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Faith And Rationality: Reason and Belief in God
Arguments about the "evidences of Christianity" have consumed the talents of believers and agnostics. These arguments have tried to give―or to deny―Christian belief a "foundation." Belief is rational, the argument goes, only if it is logically derived from axiomatic truths or is otherwise supported by "enough evidence." Arguments for belief generally fail to sway the unconvinced. But is this because the evidence is flimsy and the arguments weak―or because they attempt to give the right answer to the wrong question? What, after all, would satisfy Russell's all for evidence? Faith and Rationality investigates the rich implications of what the authors call "Calvinistic" or "Reformed epistemology." This is the view of knowledge-enunciated by Calvin, further developed by Barth-that sees belief in God as its own foundation; in the authors’ terms, is it properly "basic" in itself.
328 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1983
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About the author
Alvin Plantinga
50 books368 followersHe is an American analytic philosopher, the John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Notre Dame and the inaugural holder of the Jellema Chair in Philosophy at Calvin College.
Plantinga is widely known for his work in philosophy of religion, epistemology, metaphysics and Christian apologetics.
He has delivered the Gifford Lectures three times and was described by TIME magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God"
Plantinga is the current winner of the Templeton Prize.
Plantinga is widely known for his work in philosophy of religion, epistemology, metaphysics and Christian apologetics.
He has delivered the Gifford Lectures three times and was described by TIME magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God"
Plantinga is the current winner of the Templeton Prize.
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
February 18, 2014
Worth it for Plantinga and Wolterstorff's opening two essays alone. Though Plantinga's is probably more famous, as it eventually grew into a book, Wolterstorff's is, to my mind, an all-time best. If what you're looking for is a nonfoundationalist treatment of the rationality of belief in God's existence—and who isn't?—you're in the right place.
June 3, 2024
A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS ESPOUSING “REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY”
Co-Editor Nicholas Wolterstorff wrote in the Introduction to this 1983 book, “This book is a series of essays on the topic of faith and reason… I judge that what is significant and unique about these essays is the weaving in and out of four fundamental themes. (1) … the collapse of classical foundationalism… (2) A second theme… is that of the evidentialist challenge to religious belief… in these essays the evidentialist challenge of the Enlightenment is challenged and overcome. (3) It is met and overcome in such a way that the resultant positions bear a close affinity to positions long held on the relation of faith to reason by the Continental Reformed (Calvinist) tradition. Thus a third theme … is what might be called… ‘Calvinist epistemology’ or ‘Reformed epistemology.’ … [4] there is a fourth theme… it was the conviction of American evangelical academics in the nineteenth century that science, if competently pursued, would always prove compatible with Christianity… It has been characteristic of the Continental Reformed tradition to contest this assumption.”
Co-Editor Alvin Plantinga wrote in the first essay, “many objections have been put forward to belief in God. First, there is the claim that … there is no such thing as belief in God, because the sentence ‘God exists’ is, strictly speaking, nonsense… Second, there is the claim that belief in God is internally inconsistent in that it is impossible… that there be any such person as theists say God is… Third, some critics have urged that the existence of God is incompatible with other beliefs that are plainly true and typically accepted by theists. The most widely urged objection to theistic belief, the deductive argument from evil, falls into this category…. I think that the present consensus, even among those who urge some form of the argument of evil, is that the deductive form of the argument from evil is unsuccessful.” (Pg. 20-21)
He points out, “Consider a Christian beset by doubts. He has a hard time believing certain crucial Christian claims… he finds it cold, lifeless, without warmth or attractiveness. Nonetheless he is committed to this belief; it is his position… He has, so to speak, thrown in his lot with it. Let us say that he ACCEPTS this proposition, even though when he is assailed by doubt, he may fail to BELIEVE it… to any appreciable degree. His commitment to this proposition may be much stronger than his explicit and occurrent belief in it; so these two---that is, acceptance and belief---must be distinguished.” (Pg. 37)
He states, “Calvin holds that one can RATIONALLY ACCEPT belief in God as basic; he also claims that one who takes belief in God as basic can KNOW that God exists even if he has no argument… A foundationalist is likely to hold that some properly basic beliefs are such that anyone who accepts them KNOWS them… Calvin will have none of this; as he sees it, one need no argument to know that God exists.” (Pg. 73)
He asserts, “The Christian will of course suppose that belief in God is entirely proper and rational; if he does not accept this belief on the basis of other propositions, he will conclude that it is basic for him and quite properly so. Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madelyn Murray O’Hare [sic] may disagree; but how is that relevant? Must my criteria, or those of the Christian community, conform to their examples? Surely not. The Christian community is responsible to ITS set of examples, not to theirs.” (Pg. 77)
He acknowledges, “The Reformed epistemologist… is a fideist only if he holds that some central truths of Christianity are not among the deliverances of reason and must instead be taken faith. But just what are the deliverances of reason?... First… self-evident propositions and propositions that follow from them by self-evidently valid arguments are among the deliverances of reason. But we cannot stop there. Consider someone who holds that according to correct scientific reasoning … the earth is at least a couple of billion years old; nonetheless, he adds, the fact that is it is no more than some 6000 years old, since that is what faith teaches. Such a person is a fideist, even though the proposition ‘the earth is more than 6000 years old’ is neither self-evident nor a consequence of what is self-evident. So the deliverances of reason … also include basic perceptual truths… certain propositions about other minds… But what about the belief that there is such a person as God and that we are responsible to him? Is that among the deliverances of reason or an item of faith? For Calvin it is clearly the former… Belief in the existence of God is in the same boat as belief in other minds, the past, and perceptual objects; in each case God has so construed us that in the right circumstances we form the belief in question. But the belief that there is such a person as God is as much among the deliverances of reason as those other beliefs.” (Pg. 89-90)
Wolterstorff says in his essay, “I have said that the evidentialist challenge and objection to theistic conviction, along with the attempt to cope with that challenge by practicing evidentialist apologetics, are peculiar to modernity. Some will question this claim by pointing to the practice of natural theology among the medievals. The reply is that natural theology was a different project from evidentialist apologetics—even though the same arguments may occur in both.” (Pg. 140-141)
He observes, “It has long been the habit of philosophers to ask in abstract, nonspecific fashion whether it is rational to believe that God exists… and so on… The proper question is always and only whether it is rational for this or that particular person in this or that type of situation, or for a person of this or that particular type … to believe so-and-so. Rationality is always SITUATED rationality.” (Pg. 155)
He argues, “Just as there can be rationally justified beliefs produced by unreliable mechanisms, so too there can be rationally unjustified beliefs produced by reliable mechanisms. Suppose that some belief… is produced by a reliable mechanism, but all the evidence available to the person points to the conclusion that it is unreliable… if it did, the person would not be rational in continuing to believe the deliverances of that reliable mechanism… [EXAMPLE} A scientist has developed an instrument for obtaining information on certain matters, but on the evidence available to him, the results are largely in error. In fact, however, they are highly accurate---something which is not discovered until, say, fifty years later. If the scientist, against the evidence for his discovery’s unreliability, nonetheless continues to believe its deliverances, surely he is rationally unjustified in his belief.” (Pg. 161)
He concludes, “A person is rationally justified in believing a certain proposition which he does believe unless he has adequate reason to cease from believing it. Our beliefs are rational unless we have reason for refraining; they are not nonrational unless we have reason FOR believing.” (Pg. 163) He adds, “From the fact that it is not rational for some person to believe that God exists it does not follow that he ought to give up that belief. Rationality is only PRIMA FACIE justification; lack of rationality, only PRIMA FACIE impermissibility. Perhaps, in spite of its irrationality for him, the person ought to continue believing that God exists. Perhaps it is our duty to believe more firmly that God exists than any proposition which conflicts with this…” (Pg. 177)
George Marsden suggests, “The principal point at which the evidentialists failed was, not in supposing that there should be a preponderance of evidence favorable to Christian claims, but rather in supposing that such evidence and arguments constituted conclusive arguments for the truth of Christianity. As we have seen, the general arguments for Christianity do not stand up as logically compelling unless one already grants certain assumptions about reality that virtually presuppose a benevolent Creator. Otherwise, alternative explanations can explain the phenomena as logically as can Christianity… Furthermore, sinful people whose minds are adamantly closed to hearing God and his Word will be quick to point out the logical plausibility of the alternatives.” (Pg. 254)
This book will be of great interest to those (particularly from a Reformed perspective) seriously studying philosophical theology.
Co-Editor Nicholas Wolterstorff wrote in the Introduction to this 1983 book, “This book is a series of essays on the topic of faith and reason… I judge that what is significant and unique about these essays is the weaving in and out of four fundamental themes. (1) … the collapse of classical foundationalism… (2) A second theme… is that of the evidentialist challenge to religious belief… in these essays the evidentialist challenge of the Enlightenment is challenged and overcome. (3) It is met and overcome in such a way that the resultant positions bear a close affinity to positions long held on the relation of faith to reason by the Continental Reformed (Calvinist) tradition. Thus a third theme … is what might be called… ‘Calvinist epistemology’ or ‘Reformed epistemology.’ … [4] there is a fourth theme… it was the conviction of American evangelical academics in the nineteenth century that science, if competently pursued, would always prove compatible with Christianity… It has been characteristic of the Continental Reformed tradition to contest this assumption.”
Co-Editor Alvin Plantinga wrote in the first essay, “many objections have been put forward to belief in God. First, there is the claim that … there is no such thing as belief in God, because the sentence ‘God exists’ is, strictly speaking, nonsense… Second, there is the claim that belief in God is internally inconsistent in that it is impossible… that there be any such person as theists say God is… Third, some critics have urged that the existence of God is incompatible with other beliefs that are plainly true and typically accepted by theists. The most widely urged objection to theistic belief, the deductive argument from evil, falls into this category…. I think that the present consensus, even among those who urge some form of the argument of evil, is that the deductive form of the argument from evil is unsuccessful.” (Pg. 20-21)
He points out, “Consider a Christian beset by doubts. He has a hard time believing certain crucial Christian claims… he finds it cold, lifeless, without warmth or attractiveness. Nonetheless he is committed to this belief; it is his position… He has, so to speak, thrown in his lot with it. Let us say that he ACCEPTS this proposition, even though when he is assailed by doubt, he may fail to BELIEVE it… to any appreciable degree. His commitment to this proposition may be much stronger than his explicit and occurrent belief in it; so these two---that is, acceptance and belief---must be distinguished.” (Pg. 37)
He states, “Calvin holds that one can RATIONALLY ACCEPT belief in God as basic; he also claims that one who takes belief in God as basic can KNOW that God exists even if he has no argument… A foundationalist is likely to hold that some properly basic beliefs are such that anyone who accepts them KNOWS them… Calvin will have none of this; as he sees it, one need no argument to know that God exists.” (Pg. 73)
He asserts, “The Christian will of course suppose that belief in God is entirely proper and rational; if he does not accept this belief on the basis of other propositions, he will conclude that it is basic for him and quite properly so. Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madelyn Murray O’Hare [sic] may disagree; but how is that relevant? Must my criteria, or those of the Christian community, conform to their examples? Surely not. The Christian community is responsible to ITS set of examples, not to theirs.” (Pg. 77)
He acknowledges, “The Reformed epistemologist… is a fideist only if he holds that some central truths of Christianity are not among the deliverances of reason and must instead be taken faith. But just what are the deliverances of reason?... First… self-evident propositions and propositions that follow from them by self-evidently valid arguments are among the deliverances of reason. But we cannot stop there. Consider someone who holds that according to correct scientific reasoning … the earth is at least a couple of billion years old; nonetheless, he adds, the fact that is it is no more than some 6000 years old, since that is what faith teaches. Such a person is a fideist, even though the proposition ‘the earth is more than 6000 years old’ is neither self-evident nor a consequence of what is self-evident. So the deliverances of reason … also include basic perceptual truths… certain propositions about other minds… But what about the belief that there is such a person as God and that we are responsible to him? Is that among the deliverances of reason or an item of faith? For Calvin it is clearly the former… Belief in the existence of God is in the same boat as belief in other minds, the past, and perceptual objects; in each case God has so construed us that in the right circumstances we form the belief in question. But the belief that there is such a person as God is as much among the deliverances of reason as those other beliefs.” (Pg. 89-90)
Wolterstorff says in his essay, “I have said that the evidentialist challenge and objection to theistic conviction, along with the attempt to cope with that challenge by practicing evidentialist apologetics, are peculiar to modernity. Some will question this claim by pointing to the practice of natural theology among the medievals. The reply is that natural theology was a different project from evidentialist apologetics—even though the same arguments may occur in both.” (Pg. 140-141)
He observes, “It has long been the habit of philosophers to ask in abstract, nonspecific fashion whether it is rational to believe that God exists… and so on… The proper question is always and only whether it is rational for this or that particular person in this or that type of situation, or for a person of this or that particular type … to believe so-and-so. Rationality is always SITUATED rationality.” (Pg. 155)
He argues, “Just as there can be rationally justified beliefs produced by unreliable mechanisms, so too there can be rationally unjustified beliefs produced by reliable mechanisms. Suppose that some belief… is produced by a reliable mechanism, but all the evidence available to the person points to the conclusion that it is unreliable… if it did, the person would not be rational in continuing to believe the deliverances of that reliable mechanism… [EXAMPLE} A scientist has developed an instrument for obtaining information on certain matters, but on the evidence available to him, the results are largely in error. In fact, however, they are highly accurate---something which is not discovered until, say, fifty years later. If the scientist, against the evidence for his discovery’s unreliability, nonetheless continues to believe its deliverances, surely he is rationally unjustified in his belief.” (Pg. 161)
He concludes, “A person is rationally justified in believing a certain proposition which he does believe unless he has adequate reason to cease from believing it. Our beliefs are rational unless we have reason for refraining; they are not nonrational unless we have reason FOR believing.” (Pg. 163) He adds, “From the fact that it is not rational for some person to believe that God exists it does not follow that he ought to give up that belief. Rationality is only PRIMA FACIE justification; lack of rationality, only PRIMA FACIE impermissibility. Perhaps, in spite of its irrationality for him, the person ought to continue believing that God exists. Perhaps it is our duty to believe more firmly that God exists than any proposition which conflicts with this…” (Pg. 177)
George Marsden suggests, “The principal point at which the evidentialists failed was, not in supposing that there should be a preponderance of evidence favorable to Christian claims, but rather in supposing that such evidence and arguments constituted conclusive arguments for the truth of Christianity. As we have seen, the general arguments for Christianity do not stand up as logically compelling unless one already grants certain assumptions about reality that virtually presuppose a benevolent Creator. Otherwise, alternative explanations can explain the phenomena as logically as can Christianity… Furthermore, sinful people whose minds are adamantly closed to hearing God and his Word will be quick to point out the logical plausibility of the alternatives.” (Pg. 254)
This book will be of great interest to those (particularly from a Reformed perspective) seriously studying philosophical theology.
October 22, 2014
The contributors in this volume argue that given the inadequacies in epistemic evidentialism and classic foundationalism, the believer is warranted and rational in believing that God exists apart from evidence. I will summarize the key arguments, point out tensions and weaknesses, and conclude with some comments.
Wolterstorff's essays:
NW argues that foundationalism and evidentialism (particularly in the stronger Cliffordian case) cannot present a challenge to theism because said evidentialism is self-referentially incoherent (it's claim fails to live up to its own standards). NW's longer essay surveys the various options. He sometimes gets lost (or the reader does) in the many nuances, but there are some gems from Thomas Reid.
Plantinga:
AP gives his legendary essay on reason and belief in God. It's a fantastic essay, but in many ways the reader is urged to skip it and go to AP's larger trilogy (on the flip side, reading this essay serves as a nice intro to the larger trilogy). The essay's strength is in rebutting claims on how a Christian knows (or can't know) a certain thing. I am also glad he dealt with The Great Pumpkin Objection. I think his response gives the Reformed Epistemologian breathing room, but I am not sure it makes the objection go away.
Mavrodes, Alston, Holwerda
Mavrodes gave several short stories on religious belief. They were better than I expected. His essay "Turning," while fascinating as a story goes, is otherwise incoherent. Alston introduces what will be his later project on sense perception and religious belief. I will say no more. Holwerda responds to Wolfhart Pannenberg. I think he does a great job showing WP's criticism of dialectical theology, and gives some good problems to WP, but I would hesitate to recommend this essay because it came out before WP's publication of his systematic theology (which Holwerda himself acknowledges).
Marsden
George Marsden gives an amazing essay on American Religious Epistemology in history. He shows how Thomas Reid was received by 19th century theologians. The theologians interpreted Reid along empirical and inductive lines (which may or may not be what Reid himself intended). This proved disastrous when it met Darwinism and probably paved the way for Old Evangelicalism's demise.
Reflections:
Most of these contributors have since fine-tuned their arguments. The book itself cannot serve as a template. Further, I think the authors do a good job in showing Christian belief is warranted, but not that it is correct. And while Plantinga is correct that creating worldviews on the spot is a difficult endeavor (ala the Great Pumpkin), he didn't say it was impossible.
Still, a classic work in its own right.
Wolterstorff's essays:
NW argues that foundationalism and evidentialism (particularly in the stronger Cliffordian case) cannot present a challenge to theism because said evidentialism is self-referentially incoherent (it's claim fails to live up to its own standards). NW's longer essay surveys the various options. He sometimes gets lost (or the reader does) in the many nuances, but there are some gems from Thomas Reid.
Plantinga:
AP gives his legendary essay on reason and belief in God. It's a fantastic essay, but in many ways the reader is urged to skip it and go to AP's larger trilogy (on the flip side, reading this essay serves as a nice intro to the larger trilogy). The essay's strength is in rebutting claims on how a Christian knows (or can't know) a certain thing. I am also glad he dealt with The Great Pumpkin Objection. I think his response gives the Reformed Epistemologian breathing room, but I am not sure it makes the objection go away.
Mavrodes, Alston, Holwerda
Mavrodes gave several short stories on religious belief. They were better than I expected. His essay "Turning," while fascinating as a story goes, is otherwise incoherent. Alston introduces what will be his later project on sense perception and religious belief. I will say no more. Holwerda responds to Wolfhart Pannenberg. I think he does a great job showing WP's criticism of dialectical theology, and gives some good problems to WP, but I would hesitate to recommend this essay because it came out before WP's publication of his systematic theology (which Holwerda himself acknowledges).
Marsden
George Marsden gives an amazing essay on American Religious Epistemology in history. He shows how Thomas Reid was received by 19th century theologians. The theologians interpreted Reid along empirical and inductive lines (which may or may not be what Reid himself intended). This proved disastrous when it met Darwinism and probably paved the way for Old Evangelicalism's demise.
Reflections:
Most of these contributors have since fine-tuned their arguments. The book itself cannot serve as a template. Further, I think the authors do a good job in showing Christian belief is warranted, but not that it is correct. And while Plantinga is correct that creating worldviews on the spot is a difficult endeavor (ala the Great Pumpkin), he didn't say it was impossible.
Still, a classic work in its own right.
April 12, 2015
Reading only the first chapter on two colleagues' recommendation.
Plantinga's Aquinas is not Maritain's Aquinas. That's enough of a conclusion for me, at this point.
Plantinga's Aquinas is not Maritain's Aquinas. That's enough of a conclusion for me, at this point.
March 4, 2024
Taking a dip into the world of reformed epistemology is always fascinating. Would highly recommend as an intro into some of the compelling arguments surrounding foundationalism and natural theology.
February 14, 2015
While I will be the first to admit of the many syllogisms and arguments that were above my comprehension, I will not allow that to be an excuse for the whole of it. First off, to me, a mark of incredible intelligence is the ability to break down difficult things - to climb to the mountains peak and have the ability to climb back down to the village, illuminating what he/she had just witnessed, knowing the villagers lack the knowledge of what he/she has seen, he/she is left with the task of understanding it enough to reveal it to his villagers using examples of things they do know. If this was not his intent, I concede, but if it was he failed.
I thought the rest (of which I did comprehend) consisted of poor arguments which could be broken down to purely semantical issues. He does tackle the foundationalist's argument quite well, but that being removed, he is simply left with subpar arguments.
Quotes
"Clearly I am not foolish or irrational in believing something on the authority of my favorite mathematician, even if I cannot work it out for myself... The question is not whether it is foolish to believe something on God's authority, but whether it is foolish to believe that God has in fact proposed a given item for my belief. Obviously, if he has, then I should believe it; but what is my reason or motive for supposing that in fact it is God who has proposed..."
"Nevertheless it would be irrational to take as basic the denial of a proposition that seems self-evident to you."
I thought the rest (of which I did comprehend) consisted of poor arguments which could be broken down to purely semantical issues. He does tackle the foundationalist's argument quite well, but that being removed, he is simply left with subpar arguments.
Quotes
"Clearly I am not foolish or irrational in believing something on the authority of my favorite mathematician, even if I cannot work it out for myself... The question is not whether it is foolish to believe something on God's authority, but whether it is foolish to believe that God has in fact proposed a given item for my belief. Obviously, if he has, then I should believe it; but what is my reason or motive for supposing that in fact it is God who has proposed..."
"Nevertheless it would be irrational to take as basic the denial of a proposition that seems self-evident to you."
December 12, 2009
Read the first chapter and will probably go onto the rest someday.
Want to read
October 26, 2010Great so far!
July 10, 2012
Easily some of the best contemporary Christian philosophers. A phenomenal work.
February 16, 2017
Just reading Plantinga's long essay.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews