Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success and Failure

by Leo J. Blanken (editor), Hy Rothstein (Editor), Jason J. Lepore (Editor)

Today's protracted asymmetrical conflicts confuse efforts to measure progress, often inviting politics and wishful thinking to replace objective evaluation.In" Assessing War, " military historians, social scientists, and military officers explore how observers have analyzed the trajectory of war in American conflicts from the Seven Years War through the war in Afghanistan. Drawing on decades of acquired expertise, the contributors examine wartime assessment in both theory and practice and, through alternative dimensions of assessment such as justice and proportionality, the war of ideas and economics. This group of distinguished authors grapples with both conventional and irregular wars and emerging aspects of conflict such as cyberwar and nation building that add to the complexities of the modern threat environment. The volume ends with recommendations for practitioners on best approaches while offering sobering conclusions about the challenges of assessing war without politicization or self-delusion.Covering conflicts from the eighteenth century to today, " Assessing War "blends focused advice and a uniquely broad set of case studies to ponder vital questions about warfare's past and its future. The book includes a foreword by Gen. George W. Casey Jr. (USA, Ret.), former chief of staff of the US Army and former commander, Multi-National Force Iraq."

Genres: Military Fiction

376 pages, Kindle Edition

Published December 15, 2015

Reviews

[George Siehl · Rating 4 out of 5]

A largely technical extended argument in favor of the extensive use of assessment in deciding to go to war, conducting the war, and its conclusion and aftermath. The book offers a useful blend of theory and examples, the most interesting of which (to me) were the case studies of wars Americans fought, from the French and Indian War component of the Seven Years War to the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The authors of these cases point out how assessment sometimes resulted in new objectives for the war or new ways of conducting it.

Blanken's theoretical base for the work follows from Clausewitz's formulation of the close link between political goals and the use of military force. Blanken offers a "metrics triangle" consisting of the three military needs to meet the political goals: a set of operational benchmarks, information, and incentives that exist for the several parties to waging war. The information element is, perhaps, most closely linked to assessment. It allows the commander to measure performance and effectiveness. That is, how well a unit performs its task, and whether that task is meaningful in achieving the desired outcome.

The book is not a casual read, as some of the explanations are convoluted. Nonetheless it is informing for those whose interest in military science extends beyond the conduct of the battle to the broader concern of national military policy.

I had earlier read Blanken's "Rational Empires" and was impressed by his original thinking and clear exposition.