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Very Short Introductions #046
ویتگنشتاین
در این تبیین مختصر از [فلسفه] ویتگنشتاین، هدف من انجام دو کار است. نخستین آنها روشن ساختن محور اصلی اندیشهی ویتگنشتاین برای خوانندهی غیرمتخصص و دوم، شرح جایگاه اندیشهی وی در فلسفهی تحلیلی قرن بیستم است.
در محدودهی کتابی کوچک، رسیدن به هیچ یک از این دو هدف آسان نیست. برای این امر دلایل متعددی وجود دارد. دلیل اصلی آن است که آثار ویتگنشتاین، متعدد، پیچیده و مبهماند. در نتیجه، تفسیرهای متفاوتی را میپذیرند و مورد تفسیرهای زیادی هم قرار گرفتهاند. رعایت عدالت کامل، مستلزم بررسی تفصیلی و بنابراین طولانی نوشتههای وی، همراه با تبیینی از حجم بزرگ نوشتههایی است که حول کار وی رشد یافته است. از این رو هیچ یک از این دو کار را نمیتوان در این جا ارائه کرد. بنابراین، باید هدفهای مرا، فروتنانه درک کرد. مراد من از «محور» همین است؛ و فرض من آن است که خواننده هیچ معرفت قبلی از فلسفه ندارد.
پیروان ویتگنشتاین ادعا میکنند که تلاش برای ارائهی طرحهای مقدماتی و خلاصهای از دیدگاههای وی اشتباه است. یکی از شاگردان اصلی ویتگنشتاین، نورمن مالکوم، نوشته است: «تلاش برای خلاصه کردن [آثار ویتگنشتاین] نه موفق خواهد شد و نه مفید خواهد بود، ویتگنشتاین اندیشههای خود را به حدی فشرده ساخته، که فشردهسازی بیشتر آن ناممکن است. آن چه مورد نیاز است، آن است که [این اندیشهها] باز شوند و ارتباطهای میان آنها پیگیری شود». پیروان ویتگنشتاین، این نکته را نیز ذکر میکنند که خلاصههای دیدگاههای فلسفی طبعاً شکل تبیینی دستگاهمند، به معنای بیان منظم نکته به نکته نظریات را به خود میگیرند در صورتی که ویتگنشتاین در فلسفهی متأخر خود، مخالفت خود را با فلسفهورزی دستگاهمند اعلام و اشتغال به آن را رد کرده است، بنابراین، پیروان وی میگویند، طرح مختصر دیدگاههای ویتگنشتاین نه تنها محتوای آنها، که نیت آنها را نیز جداً غلط نشان میدهند.
در محدودهی کتابی کوچک، رسیدن به هیچ یک از این دو هدف آسان نیست. برای این امر دلایل متعددی وجود دارد. دلیل اصلی آن است که آثار ویتگنشتاین، متعدد، پیچیده و مبهماند. در نتیجه، تفسیرهای متفاوتی را میپذیرند و مورد تفسیرهای زیادی هم قرار گرفتهاند. رعایت عدالت کامل، مستلزم بررسی تفصیلی و بنابراین طولانی نوشتههای وی، همراه با تبیینی از حجم بزرگ نوشتههایی است که حول کار وی رشد یافته است. از این رو هیچ یک از این دو کار را نمیتوان در این جا ارائه کرد. بنابراین، باید هدفهای مرا، فروتنانه درک کرد. مراد من از «محور» همین است؛ و فرض من آن است که خواننده هیچ معرفت قبلی از فلسفه ندارد.
پیروان ویتگنشتاین ادعا میکنند که تلاش برای ارائهی طرحهای مقدماتی و خلاصهای از دیدگاههای وی اشتباه است. یکی از شاگردان اصلی ویتگنشتاین، نورمن مالکوم، نوشته است: «تلاش برای خلاصه کردن [آثار ویتگنشتاین] نه موفق خواهد شد و نه مفید خواهد بود، ویتگنشتاین اندیشههای خود را به حدی فشرده ساخته، که فشردهسازی بیشتر آن ناممکن است. آن چه مورد نیاز است، آن است که [این اندیشهها] باز شوند و ارتباطهای میان آنها پیگیری شود». پیروان ویتگنشتاین، این نکته را نیز ذکر میکنند که خلاصههای دیدگاههای فلسفی طبعاً شکل تبیینی دستگاهمند، به معنای بیان منظم نکته به نکته نظریات را به خود میگیرند در صورتی که ویتگنشتاین در فلسفهی متأخر خود، مخالفت خود را با فلسفهورزی دستگاهمند اعلام و اشتغال به آن را رد کرده است، بنابراین، پیروان وی میگویند، طرح مختصر دیدگاههای ویتگنشتاین نه تنها محتوای آنها، که نیت آنها را نیز جداً غلط نشان میدهند.
197 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1988
271 people are currently reading
2033 people want to read
About the author
A.C. Grayling
95 books666 followersAnthony Clifford "A. C." Grayling is a British philosopher. In 2011 he founded and became the first Master of New College of the Humanities, an independent undergraduate college in London. Until June 2011, he was Professor of Philosophy at Birkbeck, University of London, where he taught from 1991. He is also a supernumerary fellow of St Anne's College, Oxford.
He is a director and contributor at Prospect Magazine, as well as a Vice President of the British Humanist Association. His main academic interests lie in epistemology, metaphysics and philosophical logic. He has described himself as "a man of the left" and is associated in Britain with the new atheism movement, and is sometimes described as the 'Fifth Horseman of New Atheism'. He appears in the British media discussing philosophy.
He is a director and contributor at Prospect Magazine, as well as a Vice President of the British Humanist Association. His main academic interests lie in epistemology, metaphysics and philosophical logic. He has described himself as "a man of the left" and is associated in Britain with the new atheism movement, and is sometimes described as the 'Fifth Horseman of New Atheism'. He appears in the British media discussing philosophy.
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June 11, 2017
ویتگنشتاین دو دوره داشت، و دو نظام فلسفی بنیان گذاشت که نقطه مقابل هم بودند.
ابتدا رساله منطقی-فلسفی را نوشت و گفت: تمام مشکلات فلسفی با این نظریه حل می شود. پس به طور کل فلسفه را رها کرد و به شغل معلمی و باغبانی پرداخت. اما بعد از ده سال به این نتیجه رسید که بنیاد فلسفه اش به کلی اشتباه است، پس برگشت و فلسفه ی جدیدی تأسیس کرد و کتاب پژوهش های فلسفی را نگاشت که پس از مرگش منتشر شد.
ویتگنشتاین دوره اول می گوید: زبان خاصیت انفعالی دارد، یعنی صرفاً از اشیای خارجی همان طور که هستند حکایت می کند و خودش در آن ها دست نمی برد.
ویتگنشتاین دوره دوم می گوید: زبان خاصیت فعال هم دارد، یعنی فقط حاکی و تابع واقعیت خارجی نیست بلکه به برداشت ما از جهان واقع شکل می دهد. در نتیجه دو فرهنگ با دو زبان مختلف، به دو شکل مختلف جهان را درک می کنند.
فلسفه نخست ويتگنشتاين
*
فلسفه دوم ويتگنشتاين
ابتدا رساله منطقی-فلسفی را نوشت و گفت: تمام مشکلات فلسفی با این نظریه حل می شود. پس به طور کل فلسفه را رها کرد و به شغل معلمی و باغبانی پرداخت. اما بعد از ده سال به این نتیجه رسید که بنیاد فلسفه اش به کلی اشتباه است، پس برگشت و فلسفه ی جدیدی تأسیس کرد و کتاب پژوهش های فلسفی را نگاشت که پس از مرگش منتشر شد.
ویتگنشتاین دوره اول می گوید: زبان خاصیت انفعالی دارد، یعنی صرفاً از اشیای خارجی همان طور که هستند حکایت می کند و خودش در آن ها دست نمی برد.
ویتگنشتاین دوره دوم می گوید: زبان خاصیت فعال هم دارد، یعنی فقط حاکی و تابع واقعیت خارجی نیست بلکه به برداشت ما از جهان واقع شکل می دهد. در نتیجه دو فرهنگ با دو زبان مختلف، به دو شکل مختلف جهان را درک می کنند.
فلسفه نخست ويتگنشتاين
*
فلسفه دوم ويتگنشتاين
September 11, 2011
Never mind the fact that Grayling's critique of Wittgenstein sometimes is misleading; this is a good little book that you should read before you move on to heavier works. If you want to read more about Wittgenstein before you read and work your way through his own books, I also recommend the works of Baker and Hacker, and McGinn's Wittgenstein on meaning. Kripke is more controversial, and in my opinion, a bit off-track.
July 21, 2023
این کتاب یک نکته خیلی مهم را به من فهماند: عدم استفاده از میراث گذشتگان، آراء ما را محکوم به فنا میکند.
ویتگنشتاین آخرین فیلسوف مهمی بود که تحصیلات آکادمیک نداشت اما دکتری گرفت!
چجوری اش را خلاصه بگویم. راسل و اینا باهاش حال کردن و دکتری و کرسی استادی بهش دادن اونم توی آکسفورد.
البته که باحال بود و زندگی باحالی داشت. مثلا در عنفوان جوانی به خاطر یه کف دست نون حلال پاشد رفت توی ارتش. اونم 15 سال! یا مثلا دوسال پامیشد میرفت توی یه دهکده دور از همه دنیا کتاب مینوشت. البته همه آثار مهمشو همینطوری نوشت. کنج و عزلت و خلق شاهکار.
ویتگنشتاین دو دوره فکری داشته. دوره اولش که با کتاب رساله معرفی میشه مدعی یکسانی زبان و جهان بوده و اونچیزی که توی جهان نمیشد دیدش مثل اخلاق و دین رو مستور و غیرقابل دسترس میدونه.
دوره دومش با کتاب پژوهش ها اوج گرفت که خیلی نظرات دوره اولشو رد کرد و توی فلسفه خودش برای فرهنگها ، دین و اخلاق جا باز کرد اما فلسفه اش از نظم سابق خارج شد.
این کتاب معرفی دقیق، مختصر و مفیدیه که گریزی به نقد ویتگنشتاین و تاثیر اون توی فلسفه معاصر هم زده و من به شدت توصیه میکنم. ترجه ی انصافا خوبی هم داره.
سخت نیست اما دقیقه:)
ویتگنشتاین آخرین فیلسوف مهمی بود که تحصیلات آکادمیک نداشت اما دکتری گرفت!
چجوری اش را خلاصه بگویم. راسل و اینا باهاش حال کردن و دکتری و کرسی استادی بهش دادن اونم توی آکسفورد.
البته که باحال بود و زندگی باحالی داشت. مثلا در عنفوان جوانی به خاطر یه کف دست نون حلال پاشد رفت توی ارتش. اونم 15 سال! یا مثلا دوسال پامیشد میرفت توی یه دهکده دور از همه دنیا کتاب مینوشت. البته همه آثار مهمشو همینطوری نوشت. کنج و عزلت و خلق شاهکار.
ویتگنشتاین دو دوره فکری داشته. دوره اولش که با کتاب رساله معرفی میشه مدعی یکسانی زبان و جهان بوده و اونچیزی که توی جهان نمیشد دیدش مثل اخلاق و دین رو مستور و غیرقابل دسترس میدونه.
دوره دومش با کتاب پژوهش ها اوج گرفت که خیلی نظرات دوره اولشو رد کرد و توی فلسفه خودش برای فرهنگها ، دین و اخلاق جا باز کرد اما فلسفه اش از نظم سابق خارج شد.
این کتاب معرفی دقیق، مختصر و مفیدیه که گریزی به نقد ویتگنشتاین و تاثیر اون توی فلسفه معاصر هم زده و من به شدت توصیه میکنم. ترجه ی انصافا خوبی هم داره.
سخت نیست اما دقیقه:)
July 21, 2012
Grayling wrote a rather even-handed treatment of Wittgenstein's early and late philosophy; although it's rather obvious that Grayling downplays Wittgenstein's influence on contemporary philosophy,and disagrees with most - if not all of - Wittgenstein's late philosophy. Regardless of his disagreement, Grayling obviously understands Wittgenstein's philosophy, and is able to present his ideas in an economic manner. His abilities as an educator show in his attempt to introduce the reader to basic logic prior to diving into the world of analytic philosophy.Grayling's interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy may be challenged by Wittgenstein scholars (as can most people's interpretations of such an obscure philosopher's work). All in all, this is a great introduction to Wittgenstein's early and late philosophy. If you aren't familiar with Wittgenstein's work, this is a great place to start.
December 29, 2018
I should really stop reading biographies of people I'm interested in by people who dislike them.
June 15, 2016
Wittgenstein was certainly a character. He strikes me as something of an intellectual masochist. He hated most philosophy; his goal was to investigate language, in order to end philosophy; he was happy when his students gave up philosophy; yet he is one of the previous century’s most famous philosophers. This is one of the things that makes reading the Tractatus so odd: he is writing anti-philosophy philosophy.
On a smaller scale, this same oddness is replicated in Grayling’s book: Grayling is writing anti-Wittgenstein Wittgenstein. I’m not sure why he agreed to write this book in the first place. Grayling clearly has a very low opinion of Wittgenstein, and can’t help criticizing him at every turn. After explaining the thesis of the Tractatus, Grayling proceeds to tear it apart; he does the same with the Philosophical Investigations. (To be fair, I actually found many of his criticisms interesting and compelling—if out of place in an introductory text.)
Not only does Grayling disagree with Wittgenstein’s arguments, but he even goes so far as to argue that Wittgenstein’s influence has been greatly overestimated. First, Grayling downplays Wittgenstein’s influence on the Vienna Circle. Then, Grayling characterizes Wittgenstein’s influence on analytic philosophy as a flash in the pan—or at least paltry in comparison with Russell's or Frege's. I really have nothing to say about the accuracy of these claims (although they did seem at least partially politically motivated to me). It should be said, however, that if Wittgenstein did succeed in his stated goal—to dissolve all the old philosophical problems via a critique of language—then philosophy would have ended, which it clearly has not. (Or has it?)
But if Wittgenstein failed in his stated goal, so did Grayling. Parts of this book were too technical for an introductory text. Even after reading Russell and Wittgenstein, I had difficulty following Grayling’s exposition at times. But for those who, like me, have at least some background in the subject, this book will be thought-provoking. At the very least, Grayling provides a good counterpoint to all the Wittgenstein evangelists out there.
On a smaller scale, this same oddness is replicated in Grayling’s book: Grayling is writing anti-Wittgenstein Wittgenstein. I’m not sure why he agreed to write this book in the first place. Grayling clearly has a very low opinion of Wittgenstein, and can’t help criticizing him at every turn. After explaining the thesis of the Tractatus, Grayling proceeds to tear it apart; he does the same with the Philosophical Investigations. (To be fair, I actually found many of his criticisms interesting and compelling—if out of place in an introductory text.)
Not only does Grayling disagree with Wittgenstein’s arguments, but he even goes so far as to argue that Wittgenstein’s influence has been greatly overestimated. First, Grayling downplays Wittgenstein’s influence on the Vienna Circle. Then, Grayling characterizes Wittgenstein’s influence on analytic philosophy as a flash in the pan—or at least paltry in comparison with Russell's or Frege's. I really have nothing to say about the accuracy of these claims (although they did seem at least partially politically motivated to me). It should be said, however, that if Wittgenstein did succeed in his stated goal—to dissolve all the old philosophical problems via a critique of language—then philosophy would have ended, which it clearly has not. (Or has it?)
But if Wittgenstein failed in his stated goal, so did Grayling. Parts of this book were too technical for an introductory text. Even after reading Russell and Wittgenstein, I had difficulty following Grayling’s exposition at times. But for those who, like me, have at least some background in the subject, this book will be thought-provoking. At the very least, Grayling provides a good counterpoint to all the Wittgenstein evangelists out there.
June 21, 2019
یک کتاب دیگر از هم ویتگنشتاین دارم، ولی فعلاً از خواندنش منصرف شدم. این کتاب کافی بود. فلسفه متقدم و متأخر ویتگنشتاین، هر دو را مرور میکند. مفهوم، روان و خوشخوان است. برای خوانندهی آشنا به فلسفه چندان پیچیده نیست. از محاسن کتاب نگاه انتقادی آن است. ظاهراً ویتگنشتاین شیفتگانی دارد و گاهی در مورد تأثیرگذاری او در فلسفه اغراق میشود. نویسنده چنین رویکردی را به صورت مستدل نقد میکند.
منظور از ویتگنشتاین مقدم، آرای اولیهی اوست که در کتابی معروف به رساله آمده است. پس از رساله، ویتگنشتاین فلسفه را با وقفهای ده ساله از سر میگیرد و این بار با نقد خود و ارائهی آرایی متفاوت، وینگنشتاین متأخر ظهور میکند. هر اثری که به یکی از این دو ویتگنشتاین نمیپردازد، کامل نیست.
نویسندهی کتاب، ای. سی. گریلینگ، کتابی منسجم و مختصر و مفید نگاشته. مشتاق شدم از قلم او بیشتر بخوانم.
منظور از ویتگنشتاین مقدم، آرای اولیهی اوست که در کتابی معروف به رساله آمده است. پس از رساله، ویتگنشتاین فلسفه را با وقفهای ده ساله از سر میگیرد و این بار با نقد خود و ارائهی آرایی متفاوت، وینگنشتاین متأخر ظهور میکند. هر اثری که به یکی از این دو ویتگنشتاین نمیپردازد، کامل نیست.
نویسندهی کتاب، ای. سی. گریلینگ، کتابی منسجم و مختصر و مفید نگاشته. مشتاق شدم از قلم او بیشتر بخوانم.
March 19, 2018
I'm not sure about this book. It tries to explain wittgenstein. However, I'm not sure if it did. Or if it did a good job.
July 25, 2022
اگر از من بپرسید، تا فلسفه تحلیلی و خصوصا ویتگنشتاین را، به عنوان موثرترین متفکر تحلیلی نخوانید فلسفه نمیدانید. اگر هم نپرسید، این واقعیت است که اکنون در دوران ویتگنشتاینی تفکر آکادمیک به سر میبریم. مثل هر متفکر بزرگ دیگری که اندیشه پس از خود را متحول کردهاند، امروز نیز اندیشه در جدی ترین سطح آکادمیک خود، تحت تاثیر فلاسفه بزرگ معاصر قرار دارد که یکی از آنها و چه بسا مهم ترینشان ویتگنشتاین باشد. هرچند فلاسفه پیشین همچنان به اثر گذاری خود ادامه میدهند، نمیتوان با بی خبری از متاخر ترین تاثرات ژرف اندیشه، خود را نسبت به جریانات آن آگاه دانست. بنابر این در هر حدی که فلسفه میخوانید، ویتگنشتاین بخوانید. این کتاب بینهایت ساده و موجز نوشته شده و ترجمهی بسیار روانی دارد.
مجموعه در آمدی کوتاه بر ... آکسفورد هرچه خواندم یک از یک بهتر بودند. این کتاب هم مثل دیگر کتابهای مجموعه درجه یک بود. در هر زمینه ای که مایل به مطالعه هستید اگر کتابی از این مجموعه در آن باره نوشته شده بود، در خواندنش تردید نکنید. چه ترجمه و چه ترجیحا زبان اصلی
مجموعه در آمدی کوتاه بر ... آکسفورد هرچه خواندم یک از یک بهتر بودند. این کتاب هم مثل دیگر کتابهای مجموعه درجه یک بود. در هر زمینه ای که مایل به مطالعه هستید اگر کتابی از این مجموعه در آن باره نوشته شده بود، در خواندنش تردید نکنید. چه ترجمه و چه ترجیحا زبان اصلی
July 4, 2024
It’s funny that sometimes authors in the Oxford Very Short Introductions series seem to hate their subject (Singer’s famously bad book on Hegel being the prime example) and this volume by A.C. Grayling seems to be another.
Grayling seems to have mostly taken on the project of writing this book as an attempt to puncture the cult of admiration around Wittgenstein, arguing that both Wittgenstein’s earlier and later works are bad philosophizing, and also that his influence is much less pervasive and important than his esteemed place within the canon of philosophy would have us believe. It seems improper to me to write what is clearly a minority view account which sees itself as tackling the dominant view of Wittgenstein in a book that is supposed to be a student’s first introduction.
His very negative view of the influence of Wittgenstein seems flatly wrong frankly, even by his own standards. He says that virtually nobody buys the Wittgenstein’s master cash out, that philosophical problems can be dissolved by close inspection of our language, but at the same time how many people today are orthodox Kantians, let alone orthodox Aristotelians, two philosophers he cites as “important”. Dismissing all discussion of Wittgensteins thought as mere commentary, even when that commentary involves many of the most important figures of analytic philosophy, Davidson, Kripke, Anscombe, Brandom, McDowell and on and on and on feels like somebody venting a personal frustration rather than a well balanced scholarly opinion.
Grayling seems to have mostly taken on the project of writing this book as an attempt to puncture the cult of admiration around Wittgenstein, arguing that both Wittgenstein’s earlier and later works are bad philosophizing, and also that his influence is much less pervasive and important than his esteemed place within the canon of philosophy would have us believe. It seems improper to me to write what is clearly a minority view account which sees itself as tackling the dominant view of Wittgenstein in a book that is supposed to be a student’s first introduction.
His very negative view of the influence of Wittgenstein seems flatly wrong frankly, even by his own standards. He says that virtually nobody buys the Wittgenstein’s master cash out, that philosophical problems can be dissolved by close inspection of our language, but at the same time how many people today are orthodox Kantians, let alone orthodox Aristotelians, two philosophers he cites as “important”. Dismissing all discussion of Wittgensteins thought as mere commentary, even when that commentary involves many of the most important figures of analytic philosophy, Davidson, Kripke, Anscombe, Brandom, McDowell and on and on and on feels like somebody venting a personal frustration rather than a well balanced scholarly opinion.
October 5, 2024
De uitleg van Wittgensteins gedachtegoed was vrij duidelijk en ik was erg blij dat ik stiekem meer over Wittgenstein wist dan ik dacht.
Maar jeetje Grayling is wel een beetje apart... ik was het vaak niet eens met zijn kritiek. Hij denkt dat Wittgenstein niet zo belangrijk is voor de filosofie (?), omdat zijn stijl het gevoel geeft dat er diepgang in zijn gedachten zitten terwijl Wittgensteins filosofie 'vaag' blijft. Grayling laat hiermee zien dat hij een ras analytische filosoof is die er niet goed mee om kan gaan als niet alles duidelijk en helder wordt gedefinieerd. Het feit dat Wittgensteins aforismen in "filosofische onderzoekingen" op meerdere (en soms tegenstrijdige) manieren kunnen worden begrepen wil in mijn ogen niet zeggen dat ze inhoudelijk zwak zijn, maar juist dat de thema's van de ideeën zeer interessant zijn. Misschien is het handig om Wittgenstein als een soort Plato te lezen die aanzet tot nadenken over bepaalde onderwerpen. Maar misschien heeft het mystieke karakter van Wittgenstein en zijn poëtische stijl ook mij om de tuin geleid.
Maar jeetje Grayling is wel een beetje apart... ik was het vaak niet eens met zijn kritiek. Hij denkt dat Wittgenstein niet zo belangrijk is voor de filosofie (?), omdat zijn stijl het gevoel geeft dat er diepgang in zijn gedachten zitten terwijl Wittgensteins filosofie 'vaag' blijft. Grayling laat hiermee zien dat hij een ras analytische filosoof is die er niet goed mee om kan gaan als niet alles duidelijk en helder wordt gedefinieerd. Het feit dat Wittgensteins aforismen in "filosofische onderzoekingen" op meerdere (en soms tegenstrijdige) manieren kunnen worden begrepen wil in mijn ogen niet zeggen dat ze inhoudelijk zwak zijn, maar juist dat de thema's van de ideeën zeer interessant zijn. Misschien is het handig om Wittgenstein als een soort Plato te lezen die aanzet tot nadenken over bepaalde onderwerpen. Maar misschien heeft het mystieke karakter van Wittgenstein en zijn poëtische stijl ook mij om de tuin geleid.
February 17, 2022
Ludwig Wittgenstein is considered to be one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century. It is no doubt that his philosophical understanding has attracted many philosophers and writers as they are more associated with the Anglosaxon philosophical tradition. It is very difficult to enter Wittgenstein's or Heidegger's philosophy for those who have not studied philosophy in their education background before like me. This introductory book is a guide for readers who have not been acquainted with Wittgenstein before. The author explained his main works Tractatus Logico Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations using an understandable language. It's the kind of work I can recommend.
August 26, 2016
It is really quite fascinating, I have been rather interested in Wittgenstein for quite som time, but haven't actually read anything by him (I think I have been daunted by his style, and have also not quite found the time). However, Grayling manages to make me feel like maybe I shouldn't really bother to read him. This should, I think be one of this A Very Short (and Critical) type of introductions. Wittgenstein, in Grayling's view, was certainly not one of the great philosophers of the 20th century, not in terms of influence, neither in terms of insightful ideas. He was, however, very good at creating disciples.
Having said that, I think that one reason for Grayling's conclusion is that his purpose is to place Wittgenstein within the analytic tradition, that Wittgenstein himself saw himself to belong (I think). But maybe Wittgenstein's influence has been more outside of that tradition, and in a way, outside of philosophy over all. In theology for example Wittgenstein's idea about language influenced the postliberal school immensely.
If, which I think I will, I come to read Wittgenstein, I think I will limit myself to On Certainty, and probably his Philosophical Investigations. Grayling was very critical to Wittgenstein's lack of connection between language and reality (if I remember correctly), yet hasn't that idea had an great influence in the continental school? Even if it probably doesn't derive exclusively from Wittgenstein? Also, I would like to understand how Wittgenstein thought about rules, following rules, public language, and about meaning in connection with truth as well. All these are areas which I think Grayling does a good job in introducing and explaining, yet I don't think I managed to follow exactly what Wittgenstein might have meant.
Having said that, I think that one reason for Grayling's conclusion is that his purpose is to place Wittgenstein within the analytic tradition, that Wittgenstein himself saw himself to belong (I think). But maybe Wittgenstein's influence has been more outside of that tradition, and in a way, outside of philosophy over all. In theology for example Wittgenstein's idea about language influenced the postliberal school immensely.
If, which I think I will, I come to read Wittgenstein, I think I will limit myself to On Certainty, and probably his Philosophical Investigations. Grayling was very critical to Wittgenstein's lack of connection between language and reality (if I remember correctly), yet hasn't that idea had an great influence in the continental school? Even if it probably doesn't derive exclusively from Wittgenstein? Also, I would like to understand how Wittgenstein thought about rules, following rules, public language, and about meaning in connection with truth as well. All these are areas which I think Grayling does a good job in introducing and explaining, yet I don't think I managed to follow exactly what Wittgenstein might have meant.
January 27, 2016
Good introduction and helps clear out misunderstandings. However, I think the author is mistaken on the impact Wittgenstein's Tractatus had on logical positivism as a whole. He severely downplays its influence on the movement, to the point of reducing the work to a mere historical curiosity. His reasoning is that the ideas of the Vienna Circle drastically differed from Wittgenstein's own views, particularly in the areas of ethics and religion. Is this what "influence" means to Grayling? By that standard, we might be led to say that Hegel's influence on philosophy was at best minimal since mainstream contemporary philosophy is mostly a reaction against his writings. But such an analysis leads us astray from the truth of things, which is Wittgenstein's undeniable, ominous influence on modern empiricism. Even if we complied with Grayling's understanding of "influential impact", dismissing Wittgenstein's Tractatus is just bad history.
Nevertheless, Grayling has a thorough understanding of Wittgenstein, and his analysis of the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations are great. However, one must remain skeptical about his historical claims.
Nevertheless, Grayling has a thorough understanding of Wittgenstein, and his analysis of the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations are great. However, one must remain skeptical about his historical claims.
November 14, 2016
Kitap orijinalinde bir giriş kitabı (introduction) olarak geçse de tam olarak bir giriş kitabının gereklerini yerine getirememiş: Düşünürün serüvenindeki temel mevzuları açmak ve belki etkilerini tartışmak yerine yazarın seçtiği bazı konulara fokuslanıp özellikle de ikinci kısımda bol bol yazarın sesini duyuyoruz, Grayling "Kısaca Benim Wittgensteinım" dese kitabın adına, daha makul olurmuş.
Erken dönem Wittgenstein'ı iyi toparlasa da geç dönem Wittgenstein kısmında Grayling'in Wittgenstein'a bir hayli kıl olan sesini çok duyuyoruz; burada da isabetsiz yorumlar başlıyor. Wittgenstein'ın çalışmalarına analitik yaklaşma çabası da etik ve din felsefesi meselelerinden uzaklaştırıp kuru bir valid-invalid argüman okumasından başka bir yere çıkmamış. Adamın kemikleri sızlıyordur herhalde, bu Viyanacılar yüzünden.
Sonuç kısmında da Grayling zaten Wittgenstein 20. yüzyılın önemli düşünürlerinden biri değildir diyerek bana bi E YUH YANİ dedirtti.
Erken dönem Wittgenstein'ı iyi toparlasa da geç dönem Wittgenstein kısmında Grayling'in Wittgenstein'a bir hayli kıl olan sesini çok duyuyoruz; burada da isabetsiz yorumlar başlıyor. Wittgenstein'ın çalışmalarına analitik yaklaşma çabası da etik ve din felsefesi meselelerinden uzaklaştırıp kuru bir valid-invalid argüman okumasından başka bir yere çıkmamış. Adamın kemikleri sızlıyordur herhalde, bu Viyanacılar yüzünden.
Sonuç kısmında da Grayling zaten Wittgenstein 20. yüzyılın önemli düşünürlerinden biri değildir diyerek bana bi E YUH YANİ dedirtti.
September 30, 2024
I have concerns about why an introductory book is written by a thinker opposed to the subject. While this approach can be a valuable way to engage with any philosopher, it becomes strange and uncomfortable when the writer is overtly from the opposing side, creating ambiguity in how they approach the subject matter. I'm not suggesting that these texts should be written by blind supporters or that the writer must accept every assumption of the philosopher in question, as that would be equally problematic. Despite his immediate critiques, however, Grayling provides a clear overall trajectory of Wittgenstein's evolving thought. Yet, being immersed in his constant rejections makes the process by which he presents his interpretations questionable, leaving the reader with a sinking feeling.
April 16, 2016
The book provides a balanced although too concise a summary of Wittgenstein's work. The pace is a bit hurried but the main problem is that the author's own conclusions are almost self-defeatingly critical rather than constructive. One is almost made to feel why one even went through the book or the author bothered to narrate if the entire Wittgenstein work had so little to offer. The reality is that from this book too one gets a lot of insights as long as one thinks beyond conclusions provided by the author.
Wittgenstein was on to something radical and massively powerful with Tractatus, although the framework developed was too rigid to be of much use. His later work, instead of modifying the earlier - the work that must have appeared more and more restrictive to Wittgenstein himself - turned almost antagonistic and moved to the other extreme. To this reviewer, the subjective framework of the inconclusive second half of his work was far less useful in furthering the Philosophical Investigations. This summary book explains the early work well and lays the ground for readers to consider what more could have been done with those foundations. While I have got the review space, let me elaborate what I have come up with.
Early Wittgenstein had a brilliant, original idea: solutions to at least some of the Philosophical problems is dependent on the language we have. Actually, Wittgenstein's own conclusion was different and restrictive: there is only one type of language structure and this language structure will only be able to answer certain types of queries and none other. Fools - like the celebrated thinkers over centuries - keep running around in circles trying to find answers to life's profound mysteries without realising that the language structure we have prevent any definitive answers to those problems that fall just outside the realm of natural sciences. I think the great Philosopher was just a few steps away from a good new theory that could have yielded even greater results. The construct he had for a “Language” was certainly inadequate and dissatisfying as he himself proved, but he was on the right path.
Simplistically, and in the most amateurish way put, the main premise set by Wittgenstein is that the reality we sentients perceive is within the Language we have. May be there is something which is transcendental - they could be our innermost feelings like pain or the actual universe beyond our perceptions - but not only what we perceive, communicate, share but also modify, alter or analyse is defined by the structures of Language we deploy. Wittgenstein's error was in insisting that the real Language is of only one type, based on the constructs or "Pictures of Reality" which have either 0 or 1 as the Truth Value while describing various terms and interrelations.
If Wittgenstein had considered different forms of Languages, with the one he had as one of the most basic forms, he could have linked what sort of solutions could be attempted within the confines of different forms. It is easy to understand this when we think about what Java can create that Pascal or Python cannot or what Calculus can answer that Linear Algebra cannot. There are answers which are available when we use the right language. There are problems we can solve if we work on the languages in which we need to pose them (say the Matrix Math and Uncertainty Principle). If we want to build AI, we need a different Neural Network language.
There are practical and theoretical uses if Philosophy works with the Language at the base of what can be answered rather than get lost - like philosophers for many millennia - because they did not understand the limitations of the tools they were using. “All I write is False” is a typical example of most things Philosophers debated endlessly because they did not think about the role played by the structure of Language. Early Wittgenstein threw light on this and that's why he was a genius.
Language is something that allows us to express some model of perceived or artificially formed reality. To a degree, all our interactions and all but the most basic abilities and knowledge are made possible by our ability to develop and use different types of Language. With a proper study of these forms of Language, we will develop tools consciously rather than rely on the accidental evolutions of things like branches of Mathematics or programming languages to understand and alter the realities around us.
Some last thoughts on these higher forms: the most basic language - like Math - is good in natural sciences although it too needs to involve randomness rather than keep working from the Truth Value of 0 or 1 to appreciate the science that is at the base of our world. The fuzziness involved assumes greater complexity when one is trying to explain a rule-based system: effectively a Language form where the precepts have Truth values of not just 0 or 1 or something in between but could have assigned values because of the norms, practices or regulations of the society the Language form is addressing. For example, Natural Sciences alone cannot drive the railway traffic flawlessly on tracks. To explain or build such a system, we need a Language that assigns Truth Values arbitrarily set by the makers or the society. Other forms of Languages could throw in utility values or emotional values and the likes. The "higher" forms would be naturally less objective and more relativistic, but one would get great insights on what is answerable under what Language forms through a systematic study of the structures.
The book makes one think which is its utility!
Wittgenstein was on to something radical and massively powerful with Tractatus, although the framework developed was too rigid to be of much use. His later work, instead of modifying the earlier - the work that must have appeared more and more restrictive to Wittgenstein himself - turned almost antagonistic and moved to the other extreme. To this reviewer, the subjective framework of the inconclusive second half of his work was far less useful in furthering the Philosophical Investigations. This summary book explains the early work well and lays the ground for readers to consider what more could have been done with those foundations. While I have got the review space, let me elaborate what I have come up with.
Early Wittgenstein had a brilliant, original idea: solutions to at least some of the Philosophical problems is dependent on the language we have. Actually, Wittgenstein's own conclusion was different and restrictive: there is only one type of language structure and this language structure will only be able to answer certain types of queries and none other. Fools - like the celebrated thinkers over centuries - keep running around in circles trying to find answers to life's profound mysteries without realising that the language structure we have prevent any definitive answers to those problems that fall just outside the realm of natural sciences. I think the great Philosopher was just a few steps away from a good new theory that could have yielded even greater results. The construct he had for a “Language” was certainly inadequate and dissatisfying as he himself proved, but he was on the right path.
Simplistically, and in the most amateurish way put, the main premise set by Wittgenstein is that the reality we sentients perceive is within the Language we have. May be there is something which is transcendental - they could be our innermost feelings like pain or the actual universe beyond our perceptions - but not only what we perceive, communicate, share but also modify, alter or analyse is defined by the structures of Language we deploy. Wittgenstein's error was in insisting that the real Language is of only one type, based on the constructs or "Pictures of Reality" which have either 0 or 1 as the Truth Value while describing various terms and interrelations.
If Wittgenstein had considered different forms of Languages, with the one he had as one of the most basic forms, he could have linked what sort of solutions could be attempted within the confines of different forms. It is easy to understand this when we think about what Java can create that Pascal or Python cannot or what Calculus can answer that Linear Algebra cannot. There are answers which are available when we use the right language. There are problems we can solve if we work on the languages in which we need to pose them (say the Matrix Math and Uncertainty Principle). If we want to build AI, we need a different Neural Network language.
There are practical and theoretical uses if Philosophy works with the Language at the base of what can be answered rather than get lost - like philosophers for many millennia - because they did not understand the limitations of the tools they were using. “All I write is False” is a typical example of most things Philosophers debated endlessly because they did not think about the role played by the structure of Language. Early Wittgenstein threw light on this and that's why he was a genius.
Language is something that allows us to express some model of perceived or artificially formed reality. To a degree, all our interactions and all but the most basic abilities and knowledge are made possible by our ability to develop and use different types of Language. With a proper study of these forms of Language, we will develop tools consciously rather than rely on the accidental evolutions of things like branches of Mathematics or programming languages to understand and alter the realities around us.
Some last thoughts on these higher forms: the most basic language - like Math - is good in natural sciences although it too needs to involve randomness rather than keep working from the Truth Value of 0 or 1 to appreciate the science that is at the base of our world. The fuzziness involved assumes greater complexity when one is trying to explain a rule-based system: effectively a Language form where the precepts have Truth values of not just 0 or 1 or something in between but could have assigned values because of the norms, practices or regulations of the society the Language form is addressing. For example, Natural Sciences alone cannot drive the railway traffic flawlessly on tracks. To explain or build such a system, we need a Language that assigns Truth Values arbitrarily set by the makers or the society. Other forms of Languages could throw in utility values or emotional values and the likes. The "higher" forms would be naturally less objective and more relativistic, but one would get great insights on what is answerable under what Language forms through a systematic study of the structures.
The book makes one think which is its utility!
July 9, 2019
It's easier read than VSI:Hegel. Perhaps, the latter is either sophisticated or I'm not used to reading such. While I'm reading it and checking out other review, I got intimidated by the fact that the expressive logic might not easy catch for me. But it's not the case. Surprisingly, the author did not try to persuade us to read Wittgenstein's.
April 26, 2022
Good introduction to his thought. Grayling's commentary was easy to read and follow. Seems to be one of the popular starting points perhaps for the postmodern interest in the nature of language.
August 18, 2025
Five stars for his detailed, point-by-point interpretation of the TRACTACUS. Four stars for the rest. His evaluation of Wittgenstein's theory of language seems immediatley plausible to me.
August 17, 2023
One of Grayling’s best-written books, though it is interesting that his opinion of Wittgenstein is actually quite dim
February 21, 2025
If you're going to write a book about Wittgenstein which is touted as an "introduction" then you ought to know what Wittgenstein actually said.
The first chapter is a dry biography with a handful of biographical errors.
For example, he says Wittgenstein read "some of Schopenhauer" which is a colossal understatement. He says that "He was by no means a scholar; he did not study the classic philosophers carefully". Apparently being a scholar means studying "classic philosophers carefully" and this is not even right anyway, Wittgenstein studied Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Goethe, Kant, etc. very carefully.
Moving on to chapter 2 on his "early philosophy" Grayling says:
"Almost all those who have contributed to philosophy throughout its history have agreed that the matters mentioned above — existence, knowledge, truth, value — are deeply important; and it is upon this consensus that the philosophical debate, which has gone on at least since classical antiquity, has been based. Wittgenstein runs against this current. His view is that the proper task of philosophy is not one of engagement with the issues mentioned, for in his opinion they involve illusory problems which arise as a result of misunderstandings about language. The proper task of philosophy, he says, is to make the nature of our thought and talk clear, for then the traditional problems of philosophy will be recognized as spurious and will accordingly vanish."
This is a ridiculous statement, for one, that "engagement" and the belief that they involve "illusory problems which arise as a result of misunderstandings about language" is somehow mutually exclusive is incorrect. Secondly, that they involve "illusory problems" in no way means they aren't "deeply important", if they weren't then you'd wonder why he even bothered to spend time in the Tractatus discussing the nature of 'value' for example.
Grayling appears to think that unless you have his view (the metaphilosophy he holds) you just must not think these issues are important for some reason, and engagement also for some reason only involves engagement according to his own metaphilosophical standards.
He also greatly exaggerates any change of mind Wittgenstein had when propounding his "early philosophy" and then his "latter philosophy". For whatever reason when discussing the influence of Wittgenstein's early philosophy he ignores its influence on Frank Ramsey.
There are some other factual inaccuracies too regarding the logical positivists. Grayling says for them 'metaphysics' was a synonym for 'nonsense', which is wrong. He ignores Wittgenstein's influence on Carnap too, and greatly underrepresents his influence on Schlick who looked on Wittgenstein as a kind of philosophical god. Most glaringly he says that the Vienna Circle influenced Wittgenstein more than he influenced them and that they converted him to a kind of Positivist. Zero evidence is presented for this of course (because it could not possibly be found).
He says: "At least part of the impetus to Wittgenstein's later philosophy is accordingly the result of his learning from the Positivists what he could no longer agree with in his own earlier work."
What's so strange about this, is that in Philosophical Investigations (the preface) he explains that his discussions with people like Frank Ramsey and Piero Sraffa made him realise this. So it's not as though Wittgenstein made things in anyway difficult for Grayling here, but nonetheless he makes the error.
Interspersed between all these errors are Grayling's inane remarks which are really sophomoric criticisms of Wittgenstein's philosophy, or perhaps more carefully stated as what he thinks is Wittgenstein's philosophy. One which takes the cake is the claim that personal names, conjunctions, and prepositions have no meaning.
If you want to understand Wittgenstein then skip this and go read Peter Hacker for example.
The first chapter is a dry biography with a handful of biographical errors.
For example, he says Wittgenstein read "some of Schopenhauer" which is a colossal understatement. He says that "He was by no means a scholar; he did not study the classic philosophers carefully". Apparently being a scholar means studying "classic philosophers carefully" and this is not even right anyway, Wittgenstein studied Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Goethe, Kant, etc. very carefully.
Moving on to chapter 2 on his "early philosophy" Grayling says:
"Almost all those who have contributed to philosophy throughout its history have agreed that the matters mentioned above — existence, knowledge, truth, value — are deeply important; and it is upon this consensus that the philosophical debate, which has gone on at least since classical antiquity, has been based. Wittgenstein runs against this current. His view is that the proper task of philosophy is not one of engagement with the issues mentioned, for in his opinion they involve illusory problems which arise as a result of misunderstandings about language. The proper task of philosophy, he says, is to make the nature of our thought and talk clear, for then the traditional problems of philosophy will be recognized as spurious and will accordingly vanish."
This is a ridiculous statement, for one, that "engagement" and the belief that they involve "illusory problems which arise as a result of misunderstandings about language" is somehow mutually exclusive is incorrect. Secondly, that they involve "illusory problems" in no way means they aren't "deeply important", if they weren't then you'd wonder why he even bothered to spend time in the Tractatus discussing the nature of 'value' for example.
Grayling appears to think that unless you have his view (the metaphilosophy he holds) you just must not think these issues are important for some reason, and engagement also for some reason only involves engagement according to his own metaphilosophical standards.
He also greatly exaggerates any change of mind Wittgenstein had when propounding his "early philosophy" and then his "latter philosophy". For whatever reason when discussing the influence of Wittgenstein's early philosophy he ignores its influence on Frank Ramsey.
There are some other factual inaccuracies too regarding the logical positivists. Grayling says for them 'metaphysics' was a synonym for 'nonsense', which is wrong. He ignores Wittgenstein's influence on Carnap too, and greatly underrepresents his influence on Schlick who looked on Wittgenstein as a kind of philosophical god. Most glaringly he says that the Vienna Circle influenced Wittgenstein more than he influenced them and that they converted him to a kind of Positivist. Zero evidence is presented for this of course (because it could not possibly be found).
He says: "At least part of the impetus to Wittgenstein's later philosophy is accordingly the result of his learning from the Positivists what he could no longer agree with in his own earlier work."
What's so strange about this, is that in Philosophical Investigations (the preface) he explains that his discussions with people like Frank Ramsey and Piero Sraffa made him realise this. So it's not as though Wittgenstein made things in anyway difficult for Grayling here, but nonetheless he makes the error.
Interspersed between all these errors are Grayling's inane remarks which are really sophomoric criticisms of Wittgenstein's philosophy, or perhaps more carefully stated as what he thinks is Wittgenstein's philosophy. One which takes the cake is the claim that personal names, conjunctions, and prepositions have no meaning.
If you want to understand Wittgenstein then skip this and go read Peter Hacker for example.
April 26, 2025
Grayling gives decent summaries of Wittgenstein’s early and late philosophy. But his forays into history go astray, and his criticisms rely on simplistic misreadings.
December 4, 2016
Wittgenstein is considered by many the most profound philosopher in the 20th century. Which is ironic, because Wittgenstein thought most of what is called philosophy is pure garbage and originates from our misunderstanding of how language works. He thought if we understood language properly, the problems of philosophy would 'dissolve', instead of being resolved.
Wittgenstein was a classic mysterious philosopher character. Born in a very wealthy family in Austria, he lost his appetite for wealth after fighting in the first world war, and gave away his fortunes to his siblings. He led an ascetic life since. The only degree he had in life was a PhD. He was home schooled in his childhood, and didn't finish any of the colleges he enrolled into. He finally got his PhD from Cambridge for his manuscript of 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'. In his entire life, he has had various professions ranging from schoolteacher, gardener, architect, and finally a college professor. He read very little of ancient philosophy, as he considered them mostly vacuous. And he despised academic philosophy and dissuaded his students to come in the academic career.
He published only one book in his lifetime, and one other book was published posthumously in his name. Funny thing is, in his later life he changed the core tenets of his early philosophy. You don't see it in philosophers many often. In his early life, he wrote with mathematical rigor, terse and precise, and had little time for lyrical beauty. In his later life, however, his writings were more diffuse, unsystematic and obscure.
Wittgenstein basically said that the structure and logic of language restricts the meaningful questions we can ask in philosophy. Most of the philosophical questions will seem nonsense if we rigorously scrutinize them under the microscope of linguistic logic. As most questions are nonsense, the answers to these questions will also be nonsense. We cannot meaningfully talk a about them.
Thence he pronounced his famous quotation: 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent'. This does not mean, however, that those questions are not important. Indeed, Wittgenstein argued, the questions about which we cannot talk about are the most profound questions. In this regard, I think he echoes Eastern sages like Buddha or Lao Tzu, who proclaimed that thoughts and languages are inherently limited in capacity and the ultimate can't be expressed in language.
Unfortunately, this book was hardly readable for the most part. Lengthy convoluted sentences are abound through the book with little lucidity. I'm only not ratting it one star to pay some homage to Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein was a classic mysterious philosopher character. Born in a very wealthy family in Austria, he lost his appetite for wealth after fighting in the first world war, and gave away his fortunes to his siblings. He led an ascetic life since. The only degree he had in life was a PhD. He was home schooled in his childhood, and didn't finish any of the colleges he enrolled into. He finally got his PhD from Cambridge for his manuscript of 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'. In his entire life, he has had various professions ranging from schoolteacher, gardener, architect, and finally a college professor. He read very little of ancient philosophy, as he considered them mostly vacuous. And he despised academic philosophy and dissuaded his students to come in the academic career.
He published only one book in his lifetime, and one other book was published posthumously in his name. Funny thing is, in his later life he changed the core tenets of his early philosophy. You don't see it in philosophers many often. In his early life, he wrote with mathematical rigor, terse and precise, and had little time for lyrical beauty. In his later life, however, his writings were more diffuse, unsystematic and obscure.
Wittgenstein basically said that the structure and logic of language restricts the meaningful questions we can ask in philosophy. Most of the philosophical questions will seem nonsense if we rigorously scrutinize them under the microscope of linguistic logic. As most questions are nonsense, the answers to these questions will also be nonsense. We cannot meaningfully talk a about them.
Thence he pronounced his famous quotation: 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent'. This does not mean, however, that those questions are not important. Indeed, Wittgenstein argued, the questions about which we cannot talk about are the most profound questions. In this regard, I think he echoes Eastern sages like Buddha or Lao Tzu, who proclaimed that thoughts and languages are inherently limited in capacity and the ultimate can't be expressed in language.
Unfortunately, this book was hardly readable for the most part. Lengthy convoluted sentences are abound through the book with little lucidity. I'm only not ratting it one star to pay some homage to Wittgenstein.
January 11, 2014
Grayling provides a brief biography, an analysis of Wittgenstein’s early work, “The Tractatus,” and analysis of his later work mainly the “philosophical Investigations” and lastly a look at Wittgenstein’s influence. As I had little knowledge of Wittgenstein (okay I admit my ignorance) and wanted an overview this book did exactly what I wished for. It provided me a general understanding of what Wittgenstein argued and a brief background of information about him. Wittgenstein’s main concern is with language and how our use of language leads to philosophical problems. If you are like me and wanted a brief overview and understanding this book will do the job. I read this book as an audio book. Kyle Munley did a good job narrating the book.
July 26, 2011
great intro to (or refresher on, if it's been a while) wittgenstein. esp. useful if you don't want to have to slog your way through the tractatus, since he ultimately rejects the position he takes in that book. there's no substitute for reading the investigations--however, this intro could be a useful guide for someone reading the investigations for the first time outside of a classroom setting.
September 5, 2021
This book is precisely an example of why it's much better to have longer summaries, especially on complex topics. There are cases where shorter explanation means longer time to understand and vice versa. I used to read many intro chapters (in philosophy books) about LW and I thought I kind of understood. But this book makes everything much clearer, written by a famous philosopher no less.
Grayling wrote 2 long chapters - one on LW's thought around the time of Tractatus and one around Philosophical Investigations, and both have much detail, pros and cons, and clear line of reasoning so that it's as if you're reading LW's book yourself. It's not the easiest read but anyone should be able to get through it.
This book made me realize what made LW is so special. The Tractatus is basically an account of how human language corresponds to reality as a construction of reality inside our mind, just like how a musical notation corresponds to real music. Philosophical Investigations is rather disjointed but contains many profound remarks.
One I find most interesting is him pointing out that there is no such thing as a private language. Language is a system of shared symbols that are learned in the course of someone's life. He seems to imply that there is nothing innate about it. This leads to a profound remark about Descartes' "I think Therefore I am" in which LW implied that there is one thing Descartes missed in that remark. My personal existence is not the only certain thing you can deduce from that statement. You also have language rules! The fact that you have existing language rules that you learn beforehand in the context of your interaction with other people shows that other people exists! LW also had some funny debates with G.E.Moore in which the latter tries to make fun of Descartes by writing a satitical paper expressing Moore's conviction about the existence of other things than his own existence, such as his two hands, two legs, and so on. LW responded by saying that Moore has no need to respond to Descartes - " I think therefore I am" is a stupid thing only said by philosophers, while other people are sure about their own existence. We cannot doubt unless we are sure about other things that we take as existing frameworks of reality. If we doubt everything then there is no reality. Doubt to knowledge is almost like hate to love, it's another kind of manifestation.
I like LW's attitude to philosophy in his later years, in which he thought of it as a sickness. Questions have answers and it is his duty to elucidate these questions so people can finally realize their mistake in thinking and quit philosophy. I've known a couple of examples where promising philosophers decided against being a philosopher after such an advice by LW.
Nevertheless, I still feel he's too obsessed with language. There are genuine philosophical problems, right? Not everything can be clear once you explain away some language misunderstanding. But maybe he's right. There are many deeper books about language, to which this intro book has awakened my interest.
Grayling wrote 2 long chapters - one on LW's thought around the time of Tractatus and one around Philosophical Investigations, and both have much detail, pros and cons, and clear line of reasoning so that it's as if you're reading LW's book yourself. It's not the easiest read but anyone should be able to get through it.
This book made me realize what made LW is so special. The Tractatus is basically an account of how human language corresponds to reality as a construction of reality inside our mind, just like how a musical notation corresponds to real music. Philosophical Investigations is rather disjointed but contains many profound remarks.
One I find most interesting is him pointing out that there is no such thing as a private language. Language is a system of shared symbols that are learned in the course of someone's life. He seems to imply that there is nothing innate about it. This leads to a profound remark about Descartes' "I think Therefore I am" in which LW implied that there is one thing Descartes missed in that remark. My personal existence is not the only certain thing you can deduce from that statement. You also have language rules! The fact that you have existing language rules that you learn beforehand in the context of your interaction with other people shows that other people exists! LW also had some funny debates with G.E.Moore in which the latter tries to make fun of Descartes by writing a satitical paper expressing Moore's conviction about the existence of other things than his own existence, such as his two hands, two legs, and so on. LW responded by saying that Moore has no need to respond to Descartes - " I think therefore I am" is a stupid thing only said by philosophers, while other people are sure about their own existence. We cannot doubt unless we are sure about other things that we take as existing frameworks of reality. If we doubt everything then there is no reality. Doubt to knowledge is almost like hate to love, it's another kind of manifestation.
I like LW's attitude to philosophy in his later years, in which he thought of it as a sickness. Questions have answers and it is his duty to elucidate these questions so people can finally realize their mistake in thinking and quit philosophy. I've known a couple of examples where promising philosophers decided against being a philosopher after such an advice by LW.
Nevertheless, I still feel he's too obsessed with language. There are genuine philosophical problems, right? Not everything can be clear once you explain away some language misunderstanding. But maybe he's right. There are many deeper books about language, to which this intro book has awakened my interest.
March 15, 2021
I was very disappointed with this book. My experience with the Oxford University Press “Very Short Introductions” series is that they are understandable by the general public. Sometimes bits here and there are more challenging but they are usually generally suitable for a lay reader. The first 30 or so pages of this book fall into that category, as do the last 30 or so pages. But the middle 60 pages were, to me, completely incomprehensible.
I’m mystified that there are so many good reviews for this book on Goodreads. I would really like to know if *anyone* found the middle of this book understandable - not counting those who already have some pretty good background in analytic philosophy, or had covered Wittgenstein in a college course already, or had already spent some considerable amount of effort studying him already. Fine if this book makes people in those categories happy - but it shouldn’t have been included in a series that purports to make ideas available to “anyone” (OUP’s term, in the front matter of the book).
I’m mystified that there are so many good reviews for this book on Goodreads. I would really like to know if *anyone* found the middle of this book understandable - not counting those who already have some pretty good background in analytic philosophy, or had covered Wittgenstein in a college course already, or had already spent some considerable amount of effort studying him already. Fine if this book makes people in those categories happy - but it shouldn’t have been included in a series that purports to make ideas available to “anyone” (OUP’s term, in the front matter of the book).
December 10, 2020
Does a great job of discussing the basic tenets of Wittgenstein while simultaneously downplaying his significance.
What could otherwise have been an excellent book is tarnished by the author's repeated attempt to attack the subject or to point out how meaningless his work is or how his later work disproves his earlier work or how his disciples did more than him or... It's too bad as it seems Grayling knows and loves the material. The VSI series is really too short for that much critical response. Though, the whole X in 90 Minutes series suffers from this, so maybe I'm just too critical myself.
Nonetheless, still worth the read or listen.
What could otherwise have been an excellent book is tarnished by the author's repeated attempt to attack the subject or to point out how meaningless his work is or how his later work disproves his earlier work or how his disciples did more than him or... It's too bad as it seems Grayling knows and loves the material. The VSI series is really too short for that much critical response. Though, the whole X in 90 Minutes series suffers from this, so maybe I'm just too critical myself.
Nonetheless, still worth the read or listen.
December 25, 2020
As a very short introduction, it is not simplified enough to be understandable by laypeople. As a historical narrative of Wittgenstein, it downplays his historical importance. As Wittgensteinian scholarship, it fails to engage with relevant secondary resources, and it does not abide by the principle of charity in its criticisms. Nevertheless, Grayling does not misunderstand Wittgenstein, which is a difficult challenge itself, and so he manages to introduce the philosophy, though not the philosopher, quite well.
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