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Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's Campaign for Peace
Over sixteen extraordinary days in October and November 1956, the twin crises of Suez and Hungary pushed the world to the brink of a nuclear conflict and what many at the time were calling World War III. Blood & Sand is a revelatory new history of these dramatic events, for the first time setting both crises in the context of the global Cold War, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the treacherous power politics of imperialism and oil.
Blood & Sand tells this story hour by hour through a fascinating international cast of characters including Gamal Abdel Nasser, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Anthony Eden, Christian Pineau, Nikita Khrushchev, Imre Nagy and David Ben-Gurion. It is a tale of conspiracy and revolutions; spies and terrorists; kidnappings and assassination plots; the fall of the British Empire and rise of American hegemony. Blood & Sand is essential to our understanding of the modern Middle East and resonates strikingly with the problems of oil control, religious fundamentalism and international unity that face the world today.
Blood & Sand tells this story hour by hour through a fascinating international cast of characters including Gamal Abdel Nasser, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Anthony Eden, Christian Pineau, Nikita Khrushchev, Imre Nagy and David Ben-Gurion. It is a tale of conspiracy and revolutions; spies and terrorists; kidnappings and assassination plots; the fall of the British Empire and rise of American hegemony. Blood & Sand is essential to our understanding of the modern Middle East and resonates strikingly with the problems of oil control, religious fundamentalism and international unity that face the world today.
560 pages, Hardcover
First published September 22, 2016
127 people are currently reading
1214 people want to read
About the author
Alex von Tunzelmann
6 books209 followersAlex von Tunzelmann is a British historian, screenwriter and author. Tunzelmann has worked primarily as a researcher.
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November 6, 2016
Last week was the 60th anniversary of the 1956 Suez Crisis as well as the Soviet invasion of Hungary. Both events had a tremendous impact on the geo-strategic balance in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The Eisenhower administration was confronted by overlapping crises that brought the United States in opposition to its allies England and France at a time when it seemed to President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John F. Dulles that allied actions in Suez had provided cover for Soviet tanks to roll in to Budapest. The interfacing of these two crises is the subject of Alex von Tunzelmann’s new book, BLOOD AND SAND: SUEZ, HUNGARY, AND EISENHOWER’S CAMPAIGN FOR PEACE. Von Tunzelmann has a unique approach to her narrative and analysis as she chooses certain dates leading up to the crisis, from October 22 to November 6, 1956 and within each date she explains events and delves into the background history of the issues that are raised. In so doing she effectively examines how decisions were reached by the major actors, and the impact of how those decisions influenced the contemporary world order. The only drawback to this approach is that a sense of chronology is sometimes lost, and with so much taking place across the Middle East and Eastern Europe it can be confusing for the general reader.
Von Tunzelmann begins by providing the history that led up to British control of the Suez Canal. She goes on to examine the major players in the conflict; Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary and later Prime Minister who despised Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser and basically “wanted him dead” as he blamed him for all of England’s ills, domestic and foreign. President Dwight Eisenhower, who had grown tired of British colonialism and its impact on American foreign policy, and provided the guidelines that Secretary of State Dulles implemented. Gamal Abdul Nasser, the Egyptian President who rose to power in 1954 and was bent on achieving the removal of the British from the Suez Canal Base, and spreading his Pan Arabist ideology throughout the region. It is fascinating as the author delves into the role of the CIA in Egypt and the relationship between Kermit Roosevelt, the author of the 1953 Iranian coup, and Miles Copeland with Nasser taking the reader into an area than is usually forbidden. Other profiles are provided including Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, French President Guy Mollet, Imre Nagy, the leader of Hungary, and the troika that controlled the Kremlin.
Each country had its own agenda. In England neo-imperialist forces believed that “if they could no longer dominate colonies openly, they must try to foster a secret British Empire club….a powerful hidden empire of money and control,” this was apart from the “Commonwealth.” (23) This was the overall strategy that revolved around access and transportation of oil. An example of Von Tunzelmann’s approach is her March 1, 1956 section where she concentrates on Jordan’s King Hussein’s firing of John Glubb Pasha, a British serving officer who headed the Arab Legion. For Eden, Nasser was the cause and his actions were a roadblock to achieve a Middle Eastern defense pact (Baghdad Pact), and Jordanian membership. Eradicating Nasser became Eden’s life’s mission. In her discussion of March, 1956 the author raises the role of American policy, but she only mentions in passing American attempts to bring about peace between Israel and Egypt, i.e.; Project Alpha and the Anderson Mission. She presents a number of reasons why the US withdrew its offer to fund the Aswan Dam project on July 19, 1956, forgoing that Washington had already decided as early as March 28, 1956 that Nasser was an impediment to peace and the US launched Operation Omega designed to take Nasser down a peg or two, and once the presidential election was over more drastic action could be taken. For the French, Mollet blamed Nasser for all Paris’ difficulties in Algeria. When FLN leader Ahmed Ben Bella, a World War II hero in France left for Cairo it confirmed that Nasser was providing Ben Bella weapons and a safe exile. To the author’s credit throughout the narrative she whittles down all of the information in expert fashion and she sums up the interests of all concerned as the crisis approaches.
Von Tunzelmann provides many interesting details as she delves into individual motivations. For Ben-Gurion, the Straits of Tiran were the key. Many have speculated why Israel would ally with England under the Sevres Agreement, a country that had been a thorn in the side of Jews for decades. The key was an oil pipeline that was to be built from the southern Israeli port of Eilat to Ashkelon in the north (Trans Israel pipeline or Tipline) that would bring Iranian oil to Europe. In 1957, Israel brokered a deal with Iran, and the Suez Canal, by then under Egyptian control, would be bypassed. This deal would also make the Jewish state a strategic ally of Europe.
The most important parts of the narrative deal with the October 23-24, 1956 dates. It is during those few days that Von Tunzelmann provides intimate details of the negotiations between Israel, France and England at Servres. All the important players from Eden, whose health is explored in relation to his decision-making; Ben-Gurion, who exemplifies what she calls “muscular Judaism,” who wanted a preventive war before the Egyptians could absorb Soviet weapons; Guy Mollet, who agrees with Israel and promises aid in building a nuclear reactor for the Jewish state, and others. Within each chapter Von Tunzelmann switches to the machinations involving events in Hungary and how precarious the situation has become. As machinations were taking place Von Tunzelmann describes events that are evolving in Hungary. With demonstrations against Soviet encroachment in Poland and the visit of the Soviet leadership to Warsaw to make sure that the Poles remained in the Russian orbit, the aura of revolution was in the air and it spread to neighboring Hungary. With mass demonstrations led by Hungarian students, workers, and intellectuals, Moscow dispatched the head of the KGB, Ivan Seroy. Von Tunzelmann examines the thinking of Soviet leadership, the role of Imre Nagy, hardly a revolutionary, but a reformist acceptable to the people, as the situation reaches a breaking point. Finally, on October 24, 1956 Soviet troops and tanks roll into Budapest sparking further demonstrations allowing an excuse for Russian forces to crush the demonstrators. The end results vary from 60-80 killed and 100-150 seriously wounded. The proximity of Soviet actions with the Israeli invasion of the 29th would make Eisenhower apoplectic, in part because the CIA had a coup set to go in effect in Syria on the same day as the Israel attack.
One of the most conjectured part of this period is whether the United States was aware of the Sevres conspiracy and what was the role of the CIA. Von Tunzelmann approach to these questions is fair and plausible. After reviewing the available documentation she reaches the conclusion that Allen W. Dulles, the Head of the CIA, who destroyed his documentation knew about the plot in advance and kept the president in the dark because if Eisenhower had known he might have pressured England and France to call it off. The CIA had so much invested in Nasser, with the relationship fostered by Miles Copeland and Kermit Roosevelt that they wanted to protect him, in fact according to the author the CIA warned Nasser that the British wanted to kill him. According to Israeli historian and later politician, Michael Bar-Zohar the CIA was fully aware of what was going on and Allen Dulles informed his brother of the conspiracy. For the CIA “plausible deniability” was the key. Whatever the case it is clear that crucial information was withheld from Eisenhower. However, the president was fully aware of the Anglo-American plot to overthrow Syrian leader Shukri al-Kuwatty, who was developing closer ties with the Soviet Union. Explaining CIA and MI6 machinations is one of the strongest aspects of Von Tunzelmann’s work. Reading about the British obsession to kill Nasser, reminded me how Washington pursued Fidel Castro few years later.
At the same time she discusses Suez, Von Tunzelmann shifts to Hungary and analyzes Moscow’s hesitancy to invade. Her portrayal of Imre Nagy’s difficulty in controlling the uprising is solid as the demonstrations spirals out of control inside and outside of Budapest. However, once Imre Nagy decides to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and claims neutrality for his country it is a forgone conclusion in the Kremlin that despite some hesitation they must invade. The Suez situation provided Moscow with excellent cover at the United Nations. As the French and British dithered in delivering their forces to Egypt, Moscow became emboldened. Von Tunzelmann does an excellent job following communications between Dulles and Eisenhower on the American side, Mollet and Pineau for the French, Eden and the Foreign Office, and within Imre Nagy’s circle in Budapest, as it is clear in the eyes of Washington that the allies really have made a mess of things. The author’s insights and command of the material are remarkable and her new book stands with Keith Kyles’ SUEZ as the most important work on the topic. What enhances her effort is her ability to compare events in Suez and Hungary during the first week of November shifting back and forth reflecting how each crisis was dealt with, and how the final outcome in part depended on the evolution of each crisis.
One of the major aspects of the Suez Crises that many books do not deal with which BLOOD AND SAND discusses is that once war was unleashed the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could only be exacerbated. Israeli actions in Gaza stayed with those who were displaced and suffered and it would contribute to the hatred that remains today. Once the crisis played itself out and Eisenhower forced the British and French to withdraw from Egyptian territory in early November, using oil and currency pressure; threatening the Israelis, who finally withdrew in March, 1957, it seemed that American standing in the Arab world would improve. However, the United States gave away the opportunity to furthering relations in the Arab world with the introduction of the Eisenhower Doctrine which was geared against the communist threat. Von Tunzelmann makes the case that Eisenhower was the hero of Suez, but within a few years his doctrine led to dispatching US troops to Lebanon and the overthrow of the Iraqi government. By 1958 the Arab world began to view the United States through the same colonialist lens that they evaluated England and France, tarnishing the image of Eisenhower as the hero of Suez.
Von Tunzelmann begins by providing the history that led up to British control of the Suez Canal. She goes on to examine the major players in the conflict; Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary and later Prime Minister who despised Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser and basically “wanted him dead” as he blamed him for all of England’s ills, domestic and foreign. President Dwight Eisenhower, who had grown tired of British colonialism and its impact on American foreign policy, and provided the guidelines that Secretary of State Dulles implemented. Gamal Abdul Nasser, the Egyptian President who rose to power in 1954 and was bent on achieving the removal of the British from the Suez Canal Base, and spreading his Pan Arabist ideology throughout the region. It is fascinating as the author delves into the role of the CIA in Egypt and the relationship between Kermit Roosevelt, the author of the 1953 Iranian coup, and Miles Copeland with Nasser taking the reader into an area than is usually forbidden. Other profiles are provided including Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, French President Guy Mollet, Imre Nagy, the leader of Hungary, and the troika that controlled the Kremlin.
Each country had its own agenda. In England neo-imperialist forces believed that “if they could no longer dominate colonies openly, they must try to foster a secret British Empire club….a powerful hidden empire of money and control,” this was apart from the “Commonwealth.” (23) This was the overall strategy that revolved around access and transportation of oil. An example of Von Tunzelmann’s approach is her March 1, 1956 section where she concentrates on Jordan’s King Hussein’s firing of John Glubb Pasha, a British serving officer who headed the Arab Legion. For Eden, Nasser was the cause and his actions were a roadblock to achieve a Middle Eastern defense pact (Baghdad Pact), and Jordanian membership. Eradicating Nasser became Eden’s life’s mission. In her discussion of March, 1956 the author raises the role of American policy, but she only mentions in passing American attempts to bring about peace between Israel and Egypt, i.e.; Project Alpha and the Anderson Mission. She presents a number of reasons why the US withdrew its offer to fund the Aswan Dam project on July 19, 1956, forgoing that Washington had already decided as early as March 28, 1956 that Nasser was an impediment to peace and the US launched Operation Omega designed to take Nasser down a peg or two, and once the presidential election was over more drastic action could be taken. For the French, Mollet blamed Nasser for all Paris’ difficulties in Algeria. When FLN leader Ahmed Ben Bella, a World War II hero in France left for Cairo it confirmed that Nasser was providing Ben Bella weapons and a safe exile. To the author’s credit throughout the narrative she whittles down all of the information in expert fashion and she sums up the interests of all concerned as the crisis approaches.
Von Tunzelmann provides many interesting details as she delves into individual motivations. For Ben-Gurion, the Straits of Tiran were the key. Many have speculated why Israel would ally with England under the Sevres Agreement, a country that had been a thorn in the side of Jews for decades. The key was an oil pipeline that was to be built from the southern Israeli port of Eilat to Ashkelon in the north (Trans Israel pipeline or Tipline) that would bring Iranian oil to Europe. In 1957, Israel brokered a deal with Iran, and the Suez Canal, by then under Egyptian control, would be bypassed. This deal would also make the Jewish state a strategic ally of Europe.
The most important parts of the narrative deal with the October 23-24, 1956 dates. It is during those few days that Von Tunzelmann provides intimate details of the negotiations between Israel, France and England at Servres. All the important players from Eden, whose health is explored in relation to his decision-making; Ben-Gurion, who exemplifies what she calls “muscular Judaism,” who wanted a preventive war before the Egyptians could absorb Soviet weapons; Guy Mollet, who agrees with Israel and promises aid in building a nuclear reactor for the Jewish state, and others. Within each chapter Von Tunzelmann switches to the machinations involving events in Hungary and how precarious the situation has become. As machinations were taking place Von Tunzelmann describes events that are evolving in Hungary. With demonstrations against Soviet encroachment in Poland and the visit of the Soviet leadership to Warsaw to make sure that the Poles remained in the Russian orbit, the aura of revolution was in the air and it spread to neighboring Hungary. With mass demonstrations led by Hungarian students, workers, and intellectuals, Moscow dispatched the head of the KGB, Ivan Seroy. Von Tunzelmann examines the thinking of Soviet leadership, the role of Imre Nagy, hardly a revolutionary, but a reformist acceptable to the people, as the situation reaches a breaking point. Finally, on October 24, 1956 Soviet troops and tanks roll into Budapest sparking further demonstrations allowing an excuse for Russian forces to crush the demonstrators. The end results vary from 60-80 killed and 100-150 seriously wounded. The proximity of Soviet actions with the Israeli invasion of the 29th would make Eisenhower apoplectic, in part because the CIA had a coup set to go in effect in Syria on the same day as the Israel attack.
One of the most conjectured part of this period is whether the United States was aware of the Sevres conspiracy and what was the role of the CIA. Von Tunzelmann approach to these questions is fair and plausible. After reviewing the available documentation she reaches the conclusion that Allen W. Dulles, the Head of the CIA, who destroyed his documentation knew about the plot in advance and kept the president in the dark because if Eisenhower had known he might have pressured England and France to call it off. The CIA had so much invested in Nasser, with the relationship fostered by Miles Copeland and Kermit Roosevelt that they wanted to protect him, in fact according to the author the CIA warned Nasser that the British wanted to kill him. According to Israeli historian and later politician, Michael Bar-Zohar the CIA was fully aware of what was going on and Allen Dulles informed his brother of the conspiracy. For the CIA “plausible deniability” was the key. Whatever the case it is clear that crucial information was withheld from Eisenhower. However, the president was fully aware of the Anglo-American plot to overthrow Syrian leader Shukri al-Kuwatty, who was developing closer ties with the Soviet Union. Explaining CIA and MI6 machinations is one of the strongest aspects of Von Tunzelmann’s work. Reading about the British obsession to kill Nasser, reminded me how Washington pursued Fidel Castro few years later.
At the same time she discusses Suez, Von Tunzelmann shifts to Hungary and analyzes Moscow’s hesitancy to invade. Her portrayal of Imre Nagy’s difficulty in controlling the uprising is solid as the demonstrations spirals out of control inside and outside of Budapest. However, once Imre Nagy decides to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and claims neutrality for his country it is a forgone conclusion in the Kremlin that despite some hesitation they must invade. The Suez situation provided Moscow with excellent cover at the United Nations. As the French and British dithered in delivering their forces to Egypt, Moscow became emboldened. Von Tunzelmann does an excellent job following communications between Dulles and Eisenhower on the American side, Mollet and Pineau for the French, Eden and the Foreign Office, and within Imre Nagy’s circle in Budapest, as it is clear in the eyes of Washington that the allies really have made a mess of things. The author’s insights and command of the material are remarkable and her new book stands with Keith Kyles’ SUEZ as the most important work on the topic. What enhances her effort is her ability to compare events in Suez and Hungary during the first week of November shifting back and forth reflecting how each crisis was dealt with, and how the final outcome in part depended on the evolution of each crisis.
One of the major aspects of the Suez Crises that many books do not deal with which BLOOD AND SAND discusses is that once war was unleashed the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could only be exacerbated. Israeli actions in Gaza stayed with those who were displaced and suffered and it would contribute to the hatred that remains today. Once the crisis played itself out and Eisenhower forced the British and French to withdraw from Egyptian territory in early November, using oil and currency pressure; threatening the Israelis, who finally withdrew in March, 1957, it seemed that American standing in the Arab world would improve. However, the United States gave away the opportunity to furthering relations in the Arab world with the introduction of the Eisenhower Doctrine which was geared against the communist threat. Von Tunzelmann makes the case that Eisenhower was the hero of Suez, but within a few years his doctrine led to dispatching US troops to Lebanon and the overthrow of the Iraqi government. By 1958 the Arab world began to view the United States through the same colonialist lens that they evaluated England and France, tarnishing the image of Eisenhower as the hero of Suez.
September 25, 2019
Highly readable account of major turning points in history. Exposes the lack of sound judgement based on a reasoned study of potential outcomes made by most of the key players. I’m not sure why but it continues to confound me how people like most of these remain in power. I have this peculiar fantasy about time travelling to the past and providing psychotherapy to Anthony Eden. At the very least I could offer him a referral to a good physician.
July 12, 2025
Alex von Tunzelmann's Blood and Sand offers a good kick-off to my Suez Crisis research project. A recent narrative history paralleling Suez and the Hungarian rising of '56, it's engagingly written even if there's little substantively new after the in-depth volumes by Keith Kyle, Barry Turner, etc. The Hungarian sections of the story are much weaker, almost perfunctory in spots; Von Tunzelmann instead focuses on the well-worn but still fascinating verities of Suez: the bizarre Anglo-French-Israeli conspiracy to recapture Suez and "knock Nasser off his perch," Eden's personal vendetta against Nasser and increasingly erratic behavior, the bizarre, James Bond-ian assassination plots (from poison gas and commando teams to exploding razors) and America's refusal to back its allies in an act of naked, imperial aggression. It's the kind of story that would be rejected as absurdly convoluted in a film or novel, yet it really happened and it's even more bizarre than a summary can hope to convey.
January 25, 2025
Absolutely first rate history that brings together the stories of the absurd Suez campaign and the tragic events in Hungary. This is history, as story telling, at its best. I could go on and on because the Suez campaign infuriates me so much, examples of its stupidities are boundless, for example there were only eight or nine years left on the lease Britain held on the canal so it was 'wasting', asset whose time was nearly up and compensation was to be paid - the whole 'crisis' was the height of stupidity and arrogance. As for Hungary - Tunzelmann reminds us, and we need reminding again and again, that the USA/CIA supported Radio Free Europe had for years been making propaganda broadcasts on its Hungarian, and other services, to the effect that the huddled masses of the Eastern Bloc should rise up and throw off the shackles of communism and, when they did so, the USA would be there to support them. Because the Hungarian rebels imagined this was a 'promise' indeed a 'commitment' of support from the government of the USA they continued until Warsaw pact troops were banging on the studio door, to appeal, with growing desperation as they realised it was fruitless, to appeal again and again for the help and support they had been assured would be given to help them fight the good fight against Soviet communism. The lies told by Radio Free Europe (the US government would never have agreed to support anyone fighting the Russians - that could lead to nuclear Armageddon) were as delusional and stupid as the ones the British and French told (though the ones who suffered and died were ordinary Egyptians).
This is an excellent tale of shameful deeds which resulted in thousands of deaths by the actions of powerful men who died comfortably in their beds.
This is an excellent tale of shameful deeds which resulted in thousands of deaths by the actions of powerful men who died comfortably in their beds.
August 5, 2016
Excellent and very readable account of the Suez Crisis of 1956
Alex von Tunzelmann has put together an excellent account of the political manoeuvring that resulted in the 1956 Suez Crisis and how that crisis prevented a more effective response to the Soviet invasion of Hungary that occurred at the same time.
It’s an incredible story of British, French and Israeli duplicity and conspiracy with US President Eisenhower valiantly trying to prevent a potential World War whilst trying to fight an election.
The writing is excellent and whilst the content itself could be quite dry the author recounts the story in style that keeps your attention via an hour by hour account featuring a colourful group of international politicians.
With the 60th anniversary approaching I’d highly recommend this for anyone wanting to understand the modern Middle East and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.
Alex von Tunzelmann has put together an excellent account of the political manoeuvring that resulted in the 1956 Suez Crisis and how that crisis prevented a more effective response to the Soviet invasion of Hungary that occurred at the same time.
It’s an incredible story of British, French and Israeli duplicity and conspiracy with US President Eisenhower valiantly trying to prevent a potential World War whilst trying to fight an election.
The writing is excellent and whilst the content itself could be quite dry the author recounts the story in style that keeps your attention via an hour by hour account featuring a colourful group of international politicians.
With the 60th anniversary approaching I’d highly recommend this for anyone wanting to understand the modern Middle East and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.
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October 11, 2020This is a less balanced effort than Ms. von Tunzelmann’s prior excellent work, Red Heat; I felt the greatest focus on Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister. By comparison, there was far less discussion of the Hungarian, Egyptian, Russian, Israeli and French leadership. I leave this work with particularly good feelings for Presidents Eisenhower and Nasser; nearly every other major player, particularly Eden, and, to a lesser degree, the Dulles brothers, appear tainted—I can hear Boss Hogg’s voice, ‘Them Dulles boys is nothin’ but trouble.’
Suez and Hungary coincided with the 1956 US presidential election, making for an interesting moment in American foreign policy. Eisenhower acted with an acute sense of perspective, absent, it seems, in the behavior of many American presidents when put to similar tests. To attach a single word to some of the primary characters in this tale, Eisenhower – wise, Dulles (John Foster) – duplicitous, Eden – foolish, Nasser – patriotic, Mollet – myopic, Nagy – naïve, Khrushchev – predictable, Ben-Gurion – murderous, although to be fair, that word should also be associated with Eden, Mollet and Khrushchev; a wonder, for these leaders seemed such amiable humans when chatting over coffee.
Suez and Hungary coincided with the 1956 US presidential election, making for an interesting moment in American foreign policy. Eisenhower acted with an acute sense of perspective, absent, it seems, in the behavior of many American presidents when put to similar tests. To attach a single word to some of the primary characters in this tale, Eisenhower – wise, Dulles (John Foster) – duplicitous, Eden – foolish, Nasser – patriotic, Mollet – myopic, Nagy – naïve, Khrushchev – predictable, Ben-Gurion – murderous, although to be fair, that word should also be associated with Eden, Mollet and Khrushchev; a wonder, for these leaders seemed such amiable humans when chatting over coffee.
June 7, 2024
The Suez Crisis is one of those weeks where decades almost happen, to paraphrase Lenin. The overall situation is rather unbelievable: two simultaneous international crises, one a meticulously planned fiasco and one a spontaneous revolt, right before an American Presidential election. And yet it all happened, and came very close to overturning 20th century order as we know it.
The Ever Given stuck in the Suez Canal in 2021. Don't cry because it's over. Smile because it happened.
Blood and Sand is a day-by-day account of the crisis, with events well contextualized with both their origins and later consequences. Tunzelmann frames the Suez Crisis as a personal battle of wills between British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Nasser was an ambitious able Egyptian patriot, and one of his actions as part of policy of de-colonization was nationalizing the Suez Canal. In practical terms, the effects were basically nil. Egypt ran the canal effectively, fees were stable, and Nasser even allowed the transit of Israel-bound cargo, though not Israeli flagged ship. But Suez was the trachea of the British economy, the channel through which vital supplies of Arab and Iranian oil flowed. What if Nasser's ambitions lead him to put pressure on that oil supply?
So Eden embarked on a scheme to seize control of the canal and hopefully depose Nasser, enlisting France and Israel as allies. Each nation had their own reason for participating. David Ben-Gurion of Israel identified Nassar as the most dangerous Arab leader to Israeli security, and saw this as an opportunity to attack with cover from great powers. France's Guy Mollet had problems with Algerian independence fighters who were supported by Nasser.
However, this unlikely alliance couldn't just do the thing. Rather, Eden orchestrated an elaborate plan where Israel would attack, and then the British and French forces would intervene as "peace-keepers". To carry this act of outright imperialism under a lawful casus belli, Eden wove an elaborate and farcical web of deceit, lying to the international community, the British people, his own ministers, and the officers who were to carry out the invasion.
By the time everything had come together, it was months after the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and in the midst of the Hungarian Revolution. A spontaneous nationalist gathering in Budapest was fired upon by the Secret Police, and rather than dispersing the crowd found their mustard and comprehensive threw the hardline Stalinists and Soviets out.
It's unclear that Khrushchev would have let Hungary leave the Warsaw Pact, but when he saw Britain and France lurch into Egypt, and America leave them out to dry in the UN, there was nothing stopping Soviet armored divisions from rolling back into Budapest and smashing the Hungarian Revolution permanently.
Meanwhile, the Suez invasion was haltingly failing its military objectives, and utterly failing in its political ones. Israeli troops struck deep into the Sinai, achieving their main geopolitical objective at the Straits of Tiran. The French and British amphibious attack on Port Said was dilatory and piecemeal. Egypt had sunk blockships throughout the canal well before forces from the alliance reached it. Meanwhile, Britain's allies through the Muslim world, including Jordan, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, all violently denounced it.
Eisenhower, in the midst of a tense reelection campaign and kept out of the l0op, refused to allow American power, prestige, or money to be used to support the British effort, in Tunzelmann's argument maintaining a moral clarity through the whole mess that was one of the higher points of American Cold War policy. With the pound falling and oil rationing in the future, Eden backed off, failing in all of his objectives and showing once and for all that the British Empire was done.
This is the first book I've read on Suez, so I'm not sure how well the personality-driven framing works, but it makes for an engaging read.
The Ever Given stuck in the Suez Canal in 2021. Don't cry because it's over. Smile because it happened.
Blood and Sand is a day-by-day account of the crisis, with events well contextualized with both their origins and later consequences. Tunzelmann frames the Suez Crisis as a personal battle of wills between British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Nasser was an ambitious able Egyptian patriot, and one of his actions as part of policy of de-colonization was nationalizing the Suez Canal. In practical terms, the effects were basically nil. Egypt ran the canal effectively, fees were stable, and Nasser even allowed the transit of Israel-bound cargo, though not Israeli flagged ship. But Suez was the trachea of the British economy, the channel through which vital supplies of Arab and Iranian oil flowed. What if Nasser's ambitions lead him to put pressure on that oil supply?
So Eden embarked on a scheme to seize control of the canal and hopefully depose Nasser, enlisting France and Israel as allies. Each nation had their own reason for participating. David Ben-Gurion of Israel identified Nassar as the most dangerous Arab leader to Israeli security, and saw this as an opportunity to attack with cover from great powers. France's Guy Mollet had problems with Algerian independence fighters who were supported by Nasser.
However, this unlikely alliance couldn't just do the thing. Rather, Eden orchestrated an elaborate plan where Israel would attack, and then the British and French forces would intervene as "peace-keepers". To carry this act of outright imperialism under a lawful casus belli, Eden wove an elaborate and farcical web of deceit, lying to the international community, the British people, his own ministers, and the officers who were to carry out the invasion.
By the time everything had come together, it was months after the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and in the midst of the Hungarian Revolution. A spontaneous nationalist gathering in Budapest was fired upon by the Secret Police, and rather than dispersing the crowd found their mustard and comprehensive threw the hardline Stalinists and Soviets out.
It's unclear that Khrushchev would have let Hungary leave the Warsaw Pact, but when he saw Britain and France lurch into Egypt, and America leave them out to dry in the UN, there was nothing stopping Soviet armored divisions from rolling back into Budapest and smashing the Hungarian Revolution permanently.
Meanwhile, the Suez invasion was haltingly failing its military objectives, and utterly failing in its political ones. Israeli troops struck deep into the Sinai, achieving their main geopolitical objective at the Straits of Tiran. The French and British amphibious attack on Port Said was dilatory and piecemeal. Egypt had sunk blockships throughout the canal well before forces from the alliance reached it. Meanwhile, Britain's allies through the Muslim world, including Jordan, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, all violently denounced it.
Eisenhower, in the midst of a tense reelection campaign and kept out of the l0op, refused to allow American power, prestige, or money to be used to support the British effort, in Tunzelmann's argument maintaining a moral clarity through the whole mess that was one of the higher points of American Cold War policy. With the pound falling and oil rationing in the future, Eden backed off, failing in all of his objectives and showing once and for all that the British Empire was done.
This is the first book I've read on Suez, so I'm not sure how well the personality-driven framing works, but it makes for an engaging read.
December 2, 2019
2.5 Stars!
“There is nothing in the United Nations Charter which justifies any nation appointing itself as world policeman.”
I knew a bit about the events described in here, but not to the extent it is explored within these pages. I learned a lot, often a little too much, but this is a thorough, excellently researched and clearly written piece of work, but it dragged on for a bit too long and it would have been a lot better if we got less detail.
In the end this reminded me that the world is like a school playground and like all playgrounds it has its bullies. The likes of China, Russia and possibly the biggest of all the U S of A. All the others in the playground tolerate, rub up and pretend to like the bully to their face, whether it be out of self-interest or just self-protection, and then you have the sidekicks like Britain, Israel and Saudi Arabia who go out of their way to please the bullies the most, going to excruciating lengths to appease them. Bullies will only pick fights that they think they can win, rarely if at all will they challenge another bully, because like all bullies they hide the bigger coward within.
As the man said back in the day, “All governments are liars and murderers.” And this book shows how alliances may shift, leaders will change but there is nothing too horrific, awful or cruel a politician, leader or government won’t do if it serves their own personal interests…and the punishment, when it is rarely inflicted, is never commensurate with the crime.
January 2, 2018
A really fascinating and well paced account of the two most significant events of the late 1950s and probably the 20th century: The Hungarian uprisings and the Suez crisis. The author does an excellent job intertwining the different threads of both stories to show how they were connected and how each impacted the political maneuvering of the other. Highly recommended!
August 9, 2024
A lively, tick-tock narrative of the twin foreign policy crises that rocked the world in late October and early November 1956 as President Dwight Eisenhower was about to face American voters at the ballot box for re-election. Despite its title, this is mostly a history of the tripartite British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt though; you almost feel that Tunzelmann decided to throw in some episodic accounts of the Hungarian revolt in order not to make this book another history of the Suez crisis. A solid introductory primer to both events regardless.
November 19, 2021
To be fair, I think for someone who is looking for all the details about specific conversations of world leaders and their machinations concerning the Suez crisis this is a solid book choice. I was hoping for a bit less than I got. What I loved were some of the author’s final conclusions such as the United Kingdom was fortunate to stay out of the Vietnam debacle because they were still reeling from being snubbed by Eisenhower’s public rebuke of their under handed handling of the Suez Crisis. Eisenhower came out even politically stronger than he started and the reputations of both the UK and France took a bit of a dive on the international stage because of it. The Soviet invasion of Hungary was coincident to the Suez Crisis and enabled largely because of it. But the author did a poor job really linking the two events. It seemed the two narratives were more co-located in the text instead of truly integrated. This irritated me. I wanted some clear parallels to be articulated instead of what seemed to feel like reading two stories simultaneously for a few chapters. However, because of this book I hold Nasser in slightly higher regard and understand his worldview a bit better.
January 29, 2020
Possibly not the way I would have interpreted things, but it did make for a very interesting read and got me into history again.
I am struck however, by the complete omission of people who should have featured more in the telling of the history of the region. I am sure that the folk in Gaza did not feel that all was quite as benign as all this... and how did Iraq get to be such a puppet show?
The book has left me keen to read even more.
(Hey, even British-Pakistani relations would make for interesting reading)
I also wonder about the thesis that Britain and France’s involvement in Suez was the reason the US could not be more effective in Hungary.
(on a separate, totally unrelated note, - why did GDF Suez change its name to Engie?)
I am struck however, by the complete omission of people who should have featured more in the telling of the history of the region. I am sure that the folk in Gaza did not feel that all was quite as benign as all this... and how did Iraq get to be such a puppet show?
The book has left me keen to read even more.
(Hey, even British-Pakistani relations would make for interesting reading)
I also wonder about the thesis that Britain and France’s involvement in Suez was the reason the US could not be more effective in Hungary.
(on a separate, totally unrelated note, - why did GDF Suez change its name to Engie?)
July 11, 2020
A terrific read on the twin crises that hit the world in the Autumn of 1956, and how they have reverberated to the present. Beautiful research into what the leaders in Egypt, Britain, France, Israel, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and the United States thought and did during the Suez and Hungarian crises. Recommended reading for those interesting in this dangerous time in world history.
July 31, 2023
This is now a Anthony Eden hate account
April 10, 2017
I read this book because I'd previously read her book Red Heat, which juggles the goings-on in three Caribbean countries during the Cold War (Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic). That book was fantastic, and this one looked like it was right up her alley - two crises going on in different countries at the same time.
It's still really good, but not as good as Red Heat. The main issue is that this book doesn't juggle things as well as Red Heat did. Ultimately, you get a ton on the British in Suez, and less on the rest. Hungary does appear a lot, but it's the junior partner of the crisis. Von Tunzelmann actually does a really good job discussing the Eisenhower administration's responses to the matters at hand. (Though even there, I think it could have taken things a step further - she repeatedly notes that this all occurred during the stretch run of the 1956 presidential election, but we hardly hear of anything about the election beyond that). The French are barely more than bit players in this book.
Don't get me wrong, it's still a great book, but it's focus isn't as broad as I expected. She is great discussing the British government. Short version: they come off incredibly incompetent. Prime Minister Anthony Eden wanted to bring down Nassar and he lost all manner of perspective in the matter, and basically never regained it.
He thought that if England took part in this, the UK would rally together behind it. Wow, was he ever wrong. The Labour Party criticized it. There were protests in the streets. His own foreign secretary resigned. He assumed the US would go along with it. Wow, was he ever wrong there. Ike was furious that England and France appeared to prioritize their old empires over Cold War concerns. Eden thought Nassar could be brought down. How? There was no real alternative power broker in the country and invading the land just made people rally round him. Eden wanted to keep the Suez open to British shipping, but the invasion assured the opposite - and Nassar sunk dozens of block ships in the canal, making it impassable. (One British intelligence expert noted that even a novice in the field could see that response coming). Eden disregarded how badly this would make the British look across the Mideast. Eden thought the objectives could be swiftly attained, overlooking that the nearest big naval base to their objective was Malta, halfway across the Mediterranean.
The international reaction was terrible, even within the British commonwealth. Eden was jeered in Parliament even before the US sided with the UN over NATO. The UN voted 64-5 against the British (Israel, France, England, Australia, and New Zealand were the only ones voting for it. Canada was among six abstainers). One Labour leader said Eden's policy amounted to helping a burglar by shooting the householder. I mean, officially England and France were to preserve order by the Canal, but they called for it well before Israel reached anywhere near the Canal, and what they called for amounted to a sizable Israeli advance from their current position. Israel even said they'd accept a cease fire before the main UK/French effort arrived - because Israel had already achieved their objective.
England also seemed to completely ignore how this could/did hurt their finances. They couldn't buy oil from Arab nations, and Ike didn't want to give US oil until this was all resolved; at least not at a reduced price. And England couldn't afford anything other than a reduced price.
It's an all-timer fuck up of a policy.
I really didn't get much about Hungary. I have read about it before, but like I said - that crises is very much a junior partner. Von Tunzelmann does argue that while people say the Suez Crisis sealed the fate of Hungary, to flip it around - if not for Hungary then the Soviets may have helped turn the Suez into WW3. I dunno about that, but it's an interesting idea. She also says that lingering British ill will here helped keep them out of Vietnam (let's not help the guys who didn't help us) so in that regard perhaps something good came out of this for the UK.
A really good book on the Suez (especially from the British point of view) but not as successful on its other areas.
It's still really good, but not as good as Red Heat. The main issue is that this book doesn't juggle things as well as Red Heat did. Ultimately, you get a ton on the British in Suez, and less on the rest. Hungary does appear a lot, but it's the junior partner of the crisis. Von Tunzelmann actually does a really good job discussing the Eisenhower administration's responses to the matters at hand. (Though even there, I think it could have taken things a step further - she repeatedly notes that this all occurred during the stretch run of the 1956 presidential election, but we hardly hear of anything about the election beyond that). The French are barely more than bit players in this book.
Don't get me wrong, it's still a great book, but it's focus isn't as broad as I expected. She is great discussing the British government. Short version: they come off incredibly incompetent. Prime Minister Anthony Eden wanted to bring down Nassar and he lost all manner of perspective in the matter, and basically never regained it.
He thought that if England took part in this, the UK would rally together behind it. Wow, was he ever wrong. The Labour Party criticized it. There were protests in the streets. His own foreign secretary resigned. He assumed the US would go along with it. Wow, was he ever wrong there. Ike was furious that England and France appeared to prioritize their old empires over Cold War concerns. Eden thought Nassar could be brought down. How? There was no real alternative power broker in the country and invading the land just made people rally round him. Eden wanted to keep the Suez open to British shipping, but the invasion assured the opposite - and Nassar sunk dozens of block ships in the canal, making it impassable. (One British intelligence expert noted that even a novice in the field could see that response coming). Eden disregarded how badly this would make the British look across the Mideast. Eden thought the objectives could be swiftly attained, overlooking that the nearest big naval base to their objective was Malta, halfway across the Mediterranean.
The international reaction was terrible, even within the British commonwealth. Eden was jeered in Parliament even before the US sided with the UN over NATO. The UN voted 64-5 against the British (Israel, France, England, Australia, and New Zealand were the only ones voting for it. Canada was among six abstainers). One Labour leader said Eden's policy amounted to helping a burglar by shooting the householder. I mean, officially England and France were to preserve order by the Canal, but they called for it well before Israel reached anywhere near the Canal, and what they called for amounted to a sizable Israeli advance from their current position. Israel even said they'd accept a cease fire before the main UK/French effort arrived - because Israel had already achieved their objective.
England also seemed to completely ignore how this could/did hurt their finances. They couldn't buy oil from Arab nations, and Ike didn't want to give US oil until this was all resolved; at least not at a reduced price. And England couldn't afford anything other than a reduced price.
It's an all-timer fuck up of a policy.
I really didn't get much about Hungary. I have read about it before, but like I said - that crises is very much a junior partner. Von Tunzelmann does argue that while people say the Suez Crisis sealed the fate of Hungary, to flip it around - if not for Hungary then the Soviets may have helped turn the Suez into WW3. I dunno about that, but it's an interesting idea. She also says that lingering British ill will here helped keep them out of Vietnam (let's not help the guys who didn't help us) so in that regard perhaps something good came out of this for the UK.
A really good book on the Suez (especially from the British point of view) but not as successful on its other areas.
July 21, 2021
very readable and gripping, and even a bit more sympathetic to the USSR than one would expect (though not too sympathetic and the anticommunism does seep through at times)
October 30, 2016
Amazingly well-researched and well-written account of the two weeks in 1956 that included the Suez Crisis and the Soviet invasion of Hungary. Barbara Tuchman wrote a book called "The March of Folly". These events have folly written all over them. England, France and Israel connived to work together and fool the world. The USSR could not accept a defection of a client state. One crises allowed the other to continue. Nothing good came out of any of it and we live with the results today.
Only the USA and Eisenhower come out looking good. Eisenhower felt strongly that the Suez situation was wrong and acted accordingly. He did fail to help the people of Hungary for fear of igniting WW III. Eisenhower said the only way to win WW III was to stop it from happening.
Only the USA and Eisenhower come out looking good. Eisenhower felt strongly that the Suez situation was wrong and acted accordingly. He did fail to help the people of Hungary for fear of igniting WW III. Eisenhower said the only way to win WW III was to stop it from happening.
March 22, 2024
A very good synopsis of the Suez War and I liked how it was linked to Hungary to compare Eastern and western aggression. A few takeaways.
1. It’s interesting how Eisenhower seems to be a pretty good guy overall in relation to seeking peace.
2. Dulles is a terrible guy which is a confirmation I didn’t need.
3. Europe acts as though the US is terrible (because we are), but it’s not because they’re any better, it’s just because they’ve been unseated and are jealous.
4. How in the world have we all been taught that Israel has been attacked 4 times? They are clearly the aggressors here, and this war shows how they’ve long/always been on the side of imperialism. I mean, isn’t that what Zionism is?
1. It’s interesting how Eisenhower seems to be a pretty good guy overall in relation to seeking peace.
2. Dulles is a terrible guy which is a confirmation I didn’t need.
3. Europe acts as though the US is terrible (because we are), but it’s not because they’re any better, it’s just because they’ve been unseated and are jealous.
4. How in the world have we all been taught that Israel has been attacked 4 times? They are clearly the aggressors here, and this war shows how they’ve long/always been on the side of imperialism. I mean, isn’t that what Zionism is?
July 28, 2018
1) "On November 21, it was announced that Anthony Eden was leaving London for three weeks on the orders of his doctor. Rab Butler would fill in for him temporarily. Two days later, Eden and his wife departed for Jamaica and Goldeneye, the beachside villa owned by James Bond creator Ian Fleming. This was a public relations disaster. The austerity-bound British public generally felt that a serving prime minister ought not reward himself for orchestrating the biggest foreign policy disaster of the postwar era with an extended holiday in the Caribbean. 'Torquay and a sun-ray lamp would have been more peaceful and patriotic,' admitted Fleming’s wife, Ann."
November 7, 2023
I just finished “Blood and Sand” by Alex Von Tunzelmann (2016). I was looking for a book on the 1956 Suez Crisis and there are surprisingly few of those out there. The library had this one and so that’s what I decided to read.
The book isn’t exclusively about the Suez Crisis though; at the same time, there was also the Hungarian Revolution against Soviet de facto occupation and forced membership in the Warsaw Pact. Finally, all of the above was taking place against the backdrop of Eisenhower running for reelection in the USA, an uprising brewing in Algeria (considered part of France at the time, not just a colony), and the USSR beginning the process of ‘de-Stalinization’.
The Suez Crisis came about when then-president of Egypt, Gamal Nasser, nationalized the British-owned Suez Canal Company. The British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, reacted rather emotionally (he told members of his cabinet “I want him [Nasser] murdered!”) and began conspiring with the governments of France and Israel to invade Egypt and install a more friendly regime there. The French also owned part of the Suez Canal Company and were convinced that Egypt was funding the uprising in Algeria (it appears that they weren’t) and were keen to help out. What the Anglo-French alliance needed was a pretext for invasion and so that’s where the Israelis came in: Egyptian Arab infiltrators, called “Fedayeen”, were entering Israel and committing murders of Israeli Jews at that time and Israel was perfectly willing to use that as an excuse to take over Gaza (controlled by Egypt then) as well as the Sinai Peninsula, part of Egypt and an access point to the Suez Canal.
At the same time, the Hungarian people were inspired by the concept of de-Stalinization to start demanding more freedom and independence from the USSR. Protests, led by students but later joined by all types of people from Hungarian society, broke out all over Hungary but especially in Budapest. When the Hungarian secret police, the AVH, fired on unarmed demonstrators and killed several of them, this turned the peaceful protest into a violent uprising where many Hungarian police and military joined the revolt. At one point, protesters stormed into AVH headquarters and dragged several agents outside, hung them upside down from trees, and burned them alive. The Soviets, who had been toying with liberalization in the wake of Stalin’s death, suddenly associated liberalization with violent uprising and decided to crack down. Khruschev was also convinced that the West was fanning the flames of revolution in Hungary and wanted to quash any “capitalist, imperialist” plots to weaken the Eastern Bloc nations.
The real tragedy here is that if the British and French hadn’t been waging a war of aggression against a foreign power, they might have had a leg to stand on when criticizing the USSR for doing the same thing with Hungary. The harebrained scheme of the Anglo-French alliance was seen through by the whole world and fooled nobody. If the British had been more willing to pursue diplomacy instead of war, they might have been able to bring the Hungarians’ plight to the UN and get international momentum to help the Hungarian people.
All the while, Eisenhower was assumed by the British to be on their side due to the “special relationship” between the USA and the UK. Eisenhower was having none of it, however, and kept trying to bring the Anglo-French into talks with Egypt to end the war. What the British seem to have never considered is that their oil would be cut off by fighting in the Middle East, especially when they were viewed as the aggressor by the Arab world, and they would then have to buy Saudi or American oil for US dollars. The British had a limited amount of US dollars and when that supply ran out, Ike refused to give the Brits credit. It’s really remarkable to think that there was once a US president who would play hardball like that with an ally to bring about peace.
The book is mostly well-written, but I did zone out at times, so it’s lacking a little something there. Also, while the political machinations are covered in detail, there’s few details about the actual military campaigns, which disappointed me personally. That said, there didn’t seem to be a huge amount of actual fighting, with less than 5,000 killed on both sides in Hungary and perhaps that many in Egypt. There are a few details about massacres in those conflicts but even those are few.
This book seems to cover what is another instance of oddly poorly conceived policies leading to tragedy. The hubris and ignorance of politicians can only be ignored by also ignoring history.
The book isn’t exclusively about the Suez Crisis though; at the same time, there was also the Hungarian Revolution against Soviet de facto occupation and forced membership in the Warsaw Pact. Finally, all of the above was taking place against the backdrop of Eisenhower running for reelection in the USA, an uprising brewing in Algeria (considered part of France at the time, not just a colony), and the USSR beginning the process of ‘de-Stalinization’.
The Suez Crisis came about when then-president of Egypt, Gamal Nasser, nationalized the British-owned Suez Canal Company. The British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, reacted rather emotionally (he told members of his cabinet “I want him [Nasser] murdered!”) and began conspiring with the governments of France and Israel to invade Egypt and install a more friendly regime there. The French also owned part of the Suez Canal Company and were convinced that Egypt was funding the uprising in Algeria (it appears that they weren’t) and were keen to help out. What the Anglo-French alliance needed was a pretext for invasion and so that’s where the Israelis came in: Egyptian Arab infiltrators, called “Fedayeen”, were entering Israel and committing murders of Israeli Jews at that time and Israel was perfectly willing to use that as an excuse to take over Gaza (controlled by Egypt then) as well as the Sinai Peninsula, part of Egypt and an access point to the Suez Canal.
At the same time, the Hungarian people were inspired by the concept of de-Stalinization to start demanding more freedom and independence from the USSR. Protests, led by students but later joined by all types of people from Hungarian society, broke out all over Hungary but especially in Budapest. When the Hungarian secret police, the AVH, fired on unarmed demonstrators and killed several of them, this turned the peaceful protest into a violent uprising where many Hungarian police and military joined the revolt. At one point, protesters stormed into AVH headquarters and dragged several agents outside, hung them upside down from trees, and burned them alive. The Soviets, who had been toying with liberalization in the wake of Stalin’s death, suddenly associated liberalization with violent uprising and decided to crack down. Khruschev was also convinced that the West was fanning the flames of revolution in Hungary and wanted to quash any “capitalist, imperialist” plots to weaken the Eastern Bloc nations.
The real tragedy here is that if the British and French hadn’t been waging a war of aggression against a foreign power, they might have had a leg to stand on when criticizing the USSR for doing the same thing with Hungary. The harebrained scheme of the Anglo-French alliance was seen through by the whole world and fooled nobody. If the British had been more willing to pursue diplomacy instead of war, they might have been able to bring the Hungarians’ plight to the UN and get international momentum to help the Hungarian people.
All the while, Eisenhower was assumed by the British to be on their side due to the “special relationship” between the USA and the UK. Eisenhower was having none of it, however, and kept trying to bring the Anglo-French into talks with Egypt to end the war. What the British seem to have never considered is that their oil would be cut off by fighting in the Middle East, especially when they were viewed as the aggressor by the Arab world, and they would then have to buy Saudi or American oil for US dollars. The British had a limited amount of US dollars and when that supply ran out, Ike refused to give the Brits credit. It’s really remarkable to think that there was once a US president who would play hardball like that with an ally to bring about peace.
The book is mostly well-written, but I did zone out at times, so it’s lacking a little something there. Also, while the political machinations are covered in detail, there’s few details about the actual military campaigns, which disappointed me personally. That said, there didn’t seem to be a huge amount of actual fighting, with less than 5,000 killed on both sides in Hungary and perhaps that many in Egypt. There are a few details about massacres in those conflicts but even those are few.
This book seems to cover what is another instance of oddly poorly conceived policies leading to tragedy. The hubris and ignorance of politicians can only be ignored by also ignoring history.
March 13, 2023
Spoiler free Summary:
The time is 1956. Dwight D. Eisenhower is running for his second term in office as president of the United States of America, and his biggest promise made to the American people? Peace internationally. However, with both the Suez canal crisis and the Hungarian revolution reaching their boiling point and with the Soviet Union ever so slowly encroaching on the world stage, Eisenhower's campaign for peace might not just be enough. In this telling of the Suez Canal, Alex Von Tunzelmann shares his well researched and thoughtful tale of how the middle east became the place it is known as today. Join him for something akin to a James Bond movie in terms of storytelling and espionage and political intrigue.
How did I feel after reading:
What a cool way to present this information, I feel so much wiser after reading this book.
Thoughts:
Honestly, Alex von Tunzelmann by himself makes this entire book worth reading, and to be quite honest I think I could read anything written by this man and still be engaged thanks to his artistic and literary voice. The way you read this book makes you feel so, so intrigued at every little moment, adding every detail to a T. This book is not for the faint of heart, even I began to feel a little overwhelmed with how quickly and efficiently the book delivered information and really characterized every scene. One of the main things I really loved was how Alex characterized and showed me(the reader) each and every person's perspective. For example, at one point I remember there was this one section in the book about Prime Minister Ben Gurion that talked about his previous experiences with the Holocaust and why he was so devout to his belief to take over more and more territory at the time.
Another thing I liked was just how seamlessly this book sets up a situation for you to understand. You could be hearing about the Israeli-Egyptian conflict one paragraph and be completely informed about the arms dealings between Egypt, the US and the USSR the next. Although I did appreciate how many perspectives I got at times, I appreciated how the author didn't feel the need to go into the Soviet Union too much, leaving the soviet Union as this mysterious and ambiguous antagonist at times. You know why the US doesn't have the ability to help out certain countries in the middle east but at the same time you don't exactly always know what Russia's angle on the situation is. That's not to say that the author doesn't tell you anything about Russia of course, after all, this is also a book about the Hungarian uprising as well.
Something else to commend about this whole book is the amount of research that was done for this one book. Even the things that I thought were fake I had to look up and 10/10 they were exactly true. In fact, Avi Shlaim, author of The Iron Wall, even said that it was "thoroughly well researched" and "action packed." Constantly I found myself astounded at how well I knew exactly what India, the US, Britain and France wanted out of every meeting. I knew just how diametrically opposed Anthony Eden was to Foster Dulles and every page I wanted to know more and more.
However, that's not to say that this book doesn't have some problems at points. For example, one of my biggest issues is also one of this books biggest strengths, a situation or a conflict that could easily be explained in one paragraph or less can sometimes be a page and a half at worst. Another problem was how inconsistent the pace of this book can be. This book could have definitely benefitted from some editing on the part of giving additional information about certain parts and cutting down on others.
Who would I recommend this book to:
People who are big on history, people who definitely have a lot of spare time, people who aren't likely to get distracted from a certain topic, and people who can focus on a lot of things at once.
Factors for rating:
A lot of fun to read during the action packed parts(+)
A lot of perspective(+)
Word heavy/definitely not for beginners (-)
Final Thoughts:
This book is certainly one hell of an adventure to read from start to finish. There's a lot of stuff to keep track of and a lot of dates to remember, but if you can manage to follow along its well worth it. I'm glad to see that there are still authors out there willing and able to rekindle my love for history and nonfiction books and I'm especially glad that I read this book in particular.
The time is 1956. Dwight D. Eisenhower is running for his second term in office as president of the United States of America, and his biggest promise made to the American people? Peace internationally. However, with both the Suez canal crisis and the Hungarian revolution reaching their boiling point and with the Soviet Union ever so slowly encroaching on the world stage, Eisenhower's campaign for peace might not just be enough. In this telling of the Suez Canal, Alex Von Tunzelmann shares his well researched and thoughtful tale of how the middle east became the place it is known as today. Join him for something akin to a James Bond movie in terms of storytelling and espionage and political intrigue.
How did I feel after reading:
What a cool way to present this information, I feel so much wiser after reading this book.
Thoughts:
Honestly, Alex von Tunzelmann by himself makes this entire book worth reading, and to be quite honest I think I could read anything written by this man and still be engaged thanks to his artistic and literary voice. The way you read this book makes you feel so, so intrigued at every little moment, adding every detail to a T. This book is not for the faint of heart, even I began to feel a little overwhelmed with how quickly and efficiently the book delivered information and really characterized every scene. One of the main things I really loved was how Alex characterized and showed me(the reader) each and every person's perspective. For example, at one point I remember there was this one section in the book about Prime Minister Ben Gurion that talked about his previous experiences with the Holocaust and why he was so devout to his belief to take over more and more territory at the time.
Another thing I liked was just how seamlessly this book sets up a situation for you to understand. You could be hearing about the Israeli-Egyptian conflict one paragraph and be completely informed about the arms dealings between Egypt, the US and the USSR the next. Although I did appreciate how many perspectives I got at times, I appreciated how the author didn't feel the need to go into the Soviet Union too much, leaving the soviet Union as this mysterious and ambiguous antagonist at times. You know why the US doesn't have the ability to help out certain countries in the middle east but at the same time you don't exactly always know what Russia's angle on the situation is. That's not to say that the author doesn't tell you anything about Russia of course, after all, this is also a book about the Hungarian uprising as well.
Something else to commend about this whole book is the amount of research that was done for this one book. Even the things that I thought were fake I had to look up and 10/10 they were exactly true. In fact, Avi Shlaim, author of The Iron Wall, even said that it was "thoroughly well researched" and "action packed." Constantly I found myself astounded at how well I knew exactly what India, the US, Britain and France wanted out of every meeting. I knew just how diametrically opposed Anthony Eden was to Foster Dulles and every page I wanted to know more and more.
However, that's not to say that this book doesn't have some problems at points. For example, one of my biggest issues is also one of this books biggest strengths, a situation or a conflict that could easily be explained in one paragraph or less can sometimes be a page and a half at worst. Another problem was how inconsistent the pace of this book can be. This book could have definitely benefitted from some editing on the part of giving additional information about certain parts and cutting down on others.
Who would I recommend this book to:
People who are big on history, people who definitely have a lot of spare time, people who aren't likely to get distracted from a certain topic, and people who can focus on a lot of things at once.
Factors for rating:
A lot of fun to read during the action packed parts(+)
A lot of perspective(+)
Word heavy/definitely not for beginners (-)
Final Thoughts:
This book is certainly one hell of an adventure to read from start to finish. There's a lot of stuff to keep track of and a lot of dates to remember, but if you can manage to follow along its well worth it. I'm glad to see that there are still authors out there willing and able to rekindle my love for history and nonfiction books and I'm especially glad that I read this book in particular.
May 4, 2017
Today's Nonfiction post is on Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower's campaign for Peace by Alex von Tunzelmann. It is 560 pages long including notes. The cover is black and white with different pictures dealing with the content of the book. The intended reader is someone interested in the Middle East post World War 2 and Eisenhower. There is foul language, talk of sex, and voilence in this book. There Be Spoilers Ahead.
From the back of the book- Over sixteen extraordinary days in October and November 1956, the twin crises of Suez and Hungary pushed the world to the brink of a nuclear conflict and what many at the time were calling World War III. Blood & Sand is a revelatory new history of these dramatic events, for the first time setting both crises in the context of the global Cold War, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the treacherous power politics of imperialism and oil.
Blood & Sand tells this story hour by hour through a fascinating international cast of characters including Gamal Abdel Nasser, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Anthony Eden, Christian Pineau, Nikita Khrushchev, Imre Nagy and David Ben-Gurion. It is a tale of conspiracy and revolutions; spies and terrorists; kidnappings and assassination plots; the fall of the British Empire and rise of American hegemony. Blood & Sand is essential to our understanding of the modern Middle East and resonates strikingly with the problems of oil control, religious fundamentalism and international unity that face the world today.
Review- I wanted to be engaged with this book. I wanted to learn some new things about a president that I do not know much about but this book was a very slow and boring read. It is about the beginning of the Middle East as we have it today and it should have been interesting. Instead the writing is very slow, with lots of details that do not really add to the overall story, just slow it down. The notes are good and give pointers about where to go next if you want to do more research but after this book I do not.
I give this book a Two out of Five stars. I was given this book in exchange for an honest review by Harper Collins.
From the back of the book- Over sixteen extraordinary days in October and November 1956, the twin crises of Suez and Hungary pushed the world to the brink of a nuclear conflict and what many at the time were calling World War III. Blood & Sand is a revelatory new history of these dramatic events, for the first time setting both crises in the context of the global Cold War, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the treacherous power politics of imperialism and oil.
Blood & Sand tells this story hour by hour through a fascinating international cast of characters including Gamal Abdel Nasser, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Anthony Eden, Christian Pineau, Nikita Khrushchev, Imre Nagy and David Ben-Gurion. It is a tale of conspiracy and revolutions; spies and terrorists; kidnappings and assassination plots; the fall of the British Empire and rise of American hegemony. Blood & Sand is essential to our understanding of the modern Middle East and resonates strikingly with the problems of oil control, religious fundamentalism and international unity that face the world today.
Review- I wanted to be engaged with this book. I wanted to learn some new things about a president that I do not know much about but this book was a very slow and boring read. It is about the beginning of the Middle East as we have it today and it should have been interesting. Instead the writing is very slow, with lots of details that do not really add to the overall story, just slow it down. The notes are good and give pointers about where to go next if you want to do more research but after this book I do not.
I give this book a Two out of Five stars. I was given this book in exchange for an honest review by Harper Collins.
November 27, 2021
This book was like receiving a gold necklace strung with gravel after specifically instructing your child to make a gold necklace strung with pearls. There might be a pearl or two among the devastatingly ugly gravel rocks, but for the most part the necklace is a stunning disappointment.
The first, and most egregious error in my opinion, is the author’s choice of title. This book is more a history of Eden’s absolute inability to recognize Britain’s end as an imperial power than it is a history of the Suez Crisis. Incredibly, the author chose to include but not really tell the story of Hungary’s near revolution. Suez and Hungary are linked, but this book does a very poor job of telling that story.
You might forget that France and Israel participated in the foreign policy blunder known as the Suez Crisis if you read this book. They’re largely absent from the latter half of the book and I cannot fathom why. They escape largely un-attacked from this Anthony Eden hit piece.
Aside from the litany of problems I have with this book, I did learn some new things. The author provides fascinating insights into Colonel Nasser’s behavior during the crisis. The notes regarding Eden’s cabinet were also eye-opening. I appreciated the detail provided, but I felt like all the stories were poorly displayed. It was a bit like displaying a beautiful watercolor painting in a cardboard frame.
I feel like this author could have done better. There were strings that needed tying and I don’t feel like he accomplished that. This is an important moment in world history, but this book doesn’t do it justice.
The first, and most egregious error in my opinion, is the author’s choice of title. This book is more a history of Eden’s absolute inability to recognize Britain’s end as an imperial power than it is a history of the Suez Crisis. Incredibly, the author chose to include but not really tell the story of Hungary’s near revolution. Suez and Hungary are linked, but this book does a very poor job of telling that story.
You might forget that France and Israel participated in the foreign policy blunder known as the Suez Crisis if you read this book. They’re largely absent from the latter half of the book and I cannot fathom why. They escape largely un-attacked from this Anthony Eden hit piece.
Aside from the litany of problems I have with this book, I did learn some new things. The author provides fascinating insights into Colonel Nasser’s behavior during the crisis. The notes regarding Eden’s cabinet were also eye-opening. I appreciated the detail provided, but I felt like all the stories were poorly displayed. It was a bit like displaying a beautiful watercolor painting in a cardboard frame.
I feel like this author could have done better. There were strings that needed tying and I don’t feel like he accomplished that. This is an important moment in world history, but this book doesn’t do it justice.
January 14, 2018
Pros: This is a thought provoking and well researched book. Both crisis' are interwoven into the same chapters that reveal the simultaneous events of the Suez Canal "police action" and the Hungarian Revolution. This format stresses the chaotic and uncertainly of that time period. The importance of Eisenhower's elections also added to the turbulence. Appreciated the brief yet informative biographical information on John Foster Dulles, the shaky stance (ie collusion and out right lying) that Sir Anthony Eden partook. The psychological impact the Hungarian rebels had on Nikita Khrushchev and his brief try at debunking Stalinism was also intriguing, yet sad. Glad to discover MP Dingle Foot. Three poignant passages are below:
‘Historical folly’ Barbara Tuchman described acts of leaders based on preconceived fixed notions while ignoring all contrary signs. “But I thought then as I think now, that the British thrive on folly so they’ll always soldier through somehow.” Miles Copeland CIA officer “The genius of you Americans,” Nasser told Copeland, “is that you never make clear cut stupid moves, only complicated stupid moves that make us wonder at the possibility that there may be something we are missing.”
Great use of pictures and maps.
Cons: A brief retelling of the building of the Suez Canal would have been brilliant. More information (yet brief) would have been appreciated on why Tito encouraged Khrushchev to be so brutal to the rebels.
Cover Art work: 5 out of 5 stars.
‘Historical folly’ Barbara Tuchman described acts of leaders based on preconceived fixed notions while ignoring all contrary signs. “But I thought then as I think now, that the British thrive on folly so they’ll always soldier through somehow.” Miles Copeland CIA officer “The genius of you Americans,” Nasser told Copeland, “is that you never make clear cut stupid moves, only complicated stupid moves that make us wonder at the possibility that there may be something we are missing.”
Great use of pictures and maps.
Cons: A brief retelling of the building of the Suez Canal would have been brilliant. More information (yet brief) would have been appreciated on why Tito encouraged Khrushchev to be so brutal to the rebels.
Cover Art work: 5 out of 5 stars.
October 22, 2018
In my opinion Britain has had three major foreign policy fiascoes since 1900--Munich, the Suez crisis, and the ongoing Brexit debacle. (The entry into WWI is a possible fourth but there is enough blame to spread on other countries as to merit a pass.) Ironically or not, all three occurred under Conservative leadership.
Suez is the least known of the three. British PM Anthony Eden and the French government decided they wanted to oust Nasser so they concocted a scheme with Israel. Israel would attack Egypt in the Sinai and England and France would invade pretending to be peacekeepers but really with the intention of ousting Nasser and seizing the Suez Canal. Many in the British government were skeptical of the plan, but Eden who has hopped up on amphetamines threw all caution to the wind. The US was never informed, but previously had been quite adamant that the invasion would be a mistake. Meanwhile, the Hungarian rebellion is going on so there are two simultaneous crises. The West could hardly complain about Soviet reactions when they were doing the same thing in Egypt.
This book tells the story of both crises and especially how the British government up to the end lied to the US, the UN, and its own people about the intention behind this plot. Ultimately the French and British were forced to end the plot when the US imposed strict financial sanctions. The book ends with the observation before Suez there were three superpowers--US, UK, and USSR. After the debacle there were only two.
Suez is the least known of the three. British PM Anthony Eden and the French government decided they wanted to oust Nasser so they concocted a scheme with Israel. Israel would attack Egypt in the Sinai and England and France would invade pretending to be peacekeepers but really with the intention of ousting Nasser and seizing the Suez Canal. Many in the British government were skeptical of the plan, but Eden who has hopped up on amphetamines threw all caution to the wind. The US was never informed, but previously had been quite adamant that the invasion would be a mistake. Meanwhile, the Hungarian rebellion is going on so there are two simultaneous crises. The West could hardly complain about Soviet reactions when they were doing the same thing in Egypt.
This book tells the story of both crises and especially how the British government up to the end lied to the US, the UN, and its own people about the intention behind this plot. Ultimately the French and British were forced to end the plot when the US imposed strict financial sanctions. The book ends with the observation before Suez there were three superpowers--US, UK, and USSR. After the debacle there were only two.
September 6, 2025
This is a synoptic history of the Suez crisis and the Hungarian revolution of 1956; this approach makes sense in that the height of the crises played out simultaneously, and they were indirectly inter-related (primarily in that the advent of the Israel-UK-France assault on Egypt may have emboldened the Soviet response to the Hungarian revolution, and it certainly cripplingly split NATO such that they could have no coherent, united response to events in Hungary). But this is slanted heavily towards Suez- regularly digressing from the day-by-day format to jump back in time and explain the background to the events of 1956- possibly inevitably, given that it's a more complicated story overall; the Hungarian material isn't incomplete or inadequate, necessarily, but it often feels like it comes as an afterthought (it might've made more sense to just present this as a straight history of the Suez crisis, with some material on concurrent events in Hungary). Also, within the Suez material, it's focused on the internal workings and politics of the UK's involvement (not surprising for an author working in the UK), and on the US response to the crisis; France and Israel are presented as much less complicated or conflicted in their actions (though just as morally culpable), and coverage of Egypt focuses on the personality and actions of Nasser (not unreasonably). Good but not exceptional.
October 31, 2016
Blood and Sand is an engaging book that links the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolution to each other. Both events unfolded at the same time and Von Tunzelmann shows that they certainly influenced how each turned out. The book certainly covers the events, but it also gets into relationships - relationships between both the leaders involved and the countries involved, particularly Eden and Eisenhower and the United Kingdom and the United States. I have to admit that I've never studied the Suez Crisis or the Hungarian Revolution in detail and this book not only illuminated both events for me, but also showed me how both effected not only the countries involved but the Middle East as a whole and the Cold War. Blood and Sand not only puts the events of the past into perspective, but allows us to put the present into perspective as well by showing us part of what has brought about the current situation in the Middle East.
August 18, 2017
This wasn't as tongue-in-cheek snarky as von Tunzelmann's earlier book, Indian Summer. But although the subject matter was different: the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the British-French-Israeli invasion of Sinai and the Suez Canal, the theme was the same: national leadership is full of unbelievable idiots. In Indian Summer, it was Mountbatten as military idiot, and here it's Anthony Eden as civilian imbecile. The book is all about how bloody mindedness and stupidity led Eden to start an impossible war and cause financial crisis for the United Kingdom and end the power of the British Empire, while creating whole new problems for the Middle East.
In a way, this book is an antidote to conspiracy theory thinking because it demonstrates so finely that stupidity outweighs malice (though the United Kingdom was both stupid and malicious through the crisis).
And finally, it's nice to read about a time when American policy was principled more than self-interested.
In a way, this book is an antidote to conspiracy theory thinking because it demonstrates so finely that stupidity outweighs malice (though the United Kingdom was both stupid and malicious through the crisis).
And finally, it's nice to read about a time when American policy was principled more than self-interested.
April 21, 2018
An excellent book on the Suez crisis in 1956 and how it came about, developed and its ramifications. Alex von Tunzelmann has clearly done a great deal of research with a multitude of quotes from private diaries, telephone transcripts and meetings and it really helps build the picture of what went on and how people felt about it. The writing style is very easy to get into and a pleasure to read.
The only reason this is not a 5 star book is that for a book sold as covering two crises, Suez and Hungary, there is barely any of the latter covered. In terms of split it is very much 90/10. I understand why Hungary was included at all because it formed part of the context of the Suez invasion but I feel it either should have been built up to an equal footing or cut down to background information only. This middle ground frustrated me.
The only reason this is not a 5 star book is that for a book sold as covering two crises, Suez and Hungary, there is barely any of the latter covered. In terms of split it is very much 90/10. I understand why Hungary was included at all because it formed part of the context of the Suez invasion but I feel it either should have been built up to an equal footing or cut down to background information only. This middle ground frustrated me.
December 15, 2016
A fast paced and gripping telling of a sadly oft ignored chapter in the history of the Middle East, and of the Cold War. Not surprising that it is ignored, since the primary actors in the illegal invasion of Egypt, the UK, France, and Israel, would sooner forget that it ever happened. Many western readers will be familiar with the brutal Soviet suppression of the "Hungarian Spring" and of Imre Nagy, but few will know that virtually simultaneous to the Red Army tanks rolling on Budapest, the paragons of the Free World were doing much the same to Egypt. Also noteworthy are the retelling of particularly heinous moments in the war, of summary executions, and outright mass murder of civilians.
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