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Armies of the Second World War
The Red Army and the Second World War
In a definitive new account of the Soviet Union at war, Alexander Hill charts the development, successes and failures of the Red Army from the industrialisation of the Soviet Union in the late 1920s through to the end of the Great Patriotic War in May 1945. Setting military strategy and operations within a broader context that includes national mobilisation on a staggering scale, the book presents a comprehensive account of the origins and course of the war from the perspective of this key Allied power. Drawing on the latest archival research and a wealth of eyewitness testimony, Hill portrays the Red Army at war from the perspective of senior leaders and men and women at the front line to reveal how the Red Army triumphed over the forces of Nazi Germany and her allies on the Eastern Front, and why it did so at such great cost.
738 pages, Hardcover
First published October 17, 2016
24 people are currently reading
290 people want to read
About the author
Alexander Hill
100 books6 followersAlexander Hill is an associate professor in military history at the University of Calgary in Canada and specializes in Soviet military history from 1917 to 1945. He has published a range of books and articles that cover not only the Red Army at war but also the Soviet Navy and the Soviet partisan movement. He also has a Diploma in Russian from the University of Cambridge and has spent a significant period of time living and researching in Russia.
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
October 31, 2018
I am going to start by saying this is a great book. It starts with the construction of the Soviet army in the 20's and 30's and continues through to the end of the war. It describes and evaluates command and control, training, political influence, equipment effectiveness and supply, tactical and operational doctrines all framed by the Soviet army's activity and performance over the period. This is very detailed in it's studies and well supported by both primary and secondary sources including significant Russian language sources.
One take out I got from this was I never realised how neglected reconnaissance was in Soviet doctrine. Vehicle development was focused on heaver units which was only slightly alleviated by lend lease supplies. Even when the radio shortage was alleviated there was still minimal focus on providing vehicles to do this. The majority of reconnaissance was reconnaissance in force which was a very costly alternative. Even when the VVS was up to strength the amount of effort given to this was minimal. I have to wonder if even if additional resources were provided for reconnaissance how effective it would be given the restriction placed on initiative and independence in the Red army. This is just a very small example of what the book covers.
Note as much as it gives operational details of many Soviet offensive and defensive fighting these are to illustrate performance levels and changes in the same over time. It is not an operational combat history.
One take out I got from this was I never realised how neglected reconnaissance was in Soviet doctrine. Vehicle development was focused on heaver units which was only slightly alleviated by lend lease supplies. Even when the radio shortage was alleviated there was still minimal focus on providing vehicles to do this. The majority of reconnaissance was reconnaissance in force which was a very costly alternative. Even when the VVS was up to strength the amount of effort given to this was minimal. I have to wonder if even if additional resources were provided for reconnaissance how effective it would be given the restriction placed on initiative and independence in the Red army. This is just a very small example of what the book covers.
Note as much as it gives operational details of many Soviet offensive and defensive fighting these are to illustrate performance levels and changes in the same over time. It is not an operational combat history.
May 9, 2018
'The Red Army and the Second World War' is a superb single volume history of the Red Army from the late 1920s up until the end of the Second World War. Alexander Hill expertly traces the development of the Red Army from its relatively humble state in the late 1920s to the fall of the Reichstag in 1945, carefully balancing the strengths and weaknesses of the organization throughout. The book also serves as a good operational history of the Great Patriotic War from the Soviet perspective broken up by interesting tangents, such as a section discussing the role and treatment of women in the Red Army.
I personally found the first eight chapters, covering the Red Army from the late 1920s to the Winter War, the most interesting. The coverage of the purges and the "small wars" of the 1930s being of particular note. If anything I was left wanting more, particularly regarding the experience of the couple thousand Soviet pilots and ground crews that served in China as "volunteers." Of course a lack of source material may have limited deeper examinations of certain events. This is particularly the case regarding the Soviet-Japanese border skirmishes, of which the book details Changkufeng (1938) and Nomonhan (1939). I was also disappointed that the book did not discuss the Red Army's invasion of Manchuria or, more interestingly, the underwhelming performance of the Red Army in the amphibious operations in the Kuril Islands. If it isn't already apparent, it must be stressed that these are all highly subjective criticisms. Nitpicks really. The book stretches well over 700 pages and it had to end somewhere.
In conclusion, 'The Red Army and the Second World War' is well organized, well written (with the inevitable handful of awkward sentences and typos), well argued, and well researched. Hill's effective use of the available memoir literature is a welcome addition that adds some personality and life to the heavily analytical work. Those of you interested in the Eastern Front, or the Red Army in general, will find plenty to love in this hefty tome.
I personally found the first eight chapters, covering the Red Army from the late 1920s to the Winter War, the most interesting. The coverage of the purges and the "small wars" of the 1930s being of particular note. If anything I was left wanting more, particularly regarding the experience of the couple thousand Soviet pilots and ground crews that served in China as "volunteers." Of course a lack of source material may have limited deeper examinations of certain events. This is particularly the case regarding the Soviet-Japanese border skirmishes, of which the book details Changkufeng (1938) and Nomonhan (1939). I was also disappointed that the book did not discuss the Red Army's invasion of Manchuria or, more interestingly, the underwhelming performance of the Red Army in the amphibious operations in the Kuril Islands. If it isn't already apparent, it must be stressed that these are all highly subjective criticisms. Nitpicks really. The book stretches well over 700 pages and it had to end somewhere.
In conclusion, 'The Red Army and the Second World War' is well organized, well written (with the inevitable handful of awkward sentences and typos), well argued, and well researched. Hill's effective use of the available memoir literature is a welcome addition that adds some personality and life to the heavily analytical work. Those of you interested in the Eastern Front, or the Red Army in general, will find plenty to love in this hefty tome.
March 17, 2017
This is probably one of the best choices for anyone looking at a comprehensive operational history of the Red Army, and its development from the end of the Russian civil war to the end of the Second World War. Considerable time is spent also covering a lot of side topics like the impact of the purges, lend-lease, the various weapon system developments, intelligence, and the partisan war. While the author does use a lot of secondary sources, it is well balanced with considerable information from primary sources that have not been mentioned in a lot of the history.
In a lecture a while back, David Glantz described the Red Army as being a "highly effective killing machine" against both the German Wehrmacht and its own personnel. Hill's book is one of the few works on the conflict that really tries to provide a comprehensive explanation for this. A common view is that Russian manpower and equipment reserves were inexhaustible, but by the end of the war the Soviets were compelled to press gang men from recently liberated territories into the army, and many formations, particularly infantry units were always woefully understrength. The author argues that the idea that after the defeat of the Nazis the Soviets could have conceivably rolled over western Europe is wildly unrealistic.
One major contributing factor in Soviet casualties was Josef Stalin. He was the Supreme commander of the Soviet war effort and the "decider" for the bulk of major operational decisions. While he did learn and improve as the war progressed, avoidance of casualties was never a priority for him. Prior to the war, he purged the bulk of senior professional officers and their replacements were either Stalin's cronies or politically reliable but unqualified soldiers. At the start of the war, Stalin's insistence on forbidding retreats, and launching counter attacks and offensives whenever possible cost millions of casualties. Over time, Stalin would usually listen to the professionals but was inclined to overreach on operations. He would often not give adequate time for his leaders to prepare, and he would also demand that operations continue well past the point where success was remotely possible, not considering whether the operation made strategic sense.
The Red Army, while it could regenerate itself, arm itself with good weapons systems, could amass large numbers at the required points, and often mislead the Germans, there were a number of structural issues that limited its ability to achieve its objectives economically. Exercising initiative at the lower levels was not really encouraged, and there was often limited flexibility in adapting to rapidly changing situations. Communications capabilities were poor in the army to begin with and only improved marginally over time. Command and control were consequently weak. Until lend-lease kicked in, Red Army logistics had some limitations. While the lend lease trucks allowed them to provide adequate provisions for long distance drives there were not the sort of vehicles necessary to allow infantry and artillery to keep up with the armoured formations, so a lot of the massive tank losses in the war were partially attributed to inadequate support. Reconnaissance was also a weak point, and when capabilities improved, it was hampered by the demanded tempo of operations.
In a lecture a while back, David Glantz described the Red Army as being a "highly effective killing machine" against both the German Wehrmacht and its own personnel. Hill's book is one of the few works on the conflict that really tries to provide a comprehensive explanation for this. A common view is that Russian manpower and equipment reserves were inexhaustible, but by the end of the war the Soviets were compelled to press gang men from recently liberated territories into the army, and many formations, particularly infantry units were always woefully understrength. The author argues that the idea that after the defeat of the Nazis the Soviets could have conceivably rolled over western Europe is wildly unrealistic.
One major contributing factor in Soviet casualties was Josef Stalin. He was the Supreme commander of the Soviet war effort and the "decider" for the bulk of major operational decisions. While he did learn and improve as the war progressed, avoidance of casualties was never a priority for him. Prior to the war, he purged the bulk of senior professional officers and their replacements were either Stalin's cronies or politically reliable but unqualified soldiers. At the start of the war, Stalin's insistence on forbidding retreats, and launching counter attacks and offensives whenever possible cost millions of casualties. Over time, Stalin would usually listen to the professionals but was inclined to overreach on operations. He would often not give adequate time for his leaders to prepare, and he would also demand that operations continue well past the point where success was remotely possible, not considering whether the operation made strategic sense.
The Red Army, while it could regenerate itself, arm itself with good weapons systems, could amass large numbers at the required points, and often mislead the Germans, there were a number of structural issues that limited its ability to achieve its objectives economically. Exercising initiative at the lower levels was not really encouraged, and there was often limited flexibility in adapting to rapidly changing situations. Communications capabilities were poor in the army to begin with and only improved marginally over time. Command and control were consequently weak. Until lend-lease kicked in, Red Army logistics had some limitations. While the lend lease trucks allowed them to provide adequate provisions for long distance drives there were not the sort of vehicles necessary to allow infantry and artillery to keep up with the armoured formations, so a lot of the massive tank losses in the war were partially attributed to inadequate support. Reconnaissance was also a weak point, and when capabilities improved, it was hampered by the demanded tempo of operations.
June 29, 2020
A detailed analysis of the Red Army. Hill argues that this book is not a battle analysis of individual fights and one reading should've read one of the many good eastern front books. He names few and for me the accompanying book was Glantz' & House's When Titans Clashed, although I felt that the book wasn't probably the best one there. But Hill was right that although that at least superfluous knowledge of certain aspects of eastern front is a must when reading this book. It's not enough to know about few battles but the general situation during different parts of the war. So a warning, this isn't the book if you're searching for a book about eastern front. It's an excellent(a must) addition to shelf with other books of the topic.
The book covers many aspects of warfare and the organisation of the Red army. It delves into the reconnaissance, partisans, the structures of different army types, manpower, equipment, leadership and everything in between. The events of the war are sometimes only a way for him to explain what he's talking about. The whole chapter can be about leadership and underneath the battle of Stalingrad is happening without much mentioning what actually happened in the battle. Even though the book is about Red Army in World War two, we get to read about 200 pages of evolution of the Red Army and battles before the war. Yet we get only few pages of the events and the aftermath of the war. Soviet navy gets only brief mentioning because it wasn't part of the Red Army, unlike the air force.
The book covers many aspects of warfare and the organisation of the Red army. It delves into the reconnaissance, partisans, the structures of different army types, manpower, equipment, leadership and everything in between. The events of the war are sometimes only a way for him to explain what he's talking about. The whole chapter can be about leadership and underneath the battle of Stalingrad is happening without much mentioning what actually happened in the battle. Even though the book is about Red Army in World War two, we get to read about 200 pages of evolution of the Red Army and battles before the war. Yet we get only few pages of the events and the aftermath of the war. Soviet navy gets only brief mentioning because it wasn't part of the Red Army, unlike the air force.
May 26, 2020
So...do you want the short answer or the longer answer about the book? The short answer...it's the best single-volume history I've ever read of the Soviet side of the Ost Front. It is thorough, clear-eyed, comprehensive without being overwhelming, and quite readable. If you are a WW2 buff, have an interest in Russian history or want some serious history work by a great historian, then buy this book. The longer answer...Professor Hill offers a sober reflection on the horrific reality, human carnage, and mechanized destruction of the Eastern Front during the Great Patriotic War. However, it is far more than just a tale of battles and dead men. It is also a social history of the Soviet Union itself and tracks how Soviet society defined and redefined itself during the antebellum years and the war itself. This is a warts and all picture of the Red Army, the Soviet fighting man/woman and the price of industrialized warfare. It is not a blow-by-blow battle history, but rather an exploration of how organizations and human institutions evolve under the most destructive of circumstances. I was humbled and horrified to read it. If any of the above resonated with you...take the time and read the book!
May 2, 2024
A deeply researched and engrossing work, probably the definitive modern single-volume account of Soviet military evolution from the '20s until the Fall of Berlin. Covering a wide breadth of material, and with little spared of passed over in its examination, I would wager that this is a must-read for those that are interested in Soviet military theory. Some typographical errors and grammatical and contextual errors marred this only slightly, but otherwise an excellent read.
December 10, 2023
The editing was atrocious. There was an error of expression on just about every page, and that for a Cambridge monograph.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews