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High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World
Breaking with tradition, Admiral William Owens--vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and one of the nation's foremost strategic thinkers--prescribes new roles and missions and revolutionary new ships and aircraft needed for a new Navy, and lets readers in on their planning.
200 pages, Hardcover
First published February 1, 1995
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March 26, 2020
I wrote this for a journal that junior surface warfare officers at the Naval Postgraduate School published in the 90s. I don't think that I can improve on it even today in 2020. I might, however, consider myself vindicated in a few of the observations ...
BOOK REVIEW
HIGH SEAS: THE NAVAL PASSAGE TO AN UNCHARTED WORLD BY ADMIRAL WILLIAM A. OWENS
REVIEW BY J.A. GHERLONE, JR., LT, USN 6 JULY 1995
Introduction
I've referred to myself more than once as a "career paranoid," a character trait which has the disadvantage of making one seem unduly pessimistic at times. It is probably this factor which leaves me vaguely unsettled when reading Admiral Owens' High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World (USNI Press; 1995; 184 pgs.; $27.95). Don't get me wrong, I would call the book a must-read for junior officers. The thought process regarding the future and the flow- down of ideas is a sophisticated tool for understanding both the current chaos and the future of the maritime forces. What inspires my latent paranoia is the underlying assumptions on which he bases his future view, his willingness to accept high technology as an omnipotent force in warfare, and his pervasive confidence about many of the most unpredictable issues of the future.
ADM Owens presents in this work a combination of his own thought on the future of the maritime services, and the policy shaping process in the Department of the Navy (DoN) in which he participated as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfighting Requirements and Assessment (N8). He begins by detailing his view of the changes in the world since the end of the Cold War, and their significance to National Security. From this he flows the impacts into operational changes, and thence to force structure.
His thought process is impressive. He has obviously put much thought into the changes wrought by the demise of the bipolar superpower standoff and what it will mean for our National Security. He has an ordered, logical method of developing the important concepts and developing a feel for what they will mean -- it is worth emulating. What bothers me are some of his initial assumptions.
The introduction contains seven underlying assumptions (and one he does not label as such), and I can only concur with about half of them. The unlabeled assumption is that the Navy's "doctrine" was a "failure" in Desert Storm. We did leave the Gulf without the feeling, common among the other services, that our doctrine had been vindicated. I'm tired of hearing this argument in such a negative sense, however. We had no written doctrine of response and presence, but it was what we did, and have done for 50 years. The fact that Saddam Hussein made the strategic error of allowing us unlimited time to prepare does not negate the utility in other circumstances of having maritime forces ready to counter a smarter aggressor. In terms of detailed procedures, such as the ATO and JFACC, we did something more important than justifying our doctrine -- we adapted and succeeded!! We identified the interoperability disconnects, and found solutions for them. I think that is the more important lesson -- to expect those and work to kill off as many of the nits as possible beforehand while developing ways to quickly kill the others in real time. Admiral Owens initial assumptions are all based on these "failures" and the "significant changes" to our operational mindset, but I think what we need to recognize is that we've simply formalized and reemphasized the presence and joint operations roles we've had since the end of World War II. During the Cold War, we allowed the war at sea to become the dominant factor, at times giving short shrift to other critical capabilities (i.e. amphibious operations and mine warfare), we need to remember that, and ensure that we don't allow the pendulum to swing so far that we lose sight of sea control and SLOC protection now that our emphasis is closer to shore.
This caveat issued, I would call particular attention to the first and second chapters in which he discusses deterrence and use of force. This is the real stuff -- he has a definitive outlook on the New World Disorder and its implications for both enemy and own force actions. While the underlying assumptions skew many of the particulars in later chapters from that which I would have written, these sections and the general structure that flows down from them are an elegant statement of the calculus of force and operations for the modern age.
The next sections discuss the importance of high tech solutions to the Armed Forces, and to the maritime services in particular. I agree that high technology is important, but it seems as if the Admiral is willing to bet everything on a technological advantage that could evaporate overnight for any number of reasons. If some other nation exploits a technology we have overlooked, our "high tech advantage" means little, but the confidence expressed in our unassailable edge seems unshakable. Likewise, there are many low tech counters to our high tech capabilities -- we must avoid tunnel vision into the high technology world.
Another key section is that on the R3B in Chapter 6. His description and opinions about the matrix process developed by him and his staff in N8 is a presentation of a problem-solving method for a very difficult problem -- changing the balance of power in the requirements world to reflect warfighting requirements more and the needs of the "barons" less. They did an amazing job in a very short time, and how they did it is need-to-know information.
The last two chapters are his visualizations of our force in 2001 (a vision he put in motion as N8 -- it's on its way), and in 2021. These reflect some of the prevailing thought from inside the Beltway on our future, and deserve a close read. Force 2001 is based on realigning existing capabilities to meet current/near-term needs, while Force 2021 is dependent on new materiel and concepts. Read carefully -- look for ideas, and not just at the specifics. The specifics include things like the floating airbase concept Rich Dodson and I expressed a disagreement with in these pages a while back, so it's fairly obvious I don't necessarily like everything those chapters contain. What's important is to look at the broad brush, and how the Admiral views the requirements and resources picture for the future.
Bottom line: I'll say it again, a must read!! The thought process is the key -- watch how it flows smoothly from one point to another. Draw your own conclusions about the specifics, but read the book and understand the paradigm -- it's a window to the future of the maritime services.
BOOK REVIEW
HIGH SEAS: THE NAVAL PASSAGE TO AN UNCHARTED WORLD BY ADMIRAL WILLIAM A. OWENS
REVIEW BY J.A. GHERLONE, JR., LT, USN 6 JULY 1995
Introduction
I've referred to myself more than once as a "career paranoid," a character trait which has the disadvantage of making one seem unduly pessimistic at times. It is probably this factor which leaves me vaguely unsettled when reading Admiral Owens' High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World (USNI Press; 1995; 184 pgs.; $27.95). Don't get me wrong, I would call the book a must-read for junior officers. The thought process regarding the future and the flow- down of ideas is a sophisticated tool for understanding both the current chaos and the future of the maritime forces. What inspires my latent paranoia is the underlying assumptions on which he bases his future view, his willingness to accept high technology as an omnipotent force in warfare, and his pervasive confidence about many of the most unpredictable issues of the future.
ADM Owens presents in this work a combination of his own thought on the future of the maritime services, and the policy shaping process in the Department of the Navy (DoN) in which he participated as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfighting Requirements and Assessment (N8). He begins by detailing his view of the changes in the world since the end of the Cold War, and their significance to National Security. From this he flows the impacts into operational changes, and thence to force structure.
His thought process is impressive. He has obviously put much thought into the changes wrought by the demise of the bipolar superpower standoff and what it will mean for our National Security. He has an ordered, logical method of developing the important concepts and developing a feel for what they will mean -- it is worth emulating. What bothers me are some of his initial assumptions.
The introduction contains seven underlying assumptions (and one he does not label as such), and I can only concur with about half of them. The unlabeled assumption is that the Navy's "doctrine" was a "failure" in Desert Storm. We did leave the Gulf without the feeling, common among the other services, that our doctrine had been vindicated. I'm tired of hearing this argument in such a negative sense, however. We had no written doctrine of response and presence, but it was what we did, and have done for 50 years. The fact that Saddam Hussein made the strategic error of allowing us unlimited time to prepare does not negate the utility in other circumstances of having maritime forces ready to counter a smarter aggressor. In terms of detailed procedures, such as the ATO and JFACC, we did something more important than justifying our doctrine -- we adapted and succeeded!! We identified the interoperability disconnects, and found solutions for them. I think that is the more important lesson -- to expect those and work to kill off as many of the nits as possible beforehand while developing ways to quickly kill the others in real time. Admiral Owens initial assumptions are all based on these "failures" and the "significant changes" to our operational mindset, but I think what we need to recognize is that we've simply formalized and reemphasized the presence and joint operations roles we've had since the end of World War II. During the Cold War, we allowed the war at sea to become the dominant factor, at times giving short shrift to other critical capabilities (i.e. amphibious operations and mine warfare), we need to remember that, and ensure that we don't allow the pendulum to swing so far that we lose sight of sea control and SLOC protection now that our emphasis is closer to shore.
This caveat issued, I would call particular attention to the first and second chapters in which he discusses deterrence and use of force. This is the real stuff -- he has a definitive outlook on the New World Disorder and its implications for both enemy and own force actions. While the underlying assumptions skew many of the particulars in later chapters from that which I would have written, these sections and the general structure that flows down from them are an elegant statement of the calculus of force and operations for the modern age.
The next sections discuss the importance of high tech solutions to the Armed Forces, and to the maritime services in particular. I agree that high technology is important, but it seems as if the Admiral is willing to bet everything on a technological advantage that could evaporate overnight for any number of reasons. If some other nation exploits a technology we have overlooked, our "high tech advantage" means little, but the confidence expressed in our unassailable edge seems unshakable. Likewise, there are many low tech counters to our high tech capabilities -- we must avoid tunnel vision into the high technology world.
Another key section is that on the R3B in Chapter 6. His description and opinions about the matrix process developed by him and his staff in N8 is a presentation of a problem-solving method for a very difficult problem -- changing the balance of power in the requirements world to reflect warfighting requirements more and the needs of the "barons" less. They did an amazing job in a very short time, and how they did it is need-to-know information.
The last two chapters are his visualizations of our force in 2001 (a vision he put in motion as N8 -- it's on its way), and in 2021. These reflect some of the prevailing thought from inside the Beltway on our future, and deserve a close read. Force 2001 is based on realigning existing capabilities to meet current/near-term needs, while Force 2021 is dependent on new materiel and concepts. Read carefully -- look for ideas, and not just at the specifics. The specifics include things like the floating airbase concept Rich Dodson and I expressed a disagreement with in these pages a while back, so it's fairly obvious I don't necessarily like everything those chapters contain. What's important is to look at the broad brush, and how the Admiral views the requirements and resources picture for the future.
Bottom line: I'll say it again, a must read!! The thought process is the key -- watch how it flows smoothly from one point to another. Draw your own conclusions about the specifics, but read the book and understand the paradigm -- it's a window to the future of the maritime services.
Displaying 1 of 1 review