It is difficult to appreciate the workings of something while you are a small cog in the works, especially if you are not allowed to stop and reflect as by doing so you threaten to cause the machine, of which you are a part (even if unconsciously) to fail and grind to a halt. In his book Andreas Malm lifts the reader out of the box placing them outside it from where they can see the whole as he deconstructs it before their eyes and explains how and why the machine works as it does. Fossil Capital is a monumental work and one that takes capitalism seriously, presents a clear argument for how it got us into our current mess and why it will, by its nature, drag us ever deeper into the mire even if it means our civilisational, and probably planetary doom.
The book is a mixture of social and economic history, a narrative of technological change, power relations (in all senses) and a study of on going state of class struggle (conscious or not). The first part of the book looks at the transition from an artisan based production for use, to mass commodity production for profi,t or "exchange-value". Malm presents a thoroughly researched and carefully presented overview of the development of the factory and the emergence of the "working class", an entity dependent on the sale of its labour to survive. We see the effect of push and pull forces, with the new factories needing employees, while on the other hand people are driven from the land, or find their skills replaced by mechanisation forcing artisans into the labour market.
A central interest for the book is why fossil fuels - that cost to extract and turn into usable power - won over the freely available "flow" energy (wind, water, sun) which just required a means to capture energy that flowed freely. Malm shows that despite being more expensive, and initially offering no major efficiency over water, fossil fueled power (in the form of the coal fed steam engine) did give the individual capitalist a "freedom" which ranked higher than any other consideration. Coal and the steam engine gave the mill owner, the factory owner, the freedom to locate almost anywhere and the ability to produce the power they needed, when they wanted it. This trumped reliance on an uncertain flow of a free force offered by water power (fine in the days of products made for their use-value, not so good in the cut-throat profit driven world of commodities produced for their exchange-value). The automation which came with the steam engine, the move from skilled technical workers to overseers of labour replacing machines also made fossil fuel a key weapon in the struggle between workers and employers. While each innovation created new levels of conflict and opportunities for industrial action the end of reliance on a mass skilled workforce in need of housing, education and care by the employer was made possible largely thanks to the adoption of coal fired steam power. Malm goes into a lot of detail about the struggle between water power and steam power and shows conclusively that i) there was no shortage of water to drive industry and ii) the technical skills existed to expand and improve water power significantly. What the industrialists objected to was the communal nature of water power and the lack of flexibility a widely spread network of mills represented over those clustered in a town or city hub where trading facilities were on hand and a large reserve army of labour could be built up keeping labour costs and conflict down.
Labour conflict is examined in some detail. In doing so the book shows how the early capitalists were able to use their built environment and choices about power and machinery sources as a weapon in industrial conflict. While the emerging working class had been stripped of what they owned in their making they quickly realised that the one thing they had, their labour power, made them essential to the mill owners profits. Only through the employment of workers in their factories could the products be produced from which profit could be extracted. No workers, no production, no profit. The level of class conflict in the early nineteenth century was very impressive, from the early rebellions against power looms through to the height of revolutionary activity (in England at least) with the Chartist movement where labour brought about a general strike, took over workplaces, sabotaged machinery and demanded a bigger slice of the cake. (The downfall of the Chartist Movement was a failure to be revolutionary enough and seizing full control of the means of production and disposing of the employers, needless to say this was the finest and last chance the working class had in England, the state responded with force to rescue the owners of private property and became adept in the art of divide and rule and co-opting workers just enough to keep them under the thumb, anyway, I digress).
In summary early on "... capital prevailed over labour in the key industry of the British economy - smashed the unions, reestablished proper hierarchy, extracted more output of fewer workers at lower cost - by means of power, in the dual sense of the word. Automation drew its force from an extraneous source. Only the mobilisation of that source made it possible for the cotton capitalists to begin the process of salvaging profits at the expense of labour". And so the spiral of growth in production of commodities grew and with it the constant battle to extract more profit from the work done fed by an ever increasing demand for fossil based power releasing its planetary poison in the process (the level to which the harmful by-products of capitalist production were understood at the time is quite eye opening). That the global contagion has a source is clear. "If global warming has a historical homeland, there can indeed be no doubt about its identity" says Malm it was "the unique creation of Britain" something that as we grow closer to our doom the "more sharply will the British exception stand out and its history attract interest - not to honour the name of the kingdom, but rather smear it in the soot it has bequeathed to humanity". And so to the late 20th Century and the first decades of the 21st.
The opening up of China to foreign investment, which following WTO membership in 2001, skyrocketed and saw an opportunity for capital unequalled since the early days of Capitalism. China offered a vast, skilled, cheap, compliant and policed workforce, coupled with a state committed to infrastructure development and plentiful supplies of domestic and imported fossil fuel, he country became an overnight relocation no brainer, facilitated as it was by the neoliberal assault on world trade and nationally based production. This is where Malm highlights the problem with "consumption based accounting" the "...view of the Western consumer as an absolute sovereign who sends CO2 packing to other parts of the world" through their buying decisions, namely for cheap imports over domestic products. For Malm, this thinking, which results in calls for consumers/workers to "assume responsibility" for the climate crisis, misses the elephant in the room, the "owners of the means of production" who become a passive and out of sight none actor. However, as he points out "American and other Western workers never made the decision to outsource manufacturing. In fact, if there is anyone who has ever resisted such a move, it is they".He goes on to look at how and why people become integrated so entirely in a system which works against their interests. Returning to the "box" I opened with he introduces "Ideological State Apparatuses" where ideology has become "... a set of doctrines as a state of existence, in which the subject comes to be enmeshed in the relations, something not thought and said, but done and felt" (a bit like being a body in The Matrix). It therefore stands to reason that those with the most to lose in a fossil economy are those in societies most "thoroughly constituted by fossil use-value" the wealthiest consumers whose lives are built on the conveniences offered by such an economy and therefore least likely to recognise the beast or oppose it meaningfully (unlike those on the periphery still not integrated into it enough to make resistance unpalatable or give it the appearance of utter futility). Production here is the problem, consumption follows from production. "The historical tendancy of fossil capital is spew out more products (with a fossil fuel component) in them for more people '' and once captured by and integrated into consumer life it is hard to recognise it for what it is or imagine life without it.
Fossil Capital is primarily concerned with correctly identifying the problem and the historical processes that have got us to where we are today. It is rightly critical of the misdiagnosis, and thus cures prescribed, of much of the environmental and Anthropocene aristocracy. A key concern is that the speed at which things are getting worse is matched by the continued growth of fossil based economic growth and the investment in fossil based consumption. Malm argues that renewables, as the "flow" is now popularly known, are unpopular with the largest corporations for much the same reasons as in the early 19th Century, many fossil fuel giants who have dabbled in renewables had, at the time of writing his book, either withdrawn from, or scaled back, their interest in renewables while concentrating on their core fossil activities with no sign of a slowdown in demand - traditional markets turning to renewable sources more than being compensated for by emerging markets and sector growth. In such a situation piecemeal consumer led "choices" or technical fixes (endorsed by industry that sees a profitable future in them) offer little hope of any meaningful change. At the end of the day the message seems to be forget revolutions, or waiting for the workers to become class conscious and to seize the means of production, only a globally coordinated state led wartime style command economy has any hope of tackling the barest minimum of the problem we face. Even then, getting corporate cooperation would be difficult (especially with their being more powerful than most states). In conclusion Malm notes that the impact, avoidability and survivability of climate triggered disaster is a class issue "... as long as there are class societies on earth - there will be lifeboats for the rich and privileged, and there will not be any shared sense of catastrophe. More than ever class divisions will become matters of life and death: who gets to drive out of the city when the hurricane approaches; who can pay for seawalls or homes solid enough to stand the coming flood. The capitalist class is evidently not very worried. Quite a few fractions of it are rather gearing up for some sweet profits...".
This is a book you'd like to think today's descendants of the iron masters, who will keep drilling until the last breath of the last worker, might read. But they won't, it would be like staring in the mirror and seeing the four horsemen reflected back in one face. Most of those who read this book will do so because they are concerned or care about the future of humanity. In doing so they may be surprised and hopefully engaged by what they read. This book is most important in clearly showing where the problem began, how it has stayed with the same small beneficiary class who control a global machine which can only grow (or die) and how the "Anthropocene" is perhaps misnamed and should really be the Capitalocene.
To try to summarise this epic work in a few lines is unfair to it. It needs to be read and its lessons acted upon across all areas of life if there is to be any hope of mitigating, even for a while, the coming apocalypse. While I think that Andreas Malm is a little over optimistic and endorsing of an idea of a basic good ion humanity, a concept I struggle with, this a book to stand alongside other time tested historical and theoretical epic works.