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Neden Psikanaliz?: Üç Müdahale
Kurucusu Freud'dan bu yana psikanaliz kimi zaman "biyolojizm" ve "bilimcilik" ile, kimi zaman "kültürel görecilik" ile suçlanmıştır. Bu eleştirilerin çoğu, "psikanaliz kendi işine baksa ya, neden her şeyi izah etmeye kalkıyor," şeklinde örtülü bir kanaat taşır, psikanalizi bir klinik tedavi pratiği olarak sınırlamak isterler.
Oysa Alenka Zupancic'e göre psikanalizin konusu tam da biyolojik (bedensel) olan ile zihinsel ve kültürel olanın örtüştüğü yerdedir. Bu nedenle psikanaliz asıl gücünü ve verimini başka "disiplinler" veya alanlarla kurduğu diyaloğa borçludur. Psikanaliz asla bireyler ve onların mahrem sayılabilecek sorunlarıyla ilgili değildir: Tedavi etmek amacıyla bireyi topluma uyumlu kılmayı, "burjuva rüyasının garantörü" olmayı reddeden temel bir psikanaliz damarı vardır.
Neden Psikanaliz?'in ontoloji, pratik felsefe ve estetik alanlarına yaptığı "üç müdahale" işte bu damarı berraklaştırmayı amaçlıyor ve psikanalizin cinsellik teorisinin gerçekten ne olduğunu, psikanalizin varoluşumuz için ne anlam taşıdığını, Lacancı "neden" kavramının özgürlükle nasıl bir ilişkisi olduğunu, birbirinden çok ayrı, hatta karşıt gibi görünen iki estetik fenomenin, "komedi" ile "tekinsiz"in ne gibi bir ortaklığı olduğunu aydınlatıyor.
Oysa Alenka Zupancic'e göre psikanalizin konusu tam da biyolojik (bedensel) olan ile zihinsel ve kültürel olanın örtüştüğü yerdedir. Bu nedenle psikanaliz asıl gücünü ve verimini başka "disiplinler" veya alanlarla kurduğu diyaloğa borçludur. Psikanaliz asla bireyler ve onların mahrem sayılabilecek sorunlarıyla ilgili değildir: Tedavi etmek amacıyla bireyi topluma uyumlu kılmayı, "burjuva rüyasının garantörü" olmayı reddeden temel bir psikanaliz damarı vardır.
Neden Psikanaliz?'in ontoloji, pratik felsefe ve estetik alanlarına yaptığı "üç müdahale" işte bu damarı berraklaştırmayı amaçlıyor ve psikanalizin cinsellik teorisinin gerçekten ne olduğunu, psikanalizin varoluşumuz için ne anlam taşıdığını, Lacancı "neden" kavramının özgürlükle nasıl bir ilişkisi olduğunu, birbirinden çok ayrı, hatta karşıt gibi görünen iki estetik fenomenin, "komedi" ile "tekinsiz"in ne gibi bir ortaklığı olduğunu aydınlatıyor.
88 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2008
16 people are currently reading
442 people want to read
About the author
Alenka Zupančič
36 books223 followersAlenka Zupančič is a Slovenian philosopher whose work focuses on psychoanalysis and continental philosophy.
Born in Ljubljana, Zupančič graduated at the University of Ljubljana in 1990. She is currently a full-time researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts and a visiting professor at the European Graduate School. Zupančič belongs to the Ljubljana School of Psychoanalysis, which is known for its predominantly Lacanian foundations. Her philosophy was strongly influenced by Slovenian Lacanian scholars, especially Mladen Dolar and Slavoj Žižek.
Zupančič has written on several topics including ethics, literature, comedy, love and other topics. She is most renowned as a Nietzsche scholar, but Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Henri Bergson and Alain Badiou are also referenced in her work.
Born in Ljubljana, Zupančič graduated at the University of Ljubljana in 1990. She is currently a full-time researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts and a visiting professor at the European Graduate School. Zupančič belongs to the Ljubljana School of Psychoanalysis, which is known for its predominantly Lacanian foundations. Her philosophy was strongly influenced by Slovenian Lacanian scholars, especially Mladen Dolar and Slavoj Žižek.
Zupančič has written on several topics including ethics, literature, comedy, love and other topics. She is most renowned as a Nietzsche scholar, but Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Henri Bergson and Alain Badiou are also referenced in her work.
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Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews
April 4, 2019
«برای روانکاو شدن فقط کافیه همهچیز را برعکس کنید. اگر کسی مدعی است چیزی را دوست دارد، باید بگویید اتفاقا تو چون از آن متنفری چنین ادعایی داری.»
سمینار دهمِ لاکان، به روایت امیرسامان
خب مشکل همیشگی من با روانکاوی همین نقد معروفِ بیپایه بودن گزارههای واپسرانانهی آن است. ضمن اینکه خود روانشناسی این فرصت را میدهد تا تمرکز، درونگرایانه و اگزیستنسیالیستانه، به سمت ویژگیهای فردی برده شود (بجای پرداختن به سیاست). و اتفاقا شاید همین دلیل محبوبیت روانشناسیهای آبکی باشد. و نیز کارکرد ایدئولوژیک رواندرمانیِ اگزیستنسیال، اینکه بجای تمرکز بر سیاست و تأثیر امر نمادین بر فرد، --ایزولهشده-- به درون میرود.
اما دوست دارم روانکاوی را درک کنم، چوم مازیار و صالح و مراد و بقیهای که دوستشان دارم از آن استفاده میکنند. ژیژک (که با همین خانم زوپانچیچ و ملادن دالر یک حلقهی اسلوونیایی دارند) هم با آن سینما را توضیح میدهد.
چرا روانکاوی؟
زوپانچیچ جواب میدهد روانکاوی هرگز دربارهی افراد و مشکلات خصوصیشان نیست. (شخص دیگر میداند که دانه نیست، اما آیا مرغ هم این را میداند؟!) بنابراین روانکاوی باید ساختارهای امر نمادین را دگرگون کند.
سمینار دهمِ لاکان، به روایت امیرسامان
خب مشکل همیشگی من با روانکاوی همین نقد معروفِ بیپایه بودن گزارههای واپسرانانهی آن است. ضمن اینکه خود روانشناسی این فرصت را میدهد تا تمرکز، درونگرایانه و اگزیستنسیالیستانه، به سمت ویژگیهای فردی برده شود (بجای پرداختن به سیاست). و اتفاقا شاید همین دلیل محبوبیت روانشناسیهای آبکی باشد. و نیز کارکرد ایدئولوژیک رواندرمانیِ اگزیستنسیال، اینکه بجای تمرکز بر سیاست و تأثیر امر نمادین بر فرد، --ایزولهشده-- به درون میرود.
اما دوست دارم روانکاوی را درک کنم، چوم مازیار و صالح و مراد و بقیهای که دوستشان دارم از آن استفاده میکنند. ژیژک (که با همین خانم زوپانچیچ و ملادن دالر یک حلقهی اسلوونیایی دارند) هم با آن سینما را توضیح میدهد.
چرا روانکاوی؟
زوپانچیچ جواب میدهد روانکاوی هرگز دربارهی افراد و مشکلات خصوصیشان نیست. (شخص دیگر میداند که دانه نیست، اما آیا مرغ هم این را میداند؟!) بنابراین روانکاوی باید ساختارهای امر نمادین را دگرگون کند.
Read
May 27, 2023IMO, skip the zizek, pick this up. it has almost the exact ideas you find in sublime object and elsewhere but is less self-indulgent and way shorter (and has the exact same examples.) It’s really an excellent book and perhaps the best description of the Lacanian project I’ve read. The book is structured into three interventions: the ontology, ethics, and aesthetics of (Lacanian) psychoanalysis. At the base of all three is lack, but not as we normally understand it. It’s a *constitutive lack* via self-relating negation, a generative incompletion or imbalance—its production, on all levels, is the formation (epi-phenomena?) of subjectivity and all that follows.
“…if ‘objective’ reality were fully ontologically constituted, there would be no unconscious.” (Pg. 25)
This ontological stance is essentially determined through studying human sexuality, especially in Freud’s Three Essays.
“…the sexual (in the precise sense of an inconsistent circling of drives) is being…Freud is developing, constructing a concept of ‘the sexual’ as (the psychoanalytic’s name for the inconsistency of) being. And this is precisely what Lacan is more than willing to embrace in his theory: the sexual as the concept of a radical ontological impasse.” (Pg. 24)
She suggests that we are able to connect the ontological and the sexual because they are actually the same plane. It’s not a matter of proving empirically that all human experience is inherently sexual and therefore sexuality is being. Instead, the argument is that subjectivity (understood as distortions *within* the objective) is only a priori *possible* (here’s the Kantian piece) *if* reality is itself incomplete. Alenka wants to think about the subject not as a passive spectator of the objective world, but (here comes Hegel) as itself part of the objective world.
It doesn’t not make sense. If I needed nothing, was complete and whole, had no desires or drives, would I be aware that I was here? Psychoanalysis at least offers a schema for these issues that is relatively consistent (the ethics and aesthetics sections deepen the ontological point and were actually my favorite sections, but this is too long already.) Do I buy it? I certainly find the picture compelling for situating the interplay of subjectivity and the structures that surround and constitute it, and I’ll leave it at that for now.
“…if ‘objective’ reality were fully ontologically constituted, there would be no unconscious.” (Pg. 25)
This ontological stance is essentially determined through studying human sexuality, especially in Freud’s Three Essays.
“…the sexual (in the precise sense of an inconsistent circling of drives) is being…Freud is developing, constructing a concept of ‘the sexual’ as (the psychoanalytic’s name for the inconsistency of) being. And this is precisely what Lacan is more than willing to embrace in his theory: the sexual as the concept of a radical ontological impasse.” (Pg. 24)
She suggests that we are able to connect the ontological and the sexual because they are actually the same plane. It’s not a matter of proving empirically that all human experience is inherently sexual and therefore sexuality is being. Instead, the argument is that subjectivity (understood as distortions *within* the objective) is only a priori *possible* (here’s the Kantian piece) *if* reality is itself incomplete. Alenka wants to think about the subject not as a passive spectator of the objective world, but (here comes Hegel) as itself part of the objective world.
It doesn’t not make sense. If I needed nothing, was complete and whole, had no desires or drives, would I be aware that I was here? Psychoanalysis at least offers a schema for these issues that is relatively consistent (the ethics and aesthetics sections deepen the ontological point and were actually my favorite sections, but this is too long already.) Do I buy it? I certainly find the picture compelling for situating the interplay of subjectivity and the structures that surround and constitute it, and I’ll leave it at that for now.
September 22, 2025
Had some relatively high expectations going into this. Zupančič has been on my radar for a good while and, bewildering editing errors notwithstanding, this slim volume did not dissapoint.
Like any good Lacanian, she is incredibly sensitive to the intersubjective/social dimension of psychoanalysis, whether it be on the plane of ontology, practical philosophy, or aesthetics.
In fact, three realms situate her three “interventions”, which, in her own words, interrogate “sex, ontology, cause, freedom, comedy, horror”… Quite an ambitious array of problems to be sure, but somehow Zupančič manages to tackle them all head on with admirable concision. She sometimes reminded me of a more programmatic, focused Zizek, raising examples from the wider cultural repository only when it is absolutely integral for shedding light on a difficult concept.
The first intervention, Sexuality and Ontology, kicks things off with a bang, unapologetically correcting gross misconceptions about how we might understand sexuality in Freud and Lacan. Zupančič is rightly critical of the tendency for philosophical appropriations of psychoanalytic theory to either minimize or outright ignore sexuality in spite of its rather central importance.
She first attempts to explain this “missed encounter” with reference to Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, which rediscovered sexuality as an intrinsically meaningless deviation from an absented centre. Zupančič’s exposition of Freud’s findings (with reference to their later adoption and elaboration by Lacan) is really quite thorough. She explains how the sexual drive emerges as a partial surplus, a self-perpetuating remainder from the satisfaction of need, devoid of an object and yet no less operative in acquiring “satisfaction without attaining its aim”. For Freud, all sexuality is a consitutively “deviant”, unnatural imbalance. It is the “edge of meaning”, not its substantive ground (as it is often misunderstood to be).
Zupančič dwells on the sexual as “coextensive with the emerging of the subject” - an incredibly important idea for Lacan’s understanding of libido in terms of not merely loss/lack, but indeed what Zupančič calls “a radical ontological impasse”. Our unconcious cannot be explained by the purely “subjective” store of repressed materials; instead, it must be understood as a function of objective reality’s “fundamental inconsistency”, secreted through the Other’s lack to which our repressions cannot but correspond. This void’s obfuscation by sexual meaning is precisely where psychoanalysis intervenes, peeling back this veneer in order to lay bare the reality of our ontological impasse.
The second intervention - Freedom and Cause - asked plenty of important questions but I can’t pretend I wasn’t hoping for a more clear-cut articulation of how exactly we are to think freedom psychoanalytically. Then again, I can only expect so much in 80 pages (which is, if this review is anything to go by, still a colossal amount).
Building upon the first intervention, Zupančič situates the subject as the effect of the structure’s lack (or contradiction). Armed with the basics, she dives headfirst into the Laplanche/Lacan debate over childhood sexual seduction’s relation to the unconcious and fantasy. The former argues that it is a distraction to bicker over whether a case of seduction either occured in reality or was constructed in fantasy. Instead, where we should really direct our attention is the traversal of the two in what he calls the “material reality of the enigmatic message”: the irreducible remainder of ambiguity in meaning (an idea Zupančič will later apply to theatre in the final intervention).
Following Lacan, Zupančič doesn’t quite accept this explanation. What Laplanche misses is the fact that, in order for the enigma to appear at all, it must be logically preceded by the acceptance of meaning-as-such — or in other words, the presumption that the Other knows what they want. Without this move, the other would never be able to become the Big Other, thereby foreclosing symbolic coherency and the very emergence of the unconscious as such.
The unconcious is therefore always already an interpretation, leaving psychoanalysis to pick up the slack and untangle the synthetic knots of repressed material. Like Zizek, Zupančič indicates that this inextricable relationship between the unconscious and the Other is precisely where the materialism of psychoanalysis lies.
Speaking of inextricable relationships, let’s not ignore jouissance and repression, which is to say: enjoy your symptom! Remember our “ontological impasse”? Well, if repression is a response to the void in reality — itself only rendered coherent by the Other’s knowledge — then, given that jouissance cannot emerge without repression, it too acquires a decidedly social character.
Based on these findings we also get a neat and unexpected critique of Levinasian ethics. Indeed, Zupančič makes the firm claim that any ethics predicated on the Other not only “elevates repression to the level of the ethical principle”, but is indeed “definitely foreign to the ethics of psychoanalysis”. For all the commotion about the primacy of the other, Zupančič argues, ironically enough, that it is ultimately reduced to little more than a tool for the subject to assume accountability for their unconscious.
The subject encounters the lacking Other as an interminable project… What does this remind you of? The “vicious cycle of the superego”? Zupančič sure thinks so. I can already hear the phenomenologists gnashing their teeth and biding their time, but hey, there you have it.
This chapter rounds things off with a compelling rethinking of the Big Other’s death - the characteristically modern, increasingly pervasive acceptance that the Big Other does not exist. Zupančič totally flips the parameters of the discourse, insisting that what has really died (or is disappearing) is the belief in the relationship between the Big Other and the small other. The former is thereby unleashed from any grounding in the latter, receding into a transcendence where it is more inviolable than ever before. Look no further than the frantic attempts to address a socioeconomic system appearing with increasingly ineffable abstraction, beyond the reach of political agents.
After wrestling with the Other for so long, you would think that we’ve earned some welcome respite; unfortunately for our innocent joys, however, Zupančič isn’t done with us yet: not even comedy makes it out unscathed. I’ve always been of the mind that, in the words of Mark Twain, explaining comedy is like dissecting a frog: you learn a lot in the process, but in the end you kill it. Perhaps that’s why I found Freud’s joke book so torturous…
That being said, I certainly had a far better time with Zupančič, who wastes no time in setting the stakes of the third intervention between comedy and the uncanny. Of course we can hardly escape the Other, who here reappears in full force in order to look after our knowledge of reality so that we might “suspend disbelief” and enjoy our fiction. Should the Other, to put it crudely, fail to safeguard our knowledge, if we can no longer rely upon the Other as a support, then comedy becomes uncanny: the anxiety of the lack coming to lack.
I have realised that if one thing is certain in this life it’s this: the Other may not know, but Zupančič certainly does.
Like any good Lacanian, she is incredibly sensitive to the intersubjective/social dimension of psychoanalysis, whether it be on the plane of ontology, practical philosophy, or aesthetics.
In fact, three realms situate her three “interventions”, which, in her own words, interrogate “sex, ontology, cause, freedom, comedy, horror”… Quite an ambitious array of problems to be sure, but somehow Zupančič manages to tackle them all head on with admirable concision. She sometimes reminded me of a more programmatic, focused Zizek, raising examples from the wider cultural repository only when it is absolutely integral for shedding light on a difficult concept.
The first intervention, Sexuality and Ontology, kicks things off with a bang, unapologetically correcting gross misconceptions about how we might understand sexuality in Freud and Lacan. Zupančič is rightly critical of the tendency for philosophical appropriations of psychoanalytic theory to either minimize or outright ignore sexuality in spite of its rather central importance.
She first attempts to explain this “missed encounter” with reference to Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, which rediscovered sexuality as an intrinsically meaningless deviation from an absented centre. Zupančič’s exposition of Freud’s findings (with reference to their later adoption and elaboration by Lacan) is really quite thorough. She explains how the sexual drive emerges as a partial surplus, a self-perpetuating remainder from the satisfaction of need, devoid of an object and yet no less operative in acquiring “satisfaction without attaining its aim”. For Freud, all sexuality is a consitutively “deviant”, unnatural imbalance. It is the “edge of meaning”, not its substantive ground (as it is often misunderstood to be).
Zupančič dwells on the sexual as “coextensive with the emerging of the subject” - an incredibly important idea for Lacan’s understanding of libido in terms of not merely loss/lack, but indeed what Zupančič calls “a radical ontological impasse”. Our unconcious cannot be explained by the purely “subjective” store of repressed materials; instead, it must be understood as a function of objective reality’s “fundamental inconsistency”, secreted through the Other’s lack to which our repressions cannot but correspond. This void’s obfuscation by sexual meaning is precisely where psychoanalysis intervenes, peeling back this veneer in order to lay bare the reality of our ontological impasse.
The second intervention - Freedom and Cause - asked plenty of important questions but I can’t pretend I wasn’t hoping for a more clear-cut articulation of how exactly we are to think freedom psychoanalytically. Then again, I can only expect so much in 80 pages (which is, if this review is anything to go by, still a colossal amount).
Building upon the first intervention, Zupančič situates the subject as the effect of the structure’s lack (or contradiction). Armed with the basics, she dives headfirst into the Laplanche/Lacan debate over childhood sexual seduction’s relation to the unconcious and fantasy. The former argues that it is a distraction to bicker over whether a case of seduction either occured in reality or was constructed in fantasy. Instead, where we should really direct our attention is the traversal of the two in what he calls the “material reality of the enigmatic message”: the irreducible remainder of ambiguity in meaning (an idea Zupančič will later apply to theatre in the final intervention).
Following Lacan, Zupančič doesn’t quite accept this explanation. What Laplanche misses is the fact that, in order for the enigma to appear at all, it must be logically preceded by the acceptance of meaning-as-such — or in other words, the presumption that the Other knows what they want. Without this move, the other would never be able to become the Big Other, thereby foreclosing symbolic coherency and the very emergence of the unconscious as such.
The unconcious is therefore always already an interpretation, leaving psychoanalysis to pick up the slack and untangle the synthetic knots of repressed material. Like Zizek, Zupančič indicates that this inextricable relationship between the unconscious and the Other is precisely where the materialism of psychoanalysis lies.
Speaking of inextricable relationships, let’s not ignore jouissance and repression, which is to say: enjoy your symptom! Remember our “ontological impasse”? Well, if repression is a response to the void in reality — itself only rendered coherent by the Other’s knowledge — then, given that jouissance cannot emerge without repression, it too acquires a decidedly social character.
Based on these findings we also get a neat and unexpected critique of Levinasian ethics. Indeed, Zupančič makes the firm claim that any ethics predicated on the Other not only “elevates repression to the level of the ethical principle”, but is indeed “definitely foreign to the ethics of psychoanalysis”. For all the commotion about the primacy of the other, Zupančič argues, ironically enough, that it is ultimately reduced to little more than a tool for the subject to assume accountability for their unconscious.
The subject encounters the lacking Other as an interminable project… What does this remind you of? The “vicious cycle of the superego”? Zupančič sure thinks so. I can already hear the phenomenologists gnashing their teeth and biding their time, but hey, there you have it.
This chapter rounds things off with a compelling rethinking of the Big Other’s death - the characteristically modern, increasingly pervasive acceptance that the Big Other does not exist. Zupančič totally flips the parameters of the discourse, insisting that what has really died (or is disappearing) is the belief in the relationship between the Big Other and the small other. The former is thereby unleashed from any grounding in the latter, receding into a transcendence where it is more inviolable than ever before. Look no further than the frantic attempts to address a socioeconomic system appearing with increasingly ineffable abstraction, beyond the reach of political agents.
After wrestling with the Other for so long, you would think that we’ve earned some welcome respite; unfortunately for our innocent joys, however, Zupančič isn’t done with us yet: not even comedy makes it out unscathed. I’ve always been of the mind that, in the words of Mark Twain, explaining comedy is like dissecting a frog: you learn a lot in the process, but in the end you kill it. Perhaps that’s why I found Freud’s joke book so torturous…
That being said, I certainly had a far better time with Zupančič, who wastes no time in setting the stakes of the third intervention between comedy and the uncanny. Of course we can hardly escape the Other, who here reappears in full force in order to look after our knowledge of reality so that we might “suspend disbelief” and enjoy our fiction. Should the Other, to put it crudely, fail to safeguard our knowledge, if we can no longer rely upon the Other as a support, then comedy becomes uncanny: the anxiety of the lack coming to lack.
I have realised that if one thing is certain in this life it’s this: the Other may not know, but Zupančič certainly does.
August 2, 2022
روانکاوی بعد از فروید توسط لکان در عین حال که بهتر تفسیر شد اما زبانی سخت به خود گرفت.
برای خواندن یا بهتر است بگویم فهمیدن کتاب پیشنهاد میکنم کتاب را ببندید و به خواندن تاریخ فلسفه بپردازید. تا زبانِ ساختارگرایی را خوب نفهمیده باشید از لکان، لاپلانش زوپانچیچ و ژیژک نیز چیزی نخواهید فهمید
سه مداخله، روانکاوی را با سه چالش مواجه کرد و به بررسی سه زمینه مهم در روانکاوی پرداخت؛ علت/جنسیت/آزادی
سه مسأله که همچنان بی پاسخ قطعی باقی مانده و میتوان به آن پرداخت
برای خواندن یا بهتر است بگویم فهمیدن کتاب پیشنهاد میکنم کتاب را ببندید و به خواندن تاریخ فلسفه بپردازید. تا زبانِ ساختارگرایی را خوب نفهمیده باشید از لکان، لاپلانش زوپانچیچ و ژیژک نیز چیزی نخواهید فهمید
سه مداخله، روانکاوی را با سه چالش مواجه کرد و به بررسی سه زمینه مهم در روانکاوی پرداخت؛ علت/جنسیت/آزادی
سه مسأله که همچنان بی پاسخ قطعی باقی مانده و میتوان به آن پرداخت
November 19, 2016
zor bir metindi. yazar psikanalizde çokça tartışılan cinsellik, özgürlük ve komedi kavramlarını açıklamış ve bir müdahale yöntemi olarak neden kullanıldığını.
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April 4, 2025Never felt so dumb and so smart at the same time. Have to come back to this.
September 15, 2020
As lucid and concise as could be desired, a miracle of clarification without the trickery of simplification. And this, despite the wretched sabotage of the text itself. Shame shame shame upon the publisher: I've seen grade school papers--no, I've read online reviews!--with better editing. It is grievously mutilated, which might be an insuperable obstacle to novices, but even for Slovene adepts there is no justification for fobbing off something where we're just supposed to "know what she means." Or didn't you read Lacan?
November 19, 2025
این کتاب شامل صورتبندی از سه مداخله است که در سه ساحت همپوشان روانکاوی یعنی سکشوالیته، آزادی، کمدی و امرغریب بهمثابه گرهگاههای تنشآلود سوبژکتیویته عمل میکنند و نویسنده با چفت و بستدادنشان به دو دستگاه فروید و لکان، مفصلبندی نظریای پدید میآورد که در مدار لکانی میچرخد. زوپانچیچ، بهعنوان یکی از چهرههای لیوبلیانا، سبک نگارشیاش را در همتنیدگیای پارادوکسیکال میان فلسفه قارهای، ایدئالیسم هگلی و روانکاوی لکانی بنا میکند، سبکی که گاه به ژیژک نزدیک میشود تا حدی که حتی سرریز لطیفهگوییهای او را نیز بازتاب میدهد، امری که، برای من، این شباهت را به بدلسازی یک دلقک دلقکساز نزدیک میکند. افسوس که علاقهام به ژیژک، با وجود سودمندی سیاسی تحلیلهایش برای اکنونیت ما، در اثر واگراییهای درونی و ناسازگاریهای بدیهیاش کمرنگ شده است، مثلا آنجا که با خوانش ارتودکس مارکسیسم درمیافتد اما در مواجهه با ووکیسم، فمینیسم یا پسااستعمارگرایی، دوباره به نام نقد سلطه اصلی یعنی سرمایهداری به موضعی متصلب بازمیگردد. در کل، کتاب در همین تکینگی پیچیده و ناسازوار خواندنی و برانگیزاننده است و ارزش خواندن را دارد.
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August 28, 2025جفتْ آن تصویرِ آینهای است که اُبژهی آ در آن گنجانده میشود. امر خیالی با امر واقعی شروع به انطباق میکند و اضطرابی بس ویرانگر را سبب میشود. جفت همان من است به اضافهی ابژهی آ، آن بخشِ نادیدنی هستی که به تصویرم افزوده میشود. برای آنکه تصویر آینهای، ابژهی آ را در خود بگیرد، پلک زدن یا سری تکاندادن کافیست. لاکان نگاه خیره را به مثابه بهترین بازنمودِ آن ابژهی گمشده به کار میبرد؛ در آینه آدمی میتواند چشمانش را ببیند، اما نه نگاه خیره را که بخش ازدسترفته است. اما تصور کنید که آدمی میتوانست تصویر آینهای خود را نزدیک چشمانش ببیند: این کار باعث میشد ابژه به مثابه نگاهِ خیره در آینه پدیدار شود. با جفت چنین چیزی روی میدهد و اضطرابی که جفت تولید میکند، مطمئنترین نشانهی پدیدارشدنِ ابژه است. (عکسِ پروفایل)
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- شما «چیزی در بدن بیشتر از بدن» را سوژه نامیدید. این مفهوم سوژه کلید ورود به نظریهی روانکاوی لاکان است و بعضیها مثلاً ملادن دولار، آن را مولفهی اصلی ویژهبودِ فلسفهی لاکان در برابر کل بنای ساختارگرایی فرانسوی میدانند. آیا میتوانید فهم خودتان از مفهوم سوژه در روانکاوی بسط دهید؟
- همانطور که لاکان در جایی بیان میکند، میتوانیم بگوییم که سوژه «پاسخ امر واقعی» است یا معلول شکاف/عدمانسجام در ساختار است و حقیقتاً میتوانیم این گفته را در برابر تصور ساختارگرایانه قرار دهیم که «ساختاری بدون سوژه»، ساختار بیسوژه وجود دارد. اما مسئله از همه بالاتر بر سر بازشکلبندی عمیقِ آن چیزیست که هم «ساختار» و هم «سوژه» معنا میدهد یا بدان ارجاع میدهد. میتوانیم با مفهوم ساختار آغاز کنیم که در لاکان متفاوت با مفهوم ساختارگرایانهی کلاسیک است. به زبان بسیار ساده: از دید لاکان، ساختارْ «نه-همه» (یا «نهکل») است که درست به معنای همان چیزیست که با مفهوم «دیگری خطخورده» بیان میکند. این مسئله متضمن فقدان یا تناقض به مثابه -میتوان گفت- «اصل ساختیابی ساختار» است. ساختار همواره و همزمان بیشتر و کمتر از ساختار است و در اینجاست که مفهوم جدید سوژه وارد میشود. سوژه متضاد ساختار نیست، نوعی قصدیت نیست که ساختار برای ابراز خود به کار میبرد یا میکوشد کاری کند که از طریق ساختار صدای کم و بیش اصیلش شنیده شود. سوژه پیچخوردگی تکینی است که توسط عدمانسجام ساختار تولید میشود. مثال سادهی لغزشهای زبانی را در نظر بگیرید: از دید فروید و لاکان آنها گواهی بر نیروی (ناخودآگاه) واپسرانده توسط ساختار نیستند، که به رغم همهچیز حضورش را از راهِ این لغزشها آشکار میکند. در عوض آنها وجودهای تکینِ منفیت درون خودِ ساختارند.
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- شما «چیزی در بدن بیشتر از بدن» را سوژه نامیدید. این مفهوم سوژه کلید ورود به نظریهی روانکاوی لاکان است و بعضیها مثلاً ملادن دولار، آن را مولفهی اصلی ویژهبودِ فلسفهی لاکان در برابر کل بنای ساختارگرایی فرانسوی میدانند. آیا میتوانید فهم خودتان از مفهوم سوژه در روانکاوی بسط دهید؟
- همانطور که لاکان در جایی بیان میکند، میتوانیم بگوییم که سوژه «پاسخ امر واقعی» است یا معلول شکاف/عدمانسجام در ساختار است و حقیقتاً میتوانیم این گفته را در برابر تصور ساختارگرایانه قرار دهیم که «ساختاری بدون سوژه»، ساختار بیسوژه وجود دارد. اما مسئله از همه بالاتر بر سر بازشکلبندی عمیقِ آن چیزیست که هم «ساختار» و هم «سوژه» معنا میدهد یا بدان ارجاع میدهد. میتوانیم با مفهوم ساختار آغاز کنیم که در لاکان متفاوت با مفهوم ساختارگرایانهی کلاسیک است. به زبان بسیار ساده: از دید لاکان، ساختارْ «نه-همه» (یا «نهکل») است که درست به معنای همان چیزیست که با مفهوم «دیگری خطخورده» بیان میکند. این مسئله متضمن فقدان یا تناقض به مثابه -میتوان گفت- «اصل ساختیابی ساختار» است. ساختار همواره و همزمان بیشتر و کمتر از ساختار است و در اینجاست که مفهوم جدید سوژه وارد میشود. سوژه متضاد ساختار نیست، نوعی قصدیت نیست که ساختار برای ابراز خود به کار میبرد یا میکوشد کاری کند که از طریق ساختار صدای کم و بیش اصیلش شنیده شود. سوژه پیچخوردگی تکینی است که توسط عدمانسجام ساختار تولید میشود. مثال سادهی لغزشهای زبانی را در نظر بگیرید: از دید فروید و لاکان آنها گواهی بر نیروی (ناخودآگاه) واپسرانده توسط ساختار نیستند، که به رغم همهچیز حضورش را از راهِ این لغزشها آشکار میکند. در عوض آنها وجودهای تکینِ منفیت درون خودِ ساختارند.
July 27, 2021
Este libro consta de cuatro ensayos, que la autora menciona como intervenciones, basados en el psicoanálisis lacaniano y con un dialogo con la filosofía. La autora señala que los ve como "intervenciones" teóricas, ya que no se trata de textos interrelacionados y pueden leerse de manera independiente .
El primer capitulo trata sobre el psicoanálisis y la sexualidad, en donde establece cómo definir a la sexualidad, el objeto de estudio de la teoría y sus implicaciones sobre qué constituye al ser humano y la política. Establece lo sexual, como algo que no es natural, que es parte continua de la vida, como la inconsistencia del ser, algo que es ontológicamente radical (a comparación de otras perspectivas). De igual forma toca los conceptos de la pulsión y el inconsiente como parte de lo sexual.
El segundo capitulo trata sobre la idea de libertad individual y la relación con el inconsciente,el cual, por cómo se crea y estructura, hace que nuestras elecciones no sean 100% libres (y racionales). El tercer ensayo trata sobre la comedia y lo ominoso ("aborrecible") en el sentido estético, ligando la primera a las dinámicas de la pulsión y la segunda a la dinámica del deseo .
El cuarto ensayo es una adición a la versión en español pues la publicación original de 2008 en inglés Why Psychoanalysis: Three Interventions consta sólo de los 3 primeros ensayos. Este trata sobre la idea del doble y la relación con lo real. Específicamente realiza una crítica a Clément Rosset que ha trabajado ampliamente el tema desde un punto de vista filosófico, que termina señalando a lo real cómo una singularidad invisible al enfrentarse a la falla.
Un libro de ensayos, que si bien corto, contiene gran cantidad de lenguaje técnico lo cuál lo hace de dificultad media de lectura.
El primer capitulo trata sobre el psicoanálisis y la sexualidad, en donde establece cómo definir a la sexualidad, el objeto de estudio de la teoría y sus implicaciones sobre qué constituye al ser humano y la política. Establece lo sexual, como algo que no es natural, que es parte continua de la vida, como la inconsistencia del ser, algo que es ontológicamente radical (a comparación de otras perspectivas). De igual forma toca los conceptos de la pulsión y el inconsiente como parte de lo sexual.
El segundo capitulo trata sobre la idea de libertad individual y la relación con el inconsciente,el cual, por cómo se crea y estructura, hace que nuestras elecciones no sean 100% libres (y racionales). El tercer ensayo trata sobre la comedia y lo ominoso ("aborrecible") en el sentido estético, ligando la primera a las dinámicas de la pulsión y la segunda a la dinámica del deseo .
El cuarto ensayo es una adición a la versión en español pues la publicación original de 2008 en inglés Why Psychoanalysis: Three Interventions consta sólo de los 3 primeros ensayos. Este trata sobre la idea del doble y la relación con lo real. Específicamente realiza una crítica a Clément Rosset que ha trabajado ampliamente el tema desde un punto de vista filosófico, que termina señalando a lo real cómo una singularidad invisible al enfrentarse a la falla.
Un libro de ensayos, que si bien corto, contiene gran cantidad de lenguaje técnico lo cuál lo hace de dificultad media de lectura.
January 26, 2022
Mediante cuatro ensayos Alenka aborda conceptos importantes en psicoanálisis, pero complejos de entender desde la perspectiva psicológica, ya que atraviesan las esferas de lo ontológico. Alenka hace uso de diferentes abordajes filosóficos, literarios que convergen con el pensamiento de Freud y Lacan, tales como la pulsión, lo cómico y lo real, sin dejar de aterrizarlos en lo cotidiano.
Aunque en partes usa lenguaje muy técnico que dan ganas de parar, te invita a reflexionar a partir de diversas perspectivas, ejemplos y referencias y entonces llega algo de entendimiento y termina siendo ameno.
Aunque en partes usa lenguaje muy técnico que dan ganas de parar, te invita a reflexionar a partir de diversas perspectivas, ejemplos y referencias y entonces llega algo de entendimiento y termina siendo ameno.
November 26, 2022
meio difícil de acompanhar em alguns momentos para alguém (como eu) leigo em lacanês, mas ainda sim foi bom para desfazer certas interpretações grosseiras da psicanálise. e a intervenção final sobre estética me deu vontade de procurar mais sobre.
May 17, 2023
a maior que temos, livro excelente, tenho certeza que vou reler muito ainda
February 29, 2024
Bu kitabı hep bıraka bıraka okudum o yüzden bitirmesi çok zor oldu. Konuyu öğrenmek için başlangıç ama anlam yolunda kafa karıştırıcı.
August 16, 2024
Parts of this !!, latter half of lost me a little possibly bc sentences are so dense and I'm not yet versed in the language. Need to reread at some point.
March 16, 2025
Ufuk açar. Fazlasına iştahlandırır. Başlangıç metni olarak görmeyin ama.
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January 4, 2024não entendi muita coisa
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