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The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young Republic
In 1801, with the first change of administration under the Constitution, the thorny question of the role of the judiciary could no longer be avoided. In an important new assessment of the Jeffersonian period, Richard E. Ellis examines the question of the relationship of an independent judiciary to the development of American democracy in one of its earliest phases: the struggle that took place over the judiciary on both the national and state level during the Jeffersonian era.
Mr. Ellis discusses the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, the background of the Marbury v. Madison decision, and the impeachment trials of Judges John Pickering and Samuel Chase. He goes on to analyze the debate over judicial reform in the states between 1796 and 1808, focussing on key developments in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts and re-evaluating the role of radicals and moderates in both parties. The constitutional issues at stake are fully explored here for the first time in their political context--the context in which the participants themselves saw them.
In a concluding section, Mr. Ellis links his findings to the broad question of law and society in post-revolutionary America and its implications for a redefinition of Jeffersonian democracy.
Mr. Ellis discusses the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, the background of the Marbury v. Madison decision, and the impeachment trials of Judges John Pickering and Samuel Chase. He goes on to analyze the debate over judicial reform in the states between 1796 and 1808, focussing on key developments in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts and re-evaluating the role of radicals and moderates in both parties. The constitutional issues at stake are fully explored here for the first time in their political context--the context in which the participants themselves saw them.
In a concluding section, Mr. Ellis links his findings to the broad question of law and society in post-revolutionary America and its implications for a redefinition of Jeffersonian democracy.
- GenresHistory
376 pages, Paperback
First published April 15, 1971
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About the author
Richard E. Ellis
7 books1 followerRichard E. Ellis was a history professor at the University at Buffalo, where he taught from 1974 until 2009. He earned his bachelor's degree from the University of Wisconsin, Madison and both his master's degree (1961) and his Ph.D. (1969) from the University of California, Berkley.
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April 17, 2014
In 1787, Richard Spraight wrote a friend, “If the judiciary acted as a check on legislature, then who was to act as a check on the judiciary?” Ring a bell? It would seem there are so many basic conflicts inherent in our system that we have yet to resolve. Ellis focuses on the relationship of judicial power, (basically self arrogated) to American democracy and how it developed during the formative years. He see the struggle as between political moderates and extremists rather than from the traditional Federalist v Republican viewpoint.
Typically, before the revolution, the judiciary was the branch of government that affected people the most intimately and often violence broke out when the King tampered with the system. Most magistrates (except in Rhode Island and Connecticut) were political appointees and beholden to the governor so the result was a form of oligarchy. The Articles of Confederation made no provision for the judiciary its loose structure leaving virtually everything up to the states. The new Constitution hammered together in 1787 created a national court but had them riding the circuit.
Since Washington and Adams were Federalists, they naturally used the appointive powers, to assign mostly Federalists to open judicial slots and these began making decisions which infuriated the Anti-Federalists, represented by Jefferson and the Republicans. Especially when they upheld the Alien and Sedition Acts, an early preview of the Patriot Act. Despite their professed abhorrence for political parties, by 1800, there were already well-defined partisan groups.
I remain astonished by how little has changed. Following the election of 1800, the Republican party split as they now had to administer government. “With victory secured, the problem of developing positive policies soon made it clear that the party was composed of different groups holding conflicting and irreconcilable attitudes toward the way government should be administered.” The Old Republicans, agrarian and anti-federalist saw the win as a moral victory, they had overthrown the sinful monarchist Federalists and now had a chance to undo the damage caused by the likes of Washington, Adams, and Hamilton who had accumulated far too much power in the central government. Their goal was to gain control of the judiciary, pass multiple amendments to the constitution, and assure that the Federalists would never again gain control. The other wing of the party was less concerned about strong government per se, only its misuse. They wanted to “reclaim, rather than to punish,” in the words of John Hunter to James Madison.
A fine example of the quandary everyone found themselves in is the case of the impeachment of Judge Pickering. A man who had clearly gone insane, would appear on the bench drunk and making judgments everyone agreed were ridiculous, no one knew how to get rid of him. Impeachment was problematic because insanity didn't meet the definition of *high crimes and misdemeanors* so the Federalists, of which he was one, argued at his impeachment trial that since he was insane he couldn't be removed while the "Republicans were forced into the difficult position of claiming that Pickering was in his right mind.This did not please the moderate Republicans, among whom there was considerable reluctance about convicting a mental incompetent.," and they knew it was but a short step for any executive then to eliminate the opposition by a simple declaration of mental incompetence. Thus was the Constitution of no help whatsoever and the divisiveness of parties simply made things worse as allegiances hardened.
The impeachment trial of Associate Justice Samuel Chase revealed the political role of impeachment and also the invalidity of adopting an uncompromising and rigid stance on issues, positions that may yet come to haunt the current Tea Party. Chase had certainly acted intemperately, delivering clearly biased charges to the jury in cases where he used the Alien and Sedition Acts to punish Republican spokesmen, most notably James Callender. Jefferson, ever the consummate politician, realized the need for moderation and compromise and philosophically he understood the importance of an independent judiciary, a judiciary dominated by Federalists thanks to John Adams. His chief antagonist was to be John Randolph, agrarian states rights true believer, who was appalled and infuriated by the Yazoo Compromise. It was Randolph who concocted the articles of impeachment against Chase by going beyond the textual justification for impeachment in the Constitution in an effort to set a precedent for removing a sitting justice that was clearly politically motivated. He badly mishandled the case and was up against Chase, a not inconsequential jurist who hired some brilliant lawyers and they devastated Randolph in the trial presided over by Aaron Burr (who had his own reasons for not wanting to see Chase impeached - but that's another story.) Jefferson, too, had his reasons for wanting to humiliate Randolph, formerly a great supporter as he realized the importance of the mercantile economy developing in New England and he wanted to get elected to a second term.
Ultimately, "the most important explanation for Chase's exoneration, however is to be found in the struggle between moderate and radical Republicans for domination of the party. The differences were fundamental, and they left little room for compromise." Randolph's parting shot was to move for a Constitutional amendment that would permit the removal of a sitting federal judge by the president with the majority concurrence of both Houses of Congress. (Precedents existed in several state constitutions.) By this time Randolph had been thoroughly discredited and his measure went down as the House postponed it to the oblivion of committee.
I suspect the Republican Party today may be in for similar convulsions should they achieve the reins of power. (Written before the election.)
Typically, before the revolution, the judiciary was the branch of government that affected people the most intimately and often violence broke out when the King tampered with the system. Most magistrates (except in Rhode Island and Connecticut) were political appointees and beholden to the governor so the result was a form of oligarchy. The Articles of Confederation made no provision for the judiciary its loose structure leaving virtually everything up to the states. The new Constitution hammered together in 1787 created a national court but had them riding the circuit.
Since Washington and Adams were Federalists, they naturally used the appointive powers, to assign mostly Federalists to open judicial slots and these began making decisions which infuriated the Anti-Federalists, represented by Jefferson and the Republicans. Especially when they upheld the Alien and Sedition Acts, an early preview of the Patriot Act. Despite their professed abhorrence for political parties, by 1800, there were already well-defined partisan groups.
I remain astonished by how little has changed. Following the election of 1800, the Republican party split as they now had to administer government. “With victory secured, the problem of developing positive policies soon made it clear that the party was composed of different groups holding conflicting and irreconcilable attitudes toward the way government should be administered.” The Old Republicans, agrarian and anti-federalist saw the win as a moral victory, they had overthrown the sinful monarchist Federalists and now had a chance to undo the damage caused by the likes of Washington, Adams, and Hamilton who had accumulated far too much power in the central government. Their goal was to gain control of the judiciary, pass multiple amendments to the constitution, and assure that the Federalists would never again gain control. The other wing of the party was less concerned about strong government per se, only its misuse. They wanted to “reclaim, rather than to punish,” in the words of John Hunter to James Madison.
A fine example of the quandary everyone found themselves in is the case of the impeachment of Judge Pickering. A man who had clearly gone insane, would appear on the bench drunk and making judgments everyone agreed were ridiculous, no one knew how to get rid of him. Impeachment was problematic because insanity didn't meet the definition of *high crimes and misdemeanors* so the Federalists, of which he was one, argued at his impeachment trial that since he was insane he couldn't be removed while the "Republicans were forced into the difficult position of claiming that Pickering was in his right mind.This did not please the moderate Republicans, among whom there was considerable reluctance about convicting a mental incompetent.," and they knew it was but a short step for any executive then to eliminate the opposition by a simple declaration of mental incompetence. Thus was the Constitution of no help whatsoever and the divisiveness of parties simply made things worse as allegiances hardened.
The impeachment trial of Associate Justice Samuel Chase revealed the political role of impeachment and also the invalidity of adopting an uncompromising and rigid stance on issues, positions that may yet come to haunt the current Tea Party. Chase had certainly acted intemperately, delivering clearly biased charges to the jury in cases where he used the Alien and Sedition Acts to punish Republican spokesmen, most notably James Callender. Jefferson, ever the consummate politician, realized the need for moderation and compromise and philosophically he understood the importance of an independent judiciary, a judiciary dominated by Federalists thanks to John Adams. His chief antagonist was to be John Randolph, agrarian states rights true believer, who was appalled and infuriated by the Yazoo Compromise. It was Randolph who concocted the articles of impeachment against Chase by going beyond the textual justification for impeachment in the Constitution in an effort to set a precedent for removing a sitting justice that was clearly politically motivated. He badly mishandled the case and was up against Chase, a not inconsequential jurist who hired some brilliant lawyers and they devastated Randolph in the trial presided over by Aaron Burr (who had his own reasons for not wanting to see Chase impeached - but that's another story.) Jefferson, too, had his reasons for wanting to humiliate Randolph, formerly a great supporter as he realized the importance of the mercantile economy developing in New England and he wanted to get elected to a second term.
Ultimately, "the most important explanation for Chase's exoneration, however is to be found in the struggle between moderate and radical Republicans for domination of the party. The differences were fundamental, and they left little room for compromise." Randolph's parting shot was to move for a Constitutional amendment that would permit the removal of a sitting federal judge by the president with the majority concurrence of both Houses of Congress. (Precedents existed in several state constitutions.) By this time Randolph had been thoroughly discredited and his measure went down as the House postponed it to the oblivion of committee.
I suspect the Republican Party today may be in for similar convulsions should they achieve the reins of power. (Written before the election.)
October 15, 2023
On January 5, 1804, John Randolph, an eccentric Democratic-Republican congressman from Virginia, introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives calling for an impeachment inquiry against Samuel Chase, an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. After six weeks of investigation, the special committee appointed to investigate the charges against Chase submitted a report to the full House on March 12 recommending his impeachment. The representatives then voted 73-32 to impeach, making Chase the first Supreme Court justice and only the third federal official impeached in the history of the country.
In both the committee report and in the impeachment resolution, the reason given for impeaching Chase was simply “high crimes and misdemeanors,” without further elaboration. This was because the justice’s real crime in the eyes of his accusers was his intemperate partisanship. A fervent Federalist, Chase had demonstrated in his conduct of various trials a bias against Democratic-Republican defendants that made him, in Richard Ellis’s words, “the most hated member of the federal judiciary.” This made Chase’s impeachment a defining moment in the party’s attempts to reform the federal judiciary, as well as an important event in the history of the party itself. Ellis’s book is a history of that reform effort, one that uses Chase’s impeachment and other key efforts to address larger questions about the evolution of the judiciary in the early republic at both the federal and the state level.
Though the American judiciary today generally enjoys an image of impartiality and fealty to the law, this was not the case in the early years of the new nation. As Ellis notes, the judiciary suffered from the association with royal control, as most judges during the colonial era were the appointees of the royal or proprietary governors and more responsive to royal interests than those of the colonials. With independence many radicals at the state level sought to establish processes in which conflicts were resolved through arbitration by lay citizenry rather than a judicial system dominated by legal technicians. While these views were in the minority, the prevalence of such sentiments often led to the creation of judiciaries more responsive to popular or legislative control than to legal precedent.
When the new Constitution was drafted in 1787, the question of how to constitute a federal judiciary proved controversial enough that its authors chose not to elaborate on that article, leaving the details to Congress. What resulted was a court system consisting of lifetime appointees who were expected to embody federal authority in the new system. With the onset of party politics, the Federalists who dominated Congress and the presidency believed that the only people who could be trusted in such roles were men who were strong supporters of their policies. By making judicial appointments exclusively from the ranks the Federalists, though, the federal judiciary became a target of the Democratic-Republicans when the latter took over both branches after the election of 1800, an outcome that became inevitable with the eleventh-hour passage of the Judiciary Act of 1801 and the installation of one final wave of Federalists in judicial offices.
Yet the Democratic-Republicans were far from united in their views as to how to best address the Federalist hold on the judicial branch. Here Ellis details the divisions between the two parties on the issue, ones that reflected their origins as an opposition party. United more in their shared objection to Federalist policies than a common ideology, divides soon emerged between moderates and the more militant Old Republicans. Ellis sees Thomas Jefferson, as holding the balance between the two sides, yet the new president was uncertain as to how to best respond to the problem posed by a Federalist-dominated judiciary. After securing the repeal of the 1801 Judiciary Act, Jefferson seemed content to leave matters there provided that Federalists did not press the matter, only for the impeachment of John Pickering, a federal district court judge, to upset the balance. While Pickering’s removal for mental illness enjoyed broad support within the Democratic-Republican caucus in Congress, its success empowered the Old Republicans to next target Chase. This created a divide within the Democratic-Republican ranks, as the moderates balked at such an extreme step, in the end withholding the votes necessary to remove Chase from the Court.
Though Chase’s acquittal ended Democratic-Republican efforts to purge the federal courts, a similar struggle over judicial reform was still playing out at the state level. Ellis focuses on the political battles in three states in particular, using the legislative debates and elections in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts to identify the dynamics at play. In the latter two, moderate Democratic-Republicans eventually found themselves in alliance with Federalists in their efforts to resist attempts by the more radical members of their party to reform the judiciary. That the Federalists possessed only a minimal presence in Kentucky politics is seen by Ellis as the deciding factor in why the radicals enjoyed more success there, which resulted in reforms that had the effect of undermining the validity of the system of jurisprudence in the Bluegrass State, ironically leading many to turn to the federal courts to protect their rights.
Ellis sees these struggles over the judiciary as embodying a broader debate over the development of democracy in Jeffersonian America. It’s a fascinating point that ultimately credits the alliance between moderate Democratic-Republicans and Federalists with cementing the principle of an independent judiciary that supported a uniform system of common law and aided the growth of a commercial economy. That such a significant development has received such little attention only heightens the importance of Ellis’s book as a study of it. His examination of events at the state as well as the national level is especially noteworthy, as it brings into the narrative a dimension all too often absent from studies of American history. Though originally published over a half-century ago, it remains a book that should be read by anyone interested in the development of the American judiciary, Jeffersonian democracy, or simply in why we have the legal system that we do today. For as Ellis demonstrates, the debates over the judiciary that took place in the 1790s and early 1800s are ones that can remain surprisingly relevant more than two centuries later.
In both the committee report and in the impeachment resolution, the reason given for impeaching Chase was simply “high crimes and misdemeanors,” without further elaboration. This was because the justice’s real crime in the eyes of his accusers was his intemperate partisanship. A fervent Federalist, Chase had demonstrated in his conduct of various trials a bias against Democratic-Republican defendants that made him, in Richard Ellis’s words, “the most hated member of the federal judiciary.” This made Chase’s impeachment a defining moment in the party’s attempts to reform the federal judiciary, as well as an important event in the history of the party itself. Ellis’s book is a history of that reform effort, one that uses Chase’s impeachment and other key efforts to address larger questions about the evolution of the judiciary in the early republic at both the federal and the state level.
Though the American judiciary today generally enjoys an image of impartiality and fealty to the law, this was not the case in the early years of the new nation. As Ellis notes, the judiciary suffered from the association with royal control, as most judges during the colonial era were the appointees of the royal or proprietary governors and more responsive to royal interests than those of the colonials. With independence many radicals at the state level sought to establish processes in which conflicts were resolved through arbitration by lay citizenry rather than a judicial system dominated by legal technicians. While these views were in the minority, the prevalence of such sentiments often led to the creation of judiciaries more responsive to popular or legislative control than to legal precedent.
When the new Constitution was drafted in 1787, the question of how to constitute a federal judiciary proved controversial enough that its authors chose not to elaborate on that article, leaving the details to Congress. What resulted was a court system consisting of lifetime appointees who were expected to embody federal authority in the new system. With the onset of party politics, the Federalists who dominated Congress and the presidency believed that the only people who could be trusted in such roles were men who were strong supporters of their policies. By making judicial appointments exclusively from the ranks the Federalists, though, the federal judiciary became a target of the Democratic-Republicans when the latter took over both branches after the election of 1800, an outcome that became inevitable with the eleventh-hour passage of the Judiciary Act of 1801 and the installation of one final wave of Federalists in judicial offices.
Yet the Democratic-Republicans were far from united in their views as to how to best address the Federalist hold on the judicial branch. Here Ellis details the divisions between the two parties on the issue, ones that reflected their origins as an opposition party. United more in their shared objection to Federalist policies than a common ideology, divides soon emerged between moderates and the more militant Old Republicans. Ellis sees Thomas Jefferson, as holding the balance between the two sides, yet the new president was uncertain as to how to best respond to the problem posed by a Federalist-dominated judiciary. After securing the repeal of the 1801 Judiciary Act, Jefferson seemed content to leave matters there provided that Federalists did not press the matter, only for the impeachment of John Pickering, a federal district court judge, to upset the balance. While Pickering’s removal for mental illness enjoyed broad support within the Democratic-Republican caucus in Congress, its success empowered the Old Republicans to next target Chase. This created a divide within the Democratic-Republican ranks, as the moderates balked at such an extreme step, in the end withholding the votes necessary to remove Chase from the Court.
Though Chase’s acquittal ended Democratic-Republican efforts to purge the federal courts, a similar struggle over judicial reform was still playing out at the state level. Ellis focuses on the political battles in three states in particular, using the legislative debates and elections in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts to identify the dynamics at play. In the latter two, moderate Democratic-Republicans eventually found themselves in alliance with Federalists in their efforts to resist attempts by the more radical members of their party to reform the judiciary. That the Federalists possessed only a minimal presence in Kentucky politics is seen by Ellis as the deciding factor in why the radicals enjoyed more success there, which resulted in reforms that had the effect of undermining the validity of the system of jurisprudence in the Bluegrass State, ironically leading many to turn to the federal courts to protect their rights.
Ellis sees these struggles over the judiciary as embodying a broader debate over the development of democracy in Jeffersonian America. It’s a fascinating point that ultimately credits the alliance between moderate Democratic-Republicans and Federalists with cementing the principle of an independent judiciary that supported a uniform system of common law and aided the growth of a commercial economy. That such a significant development has received such little attention only heightens the importance of Ellis’s book as a study of it. His examination of events at the state as well as the national level is especially noteworthy, as it brings into the narrative a dimension all too often absent from studies of American history. Though originally published over a half-century ago, it remains a book that should be read by anyone interested in the development of the American judiciary, Jeffersonian democracy, or simply in why we have the legal system that we do today. For as Ellis demonstrates, the debates over the judiciary that took place in the 1790s and early 1800s are ones that can remain surprisingly relevant more than two centuries later.
April 11, 2012
I read this for a course on Fededralists and Jeffersonians, and I must say that I would never have otherwise picked it up off of the Amazon virtual shelf. But I'm glad I did. The book was very well-written (as an English major who's been reading a lot of history books lately, that's something of a rarity among dry and/or unprofessionally emphatic history texts), cleanly paced and laid out brilliantly. I emerged with an incredible understanding of the courts system in the early years of the United States, and also understand so much more about the present situation of the Supreme Court because of it. I'd recommend this book to any American citizen... it's fascinating to find out how your country's government works, and especially from such a faithful and well-spoken source as Ellis.
July 28, 2014
I had the opportunity to read this while taking a course from Professor Ellis in the mid-seventies at UB. He was a great professor, a fine writer, offered one of the most unique views on the history of our country and never allowed his students to settle for simply regurgitating pablum.
He made me a better writer and thinker for my entire life, and its a debt I can finally repay in public. Thank you, Professor Ellis.
He made me a better writer and thinker for my entire life, and its a debt I can finally repay in public. Thank you, Professor Ellis.
August 29, 2021
Professor Richard Ellis' magnificently researched examination of the nature of the split between radical and moderate Republicans in years following the Constitutional debate, and the agrarian vs. urban/commercial interests that favored the respective groups is an essential reading for anyone trying to understand the opposing currents of political populism and those lawyers, magistrates and legislators that who espoused judicial reform without completely democratizing the judiciary, and making it a stepchild of popular will. The many issues covered, including competing social classes, relative devotion to Jeffersonian stated policy, distrust of monied interests and the connections between the moderate Republicans and later Whig politics and between the radical (jacobin) Republicans and later Jacksonian Democrat populism are all dealt with here as in no other critical work on American political, juridical and economic history. Ellis' treatment is especially instructive regarding the post 1799 attempts at rewriting state constitutions to avoid Federalist strangleholds over the operation of political influence in Kentucky, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. Anyone enamored of the work of Justice Joseph Story would be well advised to study this book as a tonic to the iconography inherent in treatments of the early SCOTUS.
A very well written, hugely instructive tour of a part of American History which remains opaque in most modern historical, biographical and civics treatments. Bravo!
A very well written, hugely instructive tour of a part of American History which remains opaque in most modern historical, biographical and civics treatments. Bravo!
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