This book is an engaging account of the origins of the Royal Dutch Shell group in the oil industry. The author is a policy/energy wonk and not a professional historian. The story tends to focus on individuals rather than the complexities of corporate structures, antitrust law, or geological strata. This is not a huge problem, since the individuals in this story are literally of world historical scope - John D. Rockefeller, Henri Deterding, Marcus Samuel, Winston Churchill, Teddy Roosevelt, and others. The result is a book that tells an important and highly readable story and is similar in style to authors like Erik Larson.
I especially liked several aspects of how Mr. Doran told this story.
First, business strategies are not seen as developing by themselves as if they were garden plants. Instead, these strategies develop in opposition to those of other firms (and governments). Shell and Royal Dutch develop in opposition to Standard Oil and Rockefeller. That opposition is central to the development of these firms, their amalgamation and their entry into the US market. This is the difference between seeing strategy as a plan versus seeing it as a game, in which subsequent actions depend upon the moves of an opponent.
Second, government - in this case really big government - is an inherent part of the story. Shell could not have succeeded against Standard without the antitrust attacks on Standard by US Federal and state governments. Doran clearly wants to cast Samuel and Deterding and plowing free market field to free the oil business from the stranglehold imposed by Standard oil. However, this is not the free market mayhem of the open outcry markets in Chicago of days past but instead a battle among would be oligarchs who all want to dominate their business to the extent possible.
Third, technology, collusion, and competition are all interlinked in this story. Sure, one needs to have a sufficiently sophisticated technology or else one will not get the required scale and scope of production and will lose out to better endowed competitors. However, that technology needs to fit within the business context of the industry in order to provide its intended value. The best technologies do not always win out, especially in the short tun. For example, the development of the ultrasafe tanker by Shell was critical to its strategy of taking on Standard. For the technological superiority of the tanker to help Shell, however, the design of the ship had to be accepted as safe by the Suez Canal authorities, the opposition to the acceptance of that design had to be defeated, and the Canal had to be under the control of the British government. Once all of these stars fell in line, then Shell had a competitive advantage, at least for a while. Until they did, the enhanced tanker design could not help Shell enough to make a difference.
Finally, the book argues for the importance of history and the need to understand it to appreciate the present. While such claims can prove dubious, especially in books targeted to policy audiences, I think Mr. Doran has a case here and his concluding chapter is worthwhile. The linkage with contemporary Russia and Gazprom and the crisis in the Ukraine is reasonable and shows that Standard Oil has provided a playbook that is still relevant.
On top of all this, it is a very entertaining book.