What do you think?
Rate this book
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice
This book examines the strategy and means to defeat insurgents or guerrilla movements based on the author's first-hand experience in China, Greece, Indochina, and Algeria. This volume in the Praeger Security International (PSI) series Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era defines the laws of insurgency and outlines the strategy and tactics to combat such threats. Drawn from the observations of a French officer, David Galula, who witnessed guerrilla warfare on three continents, the book remains relevant today as American policymakers, military analysts, and members of the public look to the counterinsurgency era of the 1960s for lessons to apply to the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. With a new foreword by John A. Nagl, author of Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Praeger, 2002).
106 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1964
71 people are currently reading
2808 people want to read
About the author
David Galula
7 books15 followersDavid Galula was a French military officer and scholar who was influential in developing the theory and practice of counterinsurgency warfare.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 58 reviews
February 1, 2017
Short, lucid, clear how-to manual on defeating insurgencies. Written in 1963, but remains sound from everything I have read on the subject. Describes the clear-hold-build strategy eventually applied successfully in Iraq (though not by that exact name). Belongs in every counterinsurgent's backpack.
An insurgency can only succeed by building on the population's real grievances. A counterinsurgency can only succeed by winning the support of the people. Thus, the objective of the conflict is the people. Military action is secondary to political action. The war is won or lost at the company level, where the leader is in direct and continuous contact with the population.
An insurgency can only succeed by building on the population's real grievances. A counterinsurgency can only succeed by winning the support of the people. Thus, the objective of the conflict is the people. Military action is secondary to political action. The war is won or lost at the company level, where the leader is in direct and continuous contact with the population.
September 4, 2010
I have been doing some studying up on warfare and counterinsurgency warfare in particular, and this is one the most basic and essential texts on the subject. Reading it, so much of what Galula talks about seems so obvious now, but that only stands as evidence of how seminal a book it is in the field. There is plenty in it to make one wonder why the U.S. was so slow to put some of these principles into effect. There is also much in it to make me think how massive a political failure the Iraq war - and to a good extent, the war in Afghanistan as well - represents. Galula warns strongly multiple times of the dangers of having soldiers do any job that should belong to civilians for any extended length of time. And yet, in these wars, the civilians barely showed. The military, by all evidence, seems to have been more flexible and creative than our civilian agencies, with better leadership. I think this was not a failure so much in the abilities or qualifications of any civilians sent, but in the ill-informed, vague, and/or changing policies.
October 23, 2012
I'm actually quite surprised- because I have long since learned that anything trendy usually sucks, I was not expecting much from this book. In addition, I have read many other books on this subject over the last couple of decades. I have to admit, however, that 'Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory & Practice' is easily the most clearly and concisely written step-by-step guide to conducting counterinsurgency operations that I have yet read. Lieutenant Colonel Galula's reputation, which I had believed before reading this book to have become somewhat over-inflated of late, was apparently well earned. This book is on the recommended reading list at CGSC for good reason, but it seems to me that NCOs & company-grade officers would perhaps find it even more interesting and useful than field-grade officers. I would personally recommend this book highly to all of the above and also anyone else interested in military art & science and/or modern military history.
November 23, 2008
The book that informed the transformation of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. It's filled with ideas that were radical at the time.
October 7, 2020
Overall, I enjoyed the book more because it forced an internal discussion between myself and the author, than as an informative text. I found myself dis-agreeing with a sever points while also nodding in agreement with others and writing these questions in the margins as if the author was going to respond.
This book is a great primer into insurgencies and counterinsurgencies and one to get the mental juices flowing. If you have real-world experiences with the topic or have studied it in depth, you may find yourself a bit frustrated in some of the ‘this is how it is’ points in the books. Even so, many of those ideas and concepts still hold true today which make this book worth a read. It’s length too is something extremely manageable.
This book is a great primer into insurgencies and counterinsurgencies and one to get the mental juices flowing. If you have real-world experiences with the topic or have studied it in depth, you may find yourself a bit frustrated in some of the ‘this is how it is’ points in the books. Even so, many of those ideas and concepts still hold true today which make this book worth a read. It’s length too is something extremely manageable.
March 2, 2025
This is a short, classic work on how to defeat insurgencies. The book is well-written, finely argued, and comes from the mind of a man with real world experience on the topic, all of which help to explain its lasting impact and legacy.
The book acts as a primer on operations for someone needing to end an insurgency, giving a series of general rules of thumb while constantly reminding the reading that specifics of a given circumstance are vital to success. That being said, the basic formula underlined here seems correct. Galula starts by giving a brief sketch of the insurgent and his practices, his goals, and his organizational traits. He then discusses the general issue of asymmetric warfare. This is quite interesting and useful enough to have in one's conceptual toolbox, because it seems to analogize itself quite well with many different scenarios. The basic idea is that, unlike conventional warfare between two standing armies, the "hot revolutionary war" involves two sides playing very different games with very different starting hands. The counterinsurgent starts strong and ignorant, the insurgent weak and with the initiative. The basic goal of each is the same, despite their differing styles and structures. They both want to gain control over the ultimate resource in this game, the support of the population in a given area.
The insurgent's long term goal is establishing something like political autonomy for themselves, and to do that they need to control a territory, which they can do by arming themselves, organizing, and gaining the support of the population. The COIN (COunter INsurgent) on the other hand also wants to gain control of the population in order to cut the insurgent's vital political and recruiting lifeblood off. This goal ought to inform every action taken by both sides, and Galula does a good job of emphasizing this. Much of the book is a little boring to read, consisting of Galula saying something like, "pointy islands in the middle of the ocean are good for COINs because they can outgun and contain the insurgents effectively cutting them off, but round landlocked countries are good for insurgents because it is easier for them to evade capture," and then elaborating on that point to some level. This is aided by the brevity of the work, and the brisk pace at which he moves between topics.
The ultimate point he makes is that the conflict between insurgents and COINs is ultimately a deeply political one, maybe more political in nature than any other form of warfare. What does he mean by that? Simply that the way of winning in these revolutionary wars is by doing a better job of winning over and politically organizing the population to cooperate with you. The last few chapters focus on operational information and general formulae for getting this to happen for the COIN operator. This essentially goes like: clear out the main insurgent forces, establish a static set of units who will begin living amongst the population, conduct a census, establish and understand family connections, gather intelligence about the population, begin projects that benefit the population, discriminate between sympathizers and the politically apathetic, systematically eliminate the excuses that the insurgents provide for not cooperating, set up small scale operations against remaining insurgent forces, protect the local population, establish stronger ties with the population, somehow choose leaders from among this population (he recommends just letting them vote), assign tasks to the new leaders, give more power and responsibility to the competent ones, incorporate them into your own political machine, fully integrate the population as a cooperative unit, use them to help squash whatever remains of the insurgency, which will likely be the die-hard adherents to the insurgent cause. This will all be going on while psychological operations and propaganda is being used to clearly articulate your goals to the population, goad the weak insurgency into attacking, bolstering support amongst the population, and driving a wedge between members of the insurgency. It is helpful to get the members of the populace to start acting as propagandists for you, and is a goal you should pursue almost immediately once you have established their trust.
One interesting thing he mentions in his concluding remarks is an old article from the New York Times Magazine, where a political organizer in America talks about how few people there are who are actually responsible and consistently engaged in governing America. The (maybe an) implication here being that even in a political steeped culture like the US, most people aren't active political participants, so it is possible to effectively establish control over a population by eliminating pockets of resistance without mobilizing the masses.
Galula himself summarizes his vision of counterinsurgency operations as striving to "build a political machine from the population upward," which I think he does a good job of explaining the how and why of in this work. This book also passes the standard quality check of leaving the reader with a bunch of other works they want to read. To some degree this is not a direct result of the author himself. He relies on and cites his personal experience more so than some deep literature on the question of counterinsurgency. This can't be held against him, of course, because he was in the process of more or less creating the literature on COIN in this book. That said, there are several works that this book inspired me to pick up or to plan to check out from my school's library at some point. These include Coogan's book on the IRA, Bowyer Bell's book on revolts and the IRA, Horne's book A Savage War of Peace, some books on the insurgency in Iraq, Mao and Che's writings on guerrilla warfare (just to round out the picture on the classic works here), as well as some RAND studies on COIN. Ultimately this book did a lot to spur my interest in better understanding the actual mechanisms and strategies employed in attempts to achieve population control, both in general and in COIN scenarios, which has also driven me to try and find more books on topics like that. This might finally get me to read James C. Scott's Seeing Like a State, which has been on my shelf since I read Against the Grain some years ago.
The book acts as a primer on operations for someone needing to end an insurgency, giving a series of general rules of thumb while constantly reminding the reading that specifics of a given circumstance are vital to success. That being said, the basic formula underlined here seems correct. Galula starts by giving a brief sketch of the insurgent and his practices, his goals, and his organizational traits. He then discusses the general issue of asymmetric warfare. This is quite interesting and useful enough to have in one's conceptual toolbox, because it seems to analogize itself quite well with many different scenarios. The basic idea is that, unlike conventional warfare between two standing armies, the "hot revolutionary war" involves two sides playing very different games with very different starting hands. The counterinsurgent starts strong and ignorant, the insurgent weak and with the initiative. The basic goal of each is the same, despite their differing styles and structures. They both want to gain control over the ultimate resource in this game, the support of the population in a given area.
The insurgent's long term goal is establishing something like political autonomy for themselves, and to do that they need to control a territory, which they can do by arming themselves, organizing, and gaining the support of the population. The COIN (COunter INsurgent) on the other hand also wants to gain control of the population in order to cut the insurgent's vital political and recruiting lifeblood off. This goal ought to inform every action taken by both sides, and Galula does a good job of emphasizing this. Much of the book is a little boring to read, consisting of Galula saying something like, "pointy islands in the middle of the ocean are good for COINs because they can outgun and contain the insurgents effectively cutting them off, but round landlocked countries are good for insurgents because it is easier for them to evade capture," and then elaborating on that point to some level. This is aided by the brevity of the work, and the brisk pace at which he moves between topics.
The ultimate point he makes is that the conflict between insurgents and COINs is ultimately a deeply political one, maybe more political in nature than any other form of warfare. What does he mean by that? Simply that the way of winning in these revolutionary wars is by doing a better job of winning over and politically organizing the population to cooperate with you. The last few chapters focus on operational information and general formulae for getting this to happen for the COIN operator. This essentially goes like: clear out the main insurgent forces, establish a static set of units who will begin living amongst the population, conduct a census, establish and understand family connections, gather intelligence about the population, begin projects that benefit the population, discriminate between sympathizers and the politically apathetic, systematically eliminate the excuses that the insurgents provide for not cooperating, set up small scale operations against remaining insurgent forces, protect the local population, establish stronger ties with the population, somehow choose leaders from among this population (he recommends just letting them vote), assign tasks to the new leaders, give more power and responsibility to the competent ones, incorporate them into your own political machine, fully integrate the population as a cooperative unit, use them to help squash whatever remains of the insurgency, which will likely be the die-hard adherents to the insurgent cause. This will all be going on while psychological operations and propaganda is being used to clearly articulate your goals to the population, goad the weak insurgency into attacking, bolstering support amongst the population, and driving a wedge between members of the insurgency. It is helpful to get the members of the populace to start acting as propagandists for you, and is a goal you should pursue almost immediately once you have established their trust.
One interesting thing he mentions in his concluding remarks is an old article from the New York Times Magazine, where a political organizer in America talks about how few people there are who are actually responsible and consistently engaged in governing America. The (maybe an) implication here being that even in a political steeped culture like the US, most people aren't active political participants, so it is possible to effectively establish control over a population by eliminating pockets of resistance without mobilizing the masses.
Galula himself summarizes his vision of counterinsurgency operations as striving to "build a political machine from the population upward," which I think he does a good job of explaining the how and why of in this work. This book also passes the standard quality check of leaving the reader with a bunch of other works they want to read. To some degree this is not a direct result of the author himself. He relies on and cites his personal experience more so than some deep literature on the question of counterinsurgency. This can't be held against him, of course, because he was in the process of more or less creating the literature on COIN in this book. That said, there are several works that this book inspired me to pick up or to plan to check out from my school's library at some point. These include Coogan's book on the IRA, Bowyer Bell's book on revolts and the IRA, Horne's book A Savage War of Peace, some books on the insurgency in Iraq, Mao and Che's writings on guerrilla warfare (just to round out the picture on the classic works here), as well as some RAND studies on COIN. Ultimately this book did a lot to spur my interest in better understanding the actual mechanisms and strategies employed in attempts to achieve population control, both in general and in COIN scenarios, which has also driven me to try and find more books on topics like that. This might finally get me to read James C. Scott's Seeing Like a State, which has been on my shelf since I read Against the Grain some years ago.
April 10, 2015
For a book written in 1963, it really holds up. A bit oversimplified, but still a foundational work on counterinsurgency theory for good reason.
October 21, 2025
As a reader of counterinsurgency, and having written numerous fictional stories on what I thought was effective counterinsurgency, I was largely incorrect in some respects, stemming from my personal experiences in Iraq in 2004 and Afghanistan in 2008. Many of the things we did as a nation were not the right way to do things, but despite our intentions, we continued to fail. It's not always wanton destruction of a host nation, but the amount of mistakes and missteps that we encountered during Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. There were notable issues that sparked the ire of those being "liberated" and others. The reason I bring this up is that the author has served in numerous counterinsurgency campaigns and offers valuable insights into how to prosecute them effectively and reliably. Things that some people need to consider before acting.
August 10, 2018
I'm actually surprised. It's a lucid, engaging and clear book that in spite of being short, explains in a precise and detailed way the whole process of conformation and establishment of an armed insurgency and everything related to its natural reaction; the counterinsurgency. It's a book rich in historical examples that allows to understand several of the armed revolutions and the overthrow of governments, as well as their failures. This book is still in force despite having been written in the 60s, since the principles observed by the author have not changed much over the years. It's worth reading.
July 25, 2018
This book is highly overrated. Read Taber's War of the Flea instead. Sure, it's from the insurgent point of view, but you'll learn far more there than you will here, because while the subtitle may be "Theory and Practice," the truth of the matter is that there's no real "practice" in this book.
April 29, 2019
Published in 1963, so a large portion of the materials is kind of out-of-date, but the core information remains relevant today in insurgency tactics and remedies against guerrilla warfare tactics and acts of terrorism. This type of text is important should remain within the same echelon of military tactics texts as 'The Art of War' and Mao Tse-Tung's 'On Guerrilla Warfare'.
February 26, 2022
Counterinsurgency Warfare outlines the principles to combat the forms of insurgency seen throughout history. This work provides straight forward no-nonsense doctrine to combat the forms of revolutionary wars that the world experienced throughout the past. While useful as a handbook, it comes off as a 'beat a dead' horse approach to the problem set.
August 27, 2022
Once you’ve read this, you begin to see the tactics every and in a myriad of applicable scenarios: the propaganda, the way in which leverage is conducted, and you begin to see things through the lens of insurgents vs counter-insurgents; whose performing offensively vs who caused to react. How it all functions is most interesting, however.
March 19, 2025
Originally published in 1964, Galula’s work remains a classic in the ever-growing body of literature on counterinsurgency warfare. Informed by Galula’s experience with irregular warfare in Algeria and Indochina (among others), the lessons contained within this volume are just as relevant to the US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. This truly is a timeless classic.
June 25, 2021
Good to have finally read this classic. Wish it was a bit longer, but a solid intro to the topic at a time when it was a fairly new and radical theory among most twentieth century western militaries. Recommended.
December 19, 2024
Foundational piece for anyone studying national security, international affairs, or warfare in general. definitely helped me pass a couple classes and build my framework of knowledge. Written about 60 years ago but the doctrine outlined in this book has aged fairly well.
October 18, 2018
One of the authentic and detailed exposition on the nature and cause of insurgency.
December 17, 2018
Dry and overly academic
January 14, 2019
An informative, dispassionate, analytical treatment of asymmetrical warfare.
March 14, 2021
the first part which is about organizing an insurgency is a bit interesting but the latter is dry and dull.
January 26, 2022
Canon for a reason but you won't like it unless you're already interested
December 27, 2024
Worth reading for those interested in matters relating to warfare and tactics.
July 15, 2020
Its more of a textbook and if u r writing a paper or some thesis, then go through it...
January 29, 2022
This review of mine is qualified on the basis that I have never served in the armed forces in any capacity, much less participated as a civilian in a counterinsurgency campaign, or even experienced one beforehand. Much of what I have to say are merely reflections of an amateur observer. With that out of the way, I found this to be quite the lucid & engaging book.
Despite being a rather slim volume consisting of only 100 pages, and reflecting upon a short time-span of counterinsurgency dating from the end of WWII to the early 60s, this is a concisely-written book that can either be scoured in a day or contemplated in a week. Galula structured the book in such a way that a reader is first introduced to the "big picture" before being indoctrinated with the "devil in the details". Thus while the meat of his thesis, titled 'The Operations' & lies in the final chapter, skipping the foregoing chapters will ensure confusion on the part of the reader as Galula continuously makes references to terms or concepts discussed prior.
Has the book held up well since 1962? This being 2018 with the specter of contemporary terrorism, raging feverishly in the Sahel Belt to the Euphrates & reaching out to Southeast Asia's tropical climes, based on an ideology predicated on nihilism & occupies a non-negotiable space? I suppose if David Galula was vouchsafed time to a) observe the Vietnam War, witnessing the My Lai massacres & the Tet Offensive, & b) the continuing war in Afghanistan, with repeated deployment of U.S. troops & number of Taliban attacks in Kabul since they were ousted from power in 2002, he is quite unlikely to repudiate his analysis.
One of the more interesting chapters related to the insurgents' doctrine, in particular what Galula describes as 'Orthodox pattern'. Clearly he was referring to the inception & evolution of the Communist Party of China, in the manner it chose to moderate its ideology & garnered support via dissimulation. The CPC today, then employing the organizational techniques described herein during its nascent days until 1949, has embedded itself far too deep in the populace via its hydra-like bureaucracy & party structure for it to be removed by force or suasion.
David Galula, himself a ranking officer in the armed forces, staunchly advocated political direction & control over counterinsurgency efforts & dismissed outright any suggestions that it be military-led. His wisdom is reflected in the histories of two SEA nations: one opted to go along with a military-backed, anti-communist pogrom that consumed hundreds of thousands in lives. While another, under the hands of its former colonial master, settled instead for a politically-based, police-centric counterinsurgency against the guerillas. The results speaks for itself: the former has yet to reconcile itself to the pogroms & is still somewhat saddled with a highly politicized military, while the latter managed to avoid military rule of any kind, suborning the generals under civilian rule.
Speaking of Afghanistan, one of Galula's more extreme proscription -which he noted was never initiated by any government during his time, and likewise, even until today- is for the embattled government-of-the-day to concede what is already-lost territories to the insurgent, permit the latter to establish a new administration, & then for the former to run an insurgency against the newly-established rule. But it is a high-stake gamble that may not be taken, for it seems to imply a high political cost for both U.S. & the government in Kabul, even if by merely hinting that such action was being considered. That being said, since I am not privy to the "big picture", much less the "the devil in details", one can only imagine the difficult calculus & practical considerations that the U.S. & Kabul must make that colors the mountain ranges & rocky plains of Afghanistan.
Despite being a rather slim volume consisting of only 100 pages, and reflecting upon a short time-span of counterinsurgency dating from the end of WWII to the early 60s, this is a concisely-written book that can either be scoured in a day or contemplated in a week. Galula structured the book in such a way that a reader is first introduced to the "big picture" before being indoctrinated with the "devil in the details". Thus while the meat of his thesis, titled 'The Operations' & lies in the final chapter, skipping the foregoing chapters will ensure confusion on the part of the reader as Galula continuously makes references to terms or concepts discussed prior.
Has the book held up well since 1962? This being 2018 with the specter of contemporary terrorism, raging feverishly in the Sahel Belt to the Euphrates & reaching out to Southeast Asia's tropical climes, based on an ideology predicated on nihilism & occupies a non-negotiable space? I suppose if David Galula was vouchsafed time to a) observe the Vietnam War, witnessing the My Lai massacres & the Tet Offensive, & b) the continuing war in Afghanistan, with repeated deployment of U.S. troops & number of Taliban attacks in Kabul since they were ousted from power in 2002, he is quite unlikely to repudiate his analysis.
One of the more interesting chapters related to the insurgents' doctrine, in particular what Galula describes as 'Orthodox pattern'. Clearly he was referring to the inception & evolution of the Communist Party of China, in the manner it chose to moderate its ideology & garnered support via dissimulation. The CPC today, then employing the organizational techniques described herein during its nascent days until 1949, has embedded itself far too deep in the populace via its hydra-like bureaucracy & party structure for it to be removed by force or suasion.
David Galula, himself a ranking officer in the armed forces, staunchly advocated political direction & control over counterinsurgency efforts & dismissed outright any suggestions that it be military-led. His wisdom is reflected in the histories of two SEA nations: one opted to go along with a military-backed, anti-communist pogrom that consumed hundreds of thousands in lives. While another, under the hands of its former colonial master, settled instead for a politically-based, police-centric counterinsurgency against the guerillas. The results speaks for itself: the former has yet to reconcile itself to the pogroms & is still somewhat saddled with a highly politicized military, while the latter managed to avoid military rule of any kind, suborning the generals under civilian rule.
Speaking of Afghanistan, one of Galula's more extreme proscription -which he noted was never initiated by any government during his time, and likewise, even until today- is for the embattled government-of-the-day to concede what is already-lost territories to the insurgent, permit the latter to establish a new administration, & then for the former to run an insurgency against the newly-established rule. But it is a high-stake gamble that may not be taken, for it seems to imply a high political cost for both U.S. & the government in Kabul, even if by merely hinting that such action was being considered. That being said, since I am not privy to the "big picture", much less the "the devil in details", one can only imagine the difficult calculus & practical considerations that the U.S. & Kabul must make that colors the mountain ranges & rocky plains of Afghanistan.
December 30, 2010
A testament to a book about military strategy is that it must stand the test of time. Galula's observations and experiences of insurgencies in Algeria, Indochina, Greece, and China many decades ago have been translated into a clear, concise, quick to read guide about counterinsurgency that can be applied to conflicts today. This work does well to explain insurgencies, how they form, how they gather strength, how the counter insurgent can respond, and ultimately defeat the insurgency.
The theories in this work are not rocket science since many people must understand and work together to accomplish the different phases of counterinsurgency. The difficult task is to establish a well thought out doctrine that all levels of leadership must understand and fully embrace. This is not only military leadership from the generals to the privates, but also civilians put in charge of providing economic and social building blocks for the population under duress. Emphasis has been placed on providing services for the population.
If there is one thing to learn from the author it is that military might alone cannot defeat an insurgency and that ultimately it is the support of the population that will win the conflict. The population must sympathize with counter insurgent's cause and voluntarily provide information that will defeat the insurgency.
One topic I found interesting in this book was the clear definition and separation of conventional versus revolutionary conflicts and the statement that all revolutionary conflicts, and therefore insurgencies are political in nature. "A revolutionary war is 20 percent military action and 80 percent political". Most importantly, if the counter insurgent wants to win the conflict, an alternative competing political platform must be provided or a current one reinforced for the population to choose. The political movement of the masses must overwhelm the insurgencies political message. Military ventures against insurgents will ultimately fail if insurgents are still able to recruit new lackeys to their political cause. In fact, well written and directed propaganda is more useful that well directed bullets.
Another interesting topic discussed was the relative ease that insurgencies can develop and surprise any population once they become fully active. One of Galula's laws is, "In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause". This simple statement can be observed in many social causes today. Special interest groups, for good or bad, are able to push an agenda because of their aggressive propaganda and lobbying. I can definitely see how the complacency of the general population can let a political movement that may not be to its direct benefit progress. It is human nature and people are always busy with their own lives to worry about the rest.
The simplicity and common sense approach to this book is what makes it such a worthwhile book to read, but this straightforwardness of the author's writing belies the actual complexity of counter insurgent work. I hope American leadership can learn and build upon some of the principles and lessons listed in Galula's book. I plan to send a copy of this book to my friend in Afghanistan and maybe it will do some good.
The theories in this work are not rocket science since many people must understand and work together to accomplish the different phases of counterinsurgency. The difficult task is to establish a well thought out doctrine that all levels of leadership must understand and fully embrace. This is not only military leadership from the generals to the privates, but also civilians put in charge of providing economic and social building blocks for the population under duress. Emphasis has been placed on providing services for the population.
If there is one thing to learn from the author it is that military might alone cannot defeat an insurgency and that ultimately it is the support of the population that will win the conflict. The population must sympathize with counter insurgent's cause and voluntarily provide information that will defeat the insurgency.
One topic I found interesting in this book was the clear definition and separation of conventional versus revolutionary conflicts and the statement that all revolutionary conflicts, and therefore insurgencies are political in nature. "A revolutionary war is 20 percent military action and 80 percent political". Most importantly, if the counter insurgent wants to win the conflict, an alternative competing political platform must be provided or a current one reinforced for the population to choose. The political movement of the masses must overwhelm the insurgencies political message. Military ventures against insurgents will ultimately fail if insurgents are still able to recruit new lackeys to their political cause. In fact, well written and directed propaganda is more useful that well directed bullets.
Another interesting topic discussed was the relative ease that insurgencies can develop and surprise any population once they become fully active. One of Galula's laws is, "In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause". This simple statement can be observed in many social causes today. Special interest groups, for good or bad, are able to push an agenda because of their aggressive propaganda and lobbying. I can definitely see how the complacency of the general population can let a political movement that may not be to its direct benefit progress. It is human nature and people are always busy with their own lives to worry about the rest.
The simplicity and common sense approach to this book is what makes it such a worthwhile book to read, but this straightforwardness of the author's writing belies the actual complexity of counter insurgent work. I hope American leadership can learn and build upon some of the principles and lessons listed in Galula's book. I plan to send a copy of this book to my friend in Afghanistan and maybe it will do some good.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
March 15, 2019
„Counterinsurgency Warfare“ by David Galula is a brief but striking handbook on the concept of insurgency, its variations and effective countermeasures against it with still great relevance for present situations.
Written as a manual for military readers in 1964 Galula’s book provides a comprehensive understanding of the concept of insurgency in a brief and clear language. Although this might seem as a too academic angle on the topic, it is to be noted that Galula was one of the first to describe insurgency in such a way and thus lay the foundation of a thorough understanding of this kind of warfare, regardless of a specific national scenario. Thus he detached and abstract description of factors, means and effects is not to be seen as a fault, but rather a feature as he provides a framework of reference to use in a variety of conflicts.
Although writing in 1964 Galula already addresses the majority of factors like the asymmetry between forces, prerequisites for successful insurgency, the doctrine to follow and possible angles of effective counterinsurgency correctly and in a surprisingly modern way. His understanding of counterinsurgency is clearly population-centric with intelligence lead operations to deny the insurgent control over the population. Although the formulation of the phases of an effective counterinsurgency campaign may appear overly simplistic, they should only be seen as a generic template for application in a specific scenario. Still Galula already understood the need for political legitimacy of a counterinsurgent government and thus also the need for political reform of the same to win elections and politicize the population by giving them a stake in the political confrontation.
For all modern and reform-oriented thinking Galula is clearly not above critique. Although he does not overtly advise or discuss torture, like Trinquier does, there can be no doubt Galula also sees the need for the counterinsurgent to act against identified insurgents with the utmost ruthlessness. He views insurgents as enemies of the state and the people to be suppressed by overwhelming military force and not dealt with like criminals by the police. His application of military force, population control and intelligence operations, shaped by experience in Indochina and Algeria would not have been in alignment with modern limits to such endeavors.
Overall Galula’s book is a dated but still very relevant and correct treatise on the subject of insurgencies and because of his briefness and directness a good starting point for anybody starting to read on the topic of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.
Written as a manual for military readers in 1964 Galula’s book provides a comprehensive understanding of the concept of insurgency in a brief and clear language. Although this might seem as a too academic angle on the topic, it is to be noted that Galula was one of the first to describe insurgency in such a way and thus lay the foundation of a thorough understanding of this kind of warfare, regardless of a specific national scenario. Thus he detached and abstract description of factors, means and effects is not to be seen as a fault, but rather a feature as he provides a framework of reference to use in a variety of conflicts.
Although writing in 1964 Galula already addresses the majority of factors like the asymmetry between forces, prerequisites for successful insurgency, the doctrine to follow and possible angles of effective counterinsurgency correctly and in a surprisingly modern way. His understanding of counterinsurgency is clearly population-centric with intelligence lead operations to deny the insurgent control over the population. Although the formulation of the phases of an effective counterinsurgency campaign may appear overly simplistic, they should only be seen as a generic template for application in a specific scenario. Still Galula already understood the need for political legitimacy of a counterinsurgent government and thus also the need for political reform of the same to win elections and politicize the population by giving them a stake in the political confrontation.
For all modern and reform-oriented thinking Galula is clearly not above critique. Although he does not overtly advise or discuss torture, like Trinquier does, there can be no doubt Galula also sees the need for the counterinsurgent to act against identified insurgents with the utmost ruthlessness. He views insurgents as enemies of the state and the people to be suppressed by overwhelming military force and not dealt with like criminals by the police. His application of military force, population control and intelligence operations, shaped by experience in Indochina and Algeria would not have been in alignment with modern limits to such endeavors.
Overall Galula’s book is a dated but still very relevant and correct treatise on the subject of insurgencies and because of his briefness and directness a good starting point for anybody starting to read on the topic of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.
February 27, 2007
Galula and Trinquier on Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
(from a longer paper for Bruce Hoffman's SEST-520 Counterinsurgency class)
David Galula and Roger Trinquier: both French officers, both warriors through the Second World War, the French Indochinese War, and the Algerian War for Independence. In 1964, each wrote a manual on the lessons he had learned about the new form of war fought in the last two of these conflicts. Called “revolutionary warfare” by Galula and “modern warfare” by Trinquier, it spanned the spectrum from a Maoist-inspired, mostly rural insurgency in Indochina, to a mixed urban and rural insurgency in Algeria. Each author strived to abstract his experience in order to transform the conventional military and the political establishment and to meet the demands of counterinsurgency warfare and to achieve victory. While the two mostly agreed on definitions and implications, they began to diverge on the question of strategy and tactics. Trinquier tends to focus on the tactical and operational level, and although he acknowledges the importance of politics in counterinsurgency, he tends to address military issues. Galula examines larger strategic issues, and describes both military and political actions that are necessary for a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Yet whatever their differences, both have effective advice for the counterinsurgent, and both of the books should be used in conjunction when planning and preparing for counterinsurgency operations.
(from a longer paper for Bruce Hoffman's SEST-520 Counterinsurgency class)
David Galula and Roger Trinquier: both French officers, both warriors through the Second World War, the French Indochinese War, and the Algerian War for Independence. In 1964, each wrote a manual on the lessons he had learned about the new form of war fought in the last two of these conflicts. Called “revolutionary warfare” by Galula and “modern warfare” by Trinquier, it spanned the spectrum from a Maoist-inspired, mostly rural insurgency in Indochina, to a mixed urban and rural insurgency in Algeria. Each author strived to abstract his experience in order to transform the conventional military and the political establishment and to meet the demands of counterinsurgency warfare and to achieve victory. While the two mostly agreed on definitions and implications, they began to diverge on the question of strategy and tactics. Trinquier tends to focus on the tactical and operational level, and although he acknowledges the importance of politics in counterinsurgency, he tends to address military issues. Galula examines larger strategic issues, and describes both military and political actions that are necessary for a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Yet whatever their differences, both have effective advice for the counterinsurgent, and both of the books should be used in conjunction when planning and preparing for counterinsurgency operations.
August 1, 2014
Un excellent livre, clair et pratique, qui explique ce qu'est une guerre d’insurrection, ainsi que tout conflit asymétrique mettant aux prises une armée moderne avec une groupe d'individus n'ayant au départ qu'une cause et une grande détermination. L'auteur, David Galula, est un tunisien résistant qui a fait par la suite une carrière dans l'armée française. Il propose des moyens par lesquels les loyalistes peuvent l'emporter sur les insurgés, argumentés de manière rationnelle, mais aussi par son expérience. Galula, très expérimenté sur les conflits de la guerre froide, a roulé sa bosse sur tous les continents, et parvient à illustrer ses thèses par une foule d'exemples édifiants et instructifs. Parti aux États-Unis lorsque la France infléchira sa politique au début de la Vème république, il a trouvé là-bas un asile où sa précieuse expérience a été recueillie, et utilisée. L'introduction du général David Petraus est en effet dithyrambique, puisqu'il va même qualifier l'auteur nord-africain de "nouveau Clauswitz"
November 13, 2009
Upon reading this, I realized that I have read this book before - in fact, probably twice before. Written in the style of an army-guide, its insights are so basic to our modern understanding of counterinsurgency that it is difficult to see what the fuss is about. That this was one of the original such guides, written by a man who had observed and experienced counter-insurgency from North Africa, to Southeast Asia, and China, is why it has become an interesting primary source in its own right. Heavily colored by the experience of the early Cold War, communism and decolonization, some of his prescriptions might sit awkwardly on the page of modern analysis, yet there is much that remains relevant and true. And weighing in at a mere 143 pages of clearly written narrative prose, it is by far a superior read (albeit less thorough) to the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual or the Army's infamous Counterinsurgency Guide.
March 4, 2013
In Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, David Galula etches in stone, the necessities of warfare that were, at the time, predicted to be of dire need for the Occident’s success against the dissemination of communism. He wrote the book under the assumption that the West, particularly the United States, will automatically grow heavily involved in future insurgency-based warfare. Aside from redefining a priori limitations to military engagements, Galula ingeniously prescribes new developmental principles, laws and theories for states to effectively combat an insurgency. His wisdom is highlighted by the historical references and aphorisms which help illustrate the fundamental concepts only to make them seemingly simple. The book is cited within innumerable text, in which underlines the legacy of Galula’s work. The book is highly recommended to anyone who considers a career in the military or students in pursuit of a degree which pertains to international studies.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 58 reviews