A timely account of a raging debate: The history of the ongoing struggle between the presidents and Congress over who has the power to declare and wage war.
The Constitution states that it is Congress that declares war, but it is the presidents who have more often taken us to war and decided how to wage it. In Waging War, David J. Barron opens with an account of George Washington and the Continental Congress over Washington’s plan to burn New York City before the British invasion. Congress ordered him not to, and he obeyed. Barron takes us through all the wars that followed: 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American war, World Wars One and Two, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and now, most spectacularly, the War on Terror. Congress has criticized George W. Bush for being too aggressive and Barack Obama for not being aggressive enough, but it avoids a vote on the matter. By recounting how our presidents have declared and waged wars, Barron shows that these executives have had to get their way without openly defying Congress.
Waging War shows us our country’s revered and colorful presidents at their most trying times—Washington, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Johnson, both Bushes, and Obama. Their wars have made heroes of some and victims of others, but most have proved adept at getting their way over reluctant or hostile Congresses. The next president will face this challenge immediately—and the Constitution and its fragile system of checks and balances will once again be at the forefront of the national debate.
A revealing, well-researched historical review of the interplay between Congress and the executive when it comes to war powers, which Barron traces all the way back to Washington and the Continental Congress. He argues that neither side has ever gained primacy in the debate, and how different wars gave more power to the executive and vice versa.
Barron’s book does a great job telling the story of the struggle and how it is impacted by law and public opinion, but it often seems like there is more narrative than analysis. Barron does a great job describing the executive’s side of the struggle and what its interest has tended to be, but his explanation of Congress’s side of the question is a bit more nebulous.
Many readers will find that Barron skips over a couple relevant episodes, such as the Barbary Wars, President Wilson’s Mexican interventions; and how some presidents have tried to minimize Congress’s role; he inexplicably ignores the Gulf of Tonkin episode, and the Vietnam section annoyingly begins in 1970. There is nothing about the nullification crisis, the Indian Wars, or even on the Emancipation Proclamation. When discussing emancipation by field commanders during the civil war, Barron does not mention how the loyalty of states impacted these decisions (Virginia vs. Missouri, for example) He also calls George Washington the “commander-in-chief,” but fails to explain how his position was different from the commander-in-chief roles as it actually applies to the president. Also, as an aside, his rendition of the Revolutionary gets some geography mixed up and seems to try too hard to dramatize it.
There are also a few other errors; when discussing the XYZ affair, he writes that these designations belonged to the Americans, writes that the Dred Scott case denied slaves citizenship when it denied free blacks as well, and calls Charles Hughes a chief justice before he ran for president. Elsewhere Barron writes that Woodrow Wilson was criticized for maintaining neutrality while Germany was attacking US commercial ships, in January 1917, although Germany had halted this campaign by that point.
An interesting, clearly written and engaging work, but not without some unexpected problems.
I will admit that this was not exactly what I expected, but it really reflects the subtitle of “the clash between presidents and Congress.” It made me continuously challenge my ideas of the ideal power of the commander in chief and develop a respect for the messy middle and the importance of lawyering (not a huge shock given my career).
“All of which is to say that presidents repeatedly have faced rhetoric same hard question: Can they find a way to wage war without claiming that decisions about the conduct of war are the commander in chief’s alone to make?… it is one that we should hope presidents never feel entitled to stop asking. Their felt need to answer it has been a key reason why our system of checks and balances, for all its limitations, has managed to endure even when America is waging war.”
Covering over 200 years of American legal history is a tall order, but in reading David Barron's book one cannot feel that much potential material has been left on the cutting room floor. Barron examines the war powers debate in great depth from Washington to FDR. He dwells especially on the interwar and Vietnam eras when considering the war powers clash between the executive and legislative branches in the 20th century. But, his examination of the conflict over presidential and congressional war powers in the post-Cold War era (especially regarding the significant issues raised by the war on terror) is largely superficial. This was a major disappointment as the post-9/11 era has seen the most significant expansion of presidential war powers in history, and Congress' response has been muted but growing. These issues deserve much more that the ~40 pages Barron allocates them in his book. In comparison, the Quasi War with France is given more pages and critical analysis than the so-called "Global War on Terror." Barron's book was mildly disappointing in that it left so much potential material unmined when it bills itself as a comprehensive history of the war powers debate from 1776 to the present.
Starting with Washington as Commander-in-Chief during the War for Independence, and continuing through U.S. history to Obama, this book presents in detail the push and pull of presidents and Congress over the conduct of war. Fortunately for Americans, presidents have mostly backed down from their most extreme positions about how much power they have to wage war, but this book shows how presidents’ power over war has expanded slowly even though the basic arguments have remained the same. It is fascinating to see how those questions have been raised over and over without ever having been definitively answered. For example, can Congress require the president to move certain troops to a certain place? Can it require the army to attack certain cities at certain times? Congress can declare war, but can it end it by declaration? If it does, can the president ignore it? These questions have been raised since the beginning, when Congress forbade Washington from burning New York City when he left it. It is very interesting to see how the two institutions – Congress and the president – have negotiated this tricky terrain.
A great history of our most daunting constitutional question about the President's War Powers and the role of Congress. Even as a legal history, Barron strikes the right balance of giving the reader enough of the historical context to share insightful snippets of history while diving into the legal discussion without getting too deep in the weeds.
You can see how long this took me to read, which says everything. I'm not the best with American history, as a shameful unintelligent citizen. I think this book had good intentions, and for the right reader it might be incredible. But for a casual read for someone who has no legitimate interest in the subject matter, it's boring.
This is a great book about how US presidents have historically made decisions concerning war. It highlighted the different viewpoints, theories and approaches taken by our presidents, starting with Washington. Highly recommend the book!
As a student of History, I found this book to be utterly interesting and enjoyable! I think it is a book everyone should be required to read. It is definitely one I will be giving out as gifts to the younger members of my family, as well as recommending it to my friends and family.