Ike's Gamble: America's Rise to Dominance in the Middle East

by Michael Doran

“Deeply researched, tightly argued, and accessibly concise” (The New York Times Book Review)—a major retelling of the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956, a seminal event in the history of US relations with the Middle East, and why President Eisenhower sided with Egypt rather than Britain, France, and Israel, and how he came to regret that decision.In 1956 President Nasser of Egypt moved to take possession of the Suez Canal, thereby bringing the Middle East to the brink of war. The British and the French, who operated the canal, joined with Israel in a plan to retake it by force. Despite the special relationship between England and America, Dwight Eisenhower intervened to stop the invasion. In Ike’s Gamble, “a disturbing history that clearly reveals the dangerous ‘collective American delusion’ about the Middle East” (Kirkus Reviews), Michael Doran shows how Nasser manipulated the US, invoking America’s opposition to European colonialism to drive a wedge between Eisenhower and two British Prime Ministers, Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden. Meanwhile, Nasser was making weapons deals with the USSR and destabilizing other Arab countries that the US had been courting. The Suez Crisis was his crowning triumph. In time, Eisenhower would conclude that Nasser had duped him, that the Arab countries were too fractious to anchor America’s interests in the Middle East, and that the US should turn instead to Israel. “This is a story that has been told many times, but seldom with the depth and stylistic elegance of Ike’s Gamble. Michael Doran does not just challenge the prevailing historiography, he turns it on its head” (The Weekly Standard). Affording deep insight into Eisenhower and his foreign policy, this fascinating and provocative history provides a rich new understanding of how the US became the power broker in the Middle East.

Genres: History, Middle East, Politics, Nonfiction, Israel, Historical, Egypt

305 pages, Kindle Edition

First published October 11, 2016

Reviews

[Steven Z. · Rating 3 out of 5]

Today we witness a Middle East in crisis. In Iraq, ISIS remains a power though the current operation to reconquer Mosul could be the beginning of the end of the supposed caliphate. Syria is a humanitarian disaster as Russia and Iran continue to prop up Bashir Assad and keep him in power. As the Syrian Civil War continues, war in Yemen involving Saudi Arabia, an American strategic ally evolves further. The seeming winner in this juxtaposition of events is Iran which has taken advantage of the American invasion of Iraq, and how the region has since unraveled. Once ISIS is removed from Iraq it will be interesting to see how Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni factions “might” try to reconstitute their country. It seems an afterthought to this untenable situation that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict featuring Hamas, an intransigent Israeli government, and Hezbollah in the north has somewhat faded into the background. As we contemplate the morass that is the current Middle East it is interesting to return to the by gone days of the region in the 1950s when Arab nationalism/Pan Arabism was in vogue as opposed to the religious ideological road blocks of today. In IKE”S GAMBLE: AMERICA’S RISE TO DOMINANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, senior director of the National Security Council under George W. Bush, Michael Doran has revisited an American strategy to deal with the myriad of problems then in the region, that laid the foundation for America’s role in the area that we continue to grapple with today.

According to Doran when President Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the presidency, he and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles decided to offer the president as “an honest broker” in the Middle East to try and settle intra-Arab, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The term “honest broker” is an interesting one unless you think of it as a realpolitik based on power politics designed to drive the British from the region and replace it with American influence and control. In 1952, Egypt had undergone a revolution and replaced King Farouk’s government with one based on a “Free Officers Movement” dominated by Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, an Egyptian nationalist and believer in uniting the Arab world under Egyptian leadership. The British position in the region was tenuous, despite the presence of 100,000 troops at their Suez Canal base. Their Hashemite allies in Jordan and Iraq feared what was termed as “Nasserism,” the Arab-Israeli conflict was punctuated with “Fedayeen” attacks against Israel, and retaliation by the Jewish state all served to make the region a powder keg. For incoming President Eisenhower he was concerned with dealing with a region that was ripe for communist expansion in the guise of anti-colonialism. Dulles learned firsthand about these tensions when he visited the region in May, 1953 and upon his return he and the president decided on a strategy to remove the British from their Suez base by brokering a treaty that was accomplished by October, 1954, and trying to settle issues between Egypt and Israel that were getting out of hand. For the British it was a series of frustrations with the Eisenhower administration that dominated. Prime Minister Winston Churchill refused to pass leadership of the Conservative party to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden despite a stroke that left him partially paralyzed on his left side as he would not give in to Egyptian demands and sacrifice the last remaining bulwark of the British Empire. For the United States their ties to British and French imperialism and the closeness of American-Israeli relations were seen as preventing any progress in the Middle East toward peace. This resulted in a policy which set as its goal supporting Nasser in the belief he would cooperate with the United States once a treaty with Israel was arrived at, the end result of which for the Eisenhower administration would be his leadership and gaining the support of the Arab states for a Middle East Defense Organization designed to block Soviet penetration of the region. The United States would woo Nasser with economic aid and promises of military largesse for over four years, a policy that would fail as the Egyptian president was able to dupe his American counterparts.

With the above as background, Doran begins to unravel events that resulted in the 1956 Suez War that he describes as Eisenhower’s gamble, a gamble which ended in failure. Doran takes us through the intricacies of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over the Suez Canal base and the American role in pressuring London to give in to most of Nasser’s demands. He follows that up with a rather long discussion of the “Northern Tier,” an American policy of developing an alternative to a Middle East Defense Organization. The “tier” involved Pakistan and Turkey and theoretically other nations would be added. Doran argues that Nasser’s opposition to the pact and his hatred of Iraqi leader Nuri al-Said, his goal of receiving Soviet arms, and deceiving the United States were all tied together reflecting how Nasser manipulated Washington. Relying on one secondary source to bind all of this together Doran believes that he has gone where no other historian has gone. This is part of his rather condescending approach to historians who have previously studied this topic. On more than one occasion Doran starts out by stating, “most historians have failed to understand how significant….,” or “failed to realize,” in this case the importance of the Turco-Iraqi Pact, or in presenting the role of Eisenhower and Dulles in the Heads of Agreement negotiations dealing with the Suez Canal base, and the role of Jordan in Nasser’s plan to seize the leadership in the Arab world. I would point out that instead of repeated self-serving comments, the author should reflect some objectivity for those who have written previously on the background to the Suez crisis.

Doran also has a habit of twisting facts to suit his arguments. A case in point is a memo prepared by Dulles in 1958 looking back on issues that led to Suez. In the memo that Doran uses to support his narrative the Secretary of State argues there was little the United States could do to move Israel from its entrenched positions because of the influence of Jews domestically and internationally. If this was so, how come Eisenhower pressured Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion with threats in March, 1957 to gain Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai? Further he claims that the Soviet Union, “while consistently hinting to the Arab states that it will agree to dismember Israel, has never actually come out with a statement of support.” If that is correct what do we make of Soviet threats concerning the use of nuclear weapons after Israel, France, and Britain implemented the Sevres conspiracy and attacked Egypt at the end of October, 1956?

I do agree with Doran that Washington’s “blind pursuit of an illusionary Arab-Israeli peace” strengthened Nasser’s position in the Arab world, at the same time he was trying to undermine the western position in the region. Nasser deceived the State Department, raising the hopes for peace through the secret Alpha Plan. The Egyptian leaders stalling tactics and disingenuousness would continue until the Eisenhower administration would call Nasser’s bluff following the Anderson peace mission in early 1956, a mission that would lead to the Omega plan designed to pressure Nasser to be more accommodating. Doran points out that the new plan was designed to deal with Nasser and achieve behavioral change, not regime change. I would point out that the document also alluded to strong action particularly if a soft covert approach did not work as Dulles’ March 28, 1956 memo stated that “planning should be undertaken at once with a view to possibly more drastic action in the event that the above courses of action do not have the desired effect.”* For Eisenhower, whose frustration with Nasser finally took effect there were suggestions that a strong move against the Egyptian president would have to wait until after the American presidential election in November.

Doran continues his narrative by taking the reader through the immediate causes of the Suez War, the machinations that occurred after the Israeli invasion, and the final withdrawal of Israeli, French, and British troops from Sinai. The author then goes on to discuss the anti-colonial purity of the Eisenhower administration which was short lived with the announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine in January, 1957, designed to protect Arab states from communist encroachment. The reality was total failure of American policy with the overthrow of the Iraqi government and the dispatch of American marines to Lebanon. In addition, the goal of turning the Saudi monarchy into a substitute for Nasser as an Arab leader that would bring about a coalescing of Arab states in support of U.S. policy in the region never transpired. In the end I would agree with Doran that Ike’s gamble did more harm than good and by 1958 resulted in the president questioning his policies that led to the 1956 war and beyond. These musings by Eisenhower and the counterfactual scenarios presented by the author are interesting, but it does not change the fact that the team of Eisenhower and Dulles did create a popular Arab leader who was able to create strong Pan Arabist sentiment in the Middle East and left the United States with two weak allies in Jordan and Lebanon. Further, they created a “doctrine” for the Middle East that was viewed in the Arab world as the same type of colonialism that had been previously practiced by England and France. Doran completes his narrative by admonishing American policy makers that we should be careful not to make the same errors today that we made in the height of the Cold War.

*Steven Z. Freiberger. DAWN OVER SUEZ: THE RISE OF AMERICAN POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1953-1957 (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee), p. 149.

[Jean · Rating 4 out of 5]

Doran attempts to make this history relevant to today. He opens with “A new administration has come to power convinced that its predecessor has made a hash of Middle East Policy: the new team’s big idea: a bold diplomatic overture to the region’s leading Muslin State.”

The book covers the period from 1951 to 1961 and is about Dwight Eisenhower and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. Eisenhower tried wooing Nasser the first four years of his presidency. Nasser then grabbed the Canal in 1956 and aligned himself with the USSR. Doran states that in 1965 Eisenhower stated “I never should have pressured Israel to evacuate The Sinai.”

The book is well written and meticulously researched. The author states this research included newly released information from Russia. The author relied heavily on meeting reports, journals, diaries and memoirs of the key people involved. Doran admits he is providing a revisionist history in order to make his key point. Doran provides a background history then present Ike’s course of action and then analyzes the results. His in-depth analysis makes for interesting reading. The book covers a complex situation but is highly readable. Doran was the Middle East Advisor to the White House under the Bush Administration.

Casey Jones does a good job narrating the book. Jones is an award-winning audiobook narrator.

[Bill Manzi · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very good book, with a strong point of view that some think still has relevance in todays Middle East. Doran gives us a view not only of the Suez crisis, but of the post WWII erosion of the British position as the dominant Middle Eastern power, and the corresponding rise of Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser as both an Egyptian strongman, and the leader of a Pan Arab nationalist, anti-colonialist movement about to sweep the Middle East.

I enjoy history, but the Suez crisis of 1956 has been an area that I have not had much exposure to. This book is a great start for someone with no real knowledge of how this crisis came to be, and how it ended. The broad stroke here is that President Eisenhower, along with Secretary of State Dulles, faced with the rise of Nasser, chose to lend support to him, with Ike having an anti-colonialist bent, as well as a desire to freeze the Soviet Union out of any role in the Middle East. Doran gives great "credit" to Nasser, who he shows badly outmaneuvering Ike and Dulles. Nasser, by this account, utilized brilliant statecraft to get Ike's support to remove the British military from Suez, and that same statecraft to win a huge victory over the British, French and Israeli's in the 1956 Suez War. This brilliant "success" by Nasser is aided and abetted, in Doran's telling, by the gullibility of the Americans, who were in essence duped by Nasser, who cleverly hid his true intentions from the Americans, including the "Arabists" populating the State Department and the CIA.

How did Nasser achieve this brilliant "statecraft," and what were his real goals and objectives? Doran shows us that Nasser's true goals were achieving political pre-eminence in the Arab world, with his main objective eliminating Arab rivals, and making himself and Egypt the center of the Arab world. Ike, and Dulles, believing that Nasser desired accommodation with the west, floated an "honest broker" approach with Israel, hoping that by pressuring Israel for territorial concessions Nasser would be mollified, and willing to make peace with the Israelis. Doran strongly believes that Nasser was simply using the Arab-Israeli conflict to stoke the Arab street, and whipsaw his Arab rivals. The evidence, as I see it, tends to support Doran's theory. Nasser also utilized the great power rivalry to further confuse, and deceive, the Americans. Doran shows us what he believes Nasser's real goals were, with a focus on his violent opposition to the American sponsored "Northern Tier" and his eventual success in toppling the Iraqi government. Nasser was successful at not only deceiving the Americans but at doing tremendous damage to the American position in the Middle East over the longer term.

Is there some connection to American policy today? No question that history brings important lessons and we must always learn from them. What those lessons are can be discussed forever, but this book brings an interesting perspective. For those interested in the diplomatic world, and how it works, and how Nasser worked the diplomatic system to achieve his geopolitical goals this book should be on your list. An interesting perspective on Ike, who comes off as duped by Nasser, but as the ultimate pragmatist, shifting gears when he finally caught on. The question of whether Ike ever acknowledged error in 1956 is discussed, with claims from several, including Richard Nixon, that Ike had privately admitted error in forcing the British, French, and Israelis to stop the taking of Suez. But Ike never took that step publicly, so we are only left with speculation on that subject.

Doran has produced a fine book, with a certain perspective. Some of the reviews I looked at have been critical of his approach, but even if you agree with some of those criticisms it is worth a read.

[Lianna · Rating 3 out of 5]

this was not my favorite historical account but it was a fairly straightforward read, which I appreciated

[Steve Seyboldt · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very insightful look into the Suez Crisis and the begining of the United States active involvement in the middle east. A must read for anyone interested in international relations of that region.

[Brook · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is not a "whirlwind" story. What it is, is a re-look at Eisenhower and his administration's actions and policies in the Middle East (specifically with regards to Egypt/Nasser, Iraq, and Jordan).

If you are a student of that period of history (second half of the 20th cent in the ME), then this will be "gripping." This is *not* a good first read for someone on the area. It is completely factual, and not missing in parts, but it "struck" me more because it tells the true story of all the players, not the story told by those who survived long enough to write a memoir (e.g. Dulles and others).

It shows Ike as a man of absolute principle, but who was also shrewd and knew how to "play the game." He was not some yokel former soldier. He was a master of the deal - he just a) was colored by his own belief in the role of the U.S. as "honest broker," and b) subject to the same misinformation as everyone else.

You really see Just. How. Smart. Nasser was. He played a game of public opinion and intrigue that would put both Trump and Putin to shame. A real genius (half compliment, half derision, since he used it for personal gain).

This is really a book about what a genius of manipulation and global politics Nasser was...and why he is NOT the savior that he claimed to be. As noted in the book, all of his "wins" were handed to him by the Americans (Suez Canal, Israeli/French/British withdrawal, etc). But he was the one that finagled and navigated to get the Americans to do his bidding.

FASCINATING for someone with historical knowledge of the area - because most of the behind-the-scenes stuff has been reported wrong.

[The American Conservative]

Two years ago the Washingtonian magazine ran a lengthy investigation into the mismanagement of the proposed memorial in the nation’s capital to Dwight Eisenhower. Eisenhower was Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces during World II and the 34th president of the United States. He orchestrated D-Day, devoted more energy than any other Cold War president to trimming the obese defense budget, and tempered red-baiting hysteria. Yet as the Washingtonian detailed, the group devoted to establishing Ike’s memorial was mired in internal squabbles.

There is something darkly comic about the inability of the members of the Eisenhower Memorial Commission to manage their differences. Because, if nothing else, Eisenhower the man had a keen understanding of people and an agreeable nature. He was not a great battlefield general, nor was he a brilliant legislative strategist. But, as Liking Ike and Ike’s Gamble reveal in different ways, Eisenhower was remarkably shrewd in assessing human beings—both as individuals and as masses—and using them for his purposes. More often than not, those purposes were to America’s benefit.

http://www.theamericanconservative.co...

[Rodney Harvill · Rating 4 out of 5]

While suave and handsome James Bond makes movies, it is ugly old guys who make history. Why is this? Out of the public eye, it is the ugly old guys who make policy decisions that set the priorities for the James Bonds of the world. This is primarily a book about the decision making by the ugly old guys in the Suez crisis, its run-up and its aftermath that set American Middle East policy on the course that it has maintained since, with some exceptions in the Obama administration.

The Suez crisis was the visible manifestation of multiple undercurrents in the Middle East:

- Arab nationalism and its resistance to the European colonialism that was winding down in years following World War II
- The desire of European powers such as Britain and France too maintain some influence in their old colonial empires
- Arab resentment to the existence of Israel and resultant paramilitary operations to undermine it
Israeli desire to continue to exist and resultant military and paramilitary operations to strike back
- Pan-Arab nationalism, the desire of Arabs to unite into a single state and the desire of multiple Arab strongman to be the big dog, resulting in incessant internecine conflict between these strongmen
- Soviet desires to gain influence in the Middle East and gain control of the oil supplies on which the western powers relied
- The desire of the western powers to contain the Soviet Union

Not surprisingly, given the title of the book, the focus is on the decision making by Eisenhower and his advisers. Early on, because of the desire not to antagonize Arabs by being identified with European colonialism and the Israelis, Eisenhower sided with Egyptian President Nasser against Britain, France and Israel in the Suez crisis, strengthening Nasser's hand and making him a hero in the Arab world. Later, as Nasser's efforts to expand his power and influence in the Middle East undermined American interests and increased Soviet influence in the Middle East, Eisenhower recognized that he was double-dealing and shifted American policy to support Britain, France and Israel in an effort to contain Nasser. Furthermore, Eisenhower made it policy to promote Arab nationalism at the expense of pan-Arab nationalism, a divide and conquer strategy.

There are two theories regarding Nasser's actions and Eisenhower's shift:

1. Insufficient American support for Egypt, shifts in American foreign policy and Israeli reprisal raids in Gaza forced Nasser into dealing with the Soviets to gain weaponry with which to defend Egypt against the Israelis.
2. Nasser's devious double-dealings pulled the wool over the eyes of Eisenhower and his advisers. Once they recognized his larger plan to dominate the Middle East himself, Eisenhower shifted American policy to containment.

Doran is a proponent of the second view, and he draws on various statements by Eisenhower and other evidence to defend his position. Interestingly enough, he made the point that the leadership in the Arab world at that time was not necessarily interested in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. The masses essentially wanted (and still do) the destruction of Israel, and savvy leaders such as Nasser could exploit this as a means of gaining power and influence. If the conflict was resolved, the leverage to gain power in the Arab world was reduced. It was better to keep the conflict frozen. At any rate, the policy decisions made during the Suez crisis reverberated for years and set the tone for decades of American foreign policy.

[Andrew Tollemache · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting read on a rather unique and formative time for US foreign poolicy with regards to the Middle East. The UK and the French still controlled the Suez Canal and the Brits were figthing a political and insurgent war with the Egyptian govt under Nasser. It was a time just a few years after Truman had recognized the Israel as a sovereign state, a move the arabist US State dept was wildy opposed to for strategic reasons. Ike had just come to power in 1953 and had made boxing the USSR out of the Middle East a key for policy goal so as to secure the energy supplies and shipping lanes for the US and its Western allies.
Doran details how a key part of Ike's plan was to seek to set the US in opposition to Brit and French style imperialism in the eyes of the Arab world and the centerpiece of that move was to back Nasser in his efforts to kick the Brits out of Egypt. This move greatly angered and was read as betrayal by the Brits and French who thought as the US's allies they would all be on the same side.
The problem was that Ike did not take into account that Nasser had his own agenda and his own abilities which did not dovetail with the US's. By 1956 when the Egyptians seized the Suez Canal and nationalized the joint British/French company that owned that canal. When the Brits and French slyly tried to intervene in the Israeli paratrooper drop and seizure of the canal as peacekeepers when they really meant to use it as a fig leaf to take the canal back for themselves, Ike told them to withdraw from the Canal zone. Really surprising in these modern times is that the US then threatened to sanction Israel, the Uk and France and even cut off their ability to import oil. Ike hoped this move would really win over Nasser and end Russian efforts to partner with Egypt.
The mistake was that Nasser had how own agenda and never gave much to the US for its help in the Canal. Instead of winning Nasser over, Ike's gamble made Nasser stronger throughout the Middle East at the expense of the US's other allies in the region. The US had planned on making an alliance with Iran, Iraq, Syria and Jordan as a bulwark against the USSR. Nasserism did this alliance in when the King of Iraq and his family was slaughtered in a coup and numerous Nasserite plots were uncovered in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria. The fall of the Iraqi throne cowed everyone else in the region and ended this US alliance.
Doran concludes by noting that in Ike's last years in the late 1960s he began expressing regrets with regards to his actions with Nasser. By 1967 and the 6-Day War Eisenhower had realized that the strengthened Nasser had been a mistake for the US in the Middle East. In the years after the Canal affair the US would start to bolster its relationship with Saudi Arabia, Israel and for a time Iran. it would take another 20 years for the Egyption flirtation with allying with the USSR to come to an end as the Egyptians smarted from two massive losses to Israel in war. Nasser's politcal heir Anwar Saddat signed peace treaties with Israel and secured a military aid relationship with Jimmy Carter that while signing his own death warrant at the hands of Islamists a few year laters, it ended the Israel-Egyptian militay rivalry.

[Bill Tyroler · Rating 4 out of 5]

Eisenhower, in Michael Doran’s telling, gambled that Nasser would reward our support with a moderate, pro-Western policy. The idea was that the US not only would be an “honest broker” between the Arabs and the West, but would oppose colonialism of waning powers Britain and France. The Arab world, led by Nasser, would then see America as an ally rather than adversary. Thus, during the 1956 Suez crisis, Eisenhower placed the US squarely against England, France and Israel and in favor of Nasser. It was a bad bet. We may have held all the cards, but Nasser knew how to play them. After pocketing the gains we secured for him, Nasser turned away from us and toward the Soviets for support of his quixotic pan-Arabism. Nasser’s project came to grief in June 1967, but not before the region had been upended and much blood spilled. Too late, Eisenhower realized that he'd erred. That’s Doran’s view anyway (if admittedly expressed by me a mite simplistically).

This makes a good companion to Efraim Karsh’s “The Tail Wags the Dog," the burden of which is that, try as we might to impose our views on the region, the local states are remarkably successful in imposing their agendas on us. Doran’s compatible theme is that the Arab world is too riven to accomplish joint goals; national self-interest, at least as seen and pursued by individual states, is something else.

Lessons? Doran posits several (pp. 255-58); they seem sound, but two stand out. First, reject the notion that “the Arab-Israeli conflict” is key to regional stability, more particularly, that solving the Palestinian problem will reap dramatic benefits. Second, a “tragic perspective” is necessary: the region is not only unstable, there’s not a whole lot we can do to fix it. If you don’t buy that idea, then feel free to say just what you would have done to prevent the bloodshed in Syria — or what you’d do to end it now.

[Jared · Rating 4 out of 5]

'Incredibly informative study in the events surrounding the Suez Crisis of 1956'

I learned about this book oddly enough by listening to an interview of the author on a radio broadcast of the C-SPAN show 'Q&A'. (I know, its lame, but there was not much on the radio that morning!) Below is a link to the video:
www.c-span.org/video/?425084-1/qa-mic...

Anyways, I was intriqued and went into reading the book thinking that I would just learn about the key events leading up to the key events regarding the Suez Crisis (an event I had only heard about) not realizing how important it truly was in the Middle East history. Upon completing the book, I am blown away at the turn of events. I'm only going to cover the wavetops because there really was a lot going on:

- The British and the French controlled the company that ran the Suez Canal.
- They got pretty much all the money and the Egyptians cried fowl and chaffed under what they considered colonial rule.
- Col Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power in 1952 after he and a general held a successful coup against Egypt's King Faruk. (Nasser was the junior guy, but he was the brains/power in the duo).
- The Egyptians wanted the Europeans -especially the Brits- out of their country, especially since they controlled the Suez Canal.

- It is important to remember that this is only a few years into the Cold War and competition for 'friends' is very important.
- Ike felt that the Brits and the French were wrong in trying to uphold an antiquated colonialist worldview and that their actions were counterproductive in places like Egypt where nationalism was taking root. (Ike HATED colonialism).
- Ike saw himself as an 'honest broker' between the Arabs and the Europeans
- "[Ike] believed that if the United States would publicly demonstrate firm opposition to the Europeans and the Israelis, it would receive a strategic payoff in the form of widespread Arab goodwill. But the payoff never came."

- Ike's British counterpart during part of the period was good 'ol Winston Churchill.
- Churchill and Eisenhower did not see eye to eye at all.
- Churchill lived to ensure that the British empire survived, but after WWII the sun was starting to set.
- "If Winston has believed in anything at all in the course of his long life,” he wrote, “it has been in the British Empire and all that it stands for.”
- Ike felt that the hydrogen bomb made bases such as the one one at the Suez Canal obsolete.
- Churchill also felt that it would be a good idea to talk directly with the Soviets
- Ike, well, here is what he thought of the Soviets: "The Soviet Union, he said, “was a woman of the streets, and whether her dress was new, or just the old one patched, it was certainly the same whore underneath. America intended to drive her off her present ‘beat’ into the back streets.” (Ouch!)

- At any rate, the US decides to side with Egypt instead of the US' allies regarding the Suez Canal.
- This was the first of many diplomatic/political mistakes that Nasser takes full advantage of.
- After each of Nasser's acheivements, he is seen by the Arabs as a 10-foot-tall super hero that defies the West.
- Here are some of the feats Nasser was able to pull off largely as the result of our missteps:
- "In four short years [Nasser] had ousted the British from the Canal Zone, shepherded Egypt into the Soviet orbit, nationalized the Suez Canal, defeated Britain, France, and Israel in war—all that, and now this: integral Arab unity, the dream of a significant segment of the generation that was on the rise in the Arab world."

- If you only have a short amount of time to read, jump straight to the final chapter as well as the conclusion; they recap all the significant events and the lessons learned.
- Here are some take-aways:

* Pillars of Eisenhower that fell:
1. "The first pillar to fall was the Eisenhower Doctrine."
2. "...the second pillar of American strategy in the Middle East—namely, the effort to peel away Damascus from Cairo." (I had no idea that Syria and Egypt were joined together -despite not having a common border -as a single state. Google 'United Arab Republic'. This scared the crap out of rulers in the Middle East)
3. "...the third pillar of his strategy, his effort to transform Saudi Arabia into a regional counterbalance to Egypt."
4. "...the Arab Union managed to capture the imagination of Foster Dulles, and it became the fourth pillar of the American strategy of isolating Nasser." (The Arab Union was a feeble attempt by Iraq and Jordan to form a union similar to the United Arab Republic).

- Ike's dilemma regarding whether to send Marine to Lebanon (to prop up its government against the tide of Nasser) speaks volumes about US policy in the Middle East: "Be that as it may, “the losses from doing nothing would be worse than the losses from action—and . . . consequently we should send our troops into Lebanon.”

- Exploiting the tension between Arab love of its people (which seeks to throw down borders) and the Arab love of their individual countries is what Eisenhower hoped to achieve.

- " The revolutionary wave that swept the Middle East after the Suez Crisis gave Eisenhower an intensive course in the complexity of inter-Arab conflict."

- "Israeli power had become an asset in the Cold War."

- "Thanks to Nasser’s strategic pivot, the Soviets made deep inroads into the Arab world, so deep that by 1959 they had penetrated not just Egypt but Iraq and Syria, too."

Ike's Lessons:

1. "First, when making policy toward the Middle East, recite often the motto of the First Marine Division of the Marine Corps: “No better friend, no worse enemy.” The United States has no standing alliances in the Middle East"

2. "Second, a president must reject advice based on the notion that the Arab-Israeli conflict is the central strategic challenge in the Middle East."

3. "Third, pay close attention to inter-Arab politics."

4. "Fourth, adopt a tragic perspective." (The problems won't be solved overnight)

5. "Finally, remember that a picture is worth a thousand words. “Why do men make mistakes?” asked Walter Lippmann, the famous political commentator. “Because an important part of human behavior is reaction to the pictures in their heads.” 6 Lippmann’s debt to Weber is obvious. “[ M] en react to their ideas and images, to their pictures and notions of the world, treating these pictures as if they were reality.”

[Carole · Rating 4 out of 5]

For those interested in foreign policy and how it is made, this is a book for you. Doran draws on a wide variety of primary sources, including official records and private notes and diaries, to recount how President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles formulated policy in the Middle East in the 1950's. It is filled with the key players, including Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and the rising Egyptian star, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Doran traces the fascinating tale of how Eisenhower and Dulles decided to support the Egyptians after its seizure of the Suez Canal. The U.S. came out against the invading English, French, longtime allies, and Israeli forces. This move was intended to distance the U.S. from imperialistic, colonial powers in hopes of gaining long term Arab support (and in opposition to Soviet interests in the Middle East.) Over time, Eisenhower and Dulles came to see this decision as a mistake. Nasser gained influence, but at the expense of Western interests. How Eisenhower changed course and worked to undermine Nasser is a very interesting story. Doran takes you into the discussions and policy formulation and tells the tale with clarity and color. It is a good read.

[Jeff Beardsley · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Ike’s Gamble” serves as a good introduction in to early United States efforts to engage politically in the Middle East during the 1950s, specifically during and after the Suez Canal Crisis. Michael Doran does a good job of engaging the thinking of President Eisenhower and his staff in their efforts to navigate the tricky business of working with allies, such as Britain and France, whose colonial spirit was still alive and sputtering its final breaths of life in the lead up to Suez, about which the U.S. had zero sympathies. Simultaneously, Eisenhower was trying to convince Egypt’s Nasser that he should engage in a policy leaning more toward the United States, and away from the Soviet Union. These efforts ultimately had the opposite effect that Eisenhower expected, with Nasser seemingly leaning to the U.S. and taking as much aid as it could from this country, while at the same time, and in reality, drawing ever closer to the USSR. There are lessons here for U.S. policy in the Middle East, and how we should never be entirely complacent that our “allies” in the region are playing the hands in the manner in which we think they have been dealt.

[Basel · Rating 4 out of 5]

There's a lot of books and studies wich tell " The Story " OR " The Stories " of Suez Canal crisis from different point of views. At that account people judge Ike and Nasser.
So what does make this book different?Or worthy to read? To me it's crystal clear
●1st of all Michael Doran, this man do know the Middle East, and he has a sharp eye.
●2nd of all the unique angle that he trys to tell us to read the story from; no matter how many books have you read about these event before this one is different
●3rd of all the likelihood of learning something new or different about this very crisis or about the Middle East in general
● Last but not least: regardless if you see Ike a realist, idealist or what ever, and no matter if you think Nasser was a Hero, CIA agent, or such a big mouth, just open your mind and read maybe you will change your mind.

[Kenneth Tubman · Rating 4 out of 5]

I read this book to learn the mood of the Middle East during the 1950s (1956).

This is a major retelling of the Suez Crisis of 1956—one of the most important events in the history of US policy in the Middle East

Mike Doran clarified Egypt's quest for independence and aligned it self with Russia because the U.S. wouldn't clarify it's relationship between England, France, Isreal and Egypt.

The British and the French, who operated the canal, joined with Israel in a plan to retake it by force. Eisenhower prevented it from happening.

Eisenhower came to realize our true ally was Isreal not Egypt. Nasser played the U.S. while they went behind our backs and bought arms from Russia.

[Nate · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ike's Gamble is fascinating and is an insider's look at both 1950s geopolitics from America's perspective and Nasser's influence over the Middle East. Eisenhower had some tough (tough!) issues to grapple with like checking Soviet influence, rebuilding Europe, and the death of imperialism worldwide. While his every move wasn't perfect, this book shows Ike for what he truly was...a savvy realist with vision. This is easily in the top 3 books I've read this year.

Additionally, this book is perfect for budding strategists. It dives into history, context, assumptions, objectives, interests, and end-states. It is a must read in this regard.

[Wesley Janicki · Rating 3 out of 5]

Book is interesting for sure, and provides a refreshing opinion on the Suez Crisis, but I do find the underpinnings of the last chapters to be a bit perilous. A lack of evidence does not imply the opposite to be true, and I find it rather unconvincing that Eisenhower would say nothing of his true feelings on Suez beyond a few tight comments to Jewish leaders.

I do think the author has some legs to stand on when it comes to the reversal of Eisenhower’s policy. Yes, he most definitely did and it came with a shift in thinking, but does that mean Eisenhower saw his previous thinking as inherently flawed to handle Suez? I’m not quite convinced.

[Zach · Rating 5 out of 5]

Really fascinating account of how Eisenhower misplayed his hand with Nasser. Doran does a great job in running the reader through all the statecraft leading up to and including the Suez Crisis. Applicable to today's Middle East.

[Ethan Hulbert · Rating 2 out of 5]

Eh, I liked it better my first read-through. It's interesting and tells a very informative story, but I think the author is in over his head at times. Unreliable, but still a somewhat significant point of view to consider.

[Ed · Rating 3 out of 5]

Provides a lot of background on the Middle East and why things may be the way they are today. If you can't read the whole book, read the conclusion chapter. It summarizes things very nicely

[Erik Blad · Rating 5 out of 5]

Accessible and profound.

[Stacy · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting book which shows the steps & missteps taken by the U.S. in the Middle East in the 1950's and how they still have ramifications in the region today.

[John Minster · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really interesting overview of the Eisenhower admin's Middle East policy. Sometimes gets bogged down in the details, but it's largely well-told exceedingly relevant to today's situation.

[Courtney Dyer · Rating 4 out of 5]

A bit hard to get through, but like a text book, I emerged with a far greater understanding of the complexity foreign policy.

[Greg · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting how the US leadership from its earliest involvement in the Middle East as a Great Power, was misled by seeing the Arab regimes the way the US leaders want them to be rather than how they actually were.

[Jim Blessing · Rating 2 out of 5]

The book was boring to read. However, it showed Ike's inept Middle East policy. Most Americans would be shocked to learn that Ike shut down a joint military force of British, French and Israeli troops to take over the Suez Canal from Nasser. Ike apparently regretted his actions later in life.

[Phoenix · Rating 5 out of 5]

A Middle Eastern Primer

A book that leaves one with an understanding of how political compromises are made. The gamble in question was betting on Nasser. In 1956 Eisenhower opposed the attack by France, Israel and the UK on the Suez Canal because he hoped to persuade Nasser that the US was anti-colonial and Egypt's friend. His intention was to promote Nasser as a lynchpin in the Arab world against Soviet influence. Yet Eisenhower wrote, he would have stayed out of the matter had the British and the French proceeded more quicky. Instead it was Nasser who conned Eisenhower, and used Ike's ultimatum against his British and French allies as proof of his own power while showing disdain and contempt for the Americans in order to bolster his image.

While Eisehower tried to build up the Baghad Pact, an alliance of Turkey, Pakistan and Iran in what was called the Northern Tier defense strategy, Nasser saw this as an affront to his plans. Two years later in 1958 Nasser had engineered a coup of “Free Officers” in Iraq which destroyed the American led alliance, and nearly pulled off similar coups in Jordan and Lebanon. Ironically Eisenhower called on both Israel and the UK for support, and the stability of both Arab countries was maintained.

Truly enjoyable was Doran's description of British Prime Minister Eden's view of the United States as an analogy of the relationship between MI-6's James Bond and the CIA's Felix Leiter. The fact that Eden was a close friend of Ian Flemming and had spent time at his estate Golden-Eye makes this even more intriguing, and perhaps one can reread the Bond books with this in mind. Bond always counts on Leiter to back up up, which Ike failed to do during and after the Suez crisis. Yet Doran concludes that Ike didn't take to the secondary role of Leiter that way Eden expected him to.

[Bill · Rating 3 out of 5]

50 years on and the Middle East is just as unsolvable as it was for Ike.........

[P Bernhardt · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book covers the period of 1953 - 1961, the period of Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency. And it specifically covers the involvement of the United States in the Middle East. The Cold War was in full swing and the fear in Washington was the Kremlin's growing influence around the world. Eisenhower was wanted to counter the Soviet Union in the Middle East. The focus in the early part of Ike's term was Egypt and a rising star named Nassar. The book goes on to explain how Nassar deceived the U.S. government to get the British and French out of Egypt and the Suez Canal into his hands. And then how he used the U.S. once again to establish himself as the leader of the Arab world. Ike finally came to realize that there was no one Arab world and the best ally in the Middle East may be Israel.

It seems Ike lived to regret his stance in the Suez Canal dispute and how different would the Middle East look today if he had taken a different tact? We can't be sure but the author provides us guidelines that could be useful in our mess there today. I highly recommend "Ike's Gamble".

[Ami Kopstein · Rating 5 out of 5]

The myopia of the State Department's Arabist tradition

The book draws a great picture of how misconception or a paradigm can mislead policy. The State Department Arabist were so in love with Arab Nationalism that they became shills for Nasser made him into a hero and led Ike to the greatest policy fiasco until Bush.
Unfortunately Obama did not read history of the Near East, he would have learnt that it is counter productive to be an honest broker between Arabs or between them and Israel.
Either way the book paints a great scenario of the historical events with the perspective of time.
Finally it is clear that the US intervention of 1956 Suez Crisis planted the seeds of the Six Day War and the rest is history.
Loved the honest impartial narrative.