Charting the life and thought of this hugely influential medieval thinker.One of the most influential philosophers and theologians in the history of Western thought, St Thomas Aquinas established the foundations for much of modern philosophy of religion, and is infamous for his arguments for the existence of God. In this cogent and multifaceted introduction to the great Saint's work, Edward Feser argues that you cannot fully understand Aquinas' philosophy without his theology and vice-versa. Covering his thoughts on the soul, natural law, metaphysics, and the interaction of faith and reason, this will prove a indispensable resource for students, experts or the general reader.
Edward Feser is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. He has been a Visiting Assistant Professor at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles and a Visiting Scholar at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center at Bowling Green State University in Bowling Green, Ohio. He holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of California at Santa Barbara, an M.A. in religion from the Claremont Graduate School, and a B.A. in philosophy and religious studies from the California State University at Fullerton.
Called by National Review “one of the best contemporary writers on philosophy,” Feser is the author of On Nozick, Philosophy of Mind, Locke, The Last Superstition: A Refutation of the New Atheism, and Aquinas, and editor of The Cambridge Companion to Hayek and Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics. He is also the author of many academic articles. His primary academic research interests are in the philosophy of mind, moral and political philosophy, and the philosophy of religion.
Feser also writes on politics and culture, from a conservative point of view; and on religion, from a traditional Roman Catholic perspective. In this connection, his work has appeared in such publications as The American, The American Conservative, City Journal, The Claremont Review of Books, Crisis, First Things, Liberty, National Review, New Oxford Review, Public Discourse, Reason, and TCS Daily.
He lives in Los Angeles with his wife and six children.
Feser, Edward. A Beginner’s Guide to Thomas Aquinas.
I do not know if I would call this a “beginner’s guide.” Parts of it deal with discussions in current analytical philosophy, and some of these discussions would discourage the beginner. It is an indispensable guide, though. Edward Feser highlights the key elements in Thomas’s thought. You cannot go wrong in interpreting Thomas with Feser as your guide.
Thomas’s views on causality are well-known, so we will only focus on the basics. Final causality for Thomas is directional. It is always pointing.
Being
Not surprisingly, we get a good discussion of the essence/existence distinction. For God, essence and existence are the same. There is not a genus called “God” to which one could apply the category existence. This makes sense at the creaturely level. I know what the essence of a unicorn is. Whether it exists or not, I have a clear idea of its essence. For existent things, their essences have to be conjoined with their existences. Even the angels who are pure form are not identical with their existence. They are an essence conjoined with the act of existence.
Feser gives us a good handle on the act/potency distinction. God is pure act with no unrealized potencies. The more act a being has, the higher on the chain of reality it is. God is at the top. Prime matter, which is only unrealized potency, is at the bottom. Similarly, motion is simply a change from a potency to an act.
Natural Theology
The greatest harm ever done to Thomas was by philosophy of religion anthologies. Thomas never intended for his 5 Ways to be read in isolation from his larger project. I suppose that cannot be helped, though. Feser helps us avoid the pitfalls of misinterpreting Thomas. We will focus on his argument from motion. There are two types of causal serieses. There is a causal series per accidens. This is where one sequence follows another. Some apologists argue that every effect has a cause and God must be the ultimate cause. True, but there are some difficulties. In a causal series per accidens one has trouble transcending that series.
Thomas’s solution, though, is different. There is another type of causal series. It is a causal series per se. If the former is sequential, this is hierarchical. Every potency is actualized by a prior act. This allows Thomas to evade the charge that since philosophy cannot disprove the eternity of the universe, then it does not need God as a cause. Thomas answers that is true for a per accidens series, not a per se one. Even if the universe were eternal, the potencies in it would need to be actualized.
Anthropology
Thomas is a dualist, but he is not a Cartesian or Platonist. Feser explains that “soul” for Aquinas simply means the form of a person. It in-forms the matter. For Plato or Descartes, a soul was literally a ghost in the machine, with all the problems that entails. Thomas does not need that ghost.
Ethics
Natural law is important for Thomas, but not that important. He devotes surprisingly little space to it. What is more important and of higher priority is the Good. Natural law does not make a lot of sense without a previous orientation to the Good. Moderns since David Hume have attacked natural law for committing the naturalistic fallacy, of deriving an ought from an is or value from facts. That’s a very sharp criticism, but it only works if nominalism is true and all we have is a mechanistic universe. Thomas would not have understood the fact-value problem because medieval man did not think in terms of value, but of the Good, and the Good is already inherent in reality.
Conclusion
This is an excellent treatment of Thomas’s thoughts. One will not misinterpret Thomas with Feser as a guide. It’s not a beginner’s treatment, though.
If one is interested in Aquinas, one has to start somewhere, and Edward Feser's Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide is an excellent place.
But it's more: Feser not only walks the reader through the basics of Aquinas's metaphysics, but also its logical conclusions for natural theology, psychology, and ethics. The overarching argument behind the book is that Thomism remains viable and that those who dismiss Aquinas misunderstand what he actually means by certain terms as well as the kinds of arguments that he's actually making, and that those espousing modern philosophy often read those assumptions back into Aquinas.
The result is a good example of how to think clearly through and about thought-- both that of Aquinas and others who are a part of the larger conversation about Aquinas (both those who reject the latter's metaphysics, like Richard Dawkins, and even those who consider themselves Thomists in some way, like Germaine Grisez and John Finnis). Whether one agrees or does not agree with Feser's handling of the subject and the conclusions he draws, there is no denying that what's valuable about this book is that it's instructive in how to ask certain kinds of questions. Also helpful is that Feser provides a guide for further reading for each chapter at the back of the book. His further-reading suggestions are important for understanding the kinds of conversations that philosophers and non-philosophers are having about Aquinas. Such information will likely prove useful for anyone putting together an introductory course on Aquinas, Scholasticism, or even Classical philosophical thought, who needs a roadmap regarding how to approach the material systematically.
As many of the previous reviews have already indicated, although it says it is a beginner book, I would use this more to deepen my understanding of Aquinas' basic philosophy. As an introduction, it delves deeper into certain issues than beginners may be comfortable with. I would recommend starting with Feser's "The Last Superstition," where he goes into basic Platonic and especially Aristotelian metaphysics. These set the groundwork for better understanding Aquinas' thought, and much of what is in this book. These considerations aside, this book was a great tool for further understanding Aquinas' thought, especially in light of current modern misunderstandings and objections. Must read.
Edward Feser is a terrific writer. In short, in this contemporary introduction to Aquinas Feser explains fundamental results of thomism with a stress upon its conflict with modern philosophers.
To exemplify, in chapter on Aristotle’s metaphysics, to which Aquinas was committed, it is argued that four causes doctrine is not only consistent theory, but also very much presupposed by the (modern) natural sciences.
Many other topics that intrigue young philosophy students are covered, such as: difference of first cause and secondary causes, why Intelligent Design is a poor theory, why mind-body interaction and is-ought problems are pseudoproblems in thomistic perspective, how natural law is derived from human nature and so on.
Together with Chesterton’s st. Thomas Aquinas biography, one hardly finds better books to start with.
This is a remarkably clear and well written introduction Aquinas's philosophy (rather than his theology). Feser gives a wonderful example of how to give a popular exposition of heavy-duty philosophical thought. He also shows how to argue when one's readers are likely to have all the prejudices of modern philosophy. I thought there were a few weaknesses--the explanation of the fourth way's premise that the first in a genus is the cause of everything else in the genus was weak--and a few things ought to have been discussed to avoid misunderstanding--I especially thought he ought to have included a discussion of the primacy of the commmon good without which his chapter on ethics is open to Hildebrandian misunderstanding--but on the whole this is a triumphant achievement.
All concepts explained fairly well (except qualia and the problem of intentionality that I didn't understand well). My favorite parts were his explanation of the fives ways and Aquinas' psychology (souls, relation of soul with body).
This is a solid introduction to the thought of Aquinas. This book can largely be seen as an explanation of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics leading to their logical consequences in the fields of natural theology (can we prove that God exists or say anything about his attributes purely using philosophy?), psychology (what is the mind? The soul? What is a human person?), and ethics (what is moral? Why should I do what is good?).
I do think having a cursory background in metaphysical jargon would be helpful before reading this book, although Feser does a decent job of explaining all the necessary terms in the book itself. Overall, I’m definitely sympathetic and interested in Thomism generally, and I find a lot of the ideas to be plausible. However, whether one accepts Thomism as a whole seems to be entirely dependent on whether one accepts the metaphysics, and I haven’t studied them enough to make a conclusion on that.
Interested in dipping your toes into philosophy? Hit that quarter life crisis? Doubting your life decisions?
You really don’t need to become a scathing skeptic like Hume, a frenzied existentialist like Sartre, a radical like Marx, or an utterly confused Kantian.
Consider St. Thomas! You can’t find a humbler, milder man, or a philosopher more thoughtful. He will say much that aligns with your common sense! Though provide you with reasons deeper than you expect. He is wise and profound and argues with an inner consistency in all his work.
My favorite part is St. Thomas’ answers to those with whom he disagrees. He always states their objections and arguments charitably, putting them in the best possible light, before answering them with his own view.
I will return to Tommy again and again, since his philosophy makes the world more intelligible than it was before.
The only reason I gave this book four instead of five stars is because of my personal inadequacy - there were parts I had to read several times to get the gist of it. I only had one quarter of philosophy class in college (45 years ago), and it was an overview, an introduction to the subject. The early part of this book was setting the foundations of Acquinas’s metaphysical thinking. Trying to keep ‘act’ and ‘potential’, or ‘causes’, (first, final, subsistent, accidental, etc.), separate and clear was difficult for these concepts were not part of my background and education. Too often I was putting modern definitions, even applying electrical engineering meanings to some of these. About halfway through, things started to come together and make some sense. This is one of those books for which having a dictionary or encyclopedia close by is absolutely essential. Words like ‘teleological’, ‘ontology’, and ‘hylomorphism’ just are not part of my wheelhouse, so I got to look up a lot of words, and people as I read. (By the way, I do not mind looking stuff up).
“For Aquinas, we are not here for ourselves, but for the glory of God, and precisely because this is the end set for us by nature, it is in him alone that we can find our true happiness. And it must be emphasized that, as with other themes we’ve explored in this book, he takes this conclusion to be a matter, not of faith, but of reason itself. Therein lies the sting of Aquinas’s challenge to modernity”
Omitting a star review this time because my brain is too smooth and Aquinas's is too wrinkly.
I do feel this was a helpful and more complete overview of Aquinas's metaphysics and view of God than I'd previously gotten, but it did feel rushed in certain parts (it's a short book for such a large topic). I do feel at least somewhat prepared to push further into Aquinas's own writings, but to truly get much out of them I know I'll need to do a lot more legwork. Matt Fradd's Pints with Aquinas podcast, in the early episodes, covers much of the metaphysical ground with just a bit less Aristotelian context as I recall, so I'd highly recommend those. They probably helped me approach this.
After reading this, I want to read a lot more Aristotelian philosophy and more modern diverging philosophy referenced here like Kant, Hume, and Descartes, along with major referenced theologians Gilson, and Garrigou-Lagrange. I'm more and more understanding the importance of philosophy in shaping humanity's self-conception and the ways it's influenced my own thinking about the world without my even realizing, and it bothers me that there's so much that's so important that I hardly understand. Feser made, I thought, a compelling case that philosophy has really gone off the rails in the last several hundred years, and I want to understand this better.
And yes, this review feels as pretentious to write as I'm sure it feels to read. I hate it, but I can't help it. I just want to emphasize that I am baby. A lot of this stuff is above me, I just don't want it to be.
In short, this book left me with more new questions than answered questions, but I'm glad for having read it.
This is a great introduction to Aquinas’ thought and general metaphysics for someone with no prior knowledge of philosophy. Feser does a wonderful job of explaining the quotes from Aquinas and also presenting the different philosophers who were/are opposed to Aquinas’ ideas. He addresses common criticisms of Aquinas’ ideas and the ways in which his thought is often misunderstood. This book opened up a new world of thought for me and is so applicable to our times!
Uno de los mejores libros de divulgación filosófica, centrado en el gran Tomás de Aquino. Aunque sólo sea porque pude terminarlo sin sufrir y hasta gozandolo. Otro cantar es si lo he entendido o no.
Feser's "Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide" is one of the best, if not the best, academic introductions to the thought of St. Thomas that I have read. (Chesterton's "The Dumb Ox" still reigns supreme and even though I would never describe it as "academic" I would heartily recommend it to everyone who considers themselves an academic.) The book is a tour de force.
There is only a minimal treatment of Aquinas himself in the book, which is understandable since Thomas fades from view in his writings, the main purpose of which are to explicate the subject matter not provide a platform for the author's personality. After a brief introductory chapter Feser moves into the heart of the matter, viz. a lucid, accurate presentation of Thomas' metaphysics. Feser does a great job of explaining how several contemporary philosophers have understood Thomas and, when necessary, charitably corrects their mistakes. One such figure that I was happy to see covered was Robert Pasnau. I first encountered Pasnau several years ago and was shocked to see that an editor had actually allowed him to get away with his claim that Aquinas' understanding of the soul allowed for abortion to be performed licitly. Even a cursory reading of the rest of Aquinas' works destroys such a claim..Feser presents Pasnau's claim and demonstrates how 1) it is false in the wider context of Thomas' work, even taking into consideration Thomas' Aristotelian understanding of biology, and 2) that with the greater biological understanding we have today Thomas' metaphysics would most likely necessitate ensoulment to be at the moment of conception. Thus, Pasnau's argument fails on two fronts.
He also touches briefly on some of the "new atheists" treatment of Aquinas and, quite justly, refutes them as caricatures which demonstrate either a fundamental misunderstanding of basic principles or simple willful misrepresentations of what Thomas actually believes.
Perhaps the greatest achievement of Feser's book is to show that far from being outdated or refuted by contemporary philosophical thought Aquinas' metaphysics is still as relevant today as it was in his own life time. Feser shows how Thomas' thought really is the "perennial philosophy" that it is often touted as. Additionally, he explains why it undergirds the seemingly unrelated topic of ethics, why it handily answers the mind-body problem so many contemporary philosophers fall into, etc.
This should be mandatory reading to anyone studying philosophy and is highly recommended for anyone who simply wants to further their own understanding of the world.
This is an amazing book. Edward Feser has a knack for making ancient and medieval philosophy easy to comprehend. I used to read about Aristotle and Aquinas from very old books (sometimes in Latin), but because the writers didn't take the pains to adequately translate the old scholastic jargon into modern jargon, when I was confronted by contemporary analytic philosophy I became convinced that those two philosophers couldn't possibly have anything to contribute to the progress of the discipline. Mr Feser has turned this around for me, at least when it comes to Aquinas. Feser not only wonderfully defends Thomism against modern philosophy (from Descartes until the present), but also rescues it from the hands of certain neo-Thomists and Christians that badly misrepresented Aquinas, and he presents us with a grand, intellectually rigorous system of philosophy that is nothing short of admirable (even if the details are sometimes difficult to understand and accept). Probably the best part of the book is when Feser completely demolishes the New Atheist's laughable interpretation of the famous "Five Ways". I myself used to dismiss these supposed proofs, although not for the exact reasons as the New Atheists. Now, however, after reading such a strong and detailed defense of the Five ways, I feel more persuaded by them. The hardest part for the modern reader (including myself) will probably be the last chapter, which is dedicated to ethics. It is the least developed by Feser, and it asks us to accept a Catholic morality on the basis of the Thomistic metaphysics. For me the problem is not so much this strong linking of ethics with metaphysics; it is that Feser hardly talks about virtue. This seems like a glaring omission, seeing that Aquinas was an ardent Aristotelian and, as such, a believer in what today is called "virtue ethics", which centers around how to live well and not so much on following moral rules. Perhaps Feser realized that he was supposed to be writing a "Beginner's Guide" and he had already devoted too many pages to metaphysics and psychology; so he quickly wrapped up the book with a quick (and very incomplete) survey of Thomistic ethics. He fails twice, for this is not a beginner's book. It goes into details that a total newcomer to philosophy will probably fail to grasp. All in all, however, an excellent book on Aquinas that is a must read for anyone curious to get a glimpse into the genius of this great medieval philosopher.
Feser not only wrote an engaging introduction to the metaphysics of Aquinas, but the book is also a compelling defense of Thomistic thought that serves as a robust and thought provoking challenge to much of post-Enlightenment thought.
Perhaps my expectations were calibrated too highly. I was hoping for an introduction that would sketch both the theoretical manifold of Thomism, and its motivations. I was only satisfied with the former. The proffered justifications of Thomism seemed targeted towards New Atheists, failing to engage more sophisticated philosophical frameworks. Further, Feser motivates his account by way of spurious empirical examples that I will now proceed to debunk.
> Aquinas would also be baffled by the modern tendency to think of causation as essentially a relation between temporally ordered events.. For Aquinas, it is things that are causes, not events; and the immediate efficient cause of an effect is simultaneous with it, not temporally prior to it.. In the case of the broken window, the key point in the causal series would be something like the pushing of the brick into the glass and the glass's giving way. These events are simultaneous; indeed, the bricking's pushing into the glass and the glass's giving way are really just the same event. Or (to take an example often used to illustrate the Aristotelian conception of efficient causation) we might think of a potter making a pot, where the potter's positioning his hand in just such-and-such a way and the pot's taking on such-and-such a shape are simultaneous, and, again, the same event described in two different ways.
Sheets of glass and shards of pottery are physical substances extended in space. Force-carriers do not travel from the point of contact to the rest of the surface instantaneously. Like all other particles, they are constrained by the speed of light. These analogies are empirically bankrupt.
Feser introduces the concept of causal series in chapter 2. The idea is embedded within the standard Aristotelian Four Causes that Aquinas adopts: material, formal, efficient, and final. A key distinction here is that, whereas modern philosophy tends to read causality in the language of events, medieval philosophy interprets in the language of things. The two types of causal chains considered are the accidens series and the essential series. Let us now examine what Feser means by this distinction.
On page 13, Feser explains how substance and matter change:
> Sometimes change concerns some non-essential feature, as when a red ball is painted blue but remains a ball nonetheless. Sometimes it involves something essential, as when the ball is melted into a puddle of goo and thus no longer counts as a ball at all.. For a ball merely to change its color is for its matter to lose one accidental form and take on another, while retaining the substantial form of a ball and thus remaining the same substance, namely a ball. For a ball to be melted into goo is for its matter to lose one substantial form and take on another.
But this account does not treat the problem of ambiguity. Suppose I am microwaving my red ball:
* Eighty seconds into the process, 60% of Thomists would agree that the ball retains its Form. * Eighty-one seconds into the process, 60% of Thomists would agree that the ball has traded its Form.
Let us suppose that, per Thomism, my red ball really did lose its form at the eighty-one second mark. What is it about the physical phenomena during that second that differed from the previous eighty seconds? If Forms substitution is really as clean and binary as Aquinas suggests, why don't Thomists remain equally vulnerable to epistemic disagreement as the rest of us?
On page 15, Feser underscores a Thomistic asymmetry:
> On the hylemorphic analysis, considered apart from the substances that have them, form and matter are mere abstractions; there is no form of the ball apart from the matter that has that form, and no matter of the ball apart from the form that makes it a ball specifically.. While (contra Plato) no form exists apart from some particular individual substance that instantiates it, not every form exists in a material substance. There can be forms without matter, and thus immaterial substances - namely, for Aquinas, angels and postmortem human souls.. This recapitulates an asymmetry noted earlier: just as act can exist without potency even though potency cannot exist without act, so too form can exist without matter even though matter cannot exist without form.
Feser fails to provide an explanation for these curious asymmetries.
This book could have been improved by a treatment of the following topics:
How can { Forms, final causality } be epistemically accessible? How can the A-T framework mediate intra-group disagreement? How do change in matter lead to change in substance, or change in Form?
On page 48, Feser presents an argument for teleology:
> As philosopher David Oderberg has noted, it is particularly evident in natural cycles like the water cycle and the rock cycle. In the former case, condensation leads to precipitation, which leads to collection, which leads to evaporation, which leads to condensations, and the cycle begins again. In the latter case, igneous rock forms into sedimentary rock, which forms into metamorphic rock, which melts into magma, which hardens into igneous rock, and the cycle begins again. Scientists who study these processes identify each of their stages as playing a certain specific role relative to the others. For example, the role of condensation in the water is to bring about precipitation; the role of pressure in the rock cycle is, in conjunction with heat, to generate magma, and in the absence of heat to contribute to generating sedimentary rock; and so forth. Each stage has the production of some particular outcome or range of outcomes as an "end" or "goal" towards which it points. Nor will it do to suggest that either cycle could be adequately described by speaking of each stage as being the efficient cause of certain others, with no reference to its playing a "role" of generating some effect as an "end" or "goal." For each stage has many other effects that are not part of the cycle. As Oderberg points out, sedimentation might (for example) happen to block the water flow to a certain region, the formation of magma might cause some local birds to migrate, or condensation in some area might for all we know cause someone to have arthritic pain in his big toe. But [these examples] are no part of the water cycle. Some causal chains are relevant to the cycles and some are not. Nor is it correct to say that the student of the rock or water cycles just happens to be interested in the way some rock generates other kinds and how water in one form brings about water in another form, and is not interested in [these examples]. For the patterns described by scientists studying these cycles are objective patterns in nature, not mere projections of human interests. But the only way to account for this is to recognize that each stage in the process, while it might have various sorts of effects, has only the generation of certain *specific* effects among them as its "end" or "goal" and that this is what determines its role in the cycle. In short, it is to recognize such cycles as teleological.
Interesting.
> As philosophers like G.F. Schueler and Scott Sehon have argued at length, no attempt to analyze human action in non-teleological terms has succeeded.
On page 52, Feser addresses a counter-argument to the principle of proportionate causality (a cause cannot give to its effect what it does not have itself, whether formally, eminently, or virtually):
> It is nevertheless sometimes suggested that this principle is disproved by evolution, since if simpler life forms give rise to more complex ones then they must surely be producing in their effects something they did not have to give. But this does not follow.. Just as water in conjunction with something else might be sufficient to produce a red puddle even if the water by itself wouldn't be, so too do the existing genetic material, the mutation, and environmental circumstances together generate a new biological variation even though none of these factors by itself would be sufficient to do so. Thus, evolution [does not] pose a challenge to the principle of proportionate causality. Indeed, as Paul Davies points out in *The Fifth Miracle*, to deny that the information contained in a new life form derives from some combination of preexisting factors - specifically, in part from the organism's environment if not from its genetic inheritance alone - would contradict the second law of thermodynamics, which tells us that order (and thus information content) tends inevitably to decrease, not increase, within a closed system.
Paul Davies is a physicist, but this appeal to the Second Law seems empirically dubious. After all, in no sense is the Earth's biosphere a "closed system".
On page 57, Feser defends Aquinas against Anthony Kenny's arguments are inadequate from a Fregean perspective.
> As Gyula Klima has said, "it is ludicrous to claim victory by yelling 'Checkmate!' in a game of poker. But this is precisely what Kenny seems to be doing whenever he is yelling 'You are not a good enough Fregean!' at Aquinas.' Certainly other conceptions of existence are possible..
Tasteless, and misses the point. In order to sustain their school, Thomists must do more than simply regurgitate theories of a medieval Scholastic. They must engage with the current theoretical climate. If you want to deny Fregean essences wholesale, you must interact with their argumentative traditions.
Feser does later partially address Fregean thought, which to my mind partially redeems the above lethargic rhetorical device.
On page 28, Feser explains how Aquinas defends angelic differentiation:
> With what Aquinas calls "separated substances" - immaterial realities like the soul, angels, and God - things are not so straightforward. The soul.. must on Aquinas's view be conjoined to matter at some point in its existence.. God is necessarily unique, so that the question of individuation cannot arise. But what about angels, which are supposed to be both distinct from one another and yet completely immaterial? An angel, says Aquinas, is a form without matter, and thus its essence corresponds to its form alone. But precisely because there is no matter to distinguish one angel in a species from another, "among these substances there cannot be many individuals of the same species. Rather, there are as many species as there are individuals".
After this concession, Feser promptly moves on to a separate topic. But consider what this means: besides Triangle and Redness forms, Aquinas affirms that there is also JoeTheAngel form and a RobertTheAngel form. This seems an astonishingly ugly band-aid, and its ontological awkwardness is not acknowledged nor mediated by counter-argument.
On page 63, Feser sets the state for the Quinquae Viae:
> The Summa, it must be remembered, was meant as a textbook for beginners in theology who were already Christian believers, not an advanced work in apologetics intended to convince skeptics. The Five Ways themselves are merely short statements of arguments that would already have been well known to the readers of Aquinas's day, and presented at greater length and with greater precision elsewhere.
Historically accurate. But, if the Five Ways are not Aquinas' best case for theism, I would rather attention be devoted to other, more incisive, arguments.
On page 65, Feser insulates Aristotelian metaphysics from Aristotelian physics:
> It has also sometimes been claimed that Aquinas's proofs rest on outdated Aristotelian scientific theory, and thus are irrelevant in the present day. But as noted in chapter 2, Aristotle's metaphysics stands or falls independently of his physics and, as we shall see, there is never a point in any of the arguments where appeal need be made to now falsified theories in physics or any of the other sciences.
Perhaps such sharp bifurcations between physics and metaphysics are irredeemably anachronistic. Aristotelian metaphysics were originally motivated by his physics. To insulate the former from the latter is to remove its original motivators.
On page 68, Feser addresses empirical counterexamples:
> As Rudy te Velde has suggested, some critics place too much significance on the physical details of the examples Aquinas gives in the course of the proof, failing to see that their point is merely to illustrate certain basic metaphysical principles rather than to support broad empirical or quasi-scientific generalizations.
If you can't defend Thomas' examples, fix them! Immersed in the context of the section, this passage seems to evidence a pathological reluctance to improve upon Aquinas at any point.
This is really brilliant (but also really dense), because it made me rethink some of the central assumptions of medieval philosophy and made me realise how they can apply to contemporary issues. Note, however, that this is less of an introduction to Aquinas himself, and more of a defence of the Thomistic position against modern philosophy.
It is interesting how much like Augustine was inspired by Platonism, Aquinas is inspired by Aristotle (whose Physics and Metaphysics are essential to understand this). Aquinas uses Aristotle’s ideas of act vs potency, and the four causes (particular the efficient and final cause) extensively and ultimately is able to reach the theology of classical (Christian) theism within these concepts. Particularly, his final cause allows him to brand his arguments with the tag of “natural” - for example, because procreation is the final cause of intercourse, all non-procreative intercourse becomes unnatural. This is a compelling argument, regardless of whatever our political beliefs may be, though it conveniently corresponds to traditional Christian belief (its only refutation would be to argue against the concept of final cause or teleology in intercourse itself, but that ignores the biological origins of the act). But in other cases, final cause arguments don’t really say much - Aquinas considers the final purpose of humanity as being to know god, which is (to an agnostic) an unsatisfactory answer.
In his introduction, Feser explains that for Aquinas, faith is not an “irrational will to believe” something without evidence. However, Aquinas takes the Bible as evidence. I won’t attack this too much because I think Aquinas expands quite skilfully on Aristotelian concepts even if you take his faith away from him, but his idea of faith still demonstrates circular reasoning.
One of the ways through which Aquinas differentiates god from all material objects is that the latter have more than one member of each kind. Just a puzzle to think about here — what about a dying species which only has one member left? I’m sure Aquinas had an answer to this though.
Feser very helpfully explains the Five Ways of Aquinas, and also removes a misconception that I had of Aquinas’ arguments - his argument for the unmoved mover is not chronological (or, in his own terminology, per accidens). Instead, his argument for the unmoved mover is hierarchical per se. In other words, you can’t refute the unmoved mover argument by asking “Who caused god?” or “What was before god?”, because god needs to exist here and now. The hierarchy from the unmoved mover down to the prime matter exists right now, and falls with the removal of the unmoved mover (which is why god cannot die as per Aquinas).
A word on Aquinas’ conception of god. I was interested in it till he was arguing that god is the only object in the universe who has the same existence and essence (this reminded me of the Vedantic satchitananda). When he started equating this with the good, the truth, et cetera, I noticed an increasing correspondence with the Abrahamic god, and lost interest.
All in all, very engaging stuff and possibly the best set of arguments for deism I have read till now. Unfortunately, Thomism comes with a set of Christian baggage which I cannot carry along with its philosophical rigour.
Even though the subtitle of this book may be “a beginner’s guide,” I have found it to be an exhaustive exposition of what Classical Thomism is and what, indeed, Thomas Aquinas would have thought and taught. The book is comprehensive in covering its bases. Not only does it cover metaphysics, but it also covers natural theology, psychology, and ethics. What’s greatly appreciated is Feser’s time trying to peel back the layers of misrepresentation that Thomas Aquinas has been wrapped in throughout the years.
I will say a downside to this book (if you can refer to it as such) is the misuse or misrepresentation of a “beginner’s guide” to the uninitiated person who has no understanding of philosophy. This work can most likely be a difficult slog to get through. The jargon used and the concepts discussed are by no means impossible to comprehend; however, a college student who opted for psychology instead of philosophy for their elective will have a difficult time truly understanding Thomas and Classical Thomism. That being said, the philosophy student who has had no baptism into Classical Thomism should find this book to be a pleasant surprise. It is by no means a dumbing down of Classical Thomism but merely a beginner’s course in said thinking for those versed in philosophy and have at least a basic understanding of Aristotelian thought.
Edward Feser's "Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide" is an excellent introduction to the life and thinking of the great Thomas Aquinas. Feser's book is broken into five sections (1) short biography of Aquinas, then his views on (2) metaphysics, (3) natural theology, (4) psychology and (5) ethics. Aquinas' philosophy is dense, and much of the book requires intense thinking. But Feser does a great job of making complex topics like Aristotelianism, hylomorphism, ontology and causality all very approachable.
Feser helped me to see that the core of Aquinas' thinking is his metaphysics, that the forms of "things" are contained in the "things" themselves (opposite Plato who had a world of forms). I have learned to appreciate Thomism more because he viewed the world as real and knowable, which is a profoundly Biblical and Christian truth. As well Aquinas believed that all things come from God (causality) and are moving towards God (teleology), which gives meaning and life to so much of the world we see and experience. I am thankful for Feser and Aquinas for seeing more of the beauty of God and His created world. I highly recommend this book and can't wait to read more of Thomas Aquinas.
Aquinas' thoughts seemed impenetrable at first, but Feser has allowed me to scratch the surface of Thomistic philosophy. I'm not gonna lie and say that I understood everything perfectly; at times, I've had to read and re-read passages to grasp what Feser is on about. Still, the book's structure is especially helpful—starting off with Thomistic metaphysics is the perfect antidote to misunderstanding Aquinas—and Feser's abundant examples solidify the abstract into the concrete. He also covers natural theology, "psychology" (which is basically ontology for Aquinas), and ethics.
The book is refreshing for Christians (like me) who have drifted away from scholastic metaphysics and have adapted Cartesian dualism instead. The book is dense, though, so take lots of notes, especially in the chapter on metaphysics, which Feser references quite a bit.
In the philosophical world there is a re-emergence of Aristotelianism and Thomism happening across the field of ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind. To not acknowledge Aquinas as a strong thinker the people who do philosophy are missing much.
This book is a five star because of its depth. It's not exact to say it a beginners guide. It's more like a beginner's guide and how to defend Aquinas from the academic philosophers or a clever thinker. (I kid you not).