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رهينة خميني
Libro usado en buenas condiciones, por su antiguedad podria contener señales normales de uso
- GenresPolitics
130 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1980
14 people are currently reading
239 people want to read
About the author
Robert Dreyfuss
12 books27 followersFor more than fifteen years, I have worked as an independent journalist who specializes in magazine features, profiles, and investigative stories in the areas of politics and national security. In 2001, I was profiled as a leading investigative journalist by the Columbia Journalism Review, and two of my articles have won awards from The Washington Monthly. In 2003, I was awarded Project Censored’s first prize for a story on the role of oil in U.S. policy toward Iraq. I have appeared on scores of radio and television talk shows, including Hannity and Colmes on Fox News, C-Span, CNBC, MSNBC, Court TV, and, on National Public Radio, The Diane Rehm Show and Public Interest with Kojo Nnamdi, and Pacifica's Democracy Now! with Amy Goodman.
Based in Alexandria, Va., I have been writing for Rolling Stone for at least a decade, and currently I cover national security for Rolling Stone’s National Affairs section. I’m a contributing editor at The Nation, a contributing writer at Mother Jones, and a senior correspondent for The American Prospect. My articles have also appeared in The Washington Monthly, The New Republic, Newsday, Worth, California Lawyer, The Texas Observer, E, In These Times, The Detroit Metro Times, Public Citizen, Extra!, and, in Japan, in Esquire, Foresight and Nikkei Business.
Perhaps I am best known for what I consider to be ground-breaking stories about the war in Iraq, the war on terrorism, and post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy. In 2002, I wrote the first significant profile of Ahmed Chalabi by a journalist, for The American Prospect. Also in 2002, I also wrote the first analysis of the war between the Pentagon and the CIA over policy toward Iraq, which included the first important account of the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans. Other stories in The American Prospect included detailed accounts of neoconservative war plans for the broader Middle East. In 2004, I co-authored what is still the most complete account of the work of the Office of Special Plans in manufacturing misleading or false intelligence about Iraq, for Mother Jones, entitled “The Lie Factory.”
Before 9/11, I wrote extensively about intelligence issues, including pieces about post-Cold War excursions by the CIA into economic espionage, about the CIA’s nonofficial cover (NOC) program, and about lobbying by U.S. defense and intelligence contractors over the annual secret intelligence budget.
Among my many other pieces, I’ve profiled organizations, including the Democratic Leadership Council, the Center for American Progress, the National Rifle Association, the NAACP, the Human Rights Campaign, and Handgun Control. I’ve profiled Vermont Governor Howard Dean, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, House Majority Whip Tom DeLay, conservative activist Grover Norquist, House Ways & Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas, Senator John McCain, and, in 1999, Texas Governor George W. Bush. One of my most important pieces was the result of a weeks-long visit to Vietnam in 1999, where I wrote about the effects of Agent Orange dioxin in Vietnam since the 1970s. My stories on the privatization of Social Security and the politics of Medicare and Medical Savings Accounts have been widely cited.
I’m a member of the American Society of Journalists and Authors (ASJA) and Investigative Reporters and Editors (IRE). I graduated from Columbia University.
Based in Alexandria, Va., I have been writing for Rolling Stone for at least a decade, and currently I cover national security for Rolling Stone’s National Affairs section. I’m a contributing editor at The Nation, a contributing writer at Mother Jones, and a senior correspondent for The American Prospect. My articles have also appeared in The Washington Monthly, The New Republic, Newsday, Worth, California Lawyer, The Texas Observer, E, In These Times, The Detroit Metro Times, Public Citizen, Extra!, and, in Japan, in Esquire, Foresight and Nikkei Business.
Perhaps I am best known for what I consider to be ground-breaking stories about the war in Iraq, the war on terrorism, and post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy. In 2002, I wrote the first significant profile of Ahmed Chalabi by a journalist, for The American Prospect. Also in 2002, I also wrote the first analysis of the war between the Pentagon and the CIA over policy toward Iraq, which included the first important account of the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans. Other stories in The American Prospect included detailed accounts of neoconservative war plans for the broader Middle East. In 2004, I co-authored what is still the most complete account of the work of the Office of Special Plans in manufacturing misleading or false intelligence about Iraq, for Mother Jones, entitled “The Lie Factory.”
Before 9/11, I wrote extensively about intelligence issues, including pieces about post-Cold War excursions by the CIA into economic espionage, about the CIA’s nonofficial cover (NOC) program, and about lobbying by U.S. defense and intelligence contractors over the annual secret intelligence budget.
Among my many other pieces, I’ve profiled organizations, including the Democratic Leadership Council, the Center for American Progress, the National Rifle Association, the NAACP, the Human Rights Campaign, and Handgun Control. I’ve profiled Vermont Governor Howard Dean, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, House Majority Whip Tom DeLay, conservative activist Grover Norquist, House Ways & Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas, Senator John McCain, and, in 1999, Texas Governor George W. Bush. One of my most important pieces was the result of a weeks-long visit to Vietnam in 1999, where I wrote about the effects of Agent Orange dioxin in Vietnam since the 1970s. My stories on the privatization of Social Security and the politics of Medicare and Medical Savings Accounts have been widely cited.
I’m a member of the American Society of Journalists and Authors (ASJA) and Investigative Reporters and Editors (IRE). I graduated from Columbia University.
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November 10, 2013
نُشر الكتاب بعد سنة من انقلاب الخميني على حكم الشاه فيما سمي بالثورة الإسلامية، ويدّعي المؤلف -وهو عنصر مخابرات أميركي- أنه يهدف من خلاله إلى توعية الأميركيين بالمؤامرة التي حاكتها إدارة كارتر لدعم الخميني.
هناك حشد هائل لمعلومات وتسريبات لا يمكن التحقق من صحتها، لكن السياق يثير شكوكا كثيرة بشأن مصداقيتها.
انعدام الترتيب وتفاوت الأسلوب وتناقض المعلومات، هي كلها أدلة تثير الشكوك بشأن مرجعية الكاتب، فربما لا يكون كاتبا واحدا على الأقل.
من المآخذ الكبرى أنه يخلط بين كل الحركات الإسلامية، بكل ما فيها من تناقضات وتنافر وحتى عداء، فالإخوان وحزب الله والخميني وحركة أمل والوهابية والصوفية هم كلهم في نظره القاصر "أصولية إسلامية"، وهم يسعون لاستعادة العبادة الوثنية لآلهة العرب التي قضى عليها النبي! كما أن دراسته للتاريخ الإسلامي لا ترقى لمقارنتها بأي قراءة استشراقية مهما كانت نواياها، بل هي مجرد محاولة تشويش صحفي تستغل جهل القارئ الغربي بالإسلام وتاريخه.
لذا لا يمكن الاعتماد على الكتاب في شيء، لكن قد يستأنس به في بعض ما يتعلق بعلاقة الخميني وجماعته بواشنطن.
هناك حشد هائل لمعلومات وتسريبات لا يمكن التحقق من صحتها، لكن السياق يثير شكوكا كثيرة بشأن مصداقيتها.
انعدام الترتيب وتفاوت الأسلوب وتناقض المعلومات، هي كلها أدلة تثير الشكوك بشأن مرجعية الكاتب، فربما لا يكون كاتبا واحدا على الأقل.
من المآخذ الكبرى أنه يخلط بين كل الحركات الإسلامية، بكل ما فيها من تناقضات وتنافر وحتى عداء، فالإخوان وحزب الله والخميني وحركة أمل والوهابية والصوفية هم كلهم في نظره القاصر "أصولية إسلامية"، وهم يسعون لاستعادة العبادة الوثنية لآلهة العرب التي قضى عليها النبي! كما أن دراسته للتاريخ الإسلامي لا ترقى لمقارنتها بأي قراءة استشراقية مهما كانت نواياها، بل هي مجرد محاولة تشويش صحفي تستغل جهل القارئ الغربي بالإسلام وتاريخه.
لذا لا يمكن الاعتماد على الكتاب في شيء، لكن قد يستأنس به في بعض ما يتعلق بعلاقة الخميني وجماعته بواشنطن.
February 9, 2024
تقييم الكتاب صفر وليس نجمة
من اسوأ ما قرأت، كتاب مبني على نظرية المؤامرة، الكاتب منغمس بالنظرية ويؤمن بوجود حكومة خفية - لا يعرفها الا هو والراسخون بالمؤامرة- تسيطر على العالم
الهوامش التي اضافها المترجم كارثية، وتظهر حقده وجهله الواضحين بشكل غير طبيعي
من اسوأ ما قرأت، كتاب مبني على نظرية المؤامرة، الكاتب منغمس بالنظرية ويؤمن بوجود حكومة خفية - لا يعرفها الا هو والراسخون بالمؤامرة- تسيطر على العالم
الهوامش التي اضافها المترجم كارثية، وتظهر حقده وجهله الواضحين بشكل غير طبيعي
December 7, 2025
Exposing the Anglo-American orchestration behind the Iranian Revolution and its long-term geopolitical exploitation.
“Hostage to Khomeini” is not merely a historical narrative; it is an indictment of the hidden strategies of Anglo-American elites in the Middle East. Dreyfuss argues that the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was not spontaneous but carefully orchestrated to strip Iran of its modernization and industrial capacity, leaving it politically fragmented and strategically vulnerable.
Khomeini was deliberately cultivated as a controllable asset, amplified by the BBC Persian Service, London-based exile networks, and MI5/6 grown Muslim Brotherhood channels, not even speaking about his true father origins while U.S. actors, including the Council on Foreign Relations, Aspen Institute, Trilateral Commission, and Brzezinski-linked factions in the Carter administration, shaped the strategic context.
The Shah’s fall was not an accident but a convergence of elite objectives: suppressing nationalist, pro-development forces, justifying massive U.S. military expansion, and establishing long-term control over the Persian Gulf.
The 444-day U.S. embassy hostage crisis was carefully staged, not an act of spontaneous anti-Americanism, designed to discredit secular Iranian factions, manipulate the 1980 U.S. presidential election, and cement permanent U.S.–Iranian enmity. City of London financiers, MI6 Persian specialists, and Rockefeller-linked energy interests all profited from the chaos, while Israel gained a controlled regional adversary capable of checking Arab nationalism and Iraq. The revolution created a fractured, desperate Iran, ideal for covert exploitation by CIA, Mossad, and MI6 operatives, who could maintain secret channels despite public hostility.
As the Iran–Iraq War erupted, Iran’s urgent need for weapons created a deniable black market environment that enabled the Iran-Contra operation, with Israel and MI6 providing logistical support and intermediaries. The clerical regime, divided into factions, became a willing partner in clandestine deals, exchanging weapons for cash that ultimately funded the Contras while Western intelligence maintained plausible deniability. The revolution thus directly enabled Iran-Contra, providing both operational flexibility and strategic cover for one of the most audacious Cold War operations.
Dreyfuss emphasizes that Islamic fundamentalism was not organic but deliberately cultivated by British and American elites to weaken nationalist movements, fragment the Middle East, and justify long-term intervention. Khomeini’s rise was the result of decades of influence, from British Arabists shaping Islamist networks to U.S. Cold War strategists exploiting regional fractures. The resulting theocracy became a geopolitical instrument, generating permanent crisis while serving elite strategic and financial interests.
The revolution also created a psychological and political environment that justified a U.S. military buildup across the Gulf. The hostage crisis, in this context, functioned as a theater of power, manipulating both domestic American politics and international perceptions. By discrediting secular forces, Khomeini’s regime consolidated internal power, making the clerical state both unpredictable and controllable in the eyes of Western intelligence. Israel exploited the situation by keeping Iran just strong enough to counter Iraq while preventing it from becoming a dominant regional power.
The Shah’s modernization projects—nuclear energy, industrialization, and regional diplomacy—had threatened multiple Western and, especially, Israeli interests, making his removal a strategic priority.
MI6 Persian specialists, using decades of cultivated networks, provided intelligence, brokered contacts, and logistical support for covert operations in Iran, amplifying Khomeini’s influence while keeping chaos manageable. Rockefeller oil and energy interests benefited from the disruption, as Iran’s oil market became more pliable, and U.S.-aligned energy corporations maintained leverage over the region.
The Trilateral Commission and Brzezinski’s circle saw the revolution as an opportunity to implement the “Arc of Crisis,” a region-wide instability strategy to check Soviet influence, suppress secular Arab nationalism, and promote a controllable Islamic fundamentalist order. By deliberately fostering factionalism, sectarianism, and chaos,
Western elites ensured Iran could never become an independent industrial and military power. The hostage crisis and post-revolution environment created a scenario in which covert operations like Iran-Contra could thrive, with weapons flowing to Iran and funds secretly reaching U.S.-backed Contra forces in Central America.
Israel’s Mossad and its assets on the ground acted as a bridge, facilitating logistics, intelligence, and communication between U.S. and Iranian factions, ensuring that operations remained deniable yet effective. The revolution’s aftermath entrenched permanent instability in the Persian Gulf, giving the U.S., U.K., and Israel leverage over regional outcomes for decades.
Dreyfuss demonstrates that the apparent “anti-Western” stance of Khomeini’s regime was itself a carefully orchestrated tool, designed to both terrify the secular Iranian opposition and give Western powers a pretext for permanent engagement.
The intertwining of City of London financiers, MI6, Rockefeller energy interests, and Israeli intelligence illustrates a long-term elite strategy, in which regional chaos is not a byproduct but the objective. By fragmenting Iran and suppressing nationalist, development-oriented leadership, Western actors secured control over energy, regional power balances, and strategic military options.
The clerical regime’s dependence on arms, cash, and international channels created a vulnerability that intelligence services could exploit repeatedly. Iran-Contra, in this sense, was the natural extension of a decades-long plan: the revolution created the conditions, the war created the urgency, and covert channels allowed Western powers to extract strategic advantage while publicly denouncing their partners.
Even if one questions the precise level of coordination, the convergence of elite financial, intelligence, and political interests makes the outcome predictable. Khomeini’s rise, the hostage crisis, the Iran–Iraq War, and subsequent covert operations show a clear pattern: revolutions can be engineered, chaos can be weaponized, and fundamentalism can be a controlled instrument of power.
The result was exactly what Anglo-American elites sought—a fractured Iran, a militarized Gulf, perpetual regional instability, and an environment in which covert operations like Iran-Contra could flourish undetected. “Hostage to Khomeini” exposes how strategic chaos was cultivated deliberately, turning a nation into both a public enemy and a private asset.
The Iranian Revolution, far from being an organic popular uprising, was a geopolitical chess move, executed to serve centuries-old elite interests. Dreyfuss’ work lays bare the networks, motivations, and outcomes, demonstrating that Khomeini’s regime, the hostage crisis, and the arms-for-Contras operations were all part of a continuum of engineered instability.
Once Iran collapsed into internal chaos and purges, it became ripe for clandestine exploitation. The Iran–Iraq War intensified this vulnerability, draining Iran’s arsenals and making it desperate for weapons, spare parts, and diplomatic back‑channels.
This created the perfect operational environment for the Iran‑Contra pipeline, where Iran’s isolation could be monetized and weaponized at the same time. Israel acted as the bridge between Washington and Tehran, supplying aging U.S. equipment while maintaining plausible deniability for both sides. MI6 facilitated intelligence channels and logistical safe zones in Europe, smoothing the technical aspects of the trade.
The CIA used the clerical regime’s internal rivalries to negotiate deals with factions eager for survival rather than ideology, proving how easily “Death to America” could flip into “Cash for Missiles” when convenient.
The revolution didn’t just enable Iran‑Contra—it was the precondition for it. Without the engineered collapse of the Shah’s system, Iran would never have been cut off from global arms markets, nor would it have been dependent on covert channels. The hostage crisis created exactly the kind of public hostility that forced U.S. and Iranian communication underground, giving intelligence agencies total control over the relationship.
When McFarlane flew into Tehran with a Bible and a cake shaped like a key, he wasn’t opening a new channel—he was formalizing the one created through the revolution. The Contras, fighting a proxy war in Central America, became the ultimate beneficiaries of a Middle Eastern catastrophe that had been set in motion years earlier. Every missile that arrived in Iran quietly funded anti‑Sandinista warfare thousands of kilometers away.
Dreyfuss’ analysis implies that once the clerical state was installed, Iran became a managed adversary, useful for energy markets, regional balancing, and covert financing.
The City of London financiers benefited from predictable instability that kept oil markets volatile yet controllable. Washington benefited from a long-term justification for militarizing the Gulf. Israel benefited from a fragmented Iran that could counter Iraq without ever becoming strong enough to break regional parity. And intelligence agencies benefited from a sanctioned state that required black‑market channels for survival, giving them both leverage and profit.
Iran‑Contra wasn’t an aberration—it was the logical continuation of the 1979 operation. The revolution created the vacuum, the war created the urgency, and the intelligence networks created the channels.
The clerical regime’s public rhetoric kept the masses inflamed while private deals via BCCI (laundromat)with the CIA, Mossad, and MI6 proved that the real game was geopolitical leverage, not ideology. By the mid‑1980s, the very forces that toppled the Shah were now using the Islamic Republic as a covert asset, turning chaos into cash and war into opportunity.
In the end, Hostage to Khomeini shows that the revolution, the hostage crisis, and Iran‑Contra form a single chain of events—a managed transition from one controllable system to another.
The result was a permanently weakened and internally controlled Iran, an empowered security apparatus across the West, and a network of covert operations that fed on the instability they themselves created.
The disaster wasn’t accidental; it was engineered, harvested, and recycled into the next operation.
Dreyfuss forces the reader to see the revolution not as a rupture but as a handover, where a modernizing nation was handed to clerics, weaponized by intelligence services, and exploited for decades in the shadow economy of geopolitical power.
“Hostage to Khomeini” is not merely a historical narrative; it is an indictment of the hidden strategies of Anglo-American elites in the Middle East. Dreyfuss argues that the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was not spontaneous but carefully orchestrated to strip Iran of its modernization and industrial capacity, leaving it politically fragmented and strategically vulnerable.
Khomeini was deliberately cultivated as a controllable asset, amplified by the BBC Persian Service, London-based exile networks, and MI5/6 grown Muslim Brotherhood channels, not even speaking about his true father origins while U.S. actors, including the Council on Foreign Relations, Aspen Institute, Trilateral Commission, and Brzezinski-linked factions in the Carter administration, shaped the strategic context.
The Shah’s fall was not an accident but a convergence of elite objectives: suppressing nationalist, pro-development forces, justifying massive U.S. military expansion, and establishing long-term control over the Persian Gulf.
The 444-day U.S. embassy hostage crisis was carefully staged, not an act of spontaneous anti-Americanism, designed to discredit secular Iranian factions, manipulate the 1980 U.S. presidential election, and cement permanent U.S.–Iranian enmity. City of London financiers, MI6 Persian specialists, and Rockefeller-linked energy interests all profited from the chaos, while Israel gained a controlled regional adversary capable of checking Arab nationalism and Iraq. The revolution created a fractured, desperate Iran, ideal for covert exploitation by CIA, Mossad, and MI6 operatives, who could maintain secret channels despite public hostility.
As the Iran–Iraq War erupted, Iran’s urgent need for weapons created a deniable black market environment that enabled the Iran-Contra operation, with Israel and MI6 providing logistical support and intermediaries. The clerical regime, divided into factions, became a willing partner in clandestine deals, exchanging weapons for cash that ultimately funded the Contras while Western intelligence maintained plausible deniability. The revolution thus directly enabled Iran-Contra, providing both operational flexibility and strategic cover for one of the most audacious Cold War operations.
Dreyfuss emphasizes that Islamic fundamentalism was not organic but deliberately cultivated by British and American elites to weaken nationalist movements, fragment the Middle East, and justify long-term intervention. Khomeini’s rise was the result of decades of influence, from British Arabists shaping Islamist networks to U.S. Cold War strategists exploiting regional fractures. The resulting theocracy became a geopolitical instrument, generating permanent crisis while serving elite strategic and financial interests.
The revolution also created a psychological and political environment that justified a U.S. military buildup across the Gulf. The hostage crisis, in this context, functioned as a theater of power, manipulating both domestic American politics and international perceptions. By discrediting secular forces, Khomeini’s regime consolidated internal power, making the clerical state both unpredictable and controllable in the eyes of Western intelligence. Israel exploited the situation by keeping Iran just strong enough to counter Iraq while preventing it from becoming a dominant regional power.
The Shah’s modernization projects—nuclear energy, industrialization, and regional diplomacy—had threatened multiple Western and, especially, Israeli interests, making his removal a strategic priority.
MI6 Persian specialists, using decades of cultivated networks, provided intelligence, brokered contacts, and logistical support for covert operations in Iran, amplifying Khomeini’s influence while keeping chaos manageable. Rockefeller oil and energy interests benefited from the disruption, as Iran’s oil market became more pliable, and U.S.-aligned energy corporations maintained leverage over the region.
The Trilateral Commission and Brzezinski’s circle saw the revolution as an opportunity to implement the “Arc of Crisis,” a region-wide instability strategy to check Soviet influence, suppress secular Arab nationalism, and promote a controllable Islamic fundamentalist order. By deliberately fostering factionalism, sectarianism, and chaos,
Western elites ensured Iran could never become an independent industrial and military power. The hostage crisis and post-revolution environment created a scenario in which covert operations like Iran-Contra could thrive, with weapons flowing to Iran and funds secretly reaching U.S.-backed Contra forces in Central America.
Israel’s Mossad and its assets on the ground acted as a bridge, facilitating logistics, intelligence, and communication between U.S. and Iranian factions, ensuring that operations remained deniable yet effective. The revolution’s aftermath entrenched permanent instability in the Persian Gulf, giving the U.S., U.K., and Israel leverage over regional outcomes for decades.
Dreyfuss demonstrates that the apparent “anti-Western” stance of Khomeini’s regime was itself a carefully orchestrated tool, designed to both terrify the secular Iranian opposition and give Western powers a pretext for permanent engagement.
The intertwining of City of London financiers, MI6, Rockefeller energy interests, and Israeli intelligence illustrates a long-term elite strategy, in which regional chaos is not a byproduct but the objective. By fragmenting Iran and suppressing nationalist, development-oriented leadership, Western actors secured control over energy, regional power balances, and strategic military options.
The clerical regime’s dependence on arms, cash, and international channels created a vulnerability that intelligence services could exploit repeatedly. Iran-Contra, in this sense, was the natural extension of a decades-long plan: the revolution created the conditions, the war created the urgency, and covert channels allowed Western powers to extract strategic advantage while publicly denouncing their partners.
Even if one questions the precise level of coordination, the convergence of elite financial, intelligence, and political interests makes the outcome predictable. Khomeini’s rise, the hostage crisis, the Iran–Iraq War, and subsequent covert operations show a clear pattern: revolutions can be engineered, chaos can be weaponized, and fundamentalism can be a controlled instrument of power.
The result was exactly what Anglo-American elites sought—a fractured Iran, a militarized Gulf, perpetual regional instability, and an environment in which covert operations like Iran-Contra could flourish undetected. “Hostage to Khomeini” exposes how strategic chaos was cultivated deliberately, turning a nation into both a public enemy and a private asset.
The Iranian Revolution, far from being an organic popular uprising, was a geopolitical chess move, executed to serve centuries-old elite interests. Dreyfuss’ work lays bare the networks, motivations, and outcomes, demonstrating that Khomeini’s regime, the hostage crisis, and the arms-for-Contras operations were all part of a continuum of engineered instability.
Once Iran collapsed into internal chaos and purges, it became ripe for clandestine exploitation. The Iran–Iraq War intensified this vulnerability, draining Iran’s arsenals and making it desperate for weapons, spare parts, and diplomatic back‑channels.
This created the perfect operational environment for the Iran‑Contra pipeline, where Iran’s isolation could be monetized and weaponized at the same time. Israel acted as the bridge between Washington and Tehran, supplying aging U.S. equipment while maintaining plausible deniability for both sides. MI6 facilitated intelligence channels and logistical safe zones in Europe, smoothing the technical aspects of the trade.
The CIA used the clerical regime’s internal rivalries to negotiate deals with factions eager for survival rather than ideology, proving how easily “Death to America” could flip into “Cash for Missiles” when convenient.
The revolution didn’t just enable Iran‑Contra—it was the precondition for it. Without the engineered collapse of the Shah’s system, Iran would never have been cut off from global arms markets, nor would it have been dependent on covert channels. The hostage crisis created exactly the kind of public hostility that forced U.S. and Iranian communication underground, giving intelligence agencies total control over the relationship.
When McFarlane flew into Tehran with a Bible and a cake shaped like a key, he wasn’t opening a new channel—he was formalizing the one created through the revolution. The Contras, fighting a proxy war in Central America, became the ultimate beneficiaries of a Middle Eastern catastrophe that had been set in motion years earlier. Every missile that arrived in Iran quietly funded anti‑Sandinista warfare thousands of kilometers away.
Dreyfuss’ analysis implies that once the clerical state was installed, Iran became a managed adversary, useful for energy markets, regional balancing, and covert financing.
The City of London financiers benefited from predictable instability that kept oil markets volatile yet controllable. Washington benefited from a long-term justification for militarizing the Gulf. Israel benefited from a fragmented Iran that could counter Iraq without ever becoming strong enough to break regional parity. And intelligence agencies benefited from a sanctioned state that required black‑market channels for survival, giving them both leverage and profit.
Iran‑Contra wasn’t an aberration—it was the logical continuation of the 1979 operation. The revolution created the vacuum, the war created the urgency, and the intelligence networks created the channels.
The clerical regime’s public rhetoric kept the masses inflamed while private deals via BCCI (laundromat)with the CIA, Mossad, and MI6 proved that the real game was geopolitical leverage, not ideology. By the mid‑1980s, the very forces that toppled the Shah were now using the Islamic Republic as a covert asset, turning chaos into cash and war into opportunity.
In the end, Hostage to Khomeini shows that the revolution, the hostage crisis, and Iran‑Contra form a single chain of events—a managed transition from one controllable system to another.
The result was a permanently weakened and internally controlled Iran, an empowered security apparatus across the West, and a network of covert operations that fed on the instability they themselves created.
The disaster wasn’t accidental; it was engineered, harvested, and recycled into the next operation.
Dreyfuss forces the reader to see the revolution not as a rupture but as a handover, where a modernizing nation was handed to clerics, weaponized by intelligence services, and exploited for decades in the shadow economy of geopolitical power.
February 21, 2014
رهينة بقبضة الخمينى من أهم الكتب التى قرأتها شخصيا
يهتم الكتاب بشرح ملا بسات الثورة الأيرانية بداية من التمهيد لها عبر العديد من أجهزة المخابرات الغربية حتى وضع الخمينى على رأسها
يركز جزء كبير من الكتاب على الدور المهم الذى لعبه الاخوان المسلمين فى الثورة الأيرانية بالتعاون مع جهازى المخابرات الأمريكى والأنجليزى
يوجه بعض الاتهامات للصوفية ومؤسسيها عن دعمهم لأفكار تدعو للتخلف والرجعية
يظهر من قراءة نقد الكاتب للصوفية بعدم معرفة دقيقة بها فيوجه أليها أنتقادات يقوم الفكر الصوفى نفسه بأنتقادها
يتبنى الكتاب وجهة نظر معادية لعدد من الشخصيات الأسلامية المعروفة مثل الأمام الغزالى وجمال الدين الأفغانى ومحمد عبده وقد يكون جانبه الصواب فيها
يتضح فى بعض فقرات الكتاب عدم معرفة الكاتب الدقيقة بالأسلام فى أنتقاده لبعض التصرفات أو الأقوال التى لا يرى فيه المسلم وجه للأنتقاد
يهتم الكتاب بشرح ملا بسات الثورة الأيرانية بداية من التمهيد لها عبر العديد من أجهزة المخابرات الغربية حتى وضع الخمينى على رأسها
يركز جزء كبير من الكتاب على الدور المهم الذى لعبه الاخوان المسلمين فى الثورة الأيرانية بالتعاون مع جهازى المخابرات الأمريكى والأنجليزى
يوجه بعض الاتهامات للصوفية ومؤسسيها عن دعمهم لأفكار تدعو للتخلف والرجعية
يظهر من قراءة نقد الكاتب للصوفية بعدم معرفة دقيقة بها فيوجه أليها أنتقادات يقوم الفكر الصوفى نفسه بأنتقادها
يتبنى الكتاب وجهة نظر معادية لعدد من الشخصيات الأسلامية المعروفة مثل الأمام الغزالى وجمال الدين الأفغانى ومحمد عبده وقد يكون جانبه الصواب فيها
يتضح فى بعض فقرات الكتاب عدم معرفة الكاتب الدقيقة بالأسلام فى أنتقاده لبعض التصرفات أو الأقوال التى لا يرى فيه المسلم وجه للأنتقاد
February 22, 2025
Robert Dreyfuss’ 'Hostage to Khomeini' offers a provocative and deeply researched alternative perspective on the Iranian Revolution, challenging mainstream narratives and shedding light on the hidden geopolitical forces at play. With meticulous detail, Dreyfuss argues that Ayatollah Khomeini’s rise was not solely an organic revolutionary movement but was, to a significant extent, facilitated — intentionally or not — by Western intelligence agencies seeking to reshape the Middle East’s balance of power.
The book excels in connecting the Iranian Revolution to broader historical patterns, particularly the use of political Islam as a counterweight to nationalist and socialist movements. Dreyfuss’ analysis of the Shah’s downfall, the role of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the strategic implications of the Iran hostage crisis is thought-provoking and often compelling. His discussion of how Khomeini’s theocracy ultimately served to suppress leftist movements and maintain Iran’s economic dependence adds depth to the geopolitical discourse surrounding the revolution.
While some of the book’s claims remain controversial and speculative, 'Hostage to Khomeini' is a fascinating and bold work that challenges readers to rethink the complexities of modern Middle Eastern history. Whether one agrees with all of Dreyfuss’ conclusions or not, his book remains an engaging and valuable contribution to the study of global politics, intelligence operations, and the enduring consequences of the Iranian Revolution.
The book excels in connecting the Iranian Revolution to broader historical patterns, particularly the use of political Islam as a counterweight to nationalist and socialist movements. Dreyfuss’ analysis of the Shah’s downfall, the role of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the strategic implications of the Iran hostage crisis is thought-provoking and often compelling. His discussion of how Khomeini’s theocracy ultimately served to suppress leftist movements and maintain Iran’s economic dependence adds depth to the geopolitical discourse surrounding the revolution.
While some of the book’s claims remain controversial and speculative, 'Hostage to Khomeini' is a fascinating and bold work that challenges readers to rethink the complexities of modern Middle Eastern history. Whether one agrees with all of Dreyfuss’ conclusions or not, his book remains an engaging and valuable contribution to the study of global politics, intelligence operations, and the enduring consequences of the Iranian Revolution.
April 17, 2013
خرجت الجموع الغاضبة الجارفة إلى شوارع طهران مفاخرة بأسلحتها الآلية التي حازتها حديثًا، وشرعت
في نهب المباني العامة وتحطيم بقايا نظام الشاه المخلوع؛ فبدأ عصر سلطان الرعب . وفي لمح البصر وسكون الفضاء، ُأعدم كبار ضباط الجيش والمخابرات ممن رفضوا التعاون مع الحكومة الجديدة، وكان ذلك على يد فرق اغتيالات غير رسمية. ولم يختلف حال المدائن والقرى عن حواضر الدولة، إذ قُتل المئات والمئات على يد الحشود المهتاجة. كل ذلك حدث يوم ١٢ من شهر فبراير لسنة ١٩٧٩ بعد سويعات من إعلان آية الله الخميني قيام جمهورية إيران الإسلامية.
أما في واشنطن فقد عقد الرئيس كارتر مؤتمرا صحفيا على عجل ليقول للعالم أجمع "إنني أعتقد بأن إيران -حكومةً وشعبا - سيظلون أصدقاء لنا".
في نهب المباني العامة وتحطيم بقايا نظام الشاه المخلوع؛ فبدأ عصر سلطان الرعب . وفي لمح البصر وسكون الفضاء، ُأعدم كبار ضباط الجيش والمخابرات ممن رفضوا التعاون مع الحكومة الجديدة، وكان ذلك على يد فرق اغتيالات غير رسمية. ولم يختلف حال المدائن والقرى عن حواضر الدولة، إذ قُتل المئات والمئات على يد الحشود المهتاجة. كل ذلك حدث يوم ١٢ من شهر فبراير لسنة ١٩٧٩ بعد سويعات من إعلان آية الله الخميني قيام جمهورية إيران الإسلامية.
أما في واشنطن فقد عقد الرئيس كارتر مؤتمرا صحفيا على عجل ليقول للعالم أجمع "إنني أعتقد بأن إيران -حكومةً وشعبا - سيظلون أصدقاء لنا".
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
January 18, 2015
This book changed my view to current events. Robert Dreyfus goes to extreme detail in explaining how the Carter administration along with Israel created Iran's regime of insanity and illogicality of the dark ages, and to what end. Also, delves deep in the past in explaining how the Muslim Brotherhood was created by British, and to what end.
Even though the book was written in 1980, the information it contains is happening today.
Everyone should reads this. Both Arabs and Americans especially in order to avoid repeating the past. Even though we are currently repeating it.
Even though the book was written in 1980, the information it contains is happening today.
Everyone should reads this. Both Arabs and Americans especially in order to avoid repeating the past. Even though we are currently repeating it.
Read
May 7, 2016It's great to find that the one who gave the idea of the book to the writer and directed him is Lyndon LaRouche .. The book describes the relationship between USA and the MB and why helped Khomeini to overthrow Shah in Iran
Read
September 26, 2014كتاب رائع لابد للمصريين قراءته ، يوضح حقيقة الثورة الاسلاميه بايران وعلاقاتها المشبوهه بامريكا والاخوان المتاسلمين .
ارجوا ان ينال اعجابكم وتتعرفو على التاريخ الحقيقة لما حدث بايران وما كان سيحدث لمصرنا الغاليه
حمى الله مصر، حمى الله الوطن
ارجوا ان ينال اعجابكم وتتعرفو على التاريخ الحقيقة لما حدث بايران وما كان سيحدث لمصرنا الغاليه
حمى الله مصر، حمى الله الوطن
Want to read
May 1, 2016Must read, especially for Arabs at large and for some Americans and Europeans, especially from countries having significant trade relations with Iran. Although now dated (written in 1980/81) the book's contents resonate as though they are happening now.
February 24, 2016
الكتاب جيد تأريخيا للثورة الايرانية
ولكن الكاتب مستشرق حاقد
تلاتة نجوم من اجل التأريخ بينما ذفت النجمتين الأخريين لسبة الشيخ البنا وافتراءه
ولكن الكاتب مستشرق حاقد
تلاتة نجوم من اجل التأريخ بينما ذفت النجمتين الأخريين لسبة الشيخ البنا وافتراءه
April 30, 2014
ستصعق عندما تقرأ هذا الكتاب وتعرف من هم الاخوان المسلمون وما دورهم الحقيقي ومن كونهم ومولهم،،،،
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