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Making Objects and Events: A Hylomorphic Theory of Artifacts, Actions, and Organisms
Simon J. Evnine explores the view (which he calls amorphic hylomorphism) that some objects have matter from which they are distinct but that this distinctness is not due to the existence of anything like a form. He draws on Aristotle's insight that such objects must be understood in terms of an account that links what they are essentially with how they come to exist and what their functions are (the coincidence of formal, final, and efficient causes). Artifacts are the most prominent kind of objects where these three features coincide, and Evnine develops a detailed account of the existence and identity conditions of artifacts, and the origins of their functions, in terms of how they come into existence. This process is, in general terms, that they are made out of their initial matter by an agent acting with the intention to make an object of the given kind. Evnine extends the account to organisms, where evolution accomplishes what is effected by intentional making in the case of artifacts, and to actions, which are seen as artifactual events.
- GenresPhilosophy
283 pages, Hardcover
Published September 14, 2016
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
August 13, 2016
Without having any pretentions to count myself as a philosopher, I like philosophy books and have read a fair number of them. I have gradually come around to the point of view that it's wrong to judge a philosophy book, or a philosopher, by deciding whether you agree with them. At least since Socrates, philosophers have primarily been in the business of asking questions rather than providing answers. So what I should really be interested in, it seems to me, is whether the philosopher is asking good questions and forcing me to think in a new way. From this point of view, I would say Simon Evnine's new book is quite successful. He's forced me to think about several interesting questions I'd never considered before, and I have not only been thinking about them all week but also discussing them with people around me. I don't really agree with Simon's answers; as noted, though, that isn't the point.
There are many ways to try and summarize the book's central question, some of them very technical. I think a reasonable approximation, in everyday language, is that it's asking us to consider what a "thing" is. At first blush, this seems absurd, but in fact it's less odd than it seems. The initial example is a bronze statue. You have a quantity of bronze which you cast in a mould to create the statue. The statue is made of the bronze, but you have a clear intuition that it isn't just the bronze, and has an identity of its own. The statue might lose some parts, they might later be replaced, it may change color as the bronze oxidizes over time, but most people would agree that it's definitely the same statue. Why? What is this "statue", that's distinct from its component matter?
It turns out that the question has been discussed a great deal, and many different solutions have been proposed; it's not at all easy to provide a satisfactory answer which agrees with people's intuitive expectations. A whole range of ingenious examples have been constructed to show that things aren't just the matter they're made of. The oldest and most famous one is the Ship of Theseus, which is replaced plank by plank until not one of the original planks is left; but nearly everyone feels that it's still the same ship, a feeling that is strongly reinforced by the more recent discovery that our bodies do exactly the same thing.
Simon's answer, which is explained and justified at great length, is that things essentially depend on minds; in a nice phrase, they are "the impress of mind on matter". The bronze statue acquires its identity from the sculptor's intentions. The sculptor could have used a different mass of bronze, and it would still have been the same statue. (There is another recurrent example where the sculptor instead uses clay as the material, scooping it out of a revolving drum). As an account of what artifacts are, I found this very convincing. Later in the book, Simon extends the analysis to consider actions, and here too it seemed quite reasonable to consider them as projections of mind on the material world.
What I didn't agree with was that this adequately explains what other things are. There is an interesting chapter which considers living beings and tries to use the same approach. Evidently, living beings aren't created by minds. But, as we have now discovered, they are created by the information encoded in their DNA, which has evolved over a long period to perform goal-directed functions; so it has a lot in common with a mind, since there is still the essential component of immaterial information impressing itself on the world. But it still seemed to me that this was only an approximate fit, since evolution is random and contingent, and there is also the question (not discussed, though to me it seems relevant) of how the first living things arose from inorganic matter. And in the following chapter, which dealt with everything else - things which are neither artifacts nor living beings - I definitely parted company with the author. Simon argues that there are no real objects of this kind; in the chapter's main example, there are no "mountains", just "matter arranged mountain-wise". I'm afraid this seems to me an absurd conclusion: something has gone wrong.
Well, what are these other things I am so sure must exist? Two example which to me seem convincing are "stars" and "crystals". A mountain is a more or less arbitrary part of a mountain range, but a star is not like that at all. It is a self-contained entity with a clear identity, which persists over a long period of time despite the fact that its component matter changes. Dust and gas will fall into the star, light and solar wind will leave it, nuclear reactions will change its composition, but it is still the same star. It is held together by powerful forces, primarily gravity and radiation pressure, which give it stability as an individual. But its identity doesn't come from any obvious mind-like source. Similarly, it seems to me that a crystal has a clear identity. It has a shape and internal structure which make it distinct from the matter around it, and it can grow and change over time, but none of this comes from anything like a mind. It is in fact quite difficult to say what the essential difference is between a crystal and a living being. Monod, in Le hasard et la nécessité, offers an intriguing suggestion: they're similar, except that the living creature is a great deal more complicated.
Damn, I'm hooked; I've somehow been conned into feeling that I need to help sort out this annoying problem, which obviously ought to be trivial but somehow isn't. As I know from previous experience, the hallmark of a successful piece of philosophy. And that's where I came in.
(I also have a frivolous review of the book here)
There are many ways to try and summarize the book's central question, some of them very technical. I think a reasonable approximation, in everyday language, is that it's asking us to consider what a "thing" is. At first blush, this seems absurd, but in fact it's less odd than it seems. The initial example is a bronze statue. You have a quantity of bronze which you cast in a mould to create the statue. The statue is made of the bronze, but you have a clear intuition that it isn't just the bronze, and has an identity of its own. The statue might lose some parts, they might later be replaced, it may change color as the bronze oxidizes over time, but most people would agree that it's definitely the same statue. Why? What is this "statue", that's distinct from its component matter?
It turns out that the question has been discussed a great deal, and many different solutions have been proposed; it's not at all easy to provide a satisfactory answer which agrees with people's intuitive expectations. A whole range of ingenious examples have been constructed to show that things aren't just the matter they're made of. The oldest and most famous one is the Ship of Theseus, which is replaced plank by plank until not one of the original planks is left; but nearly everyone feels that it's still the same ship, a feeling that is strongly reinforced by the more recent discovery that our bodies do exactly the same thing.
Simon's answer, which is explained and justified at great length, is that things essentially depend on minds; in a nice phrase, they are "the impress of mind on matter". The bronze statue acquires its identity from the sculptor's intentions. The sculptor could have used a different mass of bronze, and it would still have been the same statue. (There is another recurrent example where the sculptor instead uses clay as the material, scooping it out of a revolving drum). As an account of what artifacts are, I found this very convincing. Later in the book, Simon extends the analysis to consider actions, and here too it seemed quite reasonable to consider them as projections of mind on the material world.
What I didn't agree with was that this adequately explains what other things are. There is an interesting chapter which considers living beings and tries to use the same approach. Evidently, living beings aren't created by minds. But, as we have now discovered, they are created by the information encoded in their DNA, which has evolved over a long period to perform goal-directed functions; so it has a lot in common with a mind, since there is still the essential component of immaterial information impressing itself on the world. But it still seemed to me that this was only an approximate fit, since evolution is random and contingent, and there is also the question (not discussed, though to me it seems relevant) of how the first living things arose from inorganic matter. And in the following chapter, which dealt with everything else - things which are neither artifacts nor living beings - I definitely parted company with the author. Simon argues that there are no real objects of this kind; in the chapter's main example, there are no "mountains", just "matter arranged mountain-wise". I'm afraid this seems to me an absurd conclusion: something has gone wrong.
Well, what are these other things I am so sure must exist? Two example which to me seem convincing are "stars" and "crystals". A mountain is a more or less arbitrary part of a mountain range, but a star is not like that at all. It is a self-contained entity with a clear identity, which persists over a long period of time despite the fact that its component matter changes. Dust and gas will fall into the star, light and solar wind will leave it, nuclear reactions will change its composition, but it is still the same star. It is held together by powerful forces, primarily gravity and radiation pressure, which give it stability as an individual. But its identity doesn't come from any obvious mind-like source. Similarly, it seems to me that a crystal has a clear identity. It has a shape and internal structure which make it distinct from the matter around it, and it can grow and change over time, but none of this comes from anything like a mind. It is in fact quite difficult to say what the essential difference is between a crystal and a living being. Monod, in Le hasard et la nécessité, offers an intriguing suggestion: they're similar, except that the living creature is a great deal more complicated.
Damn, I'm hooked; I've somehow been conned into feeling that I need to help sort out this annoying problem, which obviously ought to be trivial but somehow isn't. As I know from previous experience, the hallmark of a successful piece of philosophy. And that's where I came in.
(I also have a frivolous review of the book here)
November 18, 2021
[A courtroom in London. INDIANA JONES, DONALD J. DRUMPF, his wife MELANOMA DRUMPF, various OFFICERS OF THE COURT, etc]
COURT USHER: Case 94, Rex versus Indiana Jones, Lord Justice Cocklecarrot presiding, all rise, all rise.
COCKLECARROT: Please be seated. Mr Indiana Jones, you stand accused of having stolen from the British Museum the priceless artifact commonly known as the Ship of Theseus. How do you plead?
JONES: Not guilty.
PROSECUTOR: Mr Jones, I put it to you that you inveigled yourself into a position of trust with the British Museum, and then over a period of nearly a year stole the entire ship one piece at a time, replacing each piece as it was removed.
JONES: I was just cleaning it up. It was in terrible condition.
PROSECUTOR: But you do admit that you replaced every piece of it?
JONES: Of course I do. The Ship of Theseus is famous precisely because every piece of it has already been replaced at least once. I was continuing a tradition that goes back to the time of Plutarch.
PROSECUTOR: And you do admit that you reassembled the pieces you removed so that they looked exactly like the original boat, and donated the result to the private collection of Mr Donald J. Drumpf, also known as Lyin' Crooked Donald?
JONES: I wanted to make sure I hadn't missed anything. According to Professor Simon Evnine's recent book Making Objects and Events: A Hylomorphic Theory of Artifacts, Objects and Organisms, the identity of an artifact is determined by the act that creates it. The act that created the reassembled ship was part of my thorough program of renovation and refurbishment, hence the ship in the museum is the real one and the reassembled ship is just a copy.
PROSECUTOR: Even though it contains all the planks used in the original?
JONES: Professor Evnine convincingly argues that the matter an artifact is composed of is irrelevant and only the act that created it is important. So my intentions are what's important here. Why would I want to steal the Ship of Theseus? I didn't make a cent out of the deal. I just gave the old planks to Drumpf because I didn't need them any more and he asked for them.
[DONALD DRUMPF, who is watching from the gallery with MELANOMA, nods approvingly]
PROSECUTOR: I further put it to you that you were persuaded to steal the ship by Mrs Melanoma Drumpf, with whom you have been conducting an illicit affair.
[Pandemonium from the gallery, though DRUMPF still looks unconcerned. The JUDGE has to bang his gavel several times before anyone can hear a word he's saying]
JUDGE: Order! Order, or I will clear the court. Mr Jones, how do you respond to these accusations?
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: Objection! I wish to draw the court's attention to the theory of qua-objects advanced by Professor Kit Fine. Mr Jones was not having an affair with Melanoma-Drumpf-qua-Donald-Drumpf's-wife, but rather with Melanoma-Trump-qua-foxy-babe.
PROSECUTOR: Professor Fine postulates that a qua-object inherits all normal properties possessed by the object from which it is derived. Hence it follows, even if one accepts the outlandish postulate advanced by my learned colleague, that Mr Jones was still having an affair with Donald Drumpf's wife.
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: But one could reasonably argue that being married to Donald Drumpf is not a normal property.
JUDGE: Objection overruled. Mr Drumpf's metaphysical status is not in question here.
PROSECUTOR: Thank you m'lud. Mr Jones, it is clear that you had a motive for stealing the ship. Do you still persist in your absurd claims?
JONES: It's like I said. I was just fixing it up. I'm an archaeologist.
PROSECUTOR: But can you prove it?
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: Excuse me, m'lud, I request permission to confer with my client.
[He sits down with JONES and they whisper briefly]
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: We wish to call a witness, Miss Lolita Drumpf.
[Enter LOLITA DRUMPF, wearing an extremely short skirt and chewing gum]
USHER: Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
LOLITA DRUMPF: Yeah.
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: Miss Drumpf, do you know the defendant well?
LOLITA DRUMPF: Yeah.
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: And what is the nature of your relationship?
LOLITA DRUMPF: My Facebook page says it's complicated.
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: Miss Drumpf, I must remind you that you are under oath. Are you sleeping with the defendant?
LOLITA DRUMPF: Yeah. I guess.
[New sensation from the gallery, banging of gavel, etc. DRUMPF and MELANOMA look apoplectic]
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: And for how long has this relationship been going on?
LOLITA DRUMPF: A few months. I guess. But it's kinda over.
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: And why is it over, Miss Drumpf?
LOLITA DRUMPF: He's boring. All he wants to talk about is that old boat. Even when we're in bed.
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: And what does he say about the boat, Miss Drumpf?
LOLITA DRUMPF: He keeps saying he's going to fix it up proper. Even if he has to replace every goddamn plank.
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: No further questions, your honor.
[The PROSECUTOR and JUDGE confer briefly]
JUDGE: Case dismissed. Mr Jones, you are free to go.
JONES: [to LOLITA DRUMPF] You coming?
LOLITA DRUMPF: Yeah.
[She takes JONES'S arm. The COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENCE takes his other arm. As they leave together, DRUMPF makes a complicated gesture in their direction]
JONES: What does that mean?
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: Essentially, you're all losers and you're dead.
JONES: Oh, not essentially I hope. At worst, contingently.
(I also have a serious review of the book here)
COURT USHER: Case 94, Rex versus Indiana Jones, Lord Justice Cocklecarrot presiding, all rise, all rise.
COCKLECARROT: Please be seated. Mr Indiana Jones, you stand accused of having stolen from the British Museum the priceless artifact commonly known as the Ship of Theseus. How do you plead?
JONES: Not guilty.
PROSECUTOR: Mr Jones, I put it to you that you inveigled yourself into a position of trust with the British Museum, and then over a period of nearly a year stole the entire ship one piece at a time, replacing each piece as it was removed.
JONES: I was just cleaning it up. It was in terrible condition.
PROSECUTOR: But you do admit that you replaced every piece of it?
JONES: Of course I do. The Ship of Theseus is famous precisely because every piece of it has already been replaced at least once. I was continuing a tradition that goes back to the time of Plutarch.
PROSECUTOR: And you do admit that you reassembled the pieces you removed so that they looked exactly like the original boat, and donated the result to the private collection of Mr Donald J. Drumpf, also known as Lyin' Crooked Donald?
JONES: I wanted to make sure I hadn't missed anything. According to Professor Simon Evnine's recent book Making Objects and Events: A Hylomorphic Theory of Artifacts, Objects and Organisms, the identity of an artifact is determined by the act that creates it. The act that created the reassembled ship was part of my thorough program of renovation and refurbishment, hence the ship in the museum is the real one and the reassembled ship is just a copy.
PROSECUTOR: Even though it contains all the planks used in the original?
JONES: Professor Evnine convincingly argues that the matter an artifact is composed of is irrelevant and only the act that created it is important. So my intentions are what's important here. Why would I want to steal the Ship of Theseus? I didn't make a cent out of the deal. I just gave the old planks to Drumpf because I didn't need them any more and he asked for them.
[DONALD DRUMPF, who is watching from the gallery with MELANOMA, nods approvingly]
PROSECUTOR: I further put it to you that you were persuaded to steal the ship by Mrs Melanoma Drumpf, with whom you have been conducting an illicit affair.
[Pandemonium from the gallery, though DRUMPF still looks unconcerned. The JUDGE has to bang his gavel several times before anyone can hear a word he's saying]
JUDGE: Order! Order, or I will clear the court. Mr Jones, how do you respond to these accusations?
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: Objection! I wish to draw the court's attention to the theory of qua-objects advanced by Professor Kit Fine. Mr Jones was not having an affair with Melanoma-Drumpf-qua-Donald-Drumpf's-wife, but rather with Melanoma-Trump-qua-foxy-babe.
PROSECUTOR: Professor Fine postulates that a qua-object inherits all normal properties possessed by the object from which it is derived. Hence it follows, even if one accepts the outlandish postulate advanced by my learned colleague, that Mr Jones was still having an affair with Donald Drumpf's wife.
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: But one could reasonably argue that being married to Donald Drumpf is not a normal property.
JUDGE: Objection overruled. Mr Drumpf's metaphysical status is not in question here.
PROSECUTOR: Thank you m'lud. Mr Jones, it is clear that you had a motive for stealing the ship. Do you still persist in your absurd claims?
JONES: It's like I said. I was just fixing it up. I'm an archaeologist.
PROSECUTOR: But can you prove it?
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: Excuse me, m'lud, I request permission to confer with my client.
[He sits down with JONES and they whisper briefly]
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: We wish to call a witness, Miss Lolita Drumpf.
[Enter LOLITA DRUMPF, wearing an extremely short skirt and chewing gum]
USHER: Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
LOLITA DRUMPF: Yeah.
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: Miss Drumpf, do you know the defendant well?
LOLITA DRUMPF: Yeah.
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: And what is the nature of your relationship?
LOLITA DRUMPF: My Facebook page says it's complicated.
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: Miss Drumpf, I must remind you that you are under oath. Are you sleeping with the defendant?
LOLITA DRUMPF: Yeah. I guess.
[New sensation from the gallery, banging of gavel, etc. DRUMPF and MELANOMA look apoplectic]
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: And for how long has this relationship been going on?
LOLITA DRUMPF: A few months. I guess. But it's kinda over.
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: And why is it over, Miss Drumpf?
LOLITA DRUMPF: He's boring. All he wants to talk about is that old boat. Even when we're in bed.
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: And what does he say about the boat, Miss Drumpf?
LOLITA DRUMPF: He keeps saying he's going to fix it up proper. Even if he has to replace every goddamn plank.
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: No further questions, your honor.
[The PROSECUTOR and JUDGE confer briefly]
JUDGE: Case dismissed. Mr Jones, you are free to go.
JONES: [to LOLITA DRUMPF] You coming?
LOLITA DRUMPF: Yeah.
[She takes JONES'S arm. The COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENCE takes his other arm. As they leave together, DRUMPF makes a complicated gesture in their direction]
JONES: What does that mean?
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: Essentially, you're all losers and you're dead.
JONES: Oh, not essentially I hope. At worst, contingently.
(I also have a serious review of the book here)
July 14, 2016
this excellent book, available today in the UK and in the US (though only as a kindle book in the latter) discusses aristotle's theory of matter and form in relation to artifacts. aristotle's theory of matter and form claims that every object, in fact, every entity that is not purely mental (like numbers) is made out of some indeterminate "matter." aristotle's idea of matter does not equal what we call the matter of which something is made (wood, iron, flesh, or, at a more minute level, cells and atoms) but refers to a more abstract materiality that underlies all of that which exists in the world (and is not purely mental). so just imagine "matter" here to mean undifferentiated materiality. this is an abstract concept that doesn't match anything in the real world.
now, what makes each entity what it is, is the coupling of this indifferentiated materiality with a form. this form, again, is not something we can match with anything we are familiar with. it is, rather, precisely what makes that entity what it is. the form of me is me, plus the matter i'm made of, which, before the form and the matter united, was undifferentiated matter.
in this book, evnine rather daringly suggests that for every artifact, i.e. man-made object, you also have a matter and a form. unlike in aristotle, the matter here is not entirely undifferentiated but it's still somewhat undifferentiated. for instance, in the case of a chair, the matter is wood. what makes a generic piece of wood a chair is the intention of the maker. the maker, in other words, takes this undifferentiated piece of wood and decides to turn it into a chair.
evnine, in other words, piggy-backs on aristotle's distinction but tweaks it to resemble things we recognize -- wood, the maker's intention. this makes aristotle's original theory less "mystic" and more practical.
the real coup of this book, though, is evnine's daring suggestion that his theory applies to actions as well. actions, according to evnine, are made out of matter and the intention of the actor, just like artifacts (i don't remember here what the matter is, but maybe someone else can suggest it in the comments).
and then, then, he extends the theory to organisms, and frankly i can't see my way out of that, even after having read the book.
this is all super fascinating and, once you get used to the typical analytic shorthand, very clear and, at points, moving.
now, what makes each entity what it is, is the coupling of this indifferentiated materiality with a form. this form, again, is not something we can match with anything we are familiar with. it is, rather, precisely what makes that entity what it is. the form of me is me, plus the matter i'm made of, which, before the form and the matter united, was undifferentiated matter.
in this book, evnine rather daringly suggests that for every artifact, i.e. man-made object, you also have a matter and a form. unlike in aristotle, the matter here is not entirely undifferentiated but it's still somewhat undifferentiated. for instance, in the case of a chair, the matter is wood. what makes a generic piece of wood a chair is the intention of the maker. the maker, in other words, takes this undifferentiated piece of wood and decides to turn it into a chair.
evnine, in other words, piggy-backs on aristotle's distinction but tweaks it to resemble things we recognize -- wood, the maker's intention. this makes aristotle's original theory less "mystic" and more practical.
the real coup of this book, though, is evnine's daring suggestion that his theory applies to actions as well. actions, according to evnine, are made out of matter and the intention of the actor, just like artifacts (i don't remember here what the matter is, but maybe someone else can suggest it in the comments).
and then, then, he extends the theory to organisms, and frankly i can't see my way out of that, even after having read the book.
this is all super fascinating and, once you get used to the typical analytic shorthand, very clear and, at points, moving.
Read
November 26, 2022I am absolutely NOT recommending that anyone read this. I just wanted to share my pleasure with you that this long journey has nearly come to fruition. (To be published in July in the UK and September in the US.) :)
March 13, 2024
Amorphous hylomorphism is the hot new ontological composition theory that just dropped, and I have to say, I'm a fan. It did wonders for my theory about causally active abstract artifacts.
June 20, 2024
Aristotle bros... so tired of winning...
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews