I've always read lots of SF and written lots of history.
Now I'm trying to reverse those trends, using the experience of thirty-five years of researching and writing history as the springboard to tell some great stories.
Here's me in a nutshell: 21 years in the US military (active and reserve); 27 years at Delaware State University (teaching history); father of three (now grown) children, including twins; raising a grandson; married for 26 years to a much smarter, more accomplished woman than me.
Newton's tone is often harsh, so although his many views on the 1864 campaigns have been mine for sometime, I did reel at times. The trouble is while this book raises questions and adds nuance (he ably explains which of Johnston's units were cracking under pressure) he provides few answers. Nor does he seem to acknowledge that raw losses, however replaceable, could not make up for lost veterans and battlefield defeats. In fact, the trouble is he seems more bent on showing how well the Confederacy was doing, which leads him to downplay Union victories. He is too kind to Johnston, but I am a "Johnston-basher" as he he would label me. In the end though, this is a good book because it is incisive, intelligent, and challenges accepted wisdom about the Civil War's last stages.
Analysis of reported strength of different Confederate commands in the first half of 1864. Among other things, Newton identifies units moving from one department to another that were inadvertently left off regular reports. In conclusion, Confederate strength totals and military resources are significantly higher than reported after the end of the Gettysburg Campaign. Newton's survey includes a review of Confederate commands from Texas to Virginia.