While the American alliance system in Asia has been fundamental to the region's security and prosperity for seven decades, today it encounters challenges from the growth of China-based regional organizations. How was the American alliance system originally established in Asia, and is it currently under threat? How are competing security designs being influenced by the United States and China? In Powerplay, Victor Cha draws from theories about alliances, unipolarity, and regime complexity to examine the evolution of the U.S. alliance system and the reasons for its continued importance in Asia and the world.
Cha delves into the fears, motivations, and aspirations of the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies as they contemplated alliances with the Republic of China, Republic of Korea, and Japan at the outset of the Cold War. Their choice of a bilateral "hub and spokes" security design for Asia was entirely different from the system created in Europe, but it was essential for its time. Cha argues that the alliance system's innovations in the twenty-first century contribute to its resiliency in the face of China's increasing prominence, and that the task for the world is not to choose between American and Chinese institutions, but to maximize stability and economic progress amid Asia's increasingly complex political landscape.
Exploring U.S. bilateral relations in Asia after World War II, Powerplay takes an original look at how global alliances are achieved and maintained.
A friend loaned me this book and said I must read it. The book “Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia” by Victor D. Cha.
Cha states that since the end of World War II, the Asian security architecture has been a “hub and spokes” system with a series of bilateral relationships with the United States as the common element. He states that Asia lacks the overarching defense alliance that Europe has. Cha goes on to explain how Europe and Asia developed dissimilar alliance systems. During the first ten years that followed WWII, American leaders concluded that bilateral arrangements served U.S. interest in Asia. Cha calls that choice a “powerplay” and was designed to maximize U.S. security in the region while asserting control over key allies, particularly Korea, Taiwan and Japan. Cha goes into the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and the problems in Korea. Both Chiang and Rhee risked pulling the United States into major conflicts with China and the Soviet Union, which U.S. Leaders desperately wanted to avoid.
Cha reveals most nations concerned with “entrapment” will distance themselves from the risky ally. In postwar Asia, the United States considered that option impossible. Instead, the United States managed risk by moving closer to both nations, negotiating bilateral security treaties that gave an unprecedented level of control over its allies and the power to determine when another nation could exercise its sovereign rights to use force.
The book is 352 pages and was published in 2016 by Princeton University Press.
Read from Chapters 3-7 for a class. Good outline of the US's post-WWII "Powerplay" strategy in Asia utilizing a bilaterally based "hubs and spokes" system, with a lot of historical context for specific regions/nation-states and a prediction about the future of international engagement in Asia, both by the US and generally. Especially good for referencing different political figures and authors' arguments-- oftentimes directly quotes to support their argument. A good perspective from an Asia expert about foreign policy, but mostly explanations/support of the status quo rather than new ideas/strategies imo.
Cha makes an informative and persuasive case for the enduring history of bilateral US alliances in Asia, and the absence of a multilateral security order in the region. Each of the substantive chapters -- on Taiwan, Korea, and Japan -- are interesting, but the book overall reads like a barely edited PhD dissertation (which I'm guessing it is/was). It could have been pared down a bit for the reader's sake.
I liked the book and the author's methodology, but I think he oversimplifies the "powerplay" concept. There are several non-racist reasons why America developed a comprehensive security alliance in Europe and not in Asia. First, at the end of World War II, America had just been dragged into two wars on the European continent in less than 20 years, leaving it with an immediate challenge. There was one enemy and a history of involvement across Europe (trade, economics, security, culture). In Asia, the security challenges came piecemeal and had to be dealt with over 8 years. Taiwan wasn't a country until 1949, Korea was invaded in 1950, and America didn't have centuries of connections and involvement. Second, in Europe, there was one adversary to defend against; such a thing did not exist in Asia. Taiwan had China as an adversary, South Korea had North Korea, and the Japanese treaty was just more about ensuring it was defanged than defending it against an outside aggressor.
Regardless of my issues with the conclusions, Mr. Cha's understanding of the region, how it was formed in the modern era, and the problems facing it today is unparalleled.
Powerplay really reads like a graduate essay! Not necessarily a bad thing - the language is very straightforward, case-study driven and clear on its arguments. My favorite chapter was the one on Japan. Prior to this book, I had never thought of using the Treaty of Versailles and it's treatment of Germany as a backdrop to how US managed Japan. That was very interesting for me. Overall, while it is slightly repetitive, the book does a good job breaking down how the US has influenced the intra-regional relationships post WWII.
An interesting thesis, an interesting subject, and a clear presentation, but Cha repeats himself too often, and his references are thin. It's not necessary for his argument, but I wish he had read more, and written a thicker and more complex description of alliance-making and alliance-management -- more diplomatic history than IR. Still, I learned a great deal. I appreciate that.
This was a draggy book which read like a thesis which I struggled to finish. However by all other measures, it makes an important historical and conceptual contribution to the topic and should be read by asia watchers alike