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Unrestricted Warfare: Translated from the Original People's Liberation Army Documents
A sobering and fascinating study on war in the modern era, "Unrestricted Warfare" carefully explores strategies that militarily and politically disadvantaged nations might take in order to successfully attack a geopolitical super-power like the United States. American military doctrine is typically led by technology; a new class of weapon or vehicle is developed, which allows or encourages an adjustment in strategy. Military strategists Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui argue that this dynamic is a crucial weakness in the American military, and that this blind spot with regard to alternative forms warfare could be effectively exploited by enemies. "Unrestricted Warfare" concerns the many ways in which this might occur, and, in turn, suggests what the United States might do to defend itself.
The traditional mentality that offensive action is limited to military action is no longer adequate given the range of contemporary threats and the rising costs-both in dollars and lives lost-of traditional warfare. Instead, Liang and Xiangsui suggest the significance of alternatives to direct military confrontation, including international policy, economic warfare, attacks on digital infrastructure and networks, and terrorism. Even a relatively insignificant state can incapacitate a far more powerful enemy by applying pressure to their economic and political systems. Exploring each of these considerations with remarkable insight and clarity, "Unrestricted Warfare" is an engaging evaluation of our geopolitical future.
The traditional mentality that offensive action is limited to military action is no longer adequate given the range of contemporary threats and the rising costs-both in dollars and lives lost-of traditional warfare. Instead, Liang and Xiangsui suggest the significance of alternatives to direct military confrontation, including international policy, economic warfare, attacks on digital infrastructure and networks, and terrorism. Even a relatively insignificant state can incapacitate a far more powerful enemy by applying pressure to their economic and political systems. Exploring each of these considerations with remarkable insight and clarity, "Unrestricted Warfare" is an engaging evaluation of our geopolitical future.
212 pages, Paperback
First published February 1, 1999
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 89 reviews
April 1, 2021
The poetic language used in this book was unexpected. The China's military seems to know a lot about U.S. military weapon systems. Surprised to learn how the Golden Ratio had an important role in some battles. The book explores the Gulf War at length. One could say this work is like a modern day The Art of War.
October 19, 2016
first of all i would advise the interested to try and find a different copy than the one Goodreads displays with the Al Santoli introduction because the cover will make you look like a dumbass.
despite what the added-on subtitle claims, this is actually a work of military theory by two Chinese PLA officers and rather sympathetic to the United States at certain points. i'm not especially versed in the classics of the genre so it was probably a bit of a mistake to go into something aiming towards the avant-garde like this, but i was interested in how the abstract topics covered in the chapters would be integrated into Marxist theory. in those respects i was a little disappointed as it seems to be building on a bit of an older tradition of military philosophy, but there were still some interesting ideas.
for something with such a singular focus in terms of subject matter (the Gulf War primarily) it managed to be surprisingly prescient in some respects, but not without its faults. the stress put on economic warfare in particular was good, however when the authors draw parallels between the "terrorism" of George Soros and Usama bin-Laden i think they fail to make a distinction between master and servant that i think a more materialist outlook would have helped in doing.
while in many ways the 21st century has seen an expansion on the techniques of the Gulf War, i think in terms of "lethality" things have progressed in a different manner than predicted here, conflicts prolonging rather than shortening in many cases. as the expansion of Clausewitz i think this attempts to be, it's quite abstract but manages to get its idea across gesturally.
despite what the added-on subtitle claims, this is actually a work of military theory by two Chinese PLA officers and rather sympathetic to the United States at certain points. i'm not especially versed in the classics of the genre so it was probably a bit of a mistake to go into something aiming towards the avant-garde like this, but i was interested in how the abstract topics covered in the chapters would be integrated into Marxist theory. in those respects i was a little disappointed as it seems to be building on a bit of an older tradition of military philosophy, but there were still some interesting ideas.
for something with such a singular focus in terms of subject matter (the Gulf War primarily) it managed to be surprisingly prescient in some respects, but not without its faults. the stress put on economic warfare in particular was good, however when the authors draw parallels between the "terrorism" of George Soros and Usama bin-Laden i think they fail to make a distinction between master and servant that i think a more materialist outlook would have helped in doing.
while in many ways the 21st century has seen an expansion on the techniques of the Gulf War, i think in terms of "lethality" things have progressed in a different manner than predicted here, conflicts prolonging rather than shortening in many cases. as the expansion of Clausewitz i think this attempts to be, it's quite abstract but manages to get its idea across gesturally.
February 9, 2016
To be honest, I was a little disappointed in this book. To be fair, it is about 13 years old, so most of the strategy discussed in it is pretty much conventional wisdom by now. What the authors term "Unrestricted Warfare" is really just the idea that a country must be ready for unconventional attacks from unconventional individuals. This includes 'financial warfare' and 'electronic warfare', while also discussing the manner in which they can both be the means and ends of conflict. The book was prescient, however, in its repeated comments on the threat posed by Osama Bin Laden (two years before the attacks).
November 8, 2024
I found this to a rather interesting book, kind of out of my normal genre of reading. Although, The Chinese being one of our greatest technological & military enemies out in the world I thought it would be wise to pick this up and see what was happening and what the possible future was. After all, I was in the Air Force for 12 years and still have a desire to be abreast of dangers on the world's stage. Between the CCP creating American businesses within America and buying up our lan near and around government facilities and military bases is dangerous enough, but to be one of THE top infiltrators and perpetrators of cybersecurity attacks on our nation then they are our chief enemy on the world stage. And with their working with and backing the Russian government, this makes the both of them our top rivals which will be tough to beat. However, if we have strong leadership at the top levels of this government, we can stop them dead in their tracks. This is a great intelligence overview from the perspective of two of the CCP's top military intelligence officers. Well worth it to be aware of this information.
September 1, 2020
Are we at war?
After reading this book the question gains much more validity. Few people on the left or the on the right can deny that we are undergoing an historic level of “interesting times”. But looking for prime causes, and evidence is a daunting task. The attacks on our society seem to be hidden in the fog of media bias and restrictions on free speech.
This new phenomenon of a mainstream media managed by ideological forces seems to be an attack by foreign interests. Who in the world would do such a destructive thing? But those who pay attention can see the changes even over the last twenty years since this book was written.
The social engineering, the school propaganda, the cult attacks on “carbon”, the renewed tribalism of identity groups, the attempt to discredit and destroy the civilian police forces (to be replaced by troops and private security), the crazy proliferation of regulations impacting every minute of our lives, the collapse of family and church influence, the blatant corruption and enrichment of the leviathan corporations and ruling class; this is just the most brazen evidence that the situation is not “normal”.
This partial list of currant events is not even discussed by the ruling class. The justice system and intelligence powers have been weaponized against all who are trying to save freedom in our western civilization. Every level of government seems to be infiltrated by a hostile ideology. The people with power seem to have increasing hatred of the middle class and the system that created it. Special interest groups are running amok as they try to “burn it all down” and the rulers are complicit with this law breaking – except when people try to protect their property. An observer fresh from outer space would wonder why a civilization that has created so much seems so willing to throw it all away.
When you read Unrestricted Warfare all this will come into sharp focus. Do not read this as a bedtime story. The subtitle tells you to wake up, the rest of the book tells you what you will find when you do.
After reading this book the question gains much more validity. Few people on the left or the on the right can deny that we are undergoing an historic level of “interesting times”. But looking for prime causes, and evidence is a daunting task. The attacks on our society seem to be hidden in the fog of media bias and restrictions on free speech.
This new phenomenon of a mainstream media managed by ideological forces seems to be an attack by foreign interests. Who in the world would do such a destructive thing? But those who pay attention can see the changes even over the last twenty years since this book was written.
The social engineering, the school propaganda, the cult attacks on “carbon”, the renewed tribalism of identity groups, the attempt to discredit and destroy the civilian police forces (to be replaced by troops and private security), the crazy proliferation of regulations impacting every minute of our lives, the collapse of family and church influence, the blatant corruption and enrichment of the leviathan corporations and ruling class; this is just the most brazen evidence that the situation is not “normal”.
This partial list of currant events is not even discussed by the ruling class. The justice system and intelligence powers have been weaponized against all who are trying to save freedom in our western civilization. Every level of government seems to be infiltrated by a hostile ideology. The people with power seem to have increasing hatred of the middle class and the system that created it. Special interest groups are running amok as they try to “burn it all down” and the rulers are complicit with this law breaking – except when people try to protect their property. An observer fresh from outer space would wonder why a civilization that has created so much seems so willing to throw it all away.
When you read Unrestricted Warfare all this will come into sharp focus. Do not read this as a bedtime story. The subtitle tells you to wake up, the rest of the book tells you what you will find when you do.
August 8, 2025
I first came across Unrestricted Warfare at the turn of the millennium, when the internet was still full of screeching dial-up modems and we thought “cyberwar” meant some poor intern in Washington trying to print a PDF from Netscape Navigator. The book had just been translated into English, complete with an alarmist subtitle — China’s Master Plan to Destroy America — that screamed Cold War paperback thriller more than sober military treatise. In truth, the original Chinese title, 《超限战》 (Chāoxiàn Zhàn), was less Hollywood and more academic provocation: “warfare beyond limits.” The authors, two colonels in the People’s Liberation Army — Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui — were hardly Bond villains; they were military thinkers testing the boundaries of what “war” meant in a world that had started to globalize itself into one nervous, twitchy marketplace.
Reading it back then, in 2000, felt a bit like opening a time capsule from the future. Qiao and Wang’s central argument was unsettling in its simplicity: in the age of globalization, the lines between war and peace, civilian and military, the battlefield and the trading floor, were not just blurred — they were obsolete. Why limit yourself to tanks and missiles when you could use currencies, media narratives, computer code, viruses — both biological and digital — as your weapons? The book was essentially a manifesto for tearing up the Geneva Conventions, not by breaking them outright but by sidestepping them with a grin and a lawyer’s footnote.
They called for “unlimited means, crossing all boundaries,” and they meant it. Reading their list of possible tactics in 1999 — cyberwarfare, financial sabotage, media manipulation, legal warfare, terrorism, biotech attacks — was like hearing the outline of the next quarter century whispered into your ear. At the time, it seemed almost too theoretical, too cinematic. Of course, the Twin Towers were still standing, Facebook was a Harvard daydream, and SARS was a distant epidemiological blip. We hadn’t yet learned how much reality could take cues from fiction.
The first time I finished it, I remember feeling equal parts impressed and uneasy. Here were two officers essentially saying: the smallest, weakest country can bleed the strongest if it stops thinking about battlefields and starts thinking about vulnerabilities. You don’t take on the U.S. military head-to-head — you overload its financial systems, polarize its electorate, hack its media, infect its supply chains. You target not its army, but its national will. Clausewitz would have been horrified; Machiavelli might have offered them wine.
Fast-forward to 2025, and rereading the same pages feels less like prophecy and more like a post-event autopsy. Cyberattacks on U.S. pipelines, elections, and companies? Check. Disinformation campaigns that make half the country believe the other half is plotting the apocalypse? Check. Legal warfare — “lawfare” — waged through trade disputes, intellectual property claims, and sanctions? Check. And then there’s China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a trillion-dollar infrastructure embrace that doubles as a geopolitical chokehold. If you read Unrestricted Warfare with those headlines in mind, it’s hard not to think that Qiao and Wang had a crystal ball tucked under their PLA caps.
The English edition I read back in 2000 had its own spin — Al Santoli’s introduction framed the work with a distinctly American lens, dripping with the unease of a superpower suddenly aware of its own Achilles’ heels. This framing sometimes tilted toward the sensational, amplifying the “China threat” narrative beyond what the original text necessarily intended. The Chinese version never literally said “destroy America.” It was more about strategic competition, not annihilation. But the Western marketing machine knows a good bogeyman when it sees one, and in the shadow of the 1990s’ “unipolar moment,” this book fit the bill perfectly.
Critics — then and now — point out that Unrestricted Warfare is not official Chinese doctrine. It’s not a secret PLA master plan smuggled out of Beijing. It’s a thought experiment, a provocation. But provocations have a way of slipping into policy, especially when they capture the imagination of strategists. And this one did. It became a staple in international relations classrooms, particularly for anyone interested in Fourth Generation Warfare — the kind that isn’t fought on a battlefield but in banks, newsrooms, and server farms.
What struck me most, reading it again after 25 years, is how quaint some of its examples now seem. Qiao and Wang talk about the internet, but their internet is a 1990s network of static webpages and e-mail viruses. They talk about terrorism, but their mental model is the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, not the sprawling jihadist insurgencies that would dominate the early 2000s. They mention financial warfare, but they mean currency devaluations and stock market manipulation, not crypto-fueled economic sabotage or AI-driven algorithmic trading attacks. And yet, despite these dated references — fax machines, floppy disks, pre-Euro Europe — the architecture of their thinking still holds.
In 2000, the book felt like an abstract warning. By 2025, it reads like a field guide for the nightly news. COVID-19, for instance, wasn’t on anyone’s radar when they wrote it, but the pandemic’s geopolitical fallout — disrupted supply chains, contested narratives about origins, medical diplomacy as influence — could have been lifted from their chapters on biological and psychological warfare. The same goes for today’s AI-powered cognitive warfare: disinformation campaigns so tailored they feel like someone is whispering directly into your brainstem. If Unrestricted Warfare were written now, it would surely have entire sections on deepfakes, synthetic media, and machine-learning-driven propaganda.
There’s a certain dark humor in how the book has aged. It’s as if Qiao and Wang drafted a set of rules for a game that the whole world decided to play — and then the players upgraded the pieces, expanded the board, and made the stakes existential. The U.S.-China rivalry, tech decoupling, Taiwan and semiconductor geopolitics, the South China Sea — all these flashpoints are just iterations of their original thesis: that conflict in the 21st century won’t announce itself with declarations of war. It will seep in through the gaps in your infrastructure, your markets, your trust in each other.
And yet, for all its grim foresight, the book is strangely energizing to read. Perhaps because it strips away the polite fictions that nations like to tell themselves. It says plainly: there are no sacred arenas anymore. Everything is fair game. Your media? Weaponized. Your trade deals? Weaponized. Your public health systems? Weaponized. It’s the kind of worldview that makes diplomats shiver and generals smile.
I think back to reading it in my cramped study in 2000, under a flickering tube light, a stack of Foreign Affairs issues gathering dust in the corner. Back then, I read it as an academic curiosity, something to file under “interesting but unlikely.” Now, I read it and think: we’ve been living in it for years, and we didn’t even notice when the war began. The whole point, after all, is that you don’t notice until you’ve already lost something you can’t quite name.
Of course, one has to be careful not to treat Unrestricted Warfare as scripture. Some of its more theatrical pronouncements belong in the realm of strategic fiction — useful for thinking, dangerous for policy if taken too literally. And there’s always the temptation, especially in the West, to read it as proof of a singular, monolithic Chinese intent. The reality is more nuanced. Chinese strategic thought, like any nation’s, is a messy tapestry of competing doctrines, bureaucratic politics, and opportunistic improvisation. Still, it’s telling how often concepts from this book echo in later developments: the “Three Warfares” doctrine (public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, legal warfare), civil-military fusion, “gray zone” operations in the South China Sea. They’re not carbon copies, but the family resemblance is hard to ignore.
Revisiting Unrestricted Warfare in 2025 is like watching an old science-fiction film and realizing half the gadgets are now in your pocket. The predictions that once felt edgy now feel mundane — not because they were wrong, but because they’ve been absorbed into everyday reality. We talk about cyber defense, media literacy, supply chain security, AI ethics — all in the language of peacetime policy. But lurking under it all is the quiet acceptance that these are also theaters of war.
When I closed the book this time, I didn’t feel the same uneasy thrill I felt in 2000. Instead, I felt a sort of tired recognition, the way you feel after meeting an old acquaintance who’s aged exactly as you imagined. Qiao and Wang’s thesis has endured not because it was radical, but because the world they described was already taking shape. They just had the clarity — or the cynicism — to say it out loud before the rest of us caught on.
If there’s one thing I’ve learned from carrying this book across a quarter century, it’s that the most dangerous ideas aren’t necessarily secret. They can be printed in plain text, sold in airport bookstores, and still change the way nations think about each other. In 2000, Unrestricted Warfare was a warning. In 2025, it’s an obituary for the neat, orderly wars of the past — and a reminder that the next conflict won’t wait for us to declare it.
Reading it back then, in 2000, felt a bit like opening a time capsule from the future. Qiao and Wang’s central argument was unsettling in its simplicity: in the age of globalization, the lines between war and peace, civilian and military, the battlefield and the trading floor, were not just blurred — they were obsolete. Why limit yourself to tanks and missiles when you could use currencies, media narratives, computer code, viruses — both biological and digital — as your weapons? The book was essentially a manifesto for tearing up the Geneva Conventions, not by breaking them outright but by sidestepping them with a grin and a lawyer’s footnote.
They called for “unlimited means, crossing all boundaries,” and they meant it. Reading their list of possible tactics in 1999 — cyberwarfare, financial sabotage, media manipulation, legal warfare, terrorism, biotech attacks — was like hearing the outline of the next quarter century whispered into your ear. At the time, it seemed almost too theoretical, too cinematic. Of course, the Twin Towers were still standing, Facebook was a Harvard daydream, and SARS was a distant epidemiological blip. We hadn’t yet learned how much reality could take cues from fiction.
The first time I finished it, I remember feeling equal parts impressed and uneasy. Here were two officers essentially saying: the smallest, weakest country can bleed the strongest if it stops thinking about battlefields and starts thinking about vulnerabilities. You don’t take on the U.S. military head-to-head — you overload its financial systems, polarize its electorate, hack its media, infect its supply chains. You target not its army, but its national will. Clausewitz would have been horrified; Machiavelli might have offered them wine.
Fast-forward to 2025, and rereading the same pages feels less like prophecy and more like a post-event autopsy. Cyberattacks on U.S. pipelines, elections, and companies? Check. Disinformation campaigns that make half the country believe the other half is plotting the apocalypse? Check. Legal warfare — “lawfare” — waged through trade disputes, intellectual property claims, and sanctions? Check. And then there’s China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a trillion-dollar infrastructure embrace that doubles as a geopolitical chokehold. If you read Unrestricted Warfare with those headlines in mind, it’s hard not to think that Qiao and Wang had a crystal ball tucked under their PLA caps.
The English edition I read back in 2000 had its own spin — Al Santoli’s introduction framed the work with a distinctly American lens, dripping with the unease of a superpower suddenly aware of its own Achilles’ heels. This framing sometimes tilted toward the sensational, amplifying the “China threat” narrative beyond what the original text necessarily intended. The Chinese version never literally said “destroy America.” It was more about strategic competition, not annihilation. But the Western marketing machine knows a good bogeyman when it sees one, and in the shadow of the 1990s’ “unipolar moment,” this book fit the bill perfectly.
Critics — then and now — point out that Unrestricted Warfare is not official Chinese doctrine. It’s not a secret PLA master plan smuggled out of Beijing. It’s a thought experiment, a provocation. But provocations have a way of slipping into policy, especially when they capture the imagination of strategists. And this one did. It became a staple in international relations classrooms, particularly for anyone interested in Fourth Generation Warfare — the kind that isn’t fought on a battlefield but in banks, newsrooms, and server farms.
What struck me most, reading it again after 25 years, is how quaint some of its examples now seem. Qiao and Wang talk about the internet, but their internet is a 1990s network of static webpages and e-mail viruses. They talk about terrorism, but their mental model is the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, not the sprawling jihadist insurgencies that would dominate the early 2000s. They mention financial warfare, but they mean currency devaluations and stock market manipulation, not crypto-fueled economic sabotage or AI-driven algorithmic trading attacks. And yet, despite these dated references — fax machines, floppy disks, pre-Euro Europe — the architecture of their thinking still holds.
In 2000, the book felt like an abstract warning. By 2025, it reads like a field guide for the nightly news. COVID-19, for instance, wasn’t on anyone’s radar when they wrote it, but the pandemic’s geopolitical fallout — disrupted supply chains, contested narratives about origins, medical diplomacy as influence — could have been lifted from their chapters on biological and psychological warfare. The same goes for today’s AI-powered cognitive warfare: disinformation campaigns so tailored they feel like someone is whispering directly into your brainstem. If Unrestricted Warfare were written now, it would surely have entire sections on deepfakes, synthetic media, and machine-learning-driven propaganda.
There’s a certain dark humor in how the book has aged. It’s as if Qiao and Wang drafted a set of rules for a game that the whole world decided to play — and then the players upgraded the pieces, expanded the board, and made the stakes existential. The U.S.-China rivalry, tech decoupling, Taiwan and semiconductor geopolitics, the South China Sea — all these flashpoints are just iterations of their original thesis: that conflict in the 21st century won’t announce itself with declarations of war. It will seep in through the gaps in your infrastructure, your markets, your trust in each other.
And yet, for all its grim foresight, the book is strangely energizing to read. Perhaps because it strips away the polite fictions that nations like to tell themselves. It says plainly: there are no sacred arenas anymore. Everything is fair game. Your media? Weaponized. Your trade deals? Weaponized. Your public health systems? Weaponized. It’s the kind of worldview that makes diplomats shiver and generals smile.
I think back to reading it in my cramped study in 2000, under a flickering tube light, a stack of Foreign Affairs issues gathering dust in the corner. Back then, I read it as an academic curiosity, something to file under “interesting but unlikely.” Now, I read it and think: we’ve been living in it for years, and we didn’t even notice when the war began. The whole point, after all, is that you don’t notice until you’ve already lost something you can’t quite name.
Of course, one has to be careful not to treat Unrestricted Warfare as scripture. Some of its more theatrical pronouncements belong in the realm of strategic fiction — useful for thinking, dangerous for policy if taken too literally. And there’s always the temptation, especially in the West, to read it as proof of a singular, monolithic Chinese intent. The reality is more nuanced. Chinese strategic thought, like any nation’s, is a messy tapestry of competing doctrines, bureaucratic politics, and opportunistic improvisation. Still, it’s telling how often concepts from this book echo in later developments: the “Three Warfares” doctrine (public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, legal warfare), civil-military fusion, “gray zone” operations in the South China Sea. They’re not carbon copies, but the family resemblance is hard to ignore.
Revisiting Unrestricted Warfare in 2025 is like watching an old science-fiction film and realizing half the gadgets are now in your pocket. The predictions that once felt edgy now feel mundane — not because they were wrong, but because they’ve been absorbed into everyday reality. We talk about cyber defense, media literacy, supply chain security, AI ethics — all in the language of peacetime policy. But lurking under it all is the quiet acceptance that these are also theaters of war.
When I closed the book this time, I didn’t feel the same uneasy thrill I felt in 2000. Instead, I felt a sort of tired recognition, the way you feel after meeting an old acquaintance who’s aged exactly as you imagined. Qiao and Wang’s thesis has endured not because it was radical, but because the world they described was already taking shape. They just had the clarity — or the cynicism — to say it out loud before the rest of us caught on.
If there’s one thing I’ve learned from carrying this book across a quarter century, it’s that the most dangerous ideas aren’t necessarily secret. They can be printed in plain text, sold in airport bookstores, and still change the way nations think about each other. In 2000, Unrestricted Warfare was a warning. In 2025, it’s an obituary for the neat, orderly wars of the past — and a reminder that the next conflict won’t wait for us to declare it.
November 28, 2020
This is a 1999 military treatise from two officers in the People's Liberation Army. To begin, the basic plot as the authors present it:
By the late 90's the United States is plowing so much money into conventional weapon development and production that no other country can possibly keep up. "Based on weight," Qiao and Wang point out, "the B-2 [bomber] is some three times more expensive than an equivalent weight of gold." [14-15]. And so it would be foolish to try and fight the Americans in a conventional way. The 1990-91 Gulf War was a horribly lopsided American victory against the Iraqi conventional forces (e.g. 184 vs 30,000 casualties) that underscores this point [47].
How can an emerging power then compete with the US? Trouble with unconventional forces in e.g. Somalia after the Gulf War reveals a possible underbelly. If you can't beat the Americans in a traditional military conflict, you need to expand the battlefield and modes of war to exert force in other ways and ultimately buffalo them into accepting your interests.
To Qiao and Wang "there is nothing in the world today that cannot become a weapon" [16], and "soldiers no longer have a monopoly on war" [36]. Wars instead will be financial (they accuse George Soros numerous times of acts of financial war), cyber war, or more like Osama Bin-Laden's 1993 WTC bombing.
Good news for the PLA: the Americans are flat on their feet, vying for Congressional dollars instead of truly preparing for an "unrestricted" conflict [67-74]. The US military "has pushed [responsibility for new types of war] on to the politicians and the CIA" and "retreated from the existing all-dimensional wars" [106]. "What is surprising" to the Chinese authors "is that such a large nation unexpectedly does not have a unified strategy and command structure to deal with the threat" [107].
They conclude that the correct strategy is to embrace and prepare for "modified combined warfare that goes beyond limits" [154]. This is fighting across domains, means, and sizes and scopes of action. It is pairing some aspects of conventional war with disruptions of "the civilian electricity network, traffic dispatching network, ... mass media," with a goal of inciting "social panic, street riots, and a political crisis" [123].
(NB: I am skipping over a bizarre numerology chapter which tries to frame the unrestricted warfare strategy as a manifestation of the golden ratio and therefore correct and true. I guess we can give them credit for being good Marxists and trying to make rules to describe the flow of human history.)
I don't disagree with the authors about the nature of conflict involving traditionally non-military actors and avenues. Although, this does not seem like a novel idea that emerged only after the Gulf War. Propaganda, embargoes and tariffs, etc have been around for some time.
I do disagree that these new types of war ought to be linked to a military apparatus.
As a semantic issue, all groups of humans since the start of humans have found ways of exerting force (as distinct from violence) to get other humans to accept their interests. The Avignon Papacy got a bunch of Christians to hand over their gold for to fund debaucherous parties for most of the 14th century by making everyone afraid of hell. Was the Pope at war with Christians? We don't have to call any exertion of force "war". Qiao and Wang are guilty of semantic imperialism.
As a practical issue, they don't understand the anathema that such concentration of power (i.e. making the military responsible for all elements of what they call "war") would be in a free society. They giddily point out the conflict even within the US military between branches. It's hard for them to wrap their heads around over there in the authoritarian CCP police state, but we ensure freedom from tyranny precisely by breaking up loci of power. It is a tradeoff that we make -- such a mighty coordinated total war machine could also be turned against us domestically.
Without a coordinating authority are we doomed?
America's enduring advantage lies in allowing brilliance to rise from the bottom up. It may take longer to reach a solution in comparison to the blunt dictum of an autocrat, but a solution that has survived rounds of selective pressure usually beats a solution passed down from authorities.
Rather than appointing our own Xi Jinping, our focus ought to be to make Americans aware of what we are up against from the bottom up. The Chinese Communist Party is no friend of America. They say they are going to incite civil unrest, fight financial wars, and use international organs (like the UN -- including the WHO, and the WTO) to inflict damage onto us and we ought to take it at face value -- even if they never intend to engage in a hot war. When we start to understand that, maybe Jack Dorsey will begin to censor Zhao Lijian (https://twitter.com/zlj517) instead of the US President, and Google will start working with the US military instead of the People's Liberation Army.
By the late 90's the United States is plowing so much money into conventional weapon development and production that no other country can possibly keep up. "Based on weight," Qiao and Wang point out, "the B-2 [bomber] is some three times more expensive than an equivalent weight of gold." [14-15]. And so it would be foolish to try and fight the Americans in a conventional way. The 1990-91 Gulf War was a horribly lopsided American victory against the Iraqi conventional forces (e.g. 184 vs 30,000 casualties) that underscores this point [47].
How can an emerging power then compete with the US? Trouble with unconventional forces in e.g. Somalia after the Gulf War reveals a possible underbelly. If you can't beat the Americans in a traditional military conflict, you need to expand the battlefield and modes of war to exert force in other ways and ultimately buffalo them into accepting your interests.
To Qiao and Wang "there is nothing in the world today that cannot become a weapon" [16], and "soldiers no longer have a monopoly on war" [36]. Wars instead will be financial (they accuse George Soros numerous times of acts of financial war), cyber war, or more like Osama Bin-Laden's 1993 WTC bombing.
Good news for the PLA: the Americans are flat on their feet, vying for Congressional dollars instead of truly preparing for an "unrestricted" conflict [67-74]. The US military "has pushed [responsibility for new types of war] on to the politicians and the CIA" and "retreated from the existing all-dimensional wars" [106]. "What is surprising" to the Chinese authors "is that such a large nation unexpectedly does not have a unified strategy and command structure to deal with the threat" [107].
They conclude that the correct strategy is to embrace and prepare for "modified combined warfare that goes beyond limits" [154]. This is fighting across domains, means, and sizes and scopes of action. It is pairing some aspects of conventional war with disruptions of "the civilian electricity network, traffic dispatching network, ... mass media," with a goal of inciting "social panic, street riots, and a political crisis" [123].
(NB: I am skipping over a bizarre numerology chapter which tries to frame the unrestricted warfare strategy as a manifestation of the golden ratio and therefore correct and true. I guess we can give them credit for being good Marxists and trying to make rules to describe the flow of human history.)
I don't disagree with the authors about the nature of conflict involving traditionally non-military actors and avenues. Although, this does not seem like a novel idea that emerged only after the Gulf War. Propaganda, embargoes and tariffs, etc have been around for some time.
I do disagree that these new types of war ought to be linked to a military apparatus.
As a semantic issue, all groups of humans since the start of humans have found ways of exerting force (as distinct from violence) to get other humans to accept their interests. The Avignon Papacy got a bunch of Christians to hand over their gold for to fund debaucherous parties for most of the 14th century by making everyone afraid of hell. Was the Pope at war with Christians? We don't have to call any exertion of force "war". Qiao and Wang are guilty of semantic imperialism.
As a practical issue, they don't understand the anathema that such concentration of power (i.e. making the military responsible for all elements of what they call "war") would be in a free society. They giddily point out the conflict even within the US military between branches. It's hard for them to wrap their heads around over there in the authoritarian CCP police state, but we ensure freedom from tyranny precisely by breaking up loci of power. It is a tradeoff that we make -- such a mighty coordinated total war machine could also be turned against us domestically.
Without a coordinating authority are we doomed?
America's enduring advantage lies in allowing brilliance to rise from the bottom up. It may take longer to reach a solution in comparison to the blunt dictum of an autocrat, but a solution that has survived rounds of selective pressure usually beats a solution passed down from authorities.
Rather than appointing our own Xi Jinping, our focus ought to be to make Americans aware of what we are up against from the bottom up. The Chinese Communist Party is no friend of America. They say they are going to incite civil unrest, fight financial wars, and use international organs (like the UN -- including the WHO, and the WTO) to inflict damage onto us and we ought to take it at face value -- even if they never intend to engage in a hot war. When we start to understand that, maybe Jack Dorsey will begin to censor Zhao Lijian (https://twitter.com/zlj517) instead of the US President, and Google will start working with the US military instead of the People's Liberation Army.
September 17, 2020
This is my third time to read this book and I still get the same feelings I did as when I read it the first time -- genius, fascination, worried as hell, kind of freaked out, and curious as to what may be used from this book by the PLA, specifically against the US. In the 21 years since its believed to have been publication, I think we've had a good number of questions answered, although there remain quite a few.
When I first got my hands on this book, it was hard as hell to find. It was rumored to exist, and some in China allegedly confirmed it. Somehow, it made its way out of China and this was awhile ago, so forgive me if I'm not 100% accurate, but I recalled that some unknown French press published a copy that some could get with effort for a short while, and then some time later a South American publisher, also largely unknown, published a print run that I think was in English and it was a little easier to get. At some point, it somehow became much more prominent and you can now easily find it, although sometimes the sub-titles differ and in fact are sometimes hilarious.
However, the point I wish to make here is it's a fair controversial book, and not solely due to the subject matter. A number of China analysts and experts do not believe it to be authentic, view it as a fraud, and often tend to look down their noses at those who DO take it seriously. Despite the fact that many of the tactics described by the PLA authors have indeed been used since then. Meanwhile, probably just as many, if not more, China analysts and experts (and while I don't claim Expert status, I do include myself among this group in terms of belief) absolutely believe in the authenticity of this book, argue what I've already alluded to -- that a number of tactics described in this book written by high level PLA officers in the 1990 have already, and continue to, be used against the US. I think more importantly to me was the fact that the also controversial author and expert, Michael Pillsbury, whose books include a scary-as-shit one about China's 100-year program -- beginning in 1949 and ending in 2049 -- to pursue and eventually surpass -- by whatever means -- the US as the global superpower. He has tons of evidence to back this theory, and I think not only is it justified, but we can see progressively aggressive evidence of this plan in action yearly, as well as the fact that I place much more stock in his expert opinion and that of other experts I know and admire, than of a few high-profile ones who seem to always be in the limelight but who have never impressed me and who I think are naive idealists -- no names mentioned.
However, whether you buy it or not, this is a Must-Read for anyone who cares about the dying west and emerging east and China's role in it as well as its ultimate end game. I can't recommend this more strongly and I guess that's all for now...
When I first got my hands on this book, it was hard as hell to find. It was rumored to exist, and some in China allegedly confirmed it. Somehow, it made its way out of China and this was awhile ago, so forgive me if I'm not 100% accurate, but I recalled that some unknown French press published a copy that some could get with effort for a short while, and then some time later a South American publisher, also largely unknown, published a print run that I think was in English and it was a little easier to get. At some point, it somehow became much more prominent and you can now easily find it, although sometimes the sub-titles differ and in fact are sometimes hilarious.
However, the point I wish to make here is it's a fair controversial book, and not solely due to the subject matter. A number of China analysts and experts do not believe it to be authentic, view it as a fraud, and often tend to look down their noses at those who DO take it seriously. Despite the fact that many of the tactics described by the PLA authors have indeed been used since then. Meanwhile, probably just as many, if not more, China analysts and experts (and while I don't claim Expert status, I do include myself among this group in terms of belief) absolutely believe in the authenticity of this book, argue what I've already alluded to -- that a number of tactics described in this book written by high level PLA officers in the 1990 have already, and continue to, be used against the US. I think more importantly to me was the fact that the also controversial author and expert, Michael Pillsbury, whose books include a scary-as-shit one about China's 100-year program -- beginning in 1949 and ending in 2049 -- to pursue and eventually surpass -- by whatever means -- the US as the global superpower. He has tons of evidence to back this theory, and I think not only is it justified, but we can see progressively aggressive evidence of this plan in action yearly, as well as the fact that I place much more stock in his expert opinion and that of other experts I know and admire, than of a few high-profile ones who seem to always be in the limelight but who have never impressed me and who I think are naive idealists -- no names mentioned.
However, whether you buy it or not, this is a Must-Read for anyone who cares about the dying west and emerging east and China's role in it as well as its ultimate end game. I can't recommend this more strongly and I guess that's all for now...
January 17, 2021
I wish I would have read this much, much earlier. Although this book is over twenty years old, it is still very reveling on the subject of the future of warfare. The authors make an allusion to a future second addition, that I for one would seek out and read immediately. This book was written before the September 11, 2011 tragedy and, obviously before the Afghan and Iraq wars. The authors write this book with the Gulf War as the most recent pivotal changing point in modern warfare. The authors are very convincing in their arguments that the Gulf War represents the beginning of a new multi-faceted era of modern warfare. This new modern warfare will less and less look like the wars of the past, and more and more blur the lines of combatants. I believe the authors point correctly to a future of warfare where there is no defined battleground, because warfare will be conducted economically, internationally and above all electronically. Nations and countries will no longer have rigid boundaries that mean anything or can put up any sort of defense in the face of market manipulations and cyber attacks.
I could go on, but for those who care, I really believe this text is more worthy of an in-depth study than a quick read.
I could go on, but for those who care, I really believe this text is more worthy of an in-depth study than a quick read.
December 9, 2020
A Must-Read For Understanding Current Events
Both brilliant and frightening, this small text details China’s strategy for global dominance. Written by two Chinese colonels at the end of the 20th century, they convincingly argued the time had come to not just modernize war in the military sphere, but to take war into every sphere of influence to include the cultural, religious, political, philosophical, technological, and psychological - and do so simultaneously. You see in this text, the strategies that were put in motion decades ago that have brought us to our current state.
Both brilliant and frightening, this small text details China’s strategy for global dominance. Written by two Chinese colonels at the end of the 20th century, they convincingly argued the time had come to not just modernize war in the military sphere, but to take war into every sphere of influence to include the cultural, religious, political, philosophical, technological, and psychological - and do so simultaneously. You see in this text, the strategies that were put in motion decades ago that have brought us to our current state.
November 13, 2013
A very interesting thesis from -- what I imagine -- China's version of War College. Although not exactly what the dust jacket inside flap promises (concrete links between China and UBL’s mastermind of Sept 11th) this is well worth the read.
The main theme of the book is that warfare is/has moved beyond the armies of two nations meeting on a battlefield, to every domain, every space, and all people being involved or potentially involved in warfare. Three points that I found interesting:
-- While this is not China telling Al Qaeda how to fly passenger jets into US landmarks, that event serves as a prime example of the authors’ premise. Warfare is now taking place by non-state entities, using instruments never before considered as weapons, and involving all citizens of a nation. This shift will continue to expand and military leaders must adapt to non-war operations done by the military (MOOTW) and warfare conducted by non-armies. Terrorism is only one example of this; others include the ‘war on drugs’, financial warfare or currency valuation, cyber-war/-espionage/-crime, and potentially even environmental warfare. Essentially everything we hold of value can be used as a weapon. It seems that the US would rather pour money into new technology than think of other ways to conduct war.
-- The authors cite Operation DESERT STORM as an exception that proves the rule of classical warfare. It was very interesting to see the perspective of the Gulf War from an outsider. Rather than getting into the airpower vs. land maneuver warfare debate, the authors state that Desert Storm was the ultimate in classical warfare and proves the need for alternative forms of battle to make the US vulnerable.
-- Financial warfare sounds very scary. I’ve previously read Cyber War by Richard Clarke which talks extensively about how dependant the markets are on networks. It probably wouldn’t take much for a hostile organization to target those networks to take down the US finincal sector and cause a massive run on the banks. Maybe we’re more robust that I think we are or maybe the ‘McDonalds theory of international relations’ means that no one would try a that tactic because it would ruin the global markets as well. Hope so.
There are points of this book that don’t make sense and it is a tough read. It clearly was not written in English and, even with a reasonable translation by the CIA, uses a style of writing that take work to get through. There are many references that would probably be much clearer with a good understanding of Chinese military history. The authors also digress into irrelevancies at times like almost half a chapter on the ‘Golden Interval’ and 0.618. On the other hand, the updated list of principles of war is very interesting. Even with the above caveats, get your hands on a copy and start to contemplate beyond-limits combined war.
The main theme of the book is that warfare is/has moved beyond the armies of two nations meeting on a battlefield, to every domain, every space, and all people being involved or potentially involved in warfare. Three points that I found interesting:
-- While this is not China telling Al Qaeda how to fly passenger jets into US landmarks, that event serves as a prime example of the authors’ premise. Warfare is now taking place by non-state entities, using instruments never before considered as weapons, and involving all citizens of a nation. This shift will continue to expand and military leaders must adapt to non-war operations done by the military (MOOTW) and warfare conducted by non-armies. Terrorism is only one example of this; others include the ‘war on drugs’, financial warfare or currency valuation, cyber-war/-espionage/-crime, and potentially even environmental warfare. Essentially everything we hold of value can be used as a weapon. It seems that the US would rather pour money into new technology than think of other ways to conduct war.
-- The authors cite Operation DESERT STORM as an exception that proves the rule of classical warfare. It was very interesting to see the perspective of the Gulf War from an outsider. Rather than getting into the airpower vs. land maneuver warfare debate, the authors state that Desert Storm was the ultimate in classical warfare and proves the need for alternative forms of battle to make the US vulnerable.
-- Financial warfare sounds very scary. I’ve previously read Cyber War by Richard Clarke which talks extensively about how dependant the markets are on networks. It probably wouldn’t take much for a hostile organization to target those networks to take down the US finincal sector and cause a massive run on the banks. Maybe we’re more robust that I think we are or maybe the ‘McDonalds theory of international relations’ means that no one would try a that tactic because it would ruin the global markets as well. Hope so.
There are points of this book that don’t make sense and it is a tough read. It clearly was not written in English and, even with a reasonable translation by the CIA, uses a style of writing that take work to get through. There are many references that would probably be much clearer with a good understanding of Chinese military history. The authors also digress into irrelevancies at times like almost half a chapter on the ‘Golden Interval’ and 0.618. On the other hand, the updated list of principles of war is very interesting. Even with the above caveats, get your hands on a copy and start to contemplate beyond-limits combined war.
May 6, 2017
A must read for anyone who wants to seriously think about modern conflict
April 19, 2021
Truly amazing read. Every officer should read this book
May 2, 2025
I don’t recommend reading this. I say that on its own merits. And because there are plenty of summaries which do well enough. It’s not necessarily bad, but these ideas have been percolating in the discourse for a long time and the purple prose did not enhance my understanding. I got about a quarter deep
And of course, as you may have figured from the various covers of this book, it’s sensational and easy to run to conclusions. It’s hard for me to believe it’s broadly representative of Chinese doctrine at any point. (Not being an expert, ofc)
I feel like the translation I read made it seem more sensational. There may be a lack of precision in it which is critical when making a hypothesis.
I did like this review.
https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/li...
And of course, as you may have figured from the various covers of this book, it’s sensational and easy to run to conclusions. It’s hard for me to believe it’s broadly representative of Chinese doctrine at any point. (Not being an expert, ofc)
I feel like the translation I read made it seem more sensational. There may be a lack of precision in it which is critical when making a hypothesis.
I did like this review.
https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/li...
February 1, 2021
First general impression upon finishing is, "Get out of the cities and get off of the grid." Meanwhile, hope that unrestricted warfare never happens. A sobering read.
Two senior colonels of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) had this book published in 1999. It gained a degree of official notice and recognition within the PLA leadership. Clearly hawks, the writers advocate a fuller view of what constitutes warfare to include actions by both military and non-military actors against an enemy. The enemy most often referenced in the book is America. The exposition of their thesis draws upon pragmatic, philosophical, and metaphorical arguments.
America was identified as the primary target of much of the world because of the quick, devastating dispatch of the Iraq Army in the 1991 Gulf War. The technological supremacy shown by the U.S. military led to many other countries trying to follow suite, but finding the effort both difficult and costly. This brought the two authors to look to means other than state-of-the-art weaponry, organization, and operations to defeat such an adversary. Their proposal: unrestricted warfare, in which, "the first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden."
With this, the new concept of weapons is limitless. They state, "there is nothing in the world today that cannot become a weapon." This could include "man-made earthquakes, tsunamis, weather disasters, or subsonic wave and new biological and chemical weapons." Or, "a single man-made stock-market crash, a single computer virus invasion, or a single rumor or scandal that results in a fluctuation in the enemy country's exchange rates or exposes the leaders of an enemy country on the internet, all can be included in the ranks of new-concept weapons." They write also of "kinder weapons," with which " the best way to achieve victory is to control, not to kill."
The authors are close followers of American military leadership trends and writings. Their assessments of both make for interesting reading. Another point of interest in their writing is the fine point of semantics in discussing warfare. At first, this seems to contain a lot of circular logic, as sitting at a bar and having a well lubricated patron go on about people who "Act because they believe, believing in the Act." Qiao's and Wang's work comes out better than that, but it takes some close reading to get there.
The incorporation of the military and the private sectors, the diplomatic corps, and whatever cooperating alliances may be involved is clearly a quite complex way of going to war. How can such a combination be effectively coordinated and managed? Here, democracies seem to be at a disadvantage, while authoritarian governments without public input or even multiple political parties appear to have a significant advantage. China's one-party organization works well for them in competition with a democratic, multi-party state with changing top leadership.
There is much in this small book to ponder. Those with an interest in history in the making should find it well worth reading. It is worrisome, especially when we continue to learn of foreign cyber penetrations of our government agencies, private corporations, complexes such as regional electrical power grids, and individuals. Are we successfully doing likewise to the strong competitor, potential enemy states we face? One would hope we are at least staying even, but that is not likely to be part of any press releases from our national government. This book gives us many other questions to which we are unlikely to be informed. Dave Kilcullen's recent book provides a more recent and more global assessment of the spectrum of international competition in his 2020 book, "The Dragons and the Snakes." His book draws upon, and introduced me to, "Unrestricted Warfare."
Two senior colonels of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) had this book published in 1999. It gained a degree of official notice and recognition within the PLA leadership. Clearly hawks, the writers advocate a fuller view of what constitutes warfare to include actions by both military and non-military actors against an enemy. The enemy most often referenced in the book is America. The exposition of their thesis draws upon pragmatic, philosophical, and metaphorical arguments.
America was identified as the primary target of much of the world because of the quick, devastating dispatch of the Iraq Army in the 1991 Gulf War. The technological supremacy shown by the U.S. military led to many other countries trying to follow suite, but finding the effort both difficult and costly. This brought the two authors to look to means other than state-of-the-art weaponry, organization, and operations to defeat such an adversary. Their proposal: unrestricted warfare, in which, "the first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden."
With this, the new concept of weapons is limitless. They state, "there is nothing in the world today that cannot become a weapon." This could include "man-made earthquakes, tsunamis, weather disasters, or subsonic wave and new biological and chemical weapons." Or, "a single man-made stock-market crash, a single computer virus invasion, or a single rumor or scandal that results in a fluctuation in the enemy country's exchange rates or exposes the leaders of an enemy country on the internet, all can be included in the ranks of new-concept weapons." They write also of "kinder weapons," with which " the best way to achieve victory is to control, not to kill."
The authors are close followers of American military leadership trends and writings. Their assessments of both make for interesting reading. Another point of interest in their writing is the fine point of semantics in discussing warfare. At first, this seems to contain a lot of circular logic, as sitting at a bar and having a well lubricated patron go on about people who "Act because they believe, believing in the Act." Qiao's and Wang's work comes out better than that, but it takes some close reading to get there.
The incorporation of the military and the private sectors, the diplomatic corps, and whatever cooperating alliances may be involved is clearly a quite complex way of going to war. How can such a combination be effectively coordinated and managed? Here, democracies seem to be at a disadvantage, while authoritarian governments without public input or even multiple political parties appear to have a significant advantage. China's one-party organization works well for them in competition with a democratic, multi-party state with changing top leadership.
There is much in this small book to ponder. Those with an interest in history in the making should find it well worth reading. It is worrisome, especially when we continue to learn of foreign cyber penetrations of our government agencies, private corporations, complexes such as regional electrical power grids, and individuals. Are we successfully doing likewise to the strong competitor, potential enemy states we face? One would hope we are at least staying even, but that is not likely to be part of any press releases from our national government. This book gives us many other questions to which we are unlikely to be informed. Dave Kilcullen's recent book provides a more recent and more global assessment of the spectrum of international competition in his 2020 book, "The Dragons and the Snakes." His book draws upon, and introduced me to, "Unrestricted Warfare."
May 21, 2020
I read this book just prior to 9/11 and have never forgotten the information shared by the two generals who wrote the book. I had loaned my copy several years ago so decided to invest in a new one. The authors state they are generals in the Chinese army but that has never been confirmed, to my knowledge. The book, which was published in 1999, is mostly about how and why wars are fought and it mostly concentrates on the time after the Gulf War. The authors are complimentary to the United States in the way they conducted the Gulf War and state that the 'Reorganization Act', passed by Congress in 1986, under President Reagan, was "The most successful and fitting application of military command since the services were divided". The Reorganization Act insured that the three branches of the military would pull together to fight the same war. They then state, "What you must know is that this is a nationality (U.S.) that has never been willing to pay the price of life and, moreover, has always vied for victory at all costs." During the Gulf War, of the 500,000 troops we sent, there were only 148 fatalities and 458 wounded. These authors felt that our use of high-technology weaponry was the reason for our victory and I am sure that is likely true. They then speak of how future wars will not be anything like the Gulf War and that those wars would be "fought and won in a war beyond the battlefield". They are speaking of cyber attacks, financial warfare, media warfare, regulatory warfare, psychological warfare, germ warfare, etc. We see the recent COVID-19 virus and germ warfare is not too hard to believe. We see how the media who are, in many instances, owned and operated by foreigners control the narrative of what people see and read each day. This book was the first time I had ever heard of Osama bin Laden or George Soros, yet both were mentioned frequently. Bin Laden was mentioned as a terrorist who was responsible for "secondary wars" and Soros was mentioned, also, as being responsible for secondary wars via financial tactics. The book is not some 'Master Plan' to take over the world but it is clear that these generals have studied our culture and our country in depth and are trying to figure the best way to defeat us when the time is right. They are looking for our weak spots and it is clear, from recent events, that we have placed ourselves in a precarious situation that we need to quickly reassess and hope that it isn't too late. I never forgot this book but the information has so much more meaning to me almost twenty years later; after 9/11 and our continuing war in the Middle East...and currently COVID-19. Wake up, America!
July 4, 2022
I was really looking forward to reading this book. After all, both Michael Pillsbury and Mick Ryan mentioned it in their books, The Hundred Year Marathon and War Transformed, respectively. Yet, unlike the subtitle, “China’s Master Plan to Destroy America,” it falls far short of that hubris. Originally penned in Jan 1999 before being translated into English from Chinese many years later, the bluster and posturing narrative is really limited to the preface—so disappointing! Quail and Wang are both Senior colonels in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the book was sanctioned as such by the PLA, so readers naturally assume it is an extension of their thoughts. Contextually, because of when it was written, it reflects pre-9/11 thinking and one must note that China was still in the infancy of their geopolitical rise. Instead of being the ‘Master Plan’ that we expect it to be, it is a really good historical review of conflicts over time, and the language at times reads a bit like Sun Tux’s Art of War. The Unrestricted Warfare part of the title reflects the authors’ notion that to fight without rules (I.e. the US-made world order) and though deception and disruption, a morally-driven US can be defeated because of their own restrictive rules of warfare. The book endlessly talks about information and the advent of IT warfare before it really became a big thing. It also pre-sages the menace Osama bin Laden would presciently become two years later yet it gets many things wrong at the time (no, not because of hindsight). For example, it harps on what they believe the 1991 Gulf War was primarily fought over—Middle Eastern oil to benefit America, rather than its true purpose which was to stand up to aggression and protect the free flow of oil to all countries. It constantly wags its fingers at the US, when it has yet to demonstrate any good the PLA was done globally. It also argues illogically that the post-Gulf War force reductions in America did not lead to a peace dividend but to the advent of IT warfare. Many of its passages are admiring of US capabilities, interestingly, and I had to keep referencing the subtitle on the cover to ensure I was reading the right book’s contents! The authors also have a long section with descriptions of new principles of war that readers may find interesting. All in all, the bark is more lasting than the bite and readers can sleep safely knowing this work falls far short of creating a master plan to destroy America.
March 31, 2020
I was hoping for something different from this book... Something more in line with, oh, the title of the book, perhaps.
"Unrestricted Warfare" has a decent beginning, where the authors explain how the field of war has changed a lot since its early days, and how technology and innovations drive that change:
It then spends most of the rest of its pages talking about the 1991 Iraq War, and its ramifications.
The authors also pay homage to the greats of military strategy; Sun Tzu, Napolean, Clausewitz, Machiavelli, et al.
The book never really got into the meat of the issue; which was what I was expecting - given both its title, and the description here.
I wouldn't recommend this book. It is written in a jumbled format and is excessively long-winded, arduous and dry.
2.5 stars.
"Unrestricted Warfare" has a decent beginning, where the authors explain how the field of war has changed a lot since its early days, and how technology and innovations drive that change:
"The only point which is certain is that, from this point on, war will no longer be what it was originally. Which is to say that, if in the days to come mankind has no choice but to engage in war, it can no longer be carried out in the ways with which we are familiar. It is impossible for us to deny the impact on human society and its soul of the new motivations represented by economic freedom, the concept of human rights, and the awareness of environmental protection, but it is certain that the metamorphosis of warfare will have a more complex backdrop. Otherwise, the immortal bird of warfare will not be able to attain nirvana when it is on the verge of decline: When people begin to lean toward and rejoice in the reduced use of military force to resolve conflicts, war will be reborn in another form and in another arena, becoming an instrument of enormous power in the hands of all those who harbor intentions of controlling other countries or regions.
In this sense, there is reason for us to maintain that the financial attack by George Soros on East Asia, the terrorist attack on the U.S. embassy by Osama Bin Laden, the gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the disciples of the Aum Shinri Kyo, and the havoc wreaked by the likes of Morris Jr. on the Internet, in which the degree of destruction is by no means second to that of a war, represent semi-warfare, quasi-warfare, and subwarfare, that is, the embryonic form of another kind of warfare."
It then spends most of the rest of its pages talking about the 1991 Iraq War, and its ramifications.
The authors also pay homage to the greats of military strategy; Sun Tzu, Napolean, Clausewitz, Machiavelli, et al.
The book never really got into the meat of the issue; which was what I was expecting - given both its title, and the description here.
I wouldn't recommend this book. It is written in a jumbled format and is excessively long-winded, arduous and dry.
2.5 stars.
April 5, 2018
Irrespective of the reasons the authors wrote the book for (propaganda being one), this takes a close look at how China possibly viewed the Gulf War (and also the ongoing one). The renewed emphasis on how the political and military divide has broken personally always made a lot of sense to me.
Taking up arms professionally, at best is a means to express violence in a particular form. The underlying choice of violence is what they keep referring to. The whole destroy bit is just one small part of this that makes the title interesting.
It, however, does not talk about the lack of on-ground match practice (i.e. warfare) for China since 1961 and other minor skirmishes. One can accuse the leading power of not playing an integrated game (much has changed since 1998 when the book was written though), but cannot deny they have a willing and experienced force on the ground.
If you are into getting more perspective about how warfare is viewed or can be viewed. This is a must-read.
Taking up arms professionally, at best is a means to express violence in a particular form. The underlying choice of violence is what they keep referring to. The whole destroy bit is just one small part of this that makes the title interesting.
It, however, does not talk about the lack of on-ground match practice (i.e. warfare) for China since 1961 and other minor skirmishes. One can accuse the leading power of not playing an integrated game (much has changed since 1998 when the book was written though), but cannot deny they have a willing and experienced force on the ground.
If you are into getting more perspective about how warfare is viewed or can be viewed. This is a must-read.
April 17, 2014
Propaganda garbage meant to demonize China. The implication that China may be behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks is particularly vile.
First off, anything coming from the CIA can be safely dismissed as propaganda garbage. Much of the original meaning of the Chinese text was purposefully lost in translation to make the Chinese seem more evil and to compare them with the likes of Hitler and Mussolini.
By the way, the PLA is not inferior to the US's military. Such claims are promulgated as part of the propaganda warfare strategies detailed in this book. This whole book is part of the propaganda warfare strategy. It's all about how to manipulate the public's perception in a favorable way.
First off, anything coming from the CIA can be safely dismissed as propaganda garbage. Much of the original meaning of the Chinese text was purposefully lost in translation to make the Chinese seem more evil and to compare them with the likes of Hitler and Mussolini.
By the way, the PLA is not inferior to the US's military. Such claims are promulgated as part of the propaganda warfare strategies detailed in this book. This whole book is part of the propaganda warfare strategy. It's all about how to manipulate the public's perception in a favorable way.
July 26, 2021
If this book was a breakthrough for Western militaries in 1990's and a wake up call at current time then I can say only it is great disappointment especially concerning the modern Western military thought.
First, concept of total war (or what is called unrestricted warfare here) is as old as Roman campaigns in Dalmatia and today's Spain. Whoever read anything about the Peninsular campaign and Napoleon's campaign in Russia or WW2 Poland military actions or SOE actions and sabotages of industry and means of production, Germany's constant play of Ireland against UK from WW1 till the end of WW2, IRA and ETA, Middle East, assassinations, guerilla warfare and especially anti-guerilla warfare in the Balkans that resulted in high civilian casualties etc etc will recognize all of the above when reading this book's mentions of state and non-state actors.
Full scale psychological operations against civilian populations during Cold War (Africa, Asia, South America, Italy, contested areas near Iron curtain) using media outlets, mind-messing, changes of the regimes directly or indirectly, introducing blockades and sanctions ..... this was all as old as at least 1960's. So in general nothing new and breathtaking, except that these are writings of officers from a foreign country about use of all these measures against the America (primary opposition to China's interests). Even actions of non-state entities (cartels especially but also almost every Middle-Eastern militia) should not be a surprise since 1980's - by undermining the government they de-facto became the governments with their economy, politics, armed forces and security services.
So basically only value of the book is the way Chinese military views the US actions and doctrine starting from the First Gulf war (last old-style inter-nation war) to the time book was published. I have to say that they have a very keen eye and are very capable to link policy papers, military doctrines and non-military elements. This must be a single book where economic-hitmen are portrayed as what they are in context of military operations, very dangerous actors capable of plunging foreign markets into abyss. Although they are not directly connected with the government they are like wild dogs unleashed on any new market, acting as frauds and tricksters in order to extricate as much loot as possible - all within the law of course, because they know all the small writings. They have made huge disservice to the West at the end of Cold War and are main (or to be honest the single) reason for dislike of West in all Eastern European countries that went through so called transition period.
Since they are what you might call deniable asset they are used indirectly to strengthen the policy goals.
So, as I said very keen eye and very much aware of the IT technologies and the support role cyber warfare plays in the new world. I especially like how they are adamant that only combined use of all of the means at hand will result in victory (which is the main challenge they see - ability to adapt to ever emerging new circumstances). This view that cyber warfare plays only role of one of the arms deployed into the theater matches some of the other works I came across. On its own various arms disciplines cannot succeed. Combined they will subdue any opponent.
Also interesting point is how putting full control of means of war into hands of politicians actually produces more stress and possible vectors for conflict because they just do not know when to stop when they take the wrong turn (just look at Vietnam war, almost regular bombardment of Iraq after every affair during Clinton's presidency, not to mention occupation of Iraq during Bush (the son) in search of phantasm called WMD etc and finally way politicians handled the crisis last and this year] - they just know only to press forward because to admit they made a mistake is something only intelligent people do and lets be honest people that get elected are only nominally in this group. If you do not believe look at the episode or two of "Yes, Prime Minister" to see who actually pulls the strings and how they just keep digging deeper and deeper after first mistake they make. But I am getting off topic.
As an insight into Chinese military practice and doctrine very interesting book. It shows Chinese ability to blend experience of others with their own history.
As a breakthrough book (even at the time when it was written) ..... I dont see it as such because all of the elements presented are taken and re-arranged from the US military approach [only that Chinese at the time saw US army as able to see where it needs to go, but completely unwilling to change itself to reach the goal because they might lose funding for some of the expensive technologies - which might not be the case post 2001, when US military started to transform into highly efficient and deadly war machine)].
Only reason I gave this book 4 stars is terrible translation for this edition. Man it took me sometimes an hour to connect the dots and link finalized sentences with parts of text in the parenthesis, not to mention some weird.... weird!.....sentence structures that have no start or end. They truly need to improve editing.
Recommended as an introductory work into old/new theory of war where nothing is sacrosanct and everything is eligible target.
First, concept of total war (or what is called unrestricted warfare here) is as old as Roman campaigns in Dalmatia and today's Spain. Whoever read anything about the Peninsular campaign and Napoleon's campaign in Russia or WW2 Poland military actions or SOE actions and sabotages of industry and means of production, Germany's constant play of Ireland against UK from WW1 till the end of WW2, IRA and ETA, Middle East, assassinations, guerilla warfare and especially anti-guerilla warfare in the Balkans that resulted in high civilian casualties etc etc will recognize all of the above when reading this book's mentions of state and non-state actors.
Full scale psychological operations against civilian populations during Cold War (Africa, Asia, South America, Italy, contested areas near Iron curtain) using media outlets, mind-messing, changes of the regimes directly or indirectly, introducing blockades and sanctions ..... this was all as old as at least 1960's. So in general nothing new and breathtaking, except that these are writings of officers from a foreign country about use of all these measures against the America (primary opposition to China's interests). Even actions of non-state entities (cartels especially but also almost every Middle-Eastern militia) should not be a surprise since 1980's - by undermining the government they de-facto became the governments with their economy, politics, armed forces and security services.
So basically only value of the book is the way Chinese military views the US actions and doctrine starting from the First Gulf war (last old-style inter-nation war) to the time book was published. I have to say that they have a very keen eye and are very capable to link policy papers, military doctrines and non-military elements. This must be a single book where economic-hitmen are portrayed as what they are in context of military operations, very dangerous actors capable of plunging foreign markets into abyss. Although they are not directly connected with the government they are like wild dogs unleashed on any new market, acting as frauds and tricksters in order to extricate as much loot as possible - all within the law of course, because they know all the small writings. They have made huge disservice to the West at the end of Cold War and are main (or to be honest the single) reason for dislike of West in all Eastern European countries that went through so called transition period.
Since they are what you might call deniable asset they are used indirectly to strengthen the policy goals.
So, as I said very keen eye and very much aware of the IT technologies and the support role cyber warfare plays in the new world. I especially like how they are adamant that only combined use of all of the means at hand will result in victory (which is the main challenge they see - ability to adapt to ever emerging new circumstances). This view that cyber warfare plays only role of one of the arms deployed into the theater matches some of the other works I came across. On its own various arms disciplines cannot succeed. Combined they will subdue any opponent.
Also interesting point is how putting full control of means of war into hands of politicians actually produces more stress and possible vectors for conflict because they just do not know when to stop when they take the wrong turn (just look at Vietnam war, almost regular bombardment of Iraq after every affair during Clinton's presidency, not to mention occupation of Iraq during Bush (the son) in search of phantasm called WMD etc and finally way politicians handled the crisis last and this year] - they just know only to press forward because to admit they made a mistake is something only intelligent people do and lets be honest people that get elected are only nominally in this group. If you do not believe look at the episode or two of "Yes, Prime Minister" to see who actually pulls the strings and how they just keep digging deeper and deeper after first mistake they make. But I am getting off topic.
As an insight into Chinese military practice and doctrine very interesting book. It shows Chinese ability to blend experience of others with their own history.
As a breakthrough book (even at the time when it was written) ..... I dont see it as such because all of the elements presented are taken and re-arranged from the US military approach [only that Chinese at the time saw US army as able to see where it needs to go, but completely unwilling to change itself to reach the goal because they might lose funding for some of the expensive technologies - which might not be the case post 2001, when US military started to transform into highly efficient and deadly war machine)].
Only reason I gave this book 4 stars is terrible translation for this edition. Man it took me sometimes an hour to connect the dots and link finalized sentences with parts of text in the parenthesis, not to mention some weird.... weird!.....sentence structures that have no start or end. They truly need to improve editing.
Recommended as an introductory work into old/new theory of war where nothing is sacrosanct and everything is eligible target.
August 1, 2025
Excellent look into the perspective of modern warfare as seen from the PLA following the Gulf War and Southeast Asia market crash in the early to mid 90s. Although fairly high-level, many of the thoughts in this book show their influence in tactics seen over 25 years later. Thought provoking for sure.
April 15, 2025
Besides the "God bless America forever" title stamped on by God-fearing Americans, good meta-read.
Perfect irony that it was interpreted as a blueprint (see the damn title) rather than description and so became self-fulfilling.
Link: Zuangzi - Art of War - Red Rising - Kissinger - The Prince
Perfect irony that it was interpreted as a blueprint (see the damn title) rather than description and so became self-fulfilling.
Link: Zuangzi - Art of War - Red Rising - Kissinger - The Prince
September 2, 2022
Substance: a witches brew of poisonous ideas which if implemented will backfire and cripple Chinese foreign policy. At its foundation it's Thrasymachus's argument or that of the Athenians to the Melians. Purportedly, state-to-state relations are all force and fraud. Happily that's not true, one ought read Marcus Tullius Cicero to understand why. In any case, if China is so foolish as to try pursuing lawless asymmetric constant low-risk attacks on the USA it will learn, and already is, that this is a really foolish policy, and will not lead to anything solid, since who could trust the state capitalist mercantilist dictators, whose very army claims not to believe in law, and thus lacks any sense of justice. Hitler tried a policy of force and fraud too, and look where that led?
The translation is fluid, well written, and since contemporary Chinese is much less pithy than classical and contemporary translators have much better tools than our forbears I presume it's a good translation. Translations' quality tends to reflect the original work.
It's a must read, but partily since it is so very wrong, and also to understand how to school the fools who would run such catastrophically foolish foreign policies.
Let's hope the smarter and saner elements in the PRC remember: "Politics must control the gun, and the gun must not control politics" -Mao Zedong
The translation is fluid, well written, and since contemporary Chinese is much less pithy than classical and contemporary translators have much better tools than our forbears I presume it's a good translation. Translations' quality tends to reflect the original work.
It's a must read, but partily since it is so very wrong, and also to understand how to school the fools who would run such catastrophically foolish foreign policies.
Let's hope the smarter and saner elements in the PRC remember: "Politics must control the gun, and the gun must not control politics" -Mao Zedong
December 22, 2019
Firstly the title is pure hyperbole, which is unfortunate as the book seems to be a war college long form ‘a way of war according to three colonels’ who were apparently mesmerised by US capability displayed during the Gulf War of ‘91.
Of the book, I’d say there is around six excellent pages of thoughts covering the centrality of network enabled reconnaissance strike linkages and the benefits of multi-domain responses. The chapter covering ‘golden rules’ was pure hokum - singularity for soldiers this was not.
What was of use was the authentic voice of the authors grappling with how to respond to what was at the time a vast chasm in China and US warfighting potential. Interesting from a historical perspective but, advancing military thought - look elsewhere.
Of the book, I’d say there is around six excellent pages of thoughts covering the centrality of network enabled reconnaissance strike linkages and the benefits of multi-domain responses. The chapter covering ‘golden rules’ was pure hokum - singularity for soldiers this was not.
What was of use was the authentic voice of the authors grappling with how to respond to what was at the time a vast chasm in China and US warfighting potential. Interesting from a historical perspective but, advancing military thought - look elsewhere.
August 13, 2021
Like many other books from the 90s, this one aged fairly well. It missed 9/11 and the War on Terror, but that was a civilizational blip anyway - this book is the book to read when thinking about non-kinetic warfare (e.g. cyber, information, economic). Interesting to think about while playing Go - the frontal attack of chess rarely can outcompete the flanking attacks so critical in the Go strategy.
Ultimately, warfare is changing, and this is a solid treatise on how China has been structuring their forces. Particularly interesting when contextualized with Chinese re-investment in the physical military - nuclear, space, and naval armaments.
Ultimately, warfare is changing, and this is a solid treatise on how China has been structuring their forces. Particularly interesting when contextualized with Chinese re-investment in the physical military - nuclear, space, and naval armaments.
June 18, 2018
First off, I read a bootleg translation version, not this crazy-covered book with a misleading subtitle. Secondly, while it is really interesting to get the PLA's view on American military strategy (or really the evolution of strategy post Gulf War), it really read like a globalization-rehash of The Art of War. The final sections of the book nearly say as much. The guidelines for unrestricted warfare in Chapter 8 are illuminating and interesting, but they are also reminiscent of the "principles of offensive operations" I learned at Fort Benning.
Don't believe the hype.
Don't believe the hype.
June 15, 2020
A book that was written two decades ago, some of its then avant-garde concepts like lawfare, economic warfare, network warfare and the use of terror groups are now established as part of military canon. An interesting insight on how Chinese military thinkers may have approached anti-US military planning.
December 19, 2022
‘ In an age when an old order is about to be removed, those in lead are frequently those who are the first to destroy the rules or those who are the earliest to adapt to the new situation’. How to know the new situation of war? By reading this book full of crucial information about how war became after the Gulf War: unrestricted, on multiple levels and omnidirectional.
June 14, 2025
廿六年前寫的書, 今天讀來完全不會過時, 還有時可怕的講中了。預測到911不在話下，資訊， 電腦病毒, 生化。。。至於書中對具體美國軍官的批評，我等小土豆無從分析，但作者認為美軍中的陸軍與海軍的心病，則連我都有所耳聞。雖然各軍種間有競爭不是什麼奇事，但美國因為財大氣粗，軍工的投入巨大，要貪污或者搶ｂｕｄｇｅｔ，實在有太多的操作空間了。就是不知道在解放軍中，這種暗戰的情況如何。
又，在讀三體時，在要用線把敵船切片時，中國人的一句話，說要讓船在白天入巴拿馬運河，因為不會有人在睡覺。。。我除了嘔心外，更肯定中國一定會戰勝美國。這是五千年來打仗所累積下來的思維高度，不是Ｙａｎｋｅｅ所能比較。在這本書，目標，戰略，想像力，都是直中要害。
又，在讀三體時，在要用線把敵船切片時，中國人的一句話，說要讓船在白天入巴拿馬運河，因為不會有人在睡覺。。。我除了嘔心外，更肯定中國一定會戰勝美國。這是五千年來打仗所累積下來的思維高度，不是Ｙａｎｋｅｅ所能比較。在這本書，目標，戰略，想像力，都是直中要害。
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