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Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach
Ideas, Dan Sperber argues, may be contagious. They may invade whole populations. In the process, the people, their environment, and the ideas themselves are being transformed. To explain culture is to describe the causes and the effects of this contagion of ideas. This book will be read by all those with an interest in the impact of the cognitive revolution on our understanding of culture.
184 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1996
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About the author
Dan Sperber
27 books64 followersDan Sperber is a French social and cognitive scientist. His most influential work has been in the fields of cognitive anthropology and linguistic pragmatics: developing, with British psychologist Deirdre Wilson, relevance theory in the latter; and an approach to cultural evolution known as the 'epidemiology of representations' in the former. Sperber currently holds the positions of Directeur de Recherche émérite at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and Director of the International Cognition and Culture Institute.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 9 reviews
April 6, 2022
This book makes an interesting contribution to cultural anthropology and evolutionary psychology. From my read, this is sort of an alternative to Dennett's theory of mind that makes a couple distinctions metaphysically from his. Foremost, Sperber denies that we have any sort of objective access to minds. Where Dennett would argue we can reduce minds to what its affiliated matter does, Sperber argues our reference to minds is at best an indirect reference.
It is also interesting to compare this with Bruno Latour. Sperber has different objectives than Latour, but the practical outcomes of earlier arguments in the book seem to situate well with Actor-Network Theory despite two different goals in explanation. Latour is interested in action where Sperber is interested in limitations of naturalizing and explaining cognition.
My main critique is that, while Sperber's writing can be commendably approachable and accessible, it often seems to lean on very simplistic arguments which are easy to disagree with. That is, it does not seem very hard to come up with counter-examples to the logic he applies. This might be due to the fact that his simple writing style would be interrupted by more pedantic developments of arguments, and less because they are wrong. I'm just left with questions at times on whether I should agree or not. For example he argues in respect to other disciplines "Anthropology is free of ontological constraints," without much explanation. I'm not sure I agree with that, for anthropology or in respect to other disciplines. Certainly many disciplines are ontologically constrained, but many are not. He often makes assumptions like this throughout the book which at times can be critical to the argument, and I think it cheapens his argument.
As a final note with respect to my interest in this work, while Sperber is opposed to memetics as it was explained by Dawkins and Dennett at the time, Sperber could be said to have forwarded an alternative memetic theory. In a way, I'm tempted to say this is moving towards justifying a more semiotic system of memetics. Memetics has been critiqued in the past (such as by Terrance Deacon) for simply being a lesser developed discussion of Peircian or Saussurian signs. Sperber could be interpreted as giving memetics a connection to Peircian semiotics, although he is explicitly opposed to memetic theory of the day, and never mentions semiotics. This seems like an alternative starting point that someone like Sara Cannizzaro could have referred to to develop her notion of meme. But likewise, she didn't reference Sperber from what I remember.
It is also interesting to compare this with Bruno Latour. Sperber has different objectives than Latour, but the practical outcomes of earlier arguments in the book seem to situate well with Actor-Network Theory despite two different goals in explanation. Latour is interested in action where Sperber is interested in limitations of naturalizing and explaining cognition.
My main critique is that, while Sperber's writing can be commendably approachable and accessible, it often seems to lean on very simplistic arguments which are easy to disagree with. That is, it does not seem very hard to come up with counter-examples to the logic he applies. This might be due to the fact that his simple writing style would be interrupted by more pedantic developments of arguments, and less because they are wrong. I'm just left with questions at times on whether I should agree or not. For example he argues in respect to other disciplines "Anthropology is free of ontological constraints," without much explanation. I'm not sure I agree with that, for anthropology or in respect to other disciplines. Certainly many disciplines are ontologically constrained, but many are not. He often makes assumptions like this throughout the book which at times can be critical to the argument, and I think it cheapens his argument.
As a final note with respect to my interest in this work, while Sperber is opposed to memetics as it was explained by Dawkins and Dennett at the time, Sperber could be said to have forwarded an alternative memetic theory. In a way, I'm tempted to say this is moving towards justifying a more semiotic system of memetics. Memetics has been critiqued in the past (such as by Terrance Deacon) for simply being a lesser developed discussion of Peircian or Saussurian signs. Sperber could be interpreted as giving memetics a connection to Peircian semiotics, although he is explicitly opposed to memetic theory of the day, and never mentions semiotics. This seems like an alternative starting point that someone like Sara Cannizzaro could have referred to to develop her notion of meme. But likewise, she didn't reference Sperber from what I remember.
October 5, 2017
Magnificently proposes a radical change on how we view culture. The fusion of biological and psychological understanding of why human beings are susceptible to ideas which they cannot find rational explanations to, is, in short, the enthusiastic aim of this book. This opens the door for much research that needs to be done in what concerns ideas as mere epidemics, out there for the reach, and in perpetual competition with one another for the cognitive attention of our minds. In my humble opinion, this is the most promising application of evolutionary thought on the mind-culture paradigm I have ever encountered.
March 17, 2013
Il titolo italiano di questo libro, oramai fuori catalogo, è indubbiamente molto più evocativo dell'originale inglese "Explaining Culture" (che a sua volta mi pare un po' esagerato); peccato che le belle promesse non vengano poi rispettate dalla pratica.
Il guaio di base del libro non è tanto la sua relativa obsolescenza (mi sa che questi quindici anni abbiano portato molte nuove idee) quanto la sua disomogeneità: è infatti una collezione di brevi saggi che Sperber ha preparato per varie occasioni, quindi con ripetizioni e temi trattati solo in parte. Il concetto principe del libro è quello di rappresentazione, che è grosso modo l'idea che si fanno di un concetto le singole persone. Il concetto di meme si traduce quindi nel "contagio" delle rappresentazioni, contagio che può essere epidemico (un meme vero e proprio, qualcosa cioè che cresce di colpo per sgonfiarsi anche abbastanza in fretta) oppure endemico, e qui si va più verso i riti veri e propri. L'idea è interessante, e aiuterebbe anche a spiegare alcuni fatti come le "mutazioni" delle rappresentazioni e l'esistenza di rappresentazioni simili ma non identiche tra le varie persone: peccato che però sia rimasta appesa un po' in sospeso, probabilmente perché un mini-saggio non era sufficiente per sviscerare bene la tesi.
In definitiva, qualche utile spunto (ben tradotto da Gloria Origgi) ma nulla più.
Il guaio di base del libro non è tanto la sua relativa obsolescenza (mi sa che questi quindici anni abbiano portato molte nuove idee) quanto la sua disomogeneità: è infatti una collezione di brevi saggi che Sperber ha preparato per varie occasioni, quindi con ripetizioni e temi trattati solo in parte. Il concetto principe del libro è quello di rappresentazione, che è grosso modo l'idea che si fanno di un concetto le singole persone. Il concetto di meme si traduce quindi nel "contagio" delle rappresentazioni, contagio che può essere epidemico (un meme vero e proprio, qualcosa cioè che cresce di colpo per sgonfiarsi anche abbastanza in fretta) oppure endemico, e qui si va più verso i riti veri e propri. L'idea è interessante, e aiuterebbe anche a spiegare alcuni fatti come le "mutazioni" delle rappresentazioni e l'esistenza di rappresentazioni simili ma non identiche tra le varie persone: peccato che però sia rimasta appesa un po' in sospeso, probabilmente perché un mini-saggio non era sufficiente per sviscerare bene la tesi.
In definitiva, qualche utile spunto (ben tradotto da Gloria Origgi) ma nulla più.
December 22, 2012
Very French.
August 7, 2018
Dan Sperber is the "evolutionary psychologist" you really want to like; he rose to prominence with his neo-Gricean work in "pragmatics" with Dierdre Wilson, Relevance, and he is back on the agenda with his new book with Hugo Mercier, The Enigma of Reason (which I haven't read yet). I found Explaining Culture, from the mid-90s, surprisingly poor when I read it a decade or so ago; it is more or less an unintentional reductio of the still-extant dreams of "memetics".
Now, I have spent about as much time thinking about the "epidemiology of representations" as anybody, but it is actually stricto sensu impossible to harness the explanatory power of evolution's "modern synthesis" for social science. Human beings are evolved creatures, and evolution continues in the animal kingdom, but the thought that human culture "turbocharges" evolution is really the purest idealism and a terrible way to think about culture's role in human life (this is why we are treated to the spectacle of Richard Dawkins getting weepy about the liturgy, for example).
"Culture is what is left over after you have forgotten all you have definitely set out to learn”, John Cowper Powys famously said, and the point of cultural symbols as being "synoptic" representations of the entire sweep of a particular issue is well-taken; the idea that a "meme" embedded in a transitory but agreeably antagonistic social network is the "truth" of the cultural symbol falsifies both network and symbol. Sperber's own particular take on this mis-take is "nothing to write home about". (Perhaps we shall read the new work and be edified, but you can skip this one.)
Now, I have spent about as much time thinking about the "epidemiology of representations" as anybody, but it is actually stricto sensu impossible to harness the explanatory power of evolution's "modern synthesis" for social science. Human beings are evolved creatures, and evolution continues in the animal kingdom, but the thought that human culture "turbocharges" evolution is really the purest idealism and a terrible way to think about culture's role in human life (this is why we are treated to the spectacle of Richard Dawkins getting weepy about the liturgy, for example).
"Culture is what is left over after you have forgotten all you have definitely set out to learn”, John Cowper Powys famously said, and the point of cultural symbols as being "synoptic" representations of the entire sweep of a particular issue is well-taken; the idea that a "meme" embedded in a transitory but agreeably antagonistic social network is the "truth" of the cultural symbol falsifies both network and symbol. Sperber's own particular take on this mis-take is "nothing to write home about". (Perhaps we shall read the new work and be edified, but you can skip this one.)
January 10, 2020
Honestly quite mind-blowing. Like, to the point that I literally feel obligated to include a footnote in everything I write now about how "ideology" does not exist on some separate realm from the material. That it's an emergent property of the material world in a well-defined sense, given in this book. 100% game changer :3
May 13, 2017
De mis favoritos. Esto es lo que a mí me gustaría hacer, ojalá la vida me dé licencia.
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October 3, 2021Amazing for getting rid of pseudo-scientific Lamarkian view of culture and culture change.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 9 reviews