Professor Strange is known for her unorthodox views on the international political economy. Here, she provides the student and scholar with a new model synthesizing politics and economics by means of a four-faceted structural analysis of the effects of any kind of political authority (including states) on markets and, conversely, of market forces on states. This framework of analysis should serve as an introductory text.
Susan Strange was a British scholar of international relations who was "almost single-handedly responsible for creating international political economy".
Susan Strange earned a first in Economics at the London School of Economics (LSE) in 1943; it would be twenty years before she established her reputation as an academic. She raised a family of six and worked as a financial journalist for The Economist, then The Observer until 1965, when she began to conduct full-time research.
In 1942, she married Denis Merritt (died 1993); they had one son, and one daughter, and the marriage was dissolved in 1955. In 1955 she married Clifford Selly, with whom she had three sons, and one daughter.
She was a major figure in the professional associations in both Britain and the United States. She was an instrumental founding member and the first treasurer of the British International Studies Association and served as the third female President of the International Studies Association in 1995.
I had been reading IR books looking for a theory to frame a case-study and Strange's work was perfect. I love it when a theory of everything works out.
Strange asserts that nation-state and the corresponding financial market are flawed and not working and demands for an international government while Dicken is deeply suspicious of international strategic alliances and prefer the TNC and the market forces themselves. Dicken emphasizes the world paradigm through the economic lens as the determining factor that created new geographic activities and other political patterns. While Strange emphasizes on the social and cultural aspect and the perpetuation of the dominance of global hegemony and the inherent problem within the economic and financial system. As Susan Strange claims, in States and Markets, that governmental structure and the financial system, market forces and academic narrations are constantly interacting with each other and cannot could never be analysed with only one factor alone. Strange argues that the Westphalia system is a failure because the market is irrational especially concerning environmental protection, and performance on financial markets. Additionally the current system is allowing the aggregating development of the polarity between the power nations and the relatively powerless ones in the international arena. Strange argues that world’s political powers exerts itself through structural configuration by determining the rules and frameworks of the organizations and corporations. There are four major sources of pillars of the building of power according to Strange: security, production, credit and knowledge. Therefore we could be inferred that whoever who have military might, a.k.a. provide security, who have economic momentum and productivity, whoever has a certain accumulation of wealth of the past economic production, and who occupies the front of advanced technology and knowledge are in the dominant position of global power paradigm. Whoever is in the dominant position of the global power paradigm could control authoritative narration of the interpretation of the world itself. Strange coined the term “casino capitalism” In retrospect, her book “Mad Money” was written in the late 90s yet she has the vision to see the potential problems lies within the American financial system rooted in the Reagan era and observed an explosion of the derivatives market where banks are undertaking increasingly risky behavior for blind profit chasing under little regulation. In the famous book of the price of inequality by Joseph Stiglitz, the author raise the similar point raised by Strange ten years before the crisis that the system constructed under the neoliberalist school under the Reagan regime created a system that disproportionately redistribute wealth from the vast majority of people to the tiny few at the top of the pyramid. Although Strange identifies herself as a realist, I find Strange’s ideology close to that of Gramsci’s constructivism. Gramsci raised the idea of cultural hegemony, which is similar to Strange’s fourth point on power on how the state could maintain its dominant position in world’s financial and economic market through its cultural and technological dominance. “The bourgeoisie developed a hegemonic culture, which propagated its own values and norms so that they became the "common sense" values of all.” Similar to Strange, Gramsci also rejected the notion of only analysing one aspect such as the economic factor or the military might in isolation for a state’s power relationship in International Political Economy. Gramsci advocates for a union of all the soft and hard power as a “historic bloc” that forms the basis of legitimacy of its intellectual and political leadership role. Thereby reproducing its own dominant cultural hegemony position. Strange is more specific than Gramsci in advancing the claim that world need functioning international authorities because the nation-state created under the Westphalian system is not working. Gramsci proposed the similar idea before that a political superstructure is needed to perpetuate the dominance of the current economic power relationships of the dominance of the hegemonic power. However Strange did realized the problem in her book even in the 90s that the nation-states are all unwilling to entrust part of their sovereign power to an international bureaucrats. Her observations in the book are all provisions and even prophesies of what happened in the 2008 financial crisis, Strange would argue for the discrimination against the organizations and states at the relatively periphery of the political superstructure built by the dominance powers, however Dicken would argue those players are too poor in themselves to be a good participate in the global economy. One thing Dicken did not examine in his economic analysis though, is the effect of the globalization on the polarization of wealth distribution between developed and developing world and within the developed world itself which Stiglitz did after the 2008 financial crisis and proves Strange’s prophesy. Similar to Strange, Stiglitz argues that inequality is self-perpetuating enabled by the hegemonic political system. Similar to Dicken, Stiglitz also does not believe that technological forces are itself a factor in the gigantic economic inequality. While admitting that free market is beneficial for global economy however he calls for proper governmental regulation as proposed earlier by Strange. Following the legacy of Dicken, Stiglitz also warns about the proper behavior of TNC and the potential problem of dense concentration of market power within a few powerful TNCs.
Strange was called as "a loner" rather than "a groupie" by Robert W. Cox. I completely agree with that statement. Albeit she was put under realist perspectives in IRs, her unique approach toward subject matter in IRs is her trade mark in this academic field (Look at Griffiths, 2000).
Buku yang menyelamatkan seorang alumni HI Unpad dari masuk kategori jelek. Piss kanggo Sesepuh...:D
Nggak juga dink, kebetulan aja selamat karena memang skripsinya soal IPE. Coba tanya buku yang lain, pasti saya akan menembang lagu Ebiet G. Ade tentang rumput yang bergoyang. :D
Suka dengan Strange yang mantan wartawan dan skema di bab akhir buku ini. Di sini Strange menentang pendapat HST dari the declining perspectives. Selain juga banyak paper dia yang lain. Jawaban dia melalui skema itu adalah penurunan kekuatan power itu tidak terjadi di seluruh bidang, lagi pun masih dapat digugat dengan interpretasi atas data perdangangan yang digadang-gadangkan oleh the declining perspectives.
Salut buat Ibu yang telah berpulang ini, untuk kebersikukuhannya di antara banyak sarjana lain. She is strange indeed. In a good way though!
Hard to take too seriously a book that repeats ad nauseam that it has "no opinion" and is just "asking questions" and "providing analytic tools for everyone" even as it says almost nothing positive and in fact contains only negative sentiments about leftists, Marxism, and socialism. Perhaps this can be explained as it being simply an artifact of its time (1988, 1994)? My jaw genuinely dropped when she pondered aloud how and why capitalism, globalism, and the USA developed and "won out" with ZERO mention of chattel slavery or triangular trade -- which to me is *the* answer to her questions. (In fact, she only mentions slavery *once* in this tome on "states and markets" and it is to mention how western governments/economics led by banning it.) This willful (she's too smart for it to be ignorant) blindness occurs over and over throughout the tome to hedge, cover and distract from her theory's (and capitalism's and the market's) weak points. There's some good starting framework analysis here one can use to map out ways that power relates to itself and each other, but Strange avoids anything that could undercuts her ideology and her analysis is worse off for it.
For someone credited with founding the academic field of IPE, I'm not convinced Strange added much that the structural marxists of the 1960s hadn't already said (albeit in less accessible, swallowable language). Can't help but think that Strange presents structural marxist arguments for people uncomfortable with the idea of marxism.
If I had read this book back in the 1980s, I would have given it a 5-star rating. However, some of the details in the later chapters of this book seem outdated or simply too common-sense for a reader in 2023. Despite this, the book still serves as an excellent introduction to political economy and does an admirable job of inspiring students to explore further into various disciplines and power structures within the field of political economy as discussed in later literature.
The most relevant sections of the book for today's readers are undoubtedly the prologue and Part I, which offer a comprehensive overview of Strange's approach to the subject. Strange defines international political economy as the study of "social, political, and economic arrangements affecting the global systems of production, exchange, and distribution, as well as the mix of values reflected therein.” She uses an intriguing example of three lifeboats crashing into different parts of an isolated island, leading to the formation of vastly different societies based on variations in resource distribution, surrounding conditions, and other factors (depending on where they landed on the island). This example effectively illustrates how states may prioritize differently (e.g., wealth vs. security vs. freedom) and how a state with superior power may seek to shape the global political economy according to its own priorities. If you are a newcomer to the fields of international relations and political economy, as I was, I highly recommend that you at least read the prologue of this book for this insightful example.
States and Markets by Susan Strange offers a profound analysis of the complex relationship between government power and economic forces in the globalized world. Strange's work focuses on how the interplay between states (governments) and markets (private and public enterprises) shapes the international political economy. One of the book's most significant contributions is its critique of the neoliberal view that markets should be left largely to self-regulate. Strange argues that markets do not function in isolation but are instead deeply influenced by state policies and actions, particularly in terms of regulating, enabling, or constraining market behavior. The author underscores the importance of understanding the power dynamics at play between these two forces, highlighting the growing influence of multinational corporations and the decline of the state's ability to control market forces in the age of globalization. This is particularly relevant in discussions around labor practices, such as whether workers should be depot pay weekly or biweekly, as it touches on the larger issues of market regulation and the role of the state in ensuring fair compensation structures. This book provides a critical framework for examining how international finance, trade, and regulatory systems interact, offering valuable insights for both political economists and policymakers. While some of the language may be dense for a general audience, the book is an essential read for anyone interested in the intersection of global economics and political power.