A longitudinal case study of Chile that assesses competing hypotheses regarding judicial behavior in both democratic and undemocratic contexts, this book explores the relevance of regime-related factors, judges' personal policy preferences, social class, and legal philosophy, but argues that institutional features grounded in the ideal of "apoliticism" best explain the persistent failure of Chilean judges to take stands in defense of rights and rule of law principles, before, during, and after the authoritarian interlude. Dr. Hilbink offers comparative examples to support broader theoretical claims about when judges will be willing and able to assert their independence against abuses of public power.
I loved this book. But I'm steadily becoming a Chilean judicial politics nerd, so that's not surprising. I've read and studied a lot about Pinochet over my life and academic career, but I'm still just now finding out about the judicial branch. I think it's noteworthy how little attention is paid in general political circles to the role of judges. Hilbink's book argued mostly for the role of institutional factors - structure of appointments and an ideology of apoliticism - to explain the conformity and conservatism of the judges in Chile. I thought the historical background showing continuity pre- and post-dictatorship helped support her claims. But the strongest part was her analysis of claims, cases, lawyers, and judges from the Pinochet period. I plan to reread sections of this book.