Pakistan occupies a paradoxical, even contradictory place in American foreign policy. Nominally a strategic ally in the war on terror, it is the third-largest recipient of US aid in the world. At the same time, it is run by its military and intelligence service—whose goals certainly do not always overlap with US priorities.
This book offers a close look at what the rise of the military has meant for Pakistani society. Ayesha Siddiqa shows how entrenched the military has become, not just in day-to-day governance, but in the Pakistani corporate sector as well. What are the consequences of this unprecedented merging of the military and corporate sectors? What does it mean for Pakistan’s economic development—let alone for hopes of an eventual return to democracy and de-militarization? This new edition brings Siddiqa’s account fully up to date with a new preface and conclusion that emphasize the changing role of the media.
Milbus refers to military capital that is used for the personal benefit of the military fraternity especially the officer cadre but is neither recorded nor part of the defence budget.
Milbus in Pakistan is part of the tribute that the military extracts for providing services such as national security. The exploitation of national resources by the elite is a result of the peculiar nature of the precapitalist politico-economic system. The deliberate concealment of Milbus is meant to project the military as being more honest and less corrupt than civilian players.
Milbus compromises of two broad but distinct set of activities: 1. Profit making through the privatization of security - this trend is mostly followed by the developed economies 2. Military engagement in non-traditional roles such as farming or running businesses like hotels, airlines, banks or real estate agencies - this occurs mainly in developing economies
The businesses run by the four foundations: the Fauji Foundation, Army Welfare Trust, Shaheed Trust and Bahria Foundation are very diverse in nature, ranging from small scale ventures such as bakeries, farms, schools and private security farms to corporate enterprises, such as commercial banks, insurance companies, radio and television channels, fertilizers, cement and cereal manufacturing plants. The Fauji Foundation and the Army Welfare Trust are the largest business conglomerates in the country.
Over the 72 years of Pakistan's history, the army has experienced direct power four times and learnt to negotiate authority when not directly in control of the government. Pervez Musharraf formed the National Security Council in 2004 and transformed the status of the military from being an instrument of policy to an awesomely powerful organization that could protect its interests as an equal member of the ruling elite.
Milbus is both politically and socially expensive. Politically it nurtures the military's power ambitions and socially it reduces the society's acceptability of the military as an arbitrator and increases the alienation of the underprivileged, the dispossessed and the have nots.
Military rules takes 3 forms: 1. Personal - the political system is dominated by the dictator who distributes restrictively along his sycophants 2. Oligarchic - the ruling class relies on support of an otherwise autonomous military institution 3. Corporatist - the institutional involvement of the military in politics and governance
Pakistan's politics have had a highly elitist nature because the ruling elite tried to partner with the military to pursue their political and economic interests. The civil military bureaucracy played a key role in giving birth to the indigenous bourgeoisie or the business-industrialist class which formed part of the dominant elite. All military regimes create clients which act as the civilian face of the military and legitimize the military's control and are nourished by the defense establishment for the times when the bulk of the military has to withdraw to the barracks. The military basically replaced one set of corrupt politicians with another in order to sustain its own power base.
The main controlling authority for the defence establishment is the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The MoD controls four main planks of Milbus: the Service Headquarters, the Department of Military Land and Cantonment (ML), the FF and the Rangers (a paramilitary force). Other institutions such as the National Logistic Cell (NLC), The Frontier Work Organization and the Special Communications Organization are controlled by the army.
NLC instead of revitalizing the Pakistan Railways which had until the creation of the military transport company been the main cargo transporter in the country. The creation of NLC was not a case of privatizing cargo transport but of shifting work from one public sector institution to another and hence creating a duplication of efforts.
The blatant use of intelligence agencies to manipulate and overthrow governments had left civilian governments too insecure to challenge the military's involvement in business. The Accountability Ordinance passed by Musharraf precluded the military and judiciary from being questioned under the new accountability rules, because the military have their own accountability procedures.
Military feudalism denotes a set of economic and political relations and a pattern of social behavior. The monopolization and control of land is understood as a symbol of power which adds to the powerful image of the armed forces. Military uses three methods for acquiring and developing housing schemes: 1. Houses constructed on state land 2. Private land appropriated with or without enough compensation and developed into housing schemes by military subsidiaries 3. Private land acquired by DHAs, the management of which falls under the purview of the Army GHQ
Investment in real estate became rampant after 9/11 and also during the Afghan War when there was an extraordinary flow of dollars in Pakistan as aid. People have greater faith in investing in military-controlled schemes because there are fewer instances of fraud than in civilian schemes. Military personnel attribute this to their indisputable capacity for discipline and better management.
Pakistan's military welfare system is based on two distinct models 1. Fauji Foundation Model - the conservative method of providing health, educational and employment facilities to retired personnel and their dependents 2. The Army Welfare Trust Model - formed on the principle of generating profit to buy additional welfare for armed forces personnel and to provide post-retirement employment for retired personnel
This system might serve the interests of the armed forces personnel and help the organization retain better quality staff but it has substantial socio-political costs. The four foundations were established under the Charitable Endowment Act 1890, hence the accounts of these foundations are not audited by the government's prime accounting agency the Auditor General of Pakistan, therefore correct estimates about their loss/profit are unknown. On the other hand, AWT was thrice (1997,1999 and 2001) given financial aid from the government despite it falling under the private sector.
Milbus as a whole is a unknown territory as not much data is available hence it is not discussed much. Ayesha Siddiqa was brave enough to write about it. Though the book was quite repetitive but the information was mindbogglingly new for me.
Stephen Cohen defines the Pakistan army succinctly, there are three types of armies that guard their nation's borders, there are those that are concerned by protecting their own position in society, and there are those which defend a cause or an idea. The Pakistan army does all three. Islamic Pakistan was defined in reaction to a Hindu India. Another interesting observation is that the Army was sort of encouraged by Jinnah to act independently when he was convinced into receding his earlier order of attacking Kashmir in 1947 by the British COAS. Notice India still had a British governor general, thus avoiding any friction in carrying out orders. Coming from an army background myself, there was little I didn't know of Pakistan Army's business ventures, but the book still provided a comprehensive breakdown of the huge numbers involved. Milbus has managed to create a new class of urban feudal class in Pakistan, one which seems even lucrative to the legacy feudal of the rural variety. I found the book very difficult to digest as it reads like a PhD dissertation crammed with heavy stats, numbers and pretty boring facts. Ayesha could have masse the book a lot more interesting by introducing some candid interviews of army personal who do make very interesting interviewees.
Extremely dry, but equally mind-blowing. The book has a very detailed explanation and well-substantiated account of financial hegemony in the Pakistan Military. From corn flakes to Urea products, education sector to transportation, housing schemes to running commercial enterprises, stealing river water to having stud farms, is there LITERALLY any pie the military hasn't its finger in? Even military awards are linked with the grant of farm lands and housing plots to military personnel. The jarring banners carried by lawyers during their march in 2007, how cleverly put it into perspective.
Ae watan ke sajeele Genrailo; saaray raqbey tumhare liye hain (O’ handsome generals of the homeland, all the plots are just for you)
I think the book is a very courageous effort, no matter how difficult it is to read.
According to Francis Fukuyama, colonial powers left three institutions in former colonies as a legacy after decolonization, namely bureaucracy, military and democracy. The bureaucracy and military was strengthened by the colonial governments in order to maintain a strong control over domestic environment. Democracy however did not flourish and people were not used to self-government. After decolonization, the nascent states had strong institutions of bureaucracy and military while the democracy was relatively a weaker institution. This lead to a strong grip of the former two institutions on state of affairs in the decolonized states, whereas the democratic institutions were not as developed as in the case of West. Building upon this, Ayesha Siddiqa explains the concept of military’s influence and control over the economy of a country She coins the term Milbus, which “refers to military capital that is used for the personal benefit of the military fraternity”. This capital is not included in the defence budget of armed forces. It is also called the internal economy of the military. Author includes senior military officers, retired officers and the civilians who are dependent upon military-business associations in military fraternity. The author thus defines the functioning of Milbus and concludes that it is predatory in nature and its primary purpose is to benefit the officer cadre of armed forces. The extent of penetration of military in economic affairs of a state decides the political power of military in that certain state. She then describes Milbus in three types of states and takes the case of Milbus in Pakistan afterwards. In description of Milbus in Pakistan, the author have described the history of Milbus, its evolution and expansion, development of military as a separate class, the elements of Milbus in Pakistan namely the land acquisitions, welfare foundations and corporates owned by the armed forces. She also assesses the cost of Milbus on Pakistan’s budget and economy and describes the future prospects of Milbus and Pakistan. The definition of term Milbus is an excellent effort by Ayesha Siddiqa to lay down a framework of research in the military economy. She has not limited the extent of Milbus to Pakistan but also categorized it in different levels of states. It can serve as a sound basis for further research work in military economy of Pakistan, as well as of other countries around the world. The analysis of Milbus in Pakistan gives an enlightening account of military’s control over the economic affairs of country and thus on the political environment as well. It is a taboo topic in Pakistan and the author has carried out a very well initiative for research on this topic and have also provided basis for further research. After understanding the interestingly laid out central idea of book i.e. Milbus, the reader expects the book to go forth in an engaging manner. To his disappointment, however, the book gets dry and hard to keep up with in the chapters proceeding the theoretical concept of Milbus. Many of the ideas and opinions regarding the Milbus in Pakistan are repetitive. One of the facts that was hard to grasp was to whom she was referring to at moments because she used the term ‘military’ as a collective term for all of the forces. It would have been easier to understand to which part of the military she was referring at times. Also, there is no order and coherence in description of different ideas in a single chapter. So, for instance, the author moves from discussing armed forces’ welfare trusts to the land acquisitions and then moves back to discussing the welfare trusts, only to start discussing the corporates owned by armed forces. Another major drawback, in our opinion, was with the statistical data presented in the book. The author claimed to have acquired a good amount of data and statistics for this research, which is not easily available in general. But looking into the statistics, most of them are confined to the time between 1995 and 2007, even more between 1997 to 2003. While the Milbus has been operating much earlier. Also, the variables presented in statistics and the patterns between and among them are not satisfactorily defined by the author. The book is effective in coining the concept of Milbus but it is is hard to carry on with consistency. Also, the writing style is ineffective and incoherent. This book is not recommended for general readership. A general reader who doesn’t have any special interest in the topic of this book will find it hard to read this book. Even those with interest in military may find it difficult to keep up with. Only those who are keenly interested in the military economy of South Asia may read it.
Overall, an educating read. But one that doesn't leave impressions as far as quality of research and analysis is concerned. Seems like an hurriedly published work.
The last line of the 2017 edition epilogue is "The soft martial law is here to stay". I couldn't agree more. In terms of a good leader, Pakistan has been out of luck after Jinnah. Founding father wanted a moderate, liberal and progressive country for Muslims of sub-continent and also for minorities as well. But that didn't suit us. We, the authoritarian and feudal type illiterate and ignorant people, couldn't stand none of those principles. That's exactly what happened after Jinnah, just stay with me. Jinnah left us in 1948 when Pakistan was just one year old. An infant soon to be spoiled and exploited by every thug and lout whether in uniform or not but that comes later. Oh my country I feel sorry for you and all the people who sacrificed for you. So the so-called civilian leaders/bureaucrats started a power struggle and in between forgot to make a constitution till 1956. Just some lousy 1949 resolution based on 1935. They couldn't even decide who was to lead so there were six prime ministers from 1951-1957 and then the martial law was imposed. While the public just watched in awe what was happening still having faith in their great country for which they fought and struggled so hard. But they are just public who cares about them. Only the elite. Iskander Mirza, the then President who imposed Martial Law, hoped that his friend General Ayub will stand by him and together they will lead the country with string each. Either he was so stupid that he didn't understand what attraction the 'power' has or more stupid to trust on such a friend. And then the General threw the friend out of the club and took over the country. Now military started building institutional strength and systematic importance in the country. Stint in Kashmir in 1965 which led to a war but we didn't stop there. We did same in 1999 but that comes later.
From its inception, Pak Army has managed to sell the rhetoric of 'A National Savior' in external and internal matters. Now there was political vacuum provided by incompetency of politicians cum bureaucrats after Jinnah's demise and Army was there to save the country but not to serve the country rather to serve itself. Gen Ayub did introduce some famous land reforms but they were just a sham. How could he anger the power land feudal class by introducing land reforms which were introduced in India in 50s. I wouldn't if I wanted to stay in power. So they say"but if you want to test a man's character, give him power" dont know whether it is relevant or not but who cares.
So after the war General became Field Marshal and president. I forgot to mention 1962 presidential constitution as the 1956 one was cancelled or whatever in 1958. So now the president field marshal has everything except control over fate and time. Both are strange and funny. At that time 22 families owned a huge chunk of country assets lets say 70%. The economy was growing so was the inequality and then there were some custom officials' mishandling of the students which led to protests and death of one student. Army had to save its face by changing the facade. Finally Ayub Khan left office and also left Yahya Khan in the office who was famous for interesting things. Up till now Fauji Foundation, AWT and FWO were already up and running. Military was gaining strength politically and economically. Hopes were high for good things to come for some. Then 1971 came with a lot of action. General Elections were held and Awami League won which was unacceptable for West Pakistani leaders especially Ayub Khan's protege Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. He lobbied for no power transfer to Mujib-ur-Rehman, leader of Awami League. The General Assembly session to be held in Dhaka kept on getting delayed. People in East Pakistan, already aware of their lowly treatment by West Pakistanis, started coming on streets demandinig for independence if not for transfer of power. Yahya ordered army to strike and things go messy which made the EPs even stronger. India took advantage of the situation and our great Army had to surrender with 90000 military personnel. Bad time for Army. Bad time for Pakistan as it losts it Eastern Wing.
Finally it was realized that it was better to transfer the power to civilian government. Zulfiqar Bhutto's hunger for power was satisfied.New constitution came in 1973 which has survived till now with 25 amendments. He started a populist movement with 'roti kapra and makaan' as its slogan. Poor people liked him for his socialist thought. He nationalized all the great companies. Making people unhappy. Tried to bring military under civilian government. Making more people, now in uniform, unhappy. The time was relatively better for development of democracy but who wants that. So in 1977 Gen Zia declared Martial Law and put a stop to Bhutto and his politics and ultimately his life. The same year Shaheen Foundation was also established by PAF being not satisfied by the Fauji Foundation. Bahria Foundation was established in 1982. Both were established under Charitable Endowment Act 1890 which makes them free from any accountability. So the MILBUS was flourishing. Also after the completion of Korakoram Highway in 1979, FWO remained, to be used in case of emergency. National Logistics Cell was established in 1978. Not going in detail about all these organizations. It would be better to read the book as the author has done excellent research especially looking at the power of the organizations. No wonder she is called traitor. The so-called traitors. Author needs not to worry as she has joined an elite intellectual club of people who speak against authority and suffer just for the betterment of the society. History is full of examples. So coming back to Zia. It was a time of so called Jihad we were fighting on behalf of Americans who were showering money and wepons on us in response. The dictator utilized the Afghan War fully for his political advantage. Mullahs and their parties were standing with him and so were the Americans who are supposed to promote democracy at all times. Eighth Amendment was passed in 1985 which gave the President unilateral power to dissolve the National Assembly. Zia died in mysterious air crash in 1988. He couldn't use the power of aforementioned amendment when it became very popular in 90s. Zia gave birth to PML(N) and MQM to counter PPP. Military was infiltrating in all parts of the state. Zia's successor Gen Aslam Beg decided to let the civilians run the show for now. The next ten years was clown show resulting from the power Military had gained and the eighth amendment. First came PPP in 88, then PML (N) in 91, then PPP again in 93, then again PML (N) in 96 and then again dictatorship in 99. Great. Back to where started. 1999 was a tough year due to Kargil issue. Nawaz Sharif was angry at Gen Musharraf, then COAS, for not letting him in on Kargil Plan. He wanted to appoint a new chief. Actually he had appointed once Musharraf was away on a visit in Sri Lanka. So coup was what happened in the end. You can read the whole story at many places. So military in power again. This time they will make sure that they have a say in strategic and important decisions if they ever want to hand over the govt back to civilians. Musharraf started NAB to counter politicians not corruption. He established National Security Committee which was a very big achievement. He did a rigged referendum in 02 for presidency. He also remained COAS. He had the support from America who are supposed to support democracy at all times. Actually it was due to War on Terror launched in Afghanistan after 9/11. America needed help of Musharraf just like during Zia tenure. Musharraf also tried to solve the Kashmir with Indians by going out of the way which must have given him a bad name among the military. Musharraf also gave freedom to Media which will turn sour for him and later very sweet for Army. By the end of his tenure, military was into every part of the government. Also people including journalists started disappearing during Musharraf's time for various reasons. In 2007, after lawyers protest on his decision to remove the Chief Justice, Musharraf had to step aside. It took a lot of convincing to make him step aside. The epilogue of the book under subject gives a very interesting account of his tenure. One more thing, he also promoted MQM which later Army had to crush through a Rangers operation. Till the next time. From here Army decided to stop being in government and start governance. Psychological warfare has proved to be a friend of Army. Use of media and social media by ISPR, ISI etc. The sudden disappearance of journalists and other people who speak up is a result of such governance. It is quite clear in Pakistan if you have the eyes and will to see. Military is hailed as savior, respectful and honest profession. Yes if they stay to profession maybe. Many issues are never discussed on media which might give a bad image of military. Like the land grabbing from poor people at numerous places. Military controls the narrative.
Military is a sacred profession entrusted with the task of defending the country when threatened. But when the military is used by individuals for nefarious agendas, military will become a predatory institution. Military being the savior of poor people, who see military with most respect, becomes their oppressor. The author has put forward a daring work. I see many people even the military personnel realizing the consequences of MILBUS as well. Highly recommended book for people of Pakistan especially military personnel. And finally I would like to thank the author for enlightening us.
This was my first such a lengthy review. I have not done editing so just bear with it
Hmmm…..i don’t know…it leaves a lot to be desired. there was too much repetition of the same points over and over again which I felt was just to prolong it enough to call it a book. It could have easily been shrunk into an essay. Like one reviewer mentioned, had she included short interviews of retired officials it would have made an interesting read. It seemed like an amalgamation of few books that she read for her research to write this one. Yes, there were stats, tables and diagrams but it still left me disappointed because I expected this book to enhance my understanding as a layman which sadly it didn’t.
Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy by Ayesha Siddiqa is a book that explores the powerful and extensive influence of Pakistan's military on the country's economy.
Here's a simple breakdown:
Main Idea: The book examines how Pakistan's military isn't just about defense and security. It also runs many businesses and has significant economic power.
Key Points:
Military-Owned Businesses: The military owns and controls a wide range of businesses, from farms and factories to banks and construction companies.
Economic Impact: These military-owned enterprises contribute significantly to Pakistan's economy, but they also create an imbalance where the military's interests can overshadow those of the civilian population.
Power Dynamics: The military's economic activities increase its power and influence in politics and society, often leading to a lack of transparency and accountability. Consequences:
Imbalance: The military's dominance in the economy can hinder civilian economic growth and democratic governance.
Transparency Issues: Military businesses often operate without the same level of scrutiny as civilian businesses, leading to potential corruption and inefficiency.
Overall, the book sheds light on the hidden economic empire of Pakistan's military and its implications for the country's development and governance.
Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy is a book written by Ayesha Siddiqa about the role of Pakistan’s military in statecraft and economy. The book offers a detailed account on how military became the bedrock of Pakistan’s polity and the roles it played during her 70+ years - short history. With pervasive explanations, Ayesha Siddiqa shows how poached the military has become in Pakistan’s corporate sector and governance. With having these important knowledge about Pakistan one can presume that the country is far behind becoming a true democracy in the near future. As long as the military controls every step of life in Pakistan the civilians have to bribe the Generals to uphold their foot on political power. Without sharing a large part of the cake, it becomes impossible to run the country with democratic and civilized agendas as military has abandoned leverages to challenge civil governments. I recommend this book to ones who are interested to know Pakistan and its future.
Very well researched and well thought book. The author has really given quite an effort while writing this book. No wonder why the book has been banned in the country when it was first published. A real eye opener as well.
I started reading the book back in April 2017, and it took me some 13 days less than a year to complete the first forty percent of the book. And in those 13 days afterwards, I was done with the entire book. It wasn't a straight read, of course, I dropped it, and picked it couple of times in between. But the major reason that kept discouraging me everytime I would pick the book up was the content in that part, which was not only extremely technical, but also poorly served.
It was a hurdle after hurdle. As if the author herself didn't want more people to read. After I had successfully fought the introduction of the book (the first twenty percent), in came the historical part. I don't know whether the author had more interest in writing history of Pakistan or discussing Milbus (Military Businesse - The main topic of the book), because this was the part that only had the political history narrated all the way from the independence uptil 2005. And this is just that first forty percent of the book I am talking about, the main content hadn't even arrived yet.
Moving on in the book, except a chapter on the 'structure of Milbus,' the history makes a return once again, for two more torturous chapters. Now in this part, the history was told from the perspective of the main topic of the book, and had the first spell of general history not been there, I would have enjoyed this part since it told the history from the prism of Milbus. But because there were a lot of repetitions occurring, it just kept frustrating me.
The actual book starts when you are already about 66 percent into it. And this part had genuinely interesting information regarding Pakistan military's economic ventures. Interesting I say in terms of the information that was there. There presentation remained frustratingly weak throughout.
Although, a lot of accounts were quite eye opening, a lot of others lacked informational depth. Plus, the book had a lot of inconsistencies, a name would suddenly pop out of nowhere with a quote, with no explanation on the profile of that name given. Also, the fact that the book associates almost all the ills in the country; from its birth till the current day, with the ever expanding Milbus, the analysis looked one dimensional and at lot of times illogical. One funny thing about the book was the fact that at various occasions, the author's own published articles in dailies were presented or reffered to in the book as independent sources (you would have to keep a keen eye on the "Notes" section), and at many other instances it seemed as if the author wanted her own words or conclusion to come out of a particular source's words.
Besides all its downs (which weigh way more than its ups), I would commend the author to take a bold step to start an argument on the subject (however badly handled it maybe). Milbus is without any doubt a menace and must be curbed, and this book was at least a start in that process.
Ayesha Siddiqa maybe an authority on the subject, a bold one, sure, but she isn't a good author. Reading the last chapter of the new edition that discussed how military controls and manages media and its image building, I wondered if it really is all truth, which it maybe, why does this book keep selling in Pakistani bookstores and hasn't been banned yet? Then I realised that probably the men in boots too had read the book and would have thought, 'meh. It's a bad book any way.'
After the first edition of the book was published, Pakistan Army had released it's own paper in response to it. Now that I am done with this book, I will read that as well, and try to understand both sides of the picture. While a lot of the things in this analysis do make a lot of sense, and cannot possibly have a defensive argument on, a lot of it falls flat, and with Army's response out there, I believe the truth for those parts may lie somewhere in between.
A very interesting read. Gives an insight into the way Pak Army wields power in that country. The economic clout wielded by Pak Army has been covered in great amount of detail.
This book combined with Christine Fair's 'Fighting to the End' gives a rounded picture of the Pakistan Army, which though priding itself as standing as a bulwark against its enemies is actually taking the country on the road to perdition. It is vital for the Army to have a stake in controlling the country as its venality is dependent on it. The Author clearly brings out how the Army has got its tentacles into nearly every commercial enterprise of the country at a decided advantage. Its generals are all multi millionaires and would be the last to rock the boat. It's a credit to its professionalism that it remains effective and has not turned the country into a banana republic. However the trends are clear and a major shock may well destroy its edifice
An insightful look into the depth of the Pakistan military's interference into the country's economy. The book itself sometimes is hard to get through due to numerous facts and tables and numbers presented, but the payout is worth it. The reader will leave with plenty of information about the military's economic interests and how political power has been manipulated over the country's history to facilitate economic profits for the military.
well!this is a book seen through the spectacles of an economist cum think tank to military as a machine where it is working as a parasite on economy of a common man. categorizing the largest armies of the world in terms of their size and damage they are doing to a market of common men. i term it a biased and belligerent effort against the national cause and various issues pertinent to the great game,i might b bit exasperating.
An excellent and daring piece of work concerning the political and economic working of Pakistan Military. Although at a point it seems quiet boring because of all the minor details covered and repitition of the same things over and over again.
Every country has an army and Pakistan army has a country becomes clear after this. This book shows how the civilian government is just a face saving and the real power lies with the Army
I wanted to write a long lengthy review of this book. I wanted to add every little act of corruption. I wanted everyone to know. But then I realized it would be too lengthy.
The basic idea of this book is Milbus. Milbus is a capital earned by the Military by their economic ventures and businesses. This money is not part of defense budget and is completely off the books. It's beyond accountability of the government, neither NAB nor auditor general can audit it. In other words it is Money earned by corrupt means by top officers.
This book is divided in 12 chapters. Which explains, how milbus is earned, why it is earned, how it is multiplied. How it affects the country and the civilians.
There are many organizations run by the Military, AWT, FF, FWO, BF, etc. since these are considered trusts. Their audit is impossible. The author explains how these foundations were started, the heavy subsidies government paid. The land it which was grabbed to start these foundations. The billions of loans which were never returned.
The author further argues that out of 46 housing schemes of military none of them were for the ordinary soldiers but all were officers.
She further argues the land grab Mafia. How the army personnel got land through subsidies, like 20 to 50 rupees per acre.
The book talks about land grabs by the officers, like that land for Daducha Dam, which military got for dam but actually built housing society on it. It talks about land taken from okara farmers, and how the farmers were actually beaten and some of them died. it talks about water theft in sadiqabad, the theft of Sindh lakes etc etc. there are too many such facts.
The author further argues that basic reason Military is involved in the politics is because of their economic stakes aka Milbus.
The author argues that the officers are driven by greed. And they don't want any legislation against milbus or their economic stakes.
Further more the more control military has of civilian politics the easier for them to grab and exploit national resources for their personal gains.
The author argues as long as military has steady stream of milbus they are likely to be involved in the politics.
The author then challenges the perception that military institutes are better or more profitable then civilian run institutes. This is backed by factual data and I found the author very convincing.
Further more author argues that military has deliberately kept a weak civilian rule. They use and discard civilian leader while the rule from behind the scenes. Which further benefits the military's image as more capable.
All in all I found this book very convincing. All the arguments are backed by statics and source citation.
They have a finger in all the pies. I recommend every Pakistani to read this book.
The book further argues about the rules of the Military generals, ayub, zia and Mushraf and the role they played in inoculating military into politics by legislation. For example the article 52 b which allowed the president to dissolve assemblies and dissolve government. The author pov is that this was fail safe valve the military had installed to send home civilian governments it disliked.
It further discusses failed military ventures like Shaheen airlines, askari bank etc etc. it talks about ventures that were rescued by government loans like AWT and Fauji cement etc.
It further talks about how military illegally changed status of farm land and rifle practice land into commercial land and build housing societies on it
It talks about NLC and the role it played in destruction of Pakistan railway.
In my opinion one of the bravest books I have read by a Pakistani author. I actually emailed the author who actually responded and was very helpful with finding second version of the book.
Over the course of a few years I've come back to this book several times (this year starting from scratch and re-reading the first 150 pages to have it fresh). This long duration of returning to it is representative both of the depth and worthiness in content, and its unwieldyness as a book. The framework and examples she gives throughout are highly interesting, especially given how much she 'names names' of specific military structures and personnel throughout. However, I think this imperative to lay blame at specific doors leads her to need to be fairly repetitive and detail heavy, presumably to make sure these accusations are airtight. This means you often end up reading similar sections and lists over again, but they do reinforce an interesting picture throughout.
The first few sections define the meaning of military economy (i.e. how current or ex military personnel and structures develop direct economic power and the political latitude that provides), and then give a taxonomy of different types of state's militaries and how they relate to the economy. In terms of definition, she is keen to specific this from the broader military-industrial context, which I came in unsure of, but her case was compelling through the book. Coming to taxonomy, these types of military-state relations i.e. 'parent-guardian', were an interesting framework, but not expanded upon enough to know how I felt about it all. The categories which fit with the countries she was most interested in focusing on (Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia etc.) got more detail through the whole book. However, for those types falling outside of these (i.e. UK and US in a western bourgeois democracy type; China and Cuba in a one party type; Somalia in a war-lord state type) I had little ability to examine how appropriately they fit.
The bulk of the book is using these key definitions and categories to examine Pakistan's history of military economy. Coming to this with little knowledge of Pakistani history, it was challenging but rewarding, giving enough detail to have a sense of different political phases in the country's history. Although some points of political turbulence were difficult to follow, I don't blame the author trying to gloss 70 years of development. This history was necessarily focused on key state and military leaders rather than any 'history from below' type subjects, so I would be well set to complement it with other Pakistani reading.
Her key provocation is that there is a fairly direct relationship between a military officer cadre's involvement across the economy (ownership of businesses varying between many sectors, land acquisition to act as feudal barons) and their sense of institutional independence, which gives confidence for more direct coups and permanent military oversight of civilian governance. You will get the specifics of some these situations states again and again, and while unless you have have a more encyclopaedic memory than I do, you will learn and forgot many of the colonels, captains and generals who are part of these structures.