peace and plenty, they were figuring out how to parse competing power centers while also achieving their own material ends.
Another really important bit of context was Cleveland's focus on the means of political expression with a history of success in the region. From a contemporary American perspective, the idea of a political Islam is basically anathema. We treat it like an aberration designed for the express purpose of holding the region back from the natural course of secular liberalism. This is, needless to say, a huge joke.
Islam is one of roughly three tactics for political organization in the region in the last several centuries. It's a particularly potent one, since Islam is woven so deeply into the cultures of all the region's major players. Whatever the newest trends are that sweep the region's cities, the ulama in the countryside preserve the practice of Islam, so when all else goes wrong, it remains an important method for political expression and dissent.
More familiar from a Western perspective is nationalism of the kind expressed by Iraq or Nasser's Egypt. Nationalism tends to work really well as an organizing principle in the west, because it aligns with our pluralistic traditions. But it's really only a recent addition in the Middle East, and it doesn't have terribly deep roots because of the aforementioned capriciously-wrought borders. A Shia Muslim in eastern Iraq has more in common with a fellow Shia in neighboring Iran than he does a Sunni in Baghdad. So unless the state is generating enough revenue to buy people off with a generous welfare state, appeals to nationalism seem only so effective.
And since American global hegemony has relied for so long on the rule of nationalistic autocrats who often operate corrupt regimes that horde resources and hold down the will of the people, it seems only natural that people turn to other methods of political expression.
The third form of political organization never really stuck, but I found it pretty interesting: pan-Arabism. What WOULD happen if the Arab states were able to throw off their poorly-drawn borders and operate as a regional or global power? It's a vision only sporadically pursued, but to me it seems the model with the most long-term potential.
Back to the book. I really liked the way it was structured. It's chronological, but the chapters are also divided by theme and geography so you do kind of dip back into topics you've already covered, but they're explored through a new lens each time. It's the most effective form of historic storytelling and is particularly effective for a big historic synthesis like this one. Cleveland is a terrific writer and this work perfectly fulfilled the mission I set out for it. The fact that it ends at 1999 is honestly kind of perfect, because with all that's happened in the last 20 years, he'd need to double the page length.
That basically concludes my actual review, but I do want to stick some notes and ill-formed impressions of each country that he covers on here, because I know I will need something to jog my memory in the future when I think back on this book in light of future events.
Iran: I think I'm a little less critical of the Shah than I once was? Shia Islam and the legacy of the Safavids seems to lend Persian culture a natural affinity for monarchy that you sort of lose when you just read about the excesses of the last shah. I still find the Persian people sympathetic and I think American foreign policy that treats Iran like a pariah state is self-defeating and likely remains as it is because of concerns about Israel.
Israel: What can you say without being drawing the ire of Zionists on the web? It's hard not to be sympathetic to the plight of the Jewish diaspora in the wake of the Holocaust, but nothing about the way that the country has conducted itself since its creation lends it much sympathy to the student of history. The ill-conceived attacks by its neighbors justify the country's ruthless militancy in a way, but it's a straight-up apartheid state.
Iraq: I actually felt sympathetic for Saddam Hussein! How weird is that? Not in that he is an autocrat responsible for gassing large populations, but in the strategic sense. Attacking Kuwait makes a certain kind of sense when you take it in context, and he had every reason to believe the U.S. would support him. It's a shame what has happened to a country with such an incredibly rich history -- richer than almost any civilization on the planet.
Turkey: What a confounding mix of militancy, secularism and ambition. One wonders how different the region would be if a politician of the caliber of Ataturk was still around.
Egypt: It's easy to forget that Egypt was once one of the biggest power centers in the entire world. But with the wane of Nasser and its absorption into the American sphere of influence, they really abdicated their leadership role in the region to Iran, Turkey and Iraq. Learning about the Muslim Brotherhood was also particularly interesting in light of recent events.
Syria, Jordan, Lebanon: I still don't really understand them. Jordan is basically a fiction. And Syria should really be much larger. If only Palestine hadn't been lopped off for the sake of British expediency...
December 25, 2019
Cleveland'ın kitabı, zengin detay ve analizlerle bezenmiş, iyi bir referans kitabı; ancak kavramsal açıklamalarda eksik kalabiliyor. Bu eksiği tamamlamak için, hepsi de Türkçeye çevrilmiş;
James Gelvin'in Modern Ortadoğu Tarihi,
Roger Owen-Şevket Pamuk'un 20. Yüzyılda Ortadoğu Ekonomileri Tarihi,
Youssef M. Choueiri'nin Ortadoğu Tarihi
Hamit Bozarslan'ın Ortadoğu'nun Siyasal Sosyolojisi kitaplarını tavsiye ederim.
James Gelvin'in Modern Ortadoğu Tarihi,
Roger Owen-Şevket Pamuk'un 20. Yüzyılda Ortadoğu Ekonomileri Tarihi,
Youssef M. Choueiri'nin Ortadoğu Tarihi
Hamit Bozarslan'ın Ortadoğu'nun Siyasal Sosyolojisi kitaplarını tavsiye ederim.
September 13, 2024
Solid Overview. Not the most engaging prose ever written, but that wasn't really the assignment, was it?
July 26, 2007
This was the textbook for my modern Middle East history class... I'm not a huge fan of textbooks generally but this one is pretty well-written, and presents a good overview of political history without sacrificing intellectual commentary and analysis. There's something about reading recent history written in an impassive voice that puts everything into perspective, not to mention its extreme relevance to present day issues. I do think a few members of our current administration would benefit from much of the information here.
April 4, 2019
This was really awesome. Up to day a read almost lots of books i find about the history of Middle East. And this book really strike me up to the soul. Written elaborate and all chapters explain why you need to read all the boom to understand why Muslim world looks like West's ideal terrorist region which full of rogue states.
September 9, 2008
Still working on reading this whole book, but for what I've read so far, it's an excellent resource for understanding why we (as in the Western world) are so responsible for many of the problems that the Middle Eastern world is facing right now.
December 4, 2010
Amazing book! Once you start reading it you won't be able to put it down. The author is very accurate and the book is well researched. Highly recommended.
February 6, 2017
This is an excellent survey. It is well researched, balanced and fair. It is also highly readable!
Read
April 24, 2021listen if i want to count a textbook for my goodreads goal then that is my RIGHT
October 14, 2018
The book gives an in depth overview of the Middle East and how the all the nations came about and grew into the nations that exist today. I really appreciated the author’s way of writing, as the history of each nation and how they interacted with the other nations flowed together really well. He makes you forget that you are reading a history book and not a story book. The writing is really that good. Although it is a bit of a longer read (550p), it really is worth it. I think in today’s age, having an good understanding of the history of the Middle East and its political motives is very helpful in understanding today’s issues. Since reading the book, I have come away with a general understanding of the Middle East and a better understanding of some of the more recent political events in those countries.
April 8, 2025
A quite engaging overview of the cultural and societal dynamics of the modern Middle East. A great summary of political structures and developments from the pre-Ottoman period up to almost the present day. It's hard to label this work as orientalist or overly focused on conflict, so breath of fresh air in that sense.
January 18, 2022
Goed introducerend boek. Erg interessant en goed geschreven, maar wel erg veel info om te onthouden. Binnenkort maar nog een keer lezen. Helaas liep mijn editie maar tot 2000, dus als iemand nog een goed boek weet over het Midden-Oosten in de 21ste eeuw hoor ik het graag
August 14, 2025
exceptional as a study guide to understanding the basics of the modern middle east, starting from the pre ottoman period before focusing heavily on the post ww1 M.E. giving in depth breakdowns about the major players. id recommend getting the most updates version you can.
Read
June 19, 2023Read the entire thing for a summer class
March 26, 2024
A raíz de los sucesos recientes en la Franja de Gaza y alrededores quise aprender algo más sobre el conflicto palestino/israelí, del que no sabía mucho
Este libro es una excelente introducción a este conflicto y también es una historia general de Medio Oriente (tiene excelentes y cortos capítulos sobre la antigüedad y el periodo otomano).
Este libro es una excelente introducción a este conflicto y también es una historia general de Medio Oriente (tiene excelentes y cortos capítulos sobre la antigüedad y el periodo otomano).
August 23, 2014
This easy to read volume was the main reason I excelled at my required college course History of the Modern Middle East. It covers a timeline roughly from the start of the Ottoman Empire to today, and discusses the great political and cultural upheavals of this huge swath of lands that forged the volatile region we know today.
I am glad I read this book and took the course. It helped me understand the origins of the religious and cultural conflicts that engulf the region today. It also shed light on why there is animosity for the West, and part of it dates back to the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire after World War I.
The Middle East is insufficiently covered in U.S. schools. It is such a shame, for many Americans do not understand the culture yet we try and act as a broker of peace. Perhaps, if our leaders understood the root cause of the conflicts by studying the history of the area, perhaps we could be a viable honest broker.
I am glad I read this book and took the course. It helped me understand the origins of the religious and cultural conflicts that engulf the region today. It also shed light on why there is animosity for the West, and part of it dates back to the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire after World War I.
The Middle East is insufficiently covered in U.S. schools. It is such a shame, for many Americans do not understand the culture yet we try and act as a broker of peace. Perhaps, if our leaders understood the root cause of the conflicts by studying the history of the area, perhaps we could be a viable honest broker.
February 7, 2008
This is great for getting some perspective on the Middle East. I picked it up because I am tired of the News Media's portrayal and wanted a better understanding of our context over there. Great place to start!
February 18, 2008
I was just talking this morning with a friend about the French and the English making the modern Middle East. Who had a more disastorous run of colonialism through these invented countries? Read the history and decide for yourself.
April 24, 2011
It took nearly 3 months to slog through this dense tome of a difficult subject. Given recent events in the Middle East, it was a good investment of my time. I have a better understanding of how the West sowed the seeds of the current events.
February 24, 2025
Read parts of it for my history class. Hard to give it a review since I didn’t read the whole thing, and also because it covers the history of a massive geographic region over two hundred or so years. Pretty decent as a starting point but for profound insights you’d be better served elsewhere.
April 10, 2008
a concise entrance into the history of the middle east beginning with the eighteenth century.
April 12, 2008
It's a textbook and so it reads like one. Great for those who are interested in that geographical region and how they came to be as they are.
January 11, 2016
Ready for that exam boyy
October 15, 2016
Read it as a part of my History: Middle East course last semester. For a history book, which can be dry to read, this one was highly enjoyable and finely structured.
July 7, 2022
Como un overview empezando casi de zero me parecio un libro fabuloso, aprendi muchisimo que ya se me va olvidando desde como comenzo islam y como los paises que existen ahora han sido shaped por los poderes europeos ya desde la era de los ottoman, wue la verdad hicieron tanto para establecer orden y unir a gente en sus respectovas provincias. Y que a lo largo iba el libro menos y mnoe sme extraña las opiniones de la gente alla hacia los poderes europeos, porque desde como hicieron las fonteras ya crearon tanton problemas como en Iraq que dicieron quitarles casi todo el aceso al mar para restringir su poder y finalmente llevo hasta el gulf war y la invasion. Tambien por ejemplo palestina y como fue la influecia de un hombre en el reino unido que causo la creacion de israel y el support de Britain y mas tarde us dandose de ciegos jacia el maltrato de los Palestinians a quien quitan las tierras y echan de sus propias casas. Tambien el principio de egipto y nasser eso era mu cool despues del ottoman empire que iba desde algeria hasta grecia y siria y los poderes de hace antiguedades de en lo que hoy es iran y la infinitud de problemas y la influencia del islam creciendo ultimamente porque los partidos de izquierdas se prohibieron en tantos paises alla que el unico origen de protesta hacia los regimens viene de la iglesia, con la excepcion de iran donde el secularisation es la mayor resouesta. Tambien como la cantidad de oil wealth afecto a naciones y fue la fundacion de tantos paises como kuwait. Y como lospoderes europeos mas que nada les importa el petroleo ycom enseñan la hipocrasia haciendose amig3te con saudi por ejemplo y luego tanto para quitar al de iraq sin planear el despues y dejar tantas vidas empeoradaso perdidas. Tambien el origen de tantos regimens autocraticos vienen de las revoluciones o la manera en la que los colonizadores dejaron sus paises sin un pñan democratico que de verdad representara a la poblacion. Y muchos de estas organizaciones puestas como terroritas xomo hamas o hezbollah que salieron de la resistencia a la opresion de grupos particulares. Vamos que me gusto mucho aprender la respuesta a tantas dudas e ignorancias que tenia de la region. Y ta,bien me gusto especialmente el ver las sociedades mas antiguas en el ottoman en turquia y como diferentes leis y rulers y decisiones de ellos afectzdon tan greatly a tanta gente
May 3, 2019
This history does as the title promises, focusing more on the modern period of the Middle East, especially from the Ottoman Empire through 2015. The book covers the rise of ISIS but was written before the complete downfall of ISIS. It includes the Arab Spring of 2011, which Cleveland prefers to call the "Arab Uprisings." It includes balanced discussions of areas from Turkey to Iran to the Arabian Peninsula to Egypt. It does not include neighboring countries such as the Sudan, North Africa or Afghanistan in the discussion, except where events there affect the Middle East proper, such as the Egyptian war in Sudan, the harboring of Osama bin Laden by the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Arab uprisings that began in Tunisia and led to the downfall of Libya's dictator, too.
The book gives much attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is appropriate, as well as thorough coverage of the Kurdish problem of being a people without a homeland.
Perhaps due to his focus on the modern period, Cleveland passes over the Crusades with barely a mention, which I found peculiar, since modern Arabs like Osama bin Laden referred to Christians as the "Crusaders."
While Cleveland strives to present a balanced report of both the positive and negative traits of each people and each personality, he appears to have certain biases. He clearly is sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians verses the Jews, and is favorable to the Muslim worldview (for example, he blames Islam's low view of women on the influences of the cultures neighboring the Arabs, and refers to the Muslim Brotherhood as "moderate"). Nevertheless, he does a good job of explaining the various sectarian and ethnic groups, such as the Sunni and Shi'a, and minority groups like Arab Christians, Assyrians, Yazidis, Druze, Alawites, etc.
The book gives much attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is appropriate, as well as thorough coverage of the Kurdish problem of being a people without a homeland.
Perhaps due to his focus on the modern period, Cleveland passes over the Crusades with barely a mention, which I found peculiar, since modern Arabs like Osama bin Laden referred to Christians as the "Crusaders."
While Cleveland strives to present a balanced report of both the positive and negative traits of each people and each personality, he appears to have certain biases. He clearly is sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians verses the Jews, and is favorable to the Muslim worldview (for example, he blames Islam's low view of women on the influences of the cultures neighboring the Arabs, and refers to the Muslim Brotherhood as "moderate"). Nevertheless, he does a good job of explaining the various sectarian and ethnic groups, such as the Sunni and Shi'a, and minority groups like Arab Christians, Assyrians, Yazidis, Druze, Alawites, etc.
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