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Tolerance among the Virtues
In a pluralistic society such as ours, tolerance is a virtue―but it doesn't always seem so. Some suspect that it entangles us in unacceptable moral compromises and inequalities of power, while others dismiss it as mere political correctness or doubt that it can safeguard the moral and political relationships we value. Tolerance among the Virtues provides a vigorous defense of tolerance against its many critics and shows why the virtue of tolerance involves exercising judgment across a variety of different circumstances and relationships―not simply applying a prescribed set of rules.
Drawing inspiration from St. Paul, Aquinas, and Wittgenstein, John Bowlin offers a nuanced inquiry into tolerance as a virtue. He explains why the advocates and debunkers of toleration have reached an impasse, and he suggests a new way forward by distinguishing the virtue of tolerance from its false look-alikes, and from its sibling, forbearance. Some acts of toleration are right and good, while others amount to indifference, complicity, or condescension. Some persons are able to draw these distinctions well and to act in accord with their better judgment. When we praise them as tolerant, we are commending them as virtuous. Bowlin explores what that commendation means.
Tolerance among the Virtues offers invaluable insights into how to live amid differences we cannot endorse―beliefs we consider false, actions we think are unjust, institutional arrangements we consider cruel or corrupt, and persons who embody what we oppose.
Drawing inspiration from St. Paul, Aquinas, and Wittgenstein, John Bowlin offers a nuanced inquiry into tolerance as a virtue. He explains why the advocates and debunkers of toleration have reached an impasse, and he suggests a new way forward by distinguishing the virtue of tolerance from its false look-alikes, and from its sibling, forbearance. Some acts of toleration are right and good, while others amount to indifference, complicity, or condescension. Some persons are able to draw these distinctions well and to act in accord with their better judgment. When we praise them as tolerant, we are commending them as virtuous. Bowlin explores what that commendation means.
Tolerance among the Virtues offers invaluable insights into how to live amid differences we cannot endorse―beliefs we consider false, actions we think are unjust, institutional arrangements we consider cruel or corrupt, and persons who embody what we oppose.
- GenresPhilosophyTheology
280 pages, Hardcover
Published September 6, 2016
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About the author
John R. Bowlin
4 books1 followerJohn R. Bowlin is the Robert L. Stuart Professor of Philosophy and Christian Ethics at Princeton Theological Seminary. He earned his MDiv from Union Theological Seminary in the City of New York, and his MA and PhD from Princeton University. He is a member of the American Academy of Religion, the Society of Christian Ethics, and the Society for Values in Higher Education, and has served on the editorial board of the Journal of Religious Ethics since 2003. His areas of specialization are Christian ethics, moral philosophy, social ethics and criticism, and the history of moral theology
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
March 18, 2017
In Tolerance Among the Virtues (2016) John R. Bowlin thinks through the meaning of tolerance along with the difficulties and advantages it presents. He defines it as the patient endurance of actions and opinions that we find objectionable, obnoxious, even loathsome. Following Aristotle and Aquinas, Bowlin calls tolerance a “virtue,” an act of restraint that comes naturally to our humanity. He rejects the argument that in fact what objection naturally arouses is outright retaliation, not restraint, which is usually just resentment masquerading as tolerance.
Tolerance occurs in some form of society—a friendship, family, church, civic group, nation or international coalition—and in Bowlin’s view resentment is only one of its many semblances. Others are indifference, fear of conflict or condescension, as when advocates of social inclusion prejudge all their opponents as uneducated and therefore beneath the trouble of debate. Or tolerance may look like weakness, as when an authoritarian on the political right blames tolerance of terrorism for the meltdown of national identity and insists on hard power instead. Bowlin finds it necessary to unmask all these examples of so-called tolerance because the worth of this virtue is now so widely disputed that we need to be sure we are talking about the genuine article.
True tolerance, in Bowlin’s view, intends the deepening and perfecting of all our loves even though, given our far from perfect practice of all the virtues, that one too always falls far short of its goal. That tolerance comes naturally to us does not mean it comes easily. Like practicing a virtue such as courage, tolerance will cause us pain because of the patient endurance it demands. But like the other virtues, tolerance also gives us the pleasure of doing good—not because it changes minds, though it may do that, but because when exercised after reflective judgment and in the right circumstances, it gives outward expression to our essential humanity. We take pleasure, in other words, in the practice of the virtue itself and in the good it intends to ourselves, but also in the good it intends to those we tolerate, whose autonomy it respects, and to the particular form of society we share with those persons. Bowlin finds Dr. Martin Luther King an especially powerful example of tolerance. King undeniably wanted reconciliation between African-Americans and whites and strongly objected to its absence. But he knew very well that institutionalized white racism would probably take generations to fade, and that was the source of his tolerance—his patient endurance. Tolerance, then, is consistent with activist resistance.
Of course tolerance is not our only option in dealing with objectionable actions or opinions. A friendship may gradually reveal deep differences that finally become so unbearable our reflective judgment suggests exiting the relationship. Or legislation that makes tormenting gays a hate crime may subject an act once permitted, even approved of, to prosecution. In that case, the law no longer tolerates; it coerces. But when the particular course of action we decide on is tolerant, that decision will be arrived at by a careful consideration of what justice calls for.
Those who think Western societies historically predating liberal democracy were so homogeneous in their beliefs that they had no need for tolerance will dispute Bowlin’s reliance on Aquinas, a medieval theologian. Those wary of calling a preferred behavior like tolerance “natural” will suspect Bowlin of stacking the cards in favor of his argument. Finally, non-Christians may reject three of Bowlin’s additional claims as unable to be proved philosophically: first, his agreement with Aquinas that human nature is created by God and governed by providence, which nevertheless leaves it up to our powers of reason and will to make just choices; second, his contention that our frailty in practicing all the virtues, including tolerance, is assisted by divine grace; and third, his insistence that the virtue of tolerance has a sibling in Christian forbearance which, as Saint Paul says, “endures all things” (1 Cor 13.7).
However John Bowlin, who now works at Princeton Theological Seminary, clearly hopes his book will speak to modern non-Christians as well as Christians. This is especially evident when he argues for a close connection between Aquinas’ theological doctrine of divine grace and minimally metaphysical statements of the modern philosopher Leopold Wittgenstein like this one: “it is always by nature’s grace that one knows something” (Bowlin 89).
Tolerance occurs in some form of society—a friendship, family, church, civic group, nation or international coalition—and in Bowlin’s view resentment is only one of its many semblances. Others are indifference, fear of conflict or condescension, as when advocates of social inclusion prejudge all their opponents as uneducated and therefore beneath the trouble of debate. Or tolerance may look like weakness, as when an authoritarian on the political right blames tolerance of terrorism for the meltdown of national identity and insists on hard power instead. Bowlin finds it necessary to unmask all these examples of so-called tolerance because the worth of this virtue is now so widely disputed that we need to be sure we are talking about the genuine article.
True tolerance, in Bowlin’s view, intends the deepening and perfecting of all our loves even though, given our far from perfect practice of all the virtues, that one too always falls far short of its goal. That tolerance comes naturally to us does not mean it comes easily. Like practicing a virtue such as courage, tolerance will cause us pain because of the patient endurance it demands. But like the other virtues, tolerance also gives us the pleasure of doing good—not because it changes minds, though it may do that, but because when exercised after reflective judgment and in the right circumstances, it gives outward expression to our essential humanity. We take pleasure, in other words, in the practice of the virtue itself and in the good it intends to ourselves, but also in the good it intends to those we tolerate, whose autonomy it respects, and to the particular form of society we share with those persons. Bowlin finds Dr. Martin Luther King an especially powerful example of tolerance. King undeniably wanted reconciliation between African-Americans and whites and strongly objected to its absence. But he knew very well that institutionalized white racism would probably take generations to fade, and that was the source of his tolerance—his patient endurance. Tolerance, then, is consistent with activist resistance.
Of course tolerance is not our only option in dealing with objectionable actions or opinions. A friendship may gradually reveal deep differences that finally become so unbearable our reflective judgment suggests exiting the relationship. Or legislation that makes tormenting gays a hate crime may subject an act once permitted, even approved of, to prosecution. In that case, the law no longer tolerates; it coerces. But when the particular course of action we decide on is tolerant, that decision will be arrived at by a careful consideration of what justice calls for.
Those who think Western societies historically predating liberal democracy were so homogeneous in their beliefs that they had no need for tolerance will dispute Bowlin’s reliance on Aquinas, a medieval theologian. Those wary of calling a preferred behavior like tolerance “natural” will suspect Bowlin of stacking the cards in favor of his argument. Finally, non-Christians may reject three of Bowlin’s additional claims as unable to be proved philosophically: first, his agreement with Aquinas that human nature is created by God and governed by providence, which nevertheless leaves it up to our powers of reason and will to make just choices; second, his contention that our frailty in practicing all the virtues, including tolerance, is assisted by divine grace; and third, his insistence that the virtue of tolerance has a sibling in Christian forbearance which, as Saint Paul says, “endures all things” (1 Cor 13.7).
However John Bowlin, who now works at Princeton Theological Seminary, clearly hopes his book will speak to modern non-Christians as well as Christians. This is especially evident when he argues for a close connection between Aquinas’ theological doctrine of divine grace and minimally metaphysical statements of the modern philosopher Leopold Wittgenstein like this one: “it is always by nature’s grace that one knows something” (Bowlin 89).
October 12, 2018
Bowlin’s a good, painstakingly scrupulous Thomist, and the book inches along accordingly. He makes a compelling case that tolerance is a virtue when attached to justice. His case could aid us in our societal fractures. But true tolerance takes much care to cultivate, and I simply don’t think we have the kinds of communities necessary to cultivate it. He readily acknowledges how difficult it is to identify and practice the true virtue, but, as with all the virtues, he doesn’t think we should give up the task just because it’s difficult.
April 8, 2024
For a philosophy book regarding morals and virtues, it is very accessible. As it debates the acceptance of the practice or habit of tolerance as a virtue, the author structures the chapters and his exploration in a very engaging and digestible way.
I am also not a huge philosophy reader, so engaging with this book was something I wasn’t expecting.
I am also not a huge philosophy reader, so engaging with this book was something I wasn’t expecting.
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May 16, 2025A wonderful case for tolerance as a natural virtue, though it could have used a few more examples at points. Certainly demonstrates the universality of tolerance beyond a (in the classical sense) liberal framework.
June 26, 2021
Picked this volume up for a course I was putting together on tolerance. It has far more philosophical gravitas than any of the other books I rattled through for that course. In that respect, it has been a useful challenge for me, though I can't see assigning this text to undergraduates. Bowlin is a thoroughgoing Thomist and grounds his arguments in a robust reading of Aquinas' ethics. The resulting style can be more than a trifle challenging for one unacquainted with Thomist thinking. Further, Bowlin's style tends a bit toward the argumentative and fussy: he argues almost constantly through anticipated responses to counterarguments. This practice can lend the work a sometimes querulous tone, though Bowlin himself seems to be someone of exceptional patience and good humor. And the editors at Princeton really fell asleep at the wheel when it comes to simple proofing: edition is riddled with minor errors of spelling (or things like elicit for illicit and so on). Having said all that, this is a valuable text that offers a philosophically coherent argument for including tolerance as a virtue (it is a species of justice, in Bowlin's account). Indeed, the best part of the book is an almost Kantian insistence on regarding true tolerance as that which stems from proper intention. For Bowlin, tolerance's semblance is what causes all kinds of domestic and social arguments about the uselessness of tolerance; I think he's right about this. For nonbelievers, Bowlin offers a very strong defense for tolerance. For believers, he identifies how tolerance as a virtue is in fact allied to forbearance. Again, these arguments felt compelling. Would have preferred a few more concrete examples (his son listening to loud music, cockfighting in Oklahoma) to put meat on the bones of the arguments as opposed to extended duels with thinkers like Barbara Herman, whose views are ultimately rejected.
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June 16, 2017179.9 B7874 2016
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews