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Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939

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A major re-interpretation of international relations in the period from 1919 to 1939. Avoiding such simplistic explanations as appeasement and British decline, Keith Neilson demonstrates that the underlying cause of the Second World War was the intellectual failure to find an effective means of maintaining the new world order created in 1919. With secret diplomacy, alliances and the balance of power seen as having caused the First World War, the makers of British policy after 1919 were forced to rely on such instruments of liberal internationalism as arms control, the League of Nations and global public opinion to preserve peace. Using Britain's relations with Soviet Russia as a focus for a re-examination of Britain's dealings with Germany and Japan, this book shows that these tools were inadequate to deal with the physical and ideological threats posed by Bolshevism, fascism, Nazism and Japanese militarism.

390 pages, Hardcover

First published December 21, 2001

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Keith Neilson

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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
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36 reviews2 followers
October 5, 2018
Foreign affairs is a game in which every participant attempts to anticipate the moves of his opponent(s) by staying two steps ahead of everyone else but instead everyone ends up fifty steps behind everyone else and whomever ends up in the least-worst position won't be the first one obliterated when war inevitably breaks out. At least, that's how this book makes it seem. Neilson attempts to examine the fundamentals of British strategic foreign policy during the interwar years, as it attempted to maintain the tenets of liberal internationalism under the growing strain of revisionist Powers, by framing it through the interesting lens of Anglo-Soviet relations. The case is made that appeals to "appeasement" and "declinism" are insufficient to explain the varying nature of British foreign policy during this period and instead one must hone in on the individuals involved, all of whom had their own ideas about how best to secure peace in our time. What we discover is that Britain was as hopelessly divided on how to proceed as the Soviet Union was not. The differing ideological praxes with which each viewed the sphere of international relations and how best to wield power ensured that the two would not come to an accommodation before Germany could seize the diplomatic initiative. Disagreements over how to incorporate such nebulous concepts as "collective security" and "indirect aggression" into any potential pact precluded any alliance between the Western Powers and the USSR, dooming their efforts to construct a united front that could effectively confront the revisionist aims of the Axis.

Ultimately, it appears that British attempts to maintain the shaky new order they had constructed was hobbled by their inability to accept anything that hinted at a return to pre-1914 secret diplomacy. As far as the matter of Soviet foreign policy goes, Neilson comes down on the side of Stalin as a Marxist-Leninist devotee, which in his estimation is observationally equivalent to Realpolitik. A curious aside in my mind that deserves more attention. Decent overview of the internal and external diplomatic squabbles afflicting Britain as it watched its idealistic constructions crumble around it. Chamberlain, as always, comes across as a dolt.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews