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Douglas Macarthur: The Far Eastern General
In an army which eschewed flamboyance, General Douglas MacArthur possessed a unique flair. With his chiseled face, corn-cob pipe, and a voice which "could trumpet and drum," he looked the part of a "heaven born general." He was arguably the best-known and most popular American military
leader of the 20th century, and at least one observer--General George E. Stratemeyer, MacArthur's top air officer in Japan--thought him "the greatest man in history." Yet the men who served in the trenches of Bataan sneeringly called him "Dugout Doug," FDR privately termed MacArthur's defense of
Corregidor "criminal," and Truman called his vaunted "return" to the Philippines "a fiasco."
In this eye-opening book, historian Michael Schaller offers an intimately detailed portrait of MacArthur, particularly the General's two decades in the Far East, demythologizing this "American Caesar" and providing an insightful analysis of American foreign policy in Asia during those years.
Schaller's is far from a flattering portrait. He finds, for instance, that MacArthur's military record was less than not only did MacArthur leave direction of the army to subordinates (such as General Robert Eichelberger), but as a result of his failure to launch an air raid following
word of the attack on Pearl Harbor, nearly all B-17s in the Philippines--the strongest American air concentration outside of the States--were destroyed on the ground. Indeed, Schaller reveals that MacArthur's Pacific island campaign during World War II, often hailed as brilliant, was far more
costly and less decisive than previously assumed. Schaller is particulary deft at tracing MacArthur's futile attempts to become President and his destructive interference in foreign policy, such as his promise to local Dutch officials to restore their authority in the East Indies (even as FDR's
administration pushed the Dutch to grant self-determination), his manipulation of policies in occupied Japan, and his constant attacks on Truman's policy in China, attacks which ruined any chance of improving relations with the largest nation in Asia. Finally, during the Korean War, Schaller argues
that MacArthur willfully risked war with China and the Soviet Union to salvage his pride and humiliate his political enemies in Washington.
Schaller's thought-provoking biography provides invaluable background to America's present relations with the Far East. It is as well an unforgettable portrait of a man driven by talent, opportunism, vision, egotism, and jealousy.
leader of the 20th century, and at least one observer--General George E. Stratemeyer, MacArthur's top air officer in Japan--thought him "the greatest man in history." Yet the men who served in the trenches of Bataan sneeringly called him "Dugout Doug," FDR privately termed MacArthur's defense of
Corregidor "criminal," and Truman called his vaunted "return" to the Philippines "a fiasco."
In this eye-opening book, historian Michael Schaller offers an intimately detailed portrait of MacArthur, particularly the General's two decades in the Far East, demythologizing this "American Caesar" and providing an insightful analysis of American foreign policy in Asia during those years.
Schaller's is far from a flattering portrait. He finds, for instance, that MacArthur's military record was less than not only did MacArthur leave direction of the army to subordinates (such as General Robert Eichelberger), but as a result of his failure to launch an air raid following
word of the attack on Pearl Harbor, nearly all B-17s in the Philippines--the strongest American air concentration outside of the States--were destroyed on the ground. Indeed, Schaller reveals that MacArthur's Pacific island campaign during World War II, often hailed as brilliant, was far more
costly and less decisive than previously assumed. Schaller is particulary deft at tracing MacArthur's futile attempts to become President and his destructive interference in foreign policy, such as his promise to local Dutch officials to restore their authority in the East Indies (even as FDR's
administration pushed the Dutch to grant self-determination), his manipulation of policies in occupied Japan, and his constant attacks on Truman's policy in China, attacks which ruined any chance of improving relations with the largest nation in Asia. Finally, during the Korean War, Schaller argues
that MacArthur willfully risked war with China and the Soviet Union to salvage his pride and humiliate his political enemies in Washington.
Schaller's thought-provoking biography provides invaluable background to America's present relations with the Far East. It is as well an unforgettable portrait of a man driven by talent, opportunism, vision, egotism, and jealousy.
352 pages, Hardcover
First published May 4, 1989
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About the author
Michael Schaller
52 books5 followersMichael Schaller is Regents Professor of History at the University of Arizona. A specialist in twentieth-century American politics and foreign policy, he earned his bachelor's degree from SUNY Binghamton in 1968 and his master's (1969) and doctorate (1974) degrees from the University of Michigan.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
June 1, 2014
I started with Manchester's American Caesar but had to put it down around page 230 - AC is a shameless hagiography - Manchester the celebrity writer sold his soul but that miserable book made me find A Traitor to His Class - Then led to Schaller's honest portrayal of Dugout Doug as a fraud, a fake, a horrible duplicitous person. DD would fit right in with the right wing ilk of today. Ike learned a lot from DD as in how not to live your life. It took some effort to find this book and then more effort to find a copy to buy. Right Wing America loves its myths ~not so much reality. pg 35 - Ike painfully watched his boss become a ludicrous figure divorced from reality. pg 39 Ike saw DD as worse than worthless, the illusory "neutrality agreement" with JPN as regards the Philippines. 1939 Ike bailed. all of DD's prewar assertions were wrong. DD seems to have had no clue regarding how to handle the B-17s he was given. the two officers most important to the Philippines after Pearl Harbor were Wainwright (ground) and Brereton (air) - neither were close to DD. DD refused to coordinate any action with the Navy (Admiral Hart) - DD's disastrous decision to abandon Plan Orange for his own "we'll smash them at the beaches" ~DD had foolishly dispersed all of his supplies and then had to hastily move them to Bataan where they were supposed to have been in the first place. Read the book, MS doesn't waste words, very concise and objective I may sound shrill but MS doesn't. Only one base could accommodate the B-17s and that base was not properly prepared - it was Admiral Hart's opinion that DD wasn't entirely sane. Dec 8, DD received the warning about the Pearl Harbor attack but Mac froze, not only could he not act he also saw to it that Brereton also had to stand down. JPN destroyed half of the B-17s as they sat on the ground. DD worked liked the torpedoes our subs had that failed to function - our subs never sunk one Japanese ship. Our war in the Pacific Theater got off to an inauspicious start. During the JPN siege of Corregidor and the Bataan peninsula DD wrote 140 press releases casting himself as the lone heroic figure of the Philippines - DD literally made shit up. Ike considered DD "a big baby". Of course our press and public swallowed all of it (cripes, has anything changed?) The Philippines became a waste of scarce military materials when during those early years of our entry into WWII the foremost concern was the European Theater. Worse was the time that it wasted. A paragraph from page 60, "Not surprisingly, Quezon's demand shocked and offended American officials. Roosevelt, Marshall, and Stimson judged the Filipino a near traitor and expressed outrage at MacArthur's implicit support. In disbelief, they wondered how the top military commander in the Far East could even contemplate assenting to a deal with Japan abandoning American territory in the wake of the Pearl Harbor attack and invasion of the Philippines. It seemed especially ironic that this same general had described the islands as virtually invulnerable and able to resist indefinitely the Japanese threat. After meeting with Marshall and the president, Stimson ridiculed the "wholly unreal message" which took "no account of what the war was for." How on earth, the secretary wondered, could MacArthur even consider a "virtual settlement with the Japanese." - My take: Because DD believed the world revolved around him and him alone. MacArthur lived on a public image that he, his Republican friends, and a Right Wing press created (again, does nothing ever change?). The real DD was a sack of shit. Without his powerful friends he could easily have been replaced. DD was given the Medal of Honor as a sop (not good). In 1942 Mac fought against Wainwright receiving A MoH. It was 1945 before Wainwright was so honored.
Supreme Commander of JPN. A dream for a man who was always on stage and always in costume. A man who was forever preening for President of the United States. Censorship was a useful tool for MacArthur to protect his image. The events following the war were generally the same in Germany and JPN - fearing Communism we placed the oligarchs back in control and in Japan's case we were especially fearful of labor. Amazingly the Japanese poors had to bear the costs of reconstruction. Again nothing much changes.
The Cold War begins in earnest - Red China becomes a bugbear. DD becomes more of a problem, sets his own agenda, repetitively causing Truman embarrassment & leaving our allies wondering just what our foreign policy was. Because of the Republican party, an electorate agog with hero worship (created by a malicious right wing press) Mac got away with his clown act. Outside of the officers in his own staff the other officers who had to interact with Mac found his antics loathsome. In actuality DD was no miracle worker for JPN. Mac was a weather vane changing his policy to match whatever was currently popular. This part of the book requires careful reading as following Mac's changing edicts was like following a bouncing ball. But then it's not easy to always be covering your ass while running for president from 6,771 miles away. The one thing Mac always wanted was to start a war with Red China so he could be Christianity's savior. Ultimately that is why he had to go. Why was he given Korea? I suppose one would have had to have been there. Back then I was from 3 to 6 years old. In South Korea there was strongman Syngman Rhee, in the north Kim Il Sung. Rhee was a Christian then a Taoist (like MacArthur, Rhee covered all the bases) yada, yada, yada...the book gets sad as we see the US take its first punches at the Indochina tar baby. Manchester's book is 709 pages ~from what I read most of those pages were written as though Mac and Pinky were looking over William's shoulder. Michael Schaller's book is 253 pages - all that was needed once the bullshit was squeegeed out. Asia was a mess in 1950, Red China/ Formosa, North/South Korea, French colonialism/nationalistic insurgencies. Small wonder rebuilding JPN as a bulwark against the Red Tide seemed so urgent. And at home we had the braying ass, Joseph McCarthy. At 70 MacArthur was a poor commander possibly corrupt, probably delusional.
Supreme Commander of JPN. A dream for a man who was always on stage and always in costume. A man who was forever preening for President of the United States. Censorship was a useful tool for MacArthur to protect his image. The events following the war were generally the same in Germany and JPN - fearing Communism we placed the oligarchs back in control and in Japan's case we were especially fearful of labor. Amazingly the Japanese poors had to bear the costs of reconstruction. Again nothing much changes.
The Cold War begins in earnest - Red China becomes a bugbear. DD becomes more of a problem, sets his own agenda, repetitively causing Truman embarrassment & leaving our allies wondering just what our foreign policy was. Because of the Republican party, an electorate agog with hero worship (created by a malicious right wing press) Mac got away with his clown act. Outside of the officers in his own staff the other officers who had to interact with Mac found his antics loathsome. In actuality DD was no miracle worker for JPN. Mac was a weather vane changing his policy to match whatever was currently popular. This part of the book requires careful reading as following Mac's changing edicts was like following a bouncing ball. But then it's not easy to always be covering your ass while running for president from 6,771 miles away. The one thing Mac always wanted was to start a war with Red China so he could be Christianity's savior. Ultimately that is why he had to go. Why was he given Korea? I suppose one would have had to have been there. Back then I was from 3 to 6 years old. In South Korea there was strongman Syngman Rhee, in the north Kim Il Sung. Rhee was a Christian then a Taoist (like MacArthur, Rhee covered all the bases) yada, yada, yada...the book gets sad as we see the US take its first punches at the Indochina tar baby. Manchester's book is 709 pages ~from what I read most of those pages were written as though Mac and Pinky were looking over William's shoulder. Michael Schaller's book is 253 pages - all that was needed once the bullshit was squeegeed out. Asia was a mess in 1950, Red China/ Formosa, North/South Korea, French colonialism/nationalistic insurgencies. Small wonder rebuilding JPN as a bulwark against the Red Tide seemed so urgent. And at home we had the braying ass, Joseph McCarthy. At 70 MacArthur was a poor commander possibly corrupt, probably delusional.
September 19, 2021
I think this was a good choice of book to delve more into the character of "Dugout Doug".
From the period when his career was being more realistically assessed outside of his own spin and the ridiculous aura that grew to surround him.
From the period when his career was being more realistically assessed outside of his own spin and the ridiculous aura that grew to surround him.
December 28, 2012
I did a report on the Korean War and this book was indispensable for a certain segment. I had to write about MacArthur's experience in World War II and how it influenced his thinking in the Korean War. Schaller does a good job in summarizing important parts in MacArthur's life while revealing some interesting facts. Although Schaller does talk about MacArthur's tactics and some battles, he does not go into full detail. Schaller makes a good albeit general presentation on MacArthur's strategic thinking.
February 21, 2008
This author was not a big fan of Douglas MacArthur. I felt that he was very biased against him. However, he does provide viewpoints that many people have of him.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews