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The Seeds Of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine 1919-1939
Book by Doughty, Robert A.
243 pages, Hardcover
First published December 12, 1985
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166 people want to read
About the author
Robert A. Doughty
21 books9 followersBrigadier General Robert Allan Doughty, USA (Ret.), is an American military historian, educator and retired career military officer.
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
February 12, 2017
An immensely detailed analysis of how French doctrinal developments between the wars set the French Army up for the disaster that would befall it in 1940. Doughty addresses many of the traditional reasons given for the French collapse ever since Bloch's Strange Defeat - failure to rearm, desire to refight 1918, etc. - and argues quite convincingly that France was neither militarily hollowed-out by underinvestment, nor did it try to completely refight the last war, nor did it make terrible strategic choices (e.g., the Maginot Line); rather, the primary cause for French military failure in 1940 was overcentralization and an evolutionary approach to doctrine. The latter grafted new technologies and weapons onto the methodical battle doctrine of 1918, while the recognition of the very potential of these technologies - the speed, mobility, and firepower - and the constraints placed upon French military policy (political, financial, and geostrategic) pushed the French to increasingly centralize control and "rigidify" their tactical doctrines. It was these that proved ineffectual in 1940, not the fighting spirit of France's population or troops, nor the technical merits of its weaponry.
While the premise and thesis are simple enough, the depth and detail contained in the book illustrate just how difficult it would have been for France to change significantly. The political constraints - suspicious civil/military relations handicapping the emergence of a military leader with the power and vision to push through major change and concerns about the kinds of highly professional armored forces advocated by de Gaulle and others - the geostrategic considerations (needing to protect the resources of the northeastern provinces for the anticipated long war, the need to protect Belgium and not fight in France's industrial north, the desire to avoid provocations through maintaining overly offensive capabilities), and the bureaucratic constraints - the power of France's Great War leaders, the endless boards and committees charged with reviewing doctrinal and technological developments - all shaped and hemmed in France's choices before the war.
Given the parallels of the interwar period to today's environment of rapid technological change, there are many good lessons here for today's military planners and policymakers. The fundamental question the reader - or at least, this reader - is left with is at what point does technological change force complete revision, rather than simply evolutionary progression, of doctrine? And how do we recognize that point, so that we may be the Germans of 1940 and not the French?
All in all, a much needed antidote to many of the oversimplified interpretations of France's defeat that I've come across recently, particularly from many of the maneuver warfare acolytes.
While the premise and thesis are simple enough, the depth and detail contained in the book illustrate just how difficult it would have been for France to change significantly. The political constraints - suspicious civil/military relations handicapping the emergence of a military leader with the power and vision to push through major change and concerns about the kinds of highly professional armored forces advocated by de Gaulle and others - the geostrategic considerations (needing to protect the resources of the northeastern provinces for the anticipated long war, the need to protect Belgium and not fight in France's industrial north, the desire to avoid provocations through maintaining overly offensive capabilities), and the bureaucratic constraints - the power of France's Great War leaders, the endless boards and committees charged with reviewing doctrinal and technological developments - all shaped and hemmed in France's choices before the war.
Given the parallels of the interwar period to today's environment of rapid technological change, there are many good lessons here for today's military planners and policymakers. The fundamental question the reader - or at least, this reader - is left with is at what point does technological change force complete revision, rather than simply evolutionary progression, of doctrine? And how do we recognize that point, so that we may be the Germans of 1940 and not the French?
All in all, a much needed antidote to many of the oversimplified interpretations of France's defeat that I've come across recently, particularly from many of the maneuver warfare acolytes.
November 19, 2023
When one considers the two world wars during the 20th century, they may be inclined to ask: “Why was the country of France so prevalent during the first world war, yet basically nonexistent during the second?” Yes, we know there was a lot fighting IN France during World War II – Dunkirk and the Normandy invasion come to mind, but we don’t hear much of anything about French soldiers nor leaders. Other than Charles De Gaulle, we really only hear about the Vichy (puppet) government and the fact that Nazi Germany basically controlled the entire country during the bulk of the conflict.
This book is an attempt to tell us why. This book lays out all of the details in what essentially happened in France between the two world wars that essentially led to the emasculation of the country military-wise. I really wish that I could say that this was interesting reading. It wasn’t. It was a slog. Perhaps the subtitle with the word “doctrine” should have warned me. Doctrines, although extremely important when studying history, don’t necessarily make interesting reading.
This book reads like a government field manual. A long government field manual. It details everything. Now, I do attest that the subject matter in this book is extremely important for major countries that might potentially find themselves involved in a war in the foreseeable future. This book is a good reminder that countries need a lot more than guns and bravado to succeed. Perhaps this is why we constantly hear that military budgets are so high. For the leaders of the armed forces to be successful, no stone can be left unturned.
So we read about morale, population segments, geography, economy, relations with other countries, leadership, government, and on and on and on. This book has a lot of detailed meticulous facts presented to the reader, but there simply isn’t much to keep one interested. This entire book could get its point across in about 1/10 the page space. Imagine, say, you watch a 30-minute television show. You then watch the exact same story but it’s then presented in a format that lasts over 10 hours. How soon would you fall asleep, or at least mentally check out?
As important as this history lesson is, I can’t honestly recommend this book. I’m willing to bet that there’s a documentary out there, or at least a YouTube video, that can make the same points outlined in this book, only with a lot more brevity that what we’re presented with here. I’ll say it again, note the word “doctrine” in the title. A good book for a thesis or term paper, but for enjoyment? Not so much.
This book is an attempt to tell us why. This book lays out all of the details in what essentially happened in France between the two world wars that essentially led to the emasculation of the country military-wise. I really wish that I could say that this was interesting reading. It wasn’t. It was a slog. Perhaps the subtitle with the word “doctrine” should have warned me. Doctrines, although extremely important when studying history, don’t necessarily make interesting reading.
This book reads like a government field manual. A long government field manual. It details everything. Now, I do attest that the subject matter in this book is extremely important for major countries that might potentially find themselves involved in a war in the foreseeable future. This book is a good reminder that countries need a lot more than guns and bravado to succeed. Perhaps this is why we constantly hear that military budgets are so high. For the leaders of the armed forces to be successful, no stone can be left unturned.
So we read about morale, population segments, geography, economy, relations with other countries, leadership, government, and on and on and on. This book has a lot of detailed meticulous facts presented to the reader, but there simply isn’t much to keep one interested. This entire book could get its point across in about 1/10 the page space. Imagine, say, you watch a 30-minute television show. You then watch the exact same story but it’s then presented in a format that lasts over 10 hours. How soon would you fall asleep, or at least mentally check out?
As important as this history lesson is, I can’t honestly recommend this book. I’m willing to bet that there’s a documentary out there, or at least a YouTube video, that can make the same points outlined in this book, only with a lot more brevity that what we’re presented with here. I’ll say it again, note the word “doctrine” in the title. A good book for a thesis or term paper, but for enjoyment? Not so much.
August 22, 2023
I have been wanting to read this book for a while and it does not disappoint. Doughty lays the blame of the rapid Fall of France squarely on the French civilian-military institutions and doctrines instead of the decisions made by the French leadership and the allies. This is a must-read for those interested in World War 2 history if you want to understand the broader issues in the early days.
Perhaps most telling is the "peacetime" attitudes of training. For example, France's conscripts served only two years and then went home, unless they want to make the army as their career. They hoped that when France called them up again, the conscripts/reservists will remember what they learned before thrown into the fray - assuming the enemy allows France time to mobilize.
That is pretty ridiculous. Even in civilian jobs, no one gets really good at their jobs until after 8 to 12 months. In an ideal world, the civilian company will do all it can in its power to retain those employees since it spent so much to train them. In the military, you spend anywhere 10 to 13 weeks in basic training. That's just the beginning. Depending on their MOS, the soldier could spend another 10 weeks to 13 weeks. Six months have now passed. Now they are ready to join their unit and really learn and do their jobs. Thus, this is not an issue of individual bravery of the French soldier; no one doubts that when they actually fought. The issue is training or the sufficiency of training and experience.
I never realized some of the "seeds of disaster" were sown in the 1920s and they sprouted in 1939.
You might also want to read Case Red by Robert Forczyk who mentioned this book in his analysis on the Fall of France. By contrast, Forczyk places the blame on the cowardice and unilateral collapse of the Belgian front, Petain and Weygand's defeatist attitudes, and the strained Anglo-Franco relationships.
Doughty's research is extensive and for the hard core military historian, this is a must-read.
Perhaps most telling is the "peacetime" attitudes of training. For example, France's conscripts served only two years and then went home, unless they want to make the army as their career. They hoped that when France called them up again, the conscripts/reservists will remember what they learned before thrown into the fray - assuming the enemy allows France time to mobilize.
That is pretty ridiculous. Even in civilian jobs, no one gets really good at their jobs until after 8 to 12 months. In an ideal world, the civilian company will do all it can in its power to retain those employees since it spent so much to train them. In the military, you spend anywhere 10 to 13 weeks in basic training. That's just the beginning. Depending on their MOS, the soldier could spend another 10 weeks to 13 weeks. Six months have now passed. Now they are ready to join their unit and really learn and do their jobs. Thus, this is not an issue of individual bravery of the French soldier; no one doubts that when they actually fought. The issue is training or the sufficiency of training and experience.
I never realized some of the "seeds of disaster" were sown in the 1920s and they sprouted in 1939.
You might also want to read Case Red by Robert Forczyk who mentioned this book in his analysis on the Fall of France. By contrast, Forczyk places the blame on the cowardice and unilateral collapse of the Belgian front, Petain and Weygand's defeatist attitudes, and the strained Anglo-Franco relationships.
Doughty's research is extensive and for the hard core military historian, this is a must-read.
April 13, 2022
Great book
This explains how the mighty French army the strongest in Europe got beat so badly so swiftly. Their arrogance and failure to learn the real lessons of WW1 caught them unprepared to counter the Germans when they didn't fight as aspected.
This explains how the mighty French army the strongest in Europe got beat so badly so swiftly. Their arrogance and failure to learn the real lessons of WW1 caught them unprepared to counter the Germans when they didn't fight as aspected.
November 18, 2018
I have little to add to Matt Caris' review, though there is the adage that the losers tend to study any previous war with more fervor than the winners.
February 19, 2019
An excellent objective lesson of the problem with assumptions and wanting to be safe in an unsafe world.
November 19, 2021
A bit tedious and repetitious, but well worth reading if one is interested in the subject.
October 28, 2023
Comprehensive historical look at how France was easily defeated by Germany in WWII. Lots of great lessons to learn from. Great read
April 22, 2023
The French theorizing for future wars made a lot of sense in the context described in this book. Failed pretty hard in 1940 though.
Makes me doubt the ability of our own military bureaucracy to prep correctly for future wars. Nasty stuff. Hope I never find out.
Makes me doubt the ability of our own military bureaucracy to prep correctly for future wars. Nasty stuff. Hope I never find out.
June 22, 2019
While a bit dry, probably the best book to read to understand how the French Army thought at the start of World War 2. Nicely organized and covers most everything.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews