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Able Archer 83: The Secret History of the NATO Exercise That Almost Triggered Nuclear War
In November 1983, Soviet nuclear forces went on high alert. After months nervously watching increasingly assertive NATO military posturing, Soviet intelligence agencies in Western Europe received flash telegrams reporting alarming activity on U.S. bases. In response, the Soviets began planning for a countdown to a nuclear first strike by NATO on Eastern Europe. And then Able Archer 83, a vast NATO war game exercise that modeled a Soviet attack on NATO allies, ended.
What the West didn’t know at the time was that the Soviets thought Operation Able Archer 83 was real and were actively preparing for a surprise missile attack from NATO. This close scrape with Armageddon was largely unknown until last October when the U.S. government released a ninety-four-page presidential analysis of Able Archer that the National Security Archive had spent over a decade trying to declassify. Able Archer 83 is based upon more than a thousand pages of declassified documents that archive staffer Nate Jones has pried loose from several U.S. government agencies and British archives, as well as from formerly classified Soviet Politburo and KGB files. Able Archer 83 vividly recreates the atmosphere that nearly unleashed nuclear war.
What the West didn’t know at the time was that the Soviets thought Operation Able Archer 83 was real and were actively preparing for a surprise missile attack from NATO. This close scrape with Armageddon was largely unknown until last October when the U.S. government released a ninety-four-page presidential analysis of Able Archer that the National Security Archive had spent over a decade trying to declassify. Able Archer 83 is based upon more than a thousand pages of declassified documents that archive staffer Nate Jones has pried loose from several U.S. government agencies and British archives, as well as from formerly classified Soviet Politburo and KGB files. Able Archer 83 vividly recreates the atmosphere that nearly unleashed nuclear war.
320 pages, Hardcover
First published November 1, 2016
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About the author
Nate Jones
14 books3 followersLibrarian Note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
January 20, 2022
This book is a thinly veiled excuse to disseminate declassified documents into the world. Some of them are banal, some are shocking, and thus mostly all add a lot of colour and personal warmth to the early 80s. Though it could definitely do with some more narrative glue, I'm here for it. INF concerns also especially relevant today.
March 28, 2018
This book will appeal to subject matter experts, Cold War students, those interested in the Reagan administration, and anybody who thinks that accidental nuclear war or war through misperception are impossible.
The work concerns a joint NATO military exercise in November 1983 designated as ABLE ARCHER 83. The exercise provoked a strong Soviet military response that created what some have called the most serious threat of nuclear war since the Cuban Missile Crisis. For various reasons, the Reagan administration and others downplayed the seriousness of the Russian reaction, dismissing it as saber-rattling propaganda. Since the original disclosure of the exercise, historians have debated whether or not the United States was responsible for creating circumstances that warranted Soviet fears of an immediate "decapitation" attack, or whether the Russians cynically blamed the Americans for fear mongering.
The book is the result of nearly twenty years of Freedom of Information requests by the National Security Archive and comprises short essays by Nate Jones and reproductions of original, formerly classified documents on the incident. Jones argues that Soviet fears were both real and well-founded, and that the Americans refused to accept the sincerity of Russian fears out of political considerations. In particular, the Americans argued that Soviet reactions to ABLE ARCHER 83 were a propaganda ploy to turn public opinion against the deployment of Pershing II and Gryphon missiles in Europe. The reader can examine the evidence for herself and reach her own conclusions. I find Jones' argument and documentation to be persuasive.
As a personal aside, the Soviet and American nuclear war doctrines of the mid-1980s were nothing less than madness. The foundational assumption on both sides was that war would come suddenly and the first aim was to "decapitate" the leadership of the adversary. Weapons on both sides were on "hair-trigger" alert. The whole purpose of the Pershings and Gryphons was to eliminate Soviet leadership in one fell swoop as part of a "first strike." The doctrine of decapitation has remained steadfast in American military strategy, as evidenced by the attempt to kill Saddam Hussein on the first night of the Second Gulf War ("shock and awe"). By decapitating the enemy, experts argued, any retaliation would be uncoordinated and perhaps unlikely at all given the disruption of command and control systems.
The insanity of this doctrine is self-evident. If the purpose of a decapitation strike is to limit hostility and save lives, then, once you've eliminated the enemy leadership, with whom do you negotiate? Who signs the peace agreement, and can the guarantor deliver on the terms? Would field level commanders who realize the destruction of command and control channels be less likely to fire their weapons or more likely?
Command and control systems on both sides have improved since 1983, but as long as these weapons exist, the probability of their use is greater than zero.
The work concerns a joint NATO military exercise in November 1983 designated as ABLE ARCHER 83. The exercise provoked a strong Soviet military response that created what some have called the most serious threat of nuclear war since the Cuban Missile Crisis. For various reasons, the Reagan administration and others downplayed the seriousness of the Russian reaction, dismissing it as saber-rattling propaganda. Since the original disclosure of the exercise, historians have debated whether or not the United States was responsible for creating circumstances that warranted Soviet fears of an immediate "decapitation" attack, or whether the Russians cynically blamed the Americans for fear mongering.
The book is the result of nearly twenty years of Freedom of Information requests by the National Security Archive and comprises short essays by Nate Jones and reproductions of original, formerly classified documents on the incident. Jones argues that Soviet fears were both real and well-founded, and that the Americans refused to accept the sincerity of Russian fears out of political considerations. In particular, the Americans argued that Soviet reactions to ABLE ARCHER 83 were a propaganda ploy to turn public opinion against the deployment of Pershing II and Gryphon missiles in Europe. The reader can examine the evidence for herself and reach her own conclusions. I find Jones' argument and documentation to be persuasive.
As a personal aside, the Soviet and American nuclear war doctrines of the mid-1980s were nothing less than madness. The foundational assumption on both sides was that war would come suddenly and the first aim was to "decapitate" the leadership of the adversary. Weapons on both sides were on "hair-trigger" alert. The whole purpose of the Pershings and Gryphons was to eliminate Soviet leadership in one fell swoop as part of a "first strike." The doctrine of decapitation has remained steadfast in American military strategy, as evidenced by the attempt to kill Saddam Hussein on the first night of the Second Gulf War ("shock and awe"). By decapitating the enemy, experts argued, any retaliation would be uncoordinated and perhaps unlikely at all given the disruption of command and control systems.
The insanity of this doctrine is self-evident. If the purpose of a decapitation strike is to limit hostility and save lives, then, once you've eliminated the enemy leadership, with whom do you negotiate? Who signs the peace agreement, and can the guarantor deliver on the terms? Would field level commanders who realize the destruction of command and control channels be less likely to fire their weapons or more likely?
Command and control systems on both sides have improved since 1983, but as long as these weapons exist, the probability of their use is greater than zero.
December 12, 2019
Sometimes, I think about how likely it was that the world would have ended when I was a baby. I knew about Stanislav Petrov, of course, and how he essentially saved the world when he decided that the missile launches the computer was reporting to him were in error. He has always maintained that there was no proximate danger, that the Soviets had failsafes in place that would have prevented a full-scale war, but reading Able Archer 83 I'm not so sure. The Soviet command was on high alert due to NATO exercises which they thought might be a preamble to a pre-emptive strike. In this book, there are repeated references to unprecedented actions taken by the Soviets like keeping short-game missiles deployed and moving so they couldn't be destroyed on the ground. In that atmosphere, if Petrov had reported a possible American surprise attack, would the Soviets, knowing they only had a few minutes to decide, have waited for further information? Would they have waited for ground radar, or thought about how only a handful of missiles was odd for an American first strike? Or would they have retaliated against what they thought was an unprovoked attack, and then America would have done the same, and civilization would have burned to ash.
There's a short section at the beginning of this book that makes that point. That the USSR didn't have perfect insight into America's actions and so when they put together Reagan's inflammatory speeches with the changes in the NATO exercises designed to simulate conditions of nuclear war, they could only assume that America might be preparing to execute a decapitating strike under the premise of a war game. And to his credit, when Reagan realized how dangerous the rhetoric was and how close the world had come to doom--how much his reckless warmongering was inflaming the Soviets because they didn't have perfect access to his reasoning--he toned it down.
It's hard to even write a review of this, because other than that section, Able Archer 83 is a collection of declassified documents. How do I review a CIA report that indicates that the USSR isn't really that worried by the NATO exercises (oops), or a primary source in Russian? I can't, obviously--that's not their point. But as a book, this is a valuable reminder of how brinksmanship can almost lead to disaster, as does assuming the other side knows your threats are just posturing. I'm alive--we're all alive--because some people made the conscious decision to take a step back. There's a moment when Reagan realizes that technological developments means that on news of a launch, he'll have six minutes to decided what to do. One man, six minutes, and the end of the world.
No one should have that power, and the documents collected here are a good explanation of why.
"The princes, putting the words of their wise men to naught, thought each to himself: If I but strike quickly enough, and in secret, I shall destroy these others in their sleep, and there will be none to fight back; the earth shall be mine.I would have been fifteen months old.
"Such was the folly of princes, and there followed the Flame Deluge."
-Walter M. Miller Jr., A Canticle for Leibowitz
There's a short section at the beginning of this book that makes that point. That the USSR didn't have perfect insight into America's actions and so when they put together Reagan's inflammatory speeches with the changes in the NATO exercises designed to simulate conditions of nuclear war, they could only assume that America might be preparing to execute a decapitating strike under the premise of a war game. And to his credit, when Reagan realized how dangerous the rhetoric was and how close the world had come to doom--how much his reckless warmongering was inflaming the Soviets because they didn't have perfect access to his reasoning--he toned it down.
It's hard to even write a review of this, because other than that section, Able Archer 83 is a collection of declassified documents. How do I review a CIA report that indicates that the USSR isn't really that worried by the NATO exercises (oops), or a primary source in Russian? I can't, obviously--that's not their point. But as a book, this is a valuable reminder of how brinksmanship can almost lead to disaster, as does assuming the other side knows your threats are just posturing. I'm alive--we're all alive--because some people made the conscious decision to take a step back. There's a moment when Reagan realizes that technological developments means that on news of a launch, he'll have six minutes to decided what to do. One man, six minutes, and the end of the world.
No one should have that power, and the documents collected here are a good explanation of why.
September 5, 2017
A very good collection of primary documents of a secret NATO exercise that the soviets nearly thought was an actual preliminary Nuclear strike by the west and brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. It was this "scare" which led both sides to begin talks to reduce their nuclear arsenals.
As a treasure trove of material recently declassified ( Most by the National Security Archive-where the editor works) documents that show just how close and how real the threat was and how the United states and its allies downplayed the seriousness, mainly due to lapses in communication between allies and lack of access to materials.
My only negative is that I wish the 59 page introduction was more of a narrative history and less like an analytical document.
A vital source of documents that can lead to a better understanding of just how close the Cold War came to turning terminally hot.
As a treasure trove of material recently declassified ( Most by the National Security Archive-where the editor works) documents that show just how close and how real the threat was and how the United states and its allies downplayed the seriousness, mainly due to lapses in communication between allies and lack of access to materials.
My only negative is that I wish the 59 page introduction was more of a narrative history and less like an analytical document.
A vital source of documents that can lead to a better understanding of just how close the Cold War came to turning terminally hot.
December 25, 2016
Excellent research in a very important and timely topic. Now that presidents Trump, and Putin have both acknowledged the future increase of nuclear weapons. This research, and book has also the Soviet, and Warsaw Pact sources comments, which makes this book way more objective than others on the same topic.
World has been close to a nuclear war at least three times (1962,1983,1995 which have been publicly admitted), the last one in 1995 was due to a communication error. Someone should really hit with this book, the heads of those that want increase the nuclear weapons arsenal. Sure they are easy and quick to build, but they will never be used again (hopefully!), and dismantling them cost a lot of money, and the wast will cause major storage problems.
World has been close to a nuclear war at least three times (1962,1983,1995 which have been publicly admitted), the last one in 1995 was due to a communication error. Someone should really hit with this book, the heads of those that want increase the nuclear weapons arsenal. Sure they are easy and quick to build, but they will never be used again (hopefully!), and dismantling them cost a lot of money, and the wast will cause major storage problems.
January 8, 2019
BORING! There is less than 100 pages in the book, but there is over 200 pages of appendices. It all boils down to the Soviet Leadership almost having to change their underwear. That is the entire book in one sentence. I spent many months on this book because I could only read a few pages at a time.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
May 8, 2017
Excellent archival study of the War Scare of 1983. Able Archer to Reagan is like the Cuban Missile Crisis to JFK. Both needed a brink-like event to realize that opponents could miscalculate and there would be unaffordable consequences if they actually did.
November 3, 2022
Not a book as much as an essay-length discussion of the Able Archer war scare, with supporting government documents attached. Provides very little detail about the episode and I'm not sure it stands on its own if you're not already familiar with the events.
January 22, 2023
The topic was interesting and the presentation was fair, the fact the author only presented 65 pages of original material and fills the rest with pictures and declassified documents makes this feel like it was significantly overpriced. While interesting, it really wasn’t worth my time.
May 21, 2017
A lot of sources, some analysis. Overall, a very valuable work on an underappreciated time.
January 5, 2018
Terrifyingly relevant.
August 23, 2022
Lots of released documents but not much text telling the story.
November 13, 2018
This book is indeed “just” (as some have said) 60 pages of narrative, with the remainder being reproduced primary documents.
I have no problem with the ratio of text to sources per se. But the text is often dry, and more speculative than I’m comfortable with (yes, I realize the hypocrisy of someone trained in medieval history criticizing a modern history book for being too speculative).
I think that there is more than one fascinating history of AA83 waiting to be written. Perhaps because of the many still-sealed documents, this book is not one of those fascinating histories. I am very aware that my disappointment with this book might be due to that most-dreaded of reasons: it’s just not the book I wish had been written. Others might find it to be thoroughly engrossing and of much historical value.
I have no problem with the ratio of text to sources per se. But the text is often dry, and more speculative than I’m comfortable with (yes, I realize the hypocrisy of someone trained in medieval history criticizing a modern history book for being too speculative).
I think that there is more than one fascinating history of AA83 waiting to be written. Perhaps because of the many still-sealed documents, this book is not one of those fascinating histories. I am very aware that my disappointment with this book might be due to that most-dreaded of reasons: it’s just not the book I wish had been written. Others might find it to be thoroughly engrossing and of much historical value.
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews