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El breve e incompleto texto que nos ha llegado con el título de Categorías es probablemente el escrito de Aristóteles que más comentaristas y lectores ha tenido a lo largo de toda la tradición. Objeto de estudios detallados desde el siglo I a.C, este tratado fue, durante toda la Edad Media, fundamental para el Occidente cristiano e influyó también en otros ámbitos culturales. En esta obra el Estagirita presenta una clasificación de los predicados en los que se expresa el conocimiento que tenemos de las cosas. En el marco de esta teoría formula por primera vez tesis fundamentales de su filosofía, que representan su despedida definitiva del platonismo y que serían decisivas y que serían decisivas para la historia del pensamiento posterior.
La traducción directa del griego, la detallada anotación y la extensa traducción han estado a cargo del doctor Eduardo Sinnot, profesor de Filosofía y de lenguas y literaturas clásicas, quien realizó estudios de Filosofía, Filología Griega y Lingüística General en la Universidad de Münster (Alemania), en la que se doctoró. Ha traducido para la colección Colihue Clásica otros dos textos de Aristóteles, la Poética y la Ética Nicomaquea.
La traducción directa del griego, la detallada anotación y la extensa traducción han estado a cargo del doctor Eduardo Sinnot, profesor de Filosofía y de lenguas y literaturas clásicas, quien realizó estudios de Filosofía, Filología Griega y Lingüística General en la Universidad de Münster (Alemania), en la que se doctoró. Ha traducido para la colección Colihue Clásica otros dos textos de Aristóteles, la Poética y la Ética Nicomaquea.
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First published January 1, 351
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About the author
Aristotle
4,333 books5,553 followersAristotle (Greek: Αριστοτέλης; 384–322 BC) was an Ancient Greek philosopher and polymath. His writings cover a broad range of subjects spanning the natural sciences, philosophy, linguistics, economics, politics, psychology, and the arts. As the founder of the Peripatetic school of philosophy in the Lyceum in Athens, he began the wider Aristotelian tradition that followed, which set the groundwork for the development of modern science.
Little is known about Aristotle's life. He was born in the city of Stagira in northern Greece during the Classical period. His father, Nicomachus, died when Aristotle was a child, and he was brought up by a guardian. At 17 or 18, he joined Plato's Academy in Athens and remained there until the age of 37 (c. 347 BC). Shortly after Plato died, Aristotle left Athens and, at the request of Philip II of Macedon, tutored his son Alexander the Great beginning in 343 BC. He established a library in the Lyceum, which helped him to produce many of his hundreds of books on papyrus scrolls.
Though Aristotle wrote many treatises and dialogues for publication, only around a third of his original output has survived, none of it intended for publication. Aristotle provided a complex synthesis of the various philosophies existing prior to him. His teachings and methods of inquiry have had a significant impact across the world, and remain a subject of contemporary philosophical discussion.
Aristotle's views profoundly shaped medieval scholarship. The influence of his physical science extended from late antiquity and the Early Middle Ages into the Renaissance, and was not replaced systematically until the Enlightenment and theories such as classical mechanics were developed. He influenced Judeo-Islamic philosophies during the Middle Ages, as well as Christian theology, especially the Neoplatonism of the Early Church and the scholastic tradition of the Catholic Church.
Aristotle was revered among medieval Muslim scholars as "The First Teacher", and among medieval Christians like Thomas Aquinas as simply "The Philosopher", while the poet Dante Alighieri called him "the master of those who know". His works contain the earliest known formal study of logic, and were studied by medieval scholars such as Pierre Abélard and Jean Buridan. Aristotle's influence on logic continued well into the 19th century. In addition, his ethics, although always influential, gained renewed interest with the modern advent of virtue ethics.
Little is known about Aristotle's life. He was born in the city of Stagira in northern Greece during the Classical period. His father, Nicomachus, died when Aristotle was a child, and he was brought up by a guardian. At 17 or 18, he joined Plato's Academy in Athens and remained there until the age of 37 (c. 347 BC). Shortly after Plato died, Aristotle left Athens and, at the request of Philip II of Macedon, tutored his son Alexander the Great beginning in 343 BC. He established a library in the Lyceum, which helped him to produce many of his hundreds of books on papyrus scrolls.
Though Aristotle wrote many treatises and dialogues for publication, only around a third of his original output has survived, none of it intended for publication. Aristotle provided a complex synthesis of the various philosophies existing prior to him. His teachings and methods of inquiry have had a significant impact across the world, and remain a subject of contemporary philosophical discussion.
Aristotle's views profoundly shaped medieval scholarship. The influence of his physical science extended from late antiquity and the Early Middle Ages into the Renaissance, and was not replaced systematically until the Enlightenment and theories such as classical mechanics were developed. He influenced Judeo-Islamic philosophies during the Middle Ages, as well as Christian theology, especially the Neoplatonism of the Early Church and the scholastic tradition of the Catholic Church.
Aristotle was revered among medieval Muslim scholars as "The First Teacher", and among medieval Christians like Thomas Aquinas as simply "The Philosopher", while the poet Dante Alighieri called him "the master of those who know". His works contain the earliest known formal study of logic, and were studied by medieval scholars such as Pierre Abélard and Jean Buridan. Aristotle's influence on logic continued well into the 19th century. In addition, his ethics, although always influential, gained renewed interest with the modern advent of virtue ethics.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 117 reviews
November 1, 2014
Bitches get wet when I distinguish primary substances from secondary and stipulate said-of-subject qualities from both, in-subject and contingent properties from the former.
March 17, 2016
I'm slowly becoming to think in Aristotelian terms to the point my mom said she has no idea what I'm talking about on few occasions.
November 6, 2018
Fairly solid book. I really enjoy this one as a companion to understanding Metaphysics. A lot of the same distinctions he goes over here he would have gone over there. I do like it a fair amount, and I think it is ingeniously detailed. This goes along with almost anything you’re reading in addition: linguistics, mathematics, anything. Just like Metaphysics. Perfect book.
January 6, 2023
قرأت الكتاب بترجمتين عن اليوناية، ترجمة إنجليزية حديثة، وترجمة عربية قديمة، قديمة جدا.
الترجمة العربية كانت ترجمة إسحق ابن حنين وهي تعود للقرن الثالث الهجري أو التاسع الميلادي، وما هالني هو دقة الترجمة العربية ومطابقتها مطابقة كاملة مع النص، مع فهم كامل لطبيعة اللغتين العربية واليونانية، وعدم الاكتفاء بالنقل الحرفي، ومن هنا يمكن القول أن كثير من مترجمي العرب قديما كانوا أكثر مهنية وحرفية من مترجمي اليوم، وأن حركة الترجمة في القرن الثالث الهجري وصلت حدا من الكمال لم يكن ما بعده سوى تميما له.
ويبقى أن نقول أن أرسطو قد أجهد نفسه كثيرا في إقرار بديهيات من فرط بديهيتها تظن أنك لا تفهمها!
الترجمة العربية كانت ترجمة إسحق ابن حنين وهي تعود للقرن الثالث الهجري أو التاسع الميلادي، وما هالني هو دقة الترجمة العربية ومطابقتها مطابقة كاملة مع النص، مع فهم كامل لطبيعة اللغتين العربية واليونانية، وعدم الاكتفاء بالنقل الحرفي، ومن هنا يمكن القول أن كثير من مترجمي العرب قديما كانوا أكثر مهنية وحرفية من مترجمي اليوم، وأن حركة الترجمة في القرن الثالث الهجري وصلت حدا من الكمال لم يكن ما بعده سوى تميما له.
ويبقى أن نقول أن أرسطو قد أجهد نفسه كثيرا في إقرار بديهيات من فرط بديهيتها تظن أنك لا تفهمها!
January 29, 2021
Perfect for academics who make much ado about absolutely nothing :) After you get through the sentiments "Wow this guy had too much time on his hands" and "How does one pay the bills without a tangible skillset?", the treatise is quite an interesting assessment on the philosophy of word structure.
What's astonishing is that Aristotle's inquiry concerns ancient Greek... but is completely applicable to modern English. Unsure if his conclusions hold true viz. Sanskrit... a future paper for someone!
What's astonishing is that Aristotle's inquiry concerns ancient Greek... but is completely applicable to modern English. Unsure if his conclusions hold true viz. Sanskrit... a future paper for someone!
November 8, 2015
It's a pretty fascinating read. I utterly disagree with the author's conclusions, but it's quite obvious that many people adhere to these categories without even realizing it.
November 4, 2017
Categories is the intro text to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, or so some essay from Plato.Stanford.Edu said. Good enough for me. It is short and clear.
Some things are predicable of a subject but never in a subject. By “being present in a subject” Aristotle means “incapable of existence apart from a subject” (2, 1a).
Substance is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject.
Primary: The individual man or horse.
Secondary: the species man; the genus animal.
Key point: everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary substance. The proposition “the man is an animal” is necessarily true, but not the reverse. Further, the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate.
A primary substance has no contrary, for what can be the contrary to an individual man? Yet, while remaining numerically one it can admit contrary qualities.
Some things are predicable of a subject but never in a subject. By “being present in a subject” Aristotle means “incapable of existence apart from a subject” (2, 1a).
Substance is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject.
Primary: The individual man or horse.
Secondary: the species man; the genus animal.
Key point: everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary substance. The proposition “the man is an animal” is necessarily true, but not the reverse. Further, the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate.
A primary substance has no contrary, for what can be the contrary to an individual man? Yet, while remaining numerically one it can admit contrary qualities.
November 25, 2018
a superb even if somewhat hapazardly organized treatise on some of the fundamental terms that we take for granted. in his discussion of quantity he makes a strange claim about parts of time not enduring that I don't find convincing (if parts of time do not endure, then how can we account for prior and posterior, the flow of time). the whole treatise is like a puzzle that must be pieced together with effort.
August 15, 2022
Impressive analysis. But today we might ask: Are there secure metaphysical categories? Aren't categories part of languages validated by use/science?
June 17, 2024
Never want to hear from this hoe again
August 31, 2017
Aristotle starts his analysis of logic by analysing language. How insightful, and remarkable as well that so much of what he uncovers applicable to Greek is applicable to modern English.
Aristotle immediately goes into a long list of distinctions. There is neither a motivating statement nor any outline of his scheme. This approach may confuse some people, but it occurs to me that carefully crafted distinctions often lead to the effortless emergence of later truths. The name Organon applies; the focus is on Logic as a tool.
Aristotle would have felt very much at home with set theory and object oriented programming. Often he seems on the verge of inventing these domains.
Aristotle's ideas continue to have a large influence on how we see things in science. For instance, it is an Aristotelian notion that leads us, after Einstein, to speak of mass and time as relative.
Aristotle immediately goes into a long list of distinctions. There is neither a motivating statement nor any outline of his scheme. This approach may confuse some people, but it occurs to me that carefully crafted distinctions often lead to the effortless emergence of later truths. The name Organon applies; the focus is on Logic as a tool.
Aristotle would have felt very much at home with set theory and object oriented programming. Often he seems on the verge of inventing these domains.
Aristotle's ideas continue to have a large influence on how we see things in science. For instance, it is an Aristotelian notion that leads us, after Einstein, to speak of mass and time as relative.
June 3, 2024
Läsning 2: Vid omläsning konstaterar jag att väldigt mycket av Aristoteles tankar förklaras i dessa knappt 40 sidor. Etiken saknas, det är väl det. Jag rekommenderar den starkt till alla universitetselever och blivande universitetselever, samt till vuxna som inte vet var de vill börja i studiet av filosofi.
Läsning 1: Utmärkt genomgång av tankeregler i språket. Det jag ser som viktigast är dels relationen mellan substans och tanke (ie. Den förra kan ändras, men inte den andra - den byts ist) och dels A.:s beskrivning av förändringsslagen som fenomen.
Läsning 1: Utmärkt genomgång av tankeregler i språket. Det jag ser som viktigast är dels relationen mellan substans och tanke (ie. Den förra kan ändras, men inte den andra - den byts ist) och dels A.:s beskrivning av förändringsslagen som fenomen.
April 1, 2013
L'80% della filosofia contemporanea deriva dalle Categorie di Aristotele, che in queste cinquanta pagine ha creato la logica e tutti i suoi derivati.
May 19, 2023
Möchte das Wort "Zugrundeliegenden" nie wieder lesen.
Read
April 24, 2025Em Belém, numa biblioteca da marinha, abri Categorias pela primeira com vontade de aprender mas depois de algumas horas saí de lá sem ter compreendido sequer uma página. Tinha estacado no trecho “Outras coises são ditas de um sujeito e estão em um sujeito.” Lembro que penei para decifrar esse parágrafo. Hoje o estudante brasileiro tem à disposição ótimos recursos como a “Introdução Geral” de Antônio Pedro Mesquita ou a edição comentada e bilíngue da edusp. Naquela, por exemplo, somos lembrados do caráter fragmentado da obra, de que o principal legado de Aristóteles são anotações de aula sagazmente ordenadas.
As Categorias faz parte dos ditos “ante predicamenta”, tratados introdutórios à lógica formal e proposição, as maiores contribuições aristotélicas. Especificamente, no âmbito lógico, é um estudo do valor das palavras soltas, sem conexão com outras. Quando se termina o livro temos a unidade dos capítulos em mente, de como para se afirmar qualquer coisa usamos um sujeito e um predicado e em que medida as 10 categorias se encaixam nesses papéis. Depois, com grande ênfase à substância (categoria kyriotatos, como disse. Em grego ousia, algo como o particípio de “ser”, vale tanto como “essência” e “substância” na filosofia latina. Sublinho o kyriotatos pq o adjetivo contrasta fortemente com a etimologia de “substância”, o que jaz sob, enquanto kyrios é senhor, autoridativo, soberano &c), há explicações a cada uma das categorias.
O que achei diferente nessa leitura é que justamente o primeiro capítulo, sobre sinonímia, homonímia e paronímia, me parecia solto dessa unidade. É que o Aristóteles da primeira fase (o melhor Aristóteles or what?) reconhece apenas indivíduos como substância primeira e essas 3 denominações parecem indicar o modo pelo qual as categorias se formam. A paronímia, por exemplo, temos gramático de gramática - não é claro q formamos aí alguma qualidade ou algum predicado? A sinonímia nos dá que homem e cavalo conquanto diferentes são animais e que Jocildo e Aniceto conquanto duas pessoas são ambos homens. Temos aí a substância segunda. Já a homonímia nós dá que homem e o desenho de um homem são chamados “homem”. Meio inútil no contexto do livro mas aqui a nota da edição da edusp esclarece o texto através da citação da Metafísica:
“É evidente, a partir do exposto, que, de alguma maneira, as coisas se originam de um homônimo, como as coisas que se originam naturalmente, ou de uma parte homônima. Por exemplo, a casa, a partir de uma casa, a da mente, pois a arte é a espécie.”
No que tange a natureza claro está : filho de peixe peixinho é e não se fala mais nisso. Quanto à técnica penso que há algo de profundo nisso, de que precisamos de modelos, gráficos, maquetes, esquemas, planos, imagens mentais para nossas tecnologias e aplicações. Talvez para entender qualquer coisa usamos esses arranjos intelectuais e por homonímia os encaixamos à realidade. E esse brilhante modelo de atribuições que começa aqui nas Categorias não seria um outro esquema mental?
As Categorias faz parte dos ditos “ante predicamenta”, tratados introdutórios à lógica formal e proposição, as maiores contribuições aristotélicas. Especificamente, no âmbito lógico, é um estudo do valor das palavras soltas, sem conexão com outras. Quando se termina o livro temos a unidade dos capítulos em mente, de como para se afirmar qualquer coisa usamos um sujeito e um predicado e em que medida as 10 categorias se encaixam nesses papéis. Depois, com grande ênfase à substância (categoria kyriotatos, como disse. Em grego ousia, algo como o particípio de “ser”, vale tanto como “essência” e “substância” na filosofia latina. Sublinho o kyriotatos pq o adjetivo contrasta fortemente com a etimologia de “substância”, o que jaz sob, enquanto kyrios é senhor, autoridativo, soberano &c), há explicações a cada uma das categorias.
O que achei diferente nessa leitura é que justamente o primeiro capítulo, sobre sinonímia, homonímia e paronímia, me parecia solto dessa unidade. É que o Aristóteles da primeira fase (o melhor Aristóteles or what?) reconhece apenas indivíduos como substância primeira e essas 3 denominações parecem indicar o modo pelo qual as categorias se formam. A paronímia, por exemplo, temos gramático de gramática - não é claro q formamos aí alguma qualidade ou algum predicado? A sinonímia nos dá que homem e cavalo conquanto diferentes são animais e que Jocildo e Aniceto conquanto duas pessoas são ambos homens. Temos aí a substância segunda. Já a homonímia nós dá que homem e o desenho de um homem são chamados “homem”. Meio inútil no contexto do livro mas aqui a nota da edição da edusp esclarece o texto através da citação da Metafísica:
“É evidente, a partir do exposto, que, de alguma maneira, as coisas se originam de um homônimo, como as coisas que se originam naturalmente, ou de uma parte homônima. Por exemplo, a casa, a partir de uma casa, a da mente, pois a arte é a espécie.”
No que tange a natureza claro está : filho de peixe peixinho é e não se fala mais nisso. Quanto à técnica penso que há algo de profundo nisso, de que precisamos de modelos, gráficos, maquetes, esquemas, planos, imagens mentais para nossas tecnologias e aplicações. Talvez para entender qualquer coisa usamos esses arranjos intelectuais e por homonímia os encaixamos à realidade. E esse brilhante modelo de atribuições que começa aqui nas Categorias não seria um outro esquema mental?
June 10, 2018
“Categorize *this*, Aristotle,” one of his pupils might have said, if it were an exceptionally hot day at the Lyceum of Athens and the students were feeling out of sorts; and no doubt Aristotle would have said, “Alright,” and begun categorizing everything in sight. The man had a positive mania for categorizing, as is evident from even the most cursory reading of Aristotle’s Categories.
It makes sense, in a way, that Aristotle would believe so strongly in the benefits of categorization. Remember, after all, that central image from The School of Athens: an elderly Plato points stubbornly upward, toward idealism and his World of Forms, while Aristotle points just as resolutely downward, believing that all things can be understood in terms of material reality that can be analyzed, charted, dissected, or graphed in scientific terms. Small wonder that Aristotle has been such an inspiration to scientifically minded people in all fields for such a long time.
Aristotle, who takes categorizing very seriously, begins the Categories by stating that “Things are said to be named ‘equivocally’ when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name varies for each”, whereas “things are said to be named ‘univocally’ which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common.” That is, a real human being is an animal, while a human being in a picture is not really an animal; but a real human being and a real ox are both animals. Such is the degree of specificity with which Aristotle will be writing of categorization.
The Categories is, to say the least, a difficult and challenging treatise to work with. The Nicomachean Ethics benefits from its generalizability, as each reader is likely to consider Aristotle’s pronouncements on ethical behavior in the context of his or her own moral and ethical decisions over the course of a lifetime. Similarly, one can read The Politics and apply Aristotle’s comparative consideration of the Greek city-states of classical times to the nations of his or her own time. But the Categories occupies a philosophical zone of its own.
I engage in reflections of this kind regarding the Categories when reading passages like this one: “Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject”. So, what does “predicable” mean to the philosopher? In terms of scholastic logic, “predicable” refers to the way in which a predicate can relate to its subject. There is a proposition that contains two terms – a subject and a predicate – and the predicate can be affirmed or denied in terms of the subject. It can be affirmed or denied that Socrates is a human being, or that Secretariat is a horse.
Aristotle is also highly interested in substance; he writes that “Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary substance”. Okay, so what is a primary substance – or, for that matter, a secondary substance? In Aristotle’s logical system, a primary substance is particular and cannot be predicated; a secondary substance is universal and can be predicated. Hence “Socrates” and “Secretariat” are primary substances, while “human being” and “horse” are secondary substances. Aristotle adds that “primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underly everything else”; in other words, one’s status as, say, Socrates underlies everything else about one’s being human.
Considering with his examination of the nature of substance, Aristotle states that “Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or animal? It has none.” This concept could be a challenging one for many readers, especially as we may be used to thinking of “inhuman” as the opposite of “human” when considering the good or bad actions that people carry out. For Aristotle, though, such questions are matters of ethics, not of categories. Actions can be humane or inhumane, and can be opposites of one another in ethical terms; but there is nothing that is the “opposite” of a human being.
It is interesting to watch Aristotle work with his system of categories, as when he suggests that “The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities.” He elaborates by stating that “one and the selfsame substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting contrary qualities. The same individual person is…at one time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at another bad.” That differentiation between substance on the one hand, and the qualities of a substance on the other, seems to be one of the most important concepts set forth in the Categories.
Relativity – not in the sense of Einsteinian physics, of course, but in a more general sense – is also an important feature of the Categories. Aristotle writes that “Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing. For instance, the word ‘superior’ is explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over something else that is meant. Similarly, the expression ‘double’ has this external reference, for it is the double of something else that is meant.” 4 is a double of 2. Socrates was a superior logician to Crito, or Euthyphro, or Phaedrus. Secretariat, at the Preakness Stakes in Baltimore in 1973, was a better race horse than Torsion (the horse that finished last in that race).
Aristotle is also interested in the idea of quality, writing that “By ‘quality’ I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such and such. In that regard, he writes, for example, of “affective qualities and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of this sort of quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat, moreover, and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective qualities….Honey is called sweet because it contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains whiteness; and so in all other cases.”
And thus Aristotle proceeds throughout the Categories discoursing on concepts like action and affection (“Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of variation of degree”). It is a dizzying ascent into the empyrean heights of pure philosophy, a cold and starry race among the constellations of pure logic. It is not for everyone; but if you’re in the mood for a strenuous intellectual challenge, then Aristotle’s Categories may be for you.
It makes sense, in a way, that Aristotle would believe so strongly in the benefits of categorization. Remember, after all, that central image from The School of Athens: an elderly Plato points stubbornly upward, toward idealism and his World of Forms, while Aristotle points just as resolutely downward, believing that all things can be understood in terms of material reality that can be analyzed, charted, dissected, or graphed in scientific terms. Small wonder that Aristotle has been such an inspiration to scientifically minded people in all fields for such a long time.
Aristotle, who takes categorizing very seriously, begins the Categories by stating that “Things are said to be named ‘equivocally’ when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name varies for each”, whereas “things are said to be named ‘univocally’ which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common.” That is, a real human being is an animal, while a human being in a picture is not really an animal; but a real human being and a real ox are both animals. Such is the degree of specificity with which Aristotle will be writing of categorization.
The Categories is, to say the least, a difficult and challenging treatise to work with. The Nicomachean Ethics benefits from its generalizability, as each reader is likely to consider Aristotle’s pronouncements on ethical behavior in the context of his or her own moral and ethical decisions over the course of a lifetime. Similarly, one can read The Politics and apply Aristotle’s comparative consideration of the Greek city-states of classical times to the nations of his or her own time. But the Categories occupies a philosophical zone of its own.
I engage in reflections of this kind regarding the Categories when reading passages like this one: “Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject”. So, what does “predicable” mean to the philosopher? In terms of scholastic logic, “predicable” refers to the way in which a predicate can relate to its subject. There is a proposition that contains two terms – a subject and a predicate – and the predicate can be affirmed or denied in terms of the subject. It can be affirmed or denied that Socrates is a human being, or that Secretariat is a horse.
Aristotle is also highly interested in substance; he writes that “Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary substance”. Okay, so what is a primary substance – or, for that matter, a secondary substance? In Aristotle’s logical system, a primary substance is particular and cannot be predicated; a secondary substance is universal and can be predicated. Hence “Socrates” and “Secretariat” are primary substances, while “human being” and “horse” are secondary substances. Aristotle adds that “primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underly everything else”; in other words, one’s status as, say, Socrates underlies everything else about one’s being human.
Considering with his examination of the nature of substance, Aristotle states that “Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or animal? It has none.” This concept could be a challenging one for many readers, especially as we may be used to thinking of “inhuman” as the opposite of “human” when considering the good or bad actions that people carry out. For Aristotle, though, such questions are matters of ethics, not of categories. Actions can be humane or inhumane, and can be opposites of one another in ethical terms; but there is nothing that is the “opposite” of a human being.
It is interesting to watch Aristotle work with his system of categories, as when he suggests that “The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities.” He elaborates by stating that “one and the selfsame substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting contrary qualities. The same individual person is…at one time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at another bad.” That differentiation between substance on the one hand, and the qualities of a substance on the other, seems to be one of the most important concepts set forth in the Categories.
Relativity – not in the sense of Einsteinian physics, of course, but in a more general sense – is also an important feature of the Categories. Aristotle writes that “Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing. For instance, the word ‘superior’ is explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over something else that is meant. Similarly, the expression ‘double’ has this external reference, for it is the double of something else that is meant.” 4 is a double of 2. Socrates was a superior logician to Crito, or Euthyphro, or Phaedrus. Secretariat, at the Preakness Stakes in Baltimore in 1973, was a better race horse than Torsion (the horse that finished last in that race).
Aristotle is also interested in the idea of quality, writing that “By ‘quality’ I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such and such. In that regard, he writes, for example, of “affective qualities and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of this sort of quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat, moreover, and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective qualities….Honey is called sweet because it contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains whiteness; and so in all other cases.”
And thus Aristotle proceeds throughout the Categories discoursing on concepts like action and affection (“Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of variation of degree”). It is a dizzying ascent into the empyrean heights of pure philosophy, a cold and starry race among the constellations of pure logic. It is not for everyone; but if you’re in the mood for a strenuous intellectual challenge, then Aristotle’s Categories may be for you.
March 7, 2021
An introduction to Aristotelian logic, but also a brief introduction to his concept of primary and secondary substances. Aristotle bases this idea on what actually exists first and foremost. All living beings are primary substances, and when we categorise them based on their species and genus, these categorisations and definitions are secondary substances. While interesting, I also found the logic of changing the definitions of the secondary substances - species and genus - based on the primary substance to be a little problematic. For example, Aristotle says that because an individual human is "grammatical", we would say that a human (an individual human's species) and an animal (a human's genus) is "grammatical".
Does this really follow? Aristotle seems to derive the definition of human from the actions of an individual human. But can we ever arrive at a common definition for “human” which includes qualities influenced by our environment and upbringing, like “grammatical”? There exist, even today, humans who do not communicate through grammatical language. Aristotle even extends this to calling an animal “grammatical” (because humans are animals), which makes no sense to me. I think a better argument would’ve been that not everything about individual humans changes the definition of their species and genus, only some essential characteristics that make someone human. For example, being a biped, having a heart and brain, etc. All individual humans comply with this. It shouldn't matter for the definition of human whether someone feels emotions (a person in a coma is also human).
Does this really follow? Aristotle seems to derive the definition of human from the actions of an individual human. But can we ever arrive at a common definition for “human” which includes qualities influenced by our environment and upbringing, like “grammatical”? There exist, even today, humans who do not communicate through grammatical language. Aristotle even extends this to calling an animal “grammatical” (because humans are animals), which makes no sense to me. I think a better argument would’ve been that not everything about individual humans changes the definition of their species and genus, only some essential characteristics that make someone human. For example, being a biped, having a heart and brain, etc. All individual humans comply with this. It shouldn't matter for the definition of human whether someone feels emotions (a person in a coma is also human).
April 25, 2024
Un texto de poco más de 30 paginas que me ha llevado bastantes horas, duro de digerir, pero importante tanto en la filosofía de Aristóteles como en la.de la historia de la filosofía (influyendo en la escolástica, Kant, Gustavo Bueno...).
Leer cosas como está me hacen entender por qué hay gente que dice que la metafísica son problemas del lenguaje.
El texto parece ser que llega incompleto, hay partes que faltan, interpolaciones y un cambio de tono bastante marcado en la segunda parte
Leer cosas como está me hacen entender por qué hay gente que dice que la metafísica son problemas del lenguaje.
El texto parece ser que llega incompleto, hay partes que faltan, interpolaciones y un cambio de tono bastante marcado en la segunda parte
May 9, 2024
Aristotle's Categories provide a framework for logical reasoning, critical thinking, and effective communication. It encourages us to question assumptions and appreciate the complexities of the world. In today's society, these skills are invaluable for navigating information overload, fostering understanding, and making sound judgments.
November 16, 2020
Simple logic and common sense, but it's nice to see such common sense expanded upon.
Read
March 27, 2023aula de linguística :)
April 23, 2023
nit je gramatika... nit je filozofija... sve u svemu nije ništa (zbog koncepta sućine 2 zvjezdice)
Read
November 9, 2025gostava mesmo de saber quantas versões disto existem, como é que há edições para linguística e outras para filosofia, e por que caralhos não coincidem
December 26, 2025
Aristotle doing what he does. I’ll have to watch a video to understand what I just read though.
February 25, 2023
Aristotle, Grammar, and Reality.
The diagrams are here - https://medium.com/@peterseanbradle/a...
The Categories by Aristotle
The Categories is an essential text in Aristotle's body of work.[1] This text seems to be prior to and a foundation for Aristotle's Metaphysics. The Categories does not deal with why "primary substances" are "substances," but it does define "primary substance" and "secondary substance," which appear undefined and unexplained in material form in Metaphysics. A takeaway may be that one should start with Categories before approaching Metaphysics.[2]
One of the interesting features of Aristotle's philosophy is how grammar seems to model reality. Aristotle's categorization of things into "primary substance," "secondary substance," and "accidents"[3] occurs almost as the result of analyzing the grammatical relationship of the subjects of sentences to the predicates of sentences. This is unclear, and Aristotle does not offer an explanation. If we were to speculate, we might wonder if Aristotle assumed that human reason via human language was in sync with the structure of reality. This makes sense from a Christian perspective since reason would be considered "Logos," and language would be regarded as "the word," while Logos created and organized the universe. The Logos connect the universe and reason; language reflects reality for Aristotle like mathematics does for modern science.
Since Categories is about subjects and predicates, we should consider what those terms mean. A subject is the sentence's subject, essentially a noun, a person, place, or thing, e.g., "Peter" or "This bird." A predicate is what happens to the subject or what the subject does, e.g., "Peter kicked the dog" or "This bird has wings. To get a better sense of what "subject" means for Aristotle, we have to read Metaphysics where we learn that subject is a unitary singular thing. "Two dogs" are not a "subject" in this sense[4]; neither is "pile of sand."
In Categories, Aristotle observes that subjects can be coordinated with predicates in two primary ways:
1. The predicate can be said of the subject, e.g., "Peter is a lawyer" or "Peter has two legs."
2. The predicate can be in the subject, e.g., "Peter is a lawyer" or "Peter knows how to type." The "in the subject" criteria pertains to things "incapable of existence apart from the said subject." [Peter's head can be a subject if separated from Peter's body, and, maybe, grammatically and less violently as part of Peter while still attached.]
In "Aristotle: A Guide for the Perplexed," John Vella explains the distinction as follows:
"A predicate that is in a subject cannot have its definition predicated of the subject; a predicate that is said of a subject necessarily has its definition predicated of the subject."
"Being a lawyer" is "passing the bar exam." Peter has passed the bar exam, but he is not "passing the bar exam." Thus, "being a lawyer" is something we can say OF Peter, but it is not IN Peter. Similarly, a mammal is warm-blooded and a member of species capable of producing milk. Peter is warm-blooded and a member of a species capable of producing milk. So, "Peter is a mammal" can be said OF Peter, but cannot be IN Peter, since "mammal" is a word for a group and not an individual. ("Mammal" is also not an "accidental" feature of Peter; it is part OF the definition of Peter.)
Put this together and we have this diagram:
This may be less than overwhelming, but it is incredibly insightful when it comes to Metaphysics[5] because it identifies a way of thinking about "accidents" and "subjects." The "subject" falls into the "double No" category because a subject is not in itself (It is itself), nor is the subject said of the subject. A subject cannot be predicated of anything, according to Aristotle. This seems to make sense - how would we make "Peter" a predicate of some other subject?
Aristotle then moves into a discussion of the categories themselves. Categories are those things that are in a subject in the sense that they cannot exist without the subject but cannot be said of the subject. In my chart, this group - Category (III) is what Aristotle calls "accidents." Accidents are things that can be changed without changing the essence or substance of the subject. If we say, "Peter is a lawyer," we are speaking about something that cannot be separated from Peter and made to exist separately. Peter's quality/status as a lawyer lives in Peter; it cannot be carved out and displayed separately from Peter. The classic example is "Socrates is white." Socrates' whiteness is something that cannot be separated from Socrates. "Whiteness" cannot exist as a free-floating thing separated from the thing it makes white.
However, the definition of these things cannot be predicated directly of the subject. I can't do a better job of explaining this than John Vella does in Aristotle: a Guide for the Perplexed:
"The definition of white is the following: reflected light of a certain wavelength. The definition of a human being is the following: a rational animal. Now try substituting each of these definitions into the sentence Socrates is x. For the latter predicate, this would result in the following sentence:
Socrates is a rational animal. This is a true predication with respect to Socrates. With the former predicate, the following sentence results: Socrates is reflected light of a certain wavelength. This is a flatly false predication with respect to Socrates; he is not light of a certain wavelength. He is a human being whose body reflects light of a certain wavelength. What Aristotle illustrates here are two fundamentally different ways of predicating with respect to any given subject. A predicate that is in a subject cannot have its definition predicated of the subject; a predicate that is said of a subject necessarily has its definition predicated of the subject.
Vella, John. Aristotle: A Guide for the Perplexed (Guides for the Perplexed) (p. 36). Bloomsbury Publishing. Kindle Edition.
Aristotle offers a list of ten categories - one is "substance" (Group (I)), and the other nine fall into Group (III). The nine are:
Aristotle discusses Quality, Quantity, and Relation quite extensively. He gives a summary treatment of the other categories because they are self-explanatory. The one category that may not be for moderns is "affection." I think "affection" is contrary to "action." Subjects take actions to impose effects on other things. Subjects are subjected to the actions of others by which they are "affected." "Affection" means the things to which subjects are "passive recipients." The Latin word for this is "Passions." Aristotle explains:
"Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not said to be affective qualities in this sense, but - because they themselves are the results of an affection. It is plain that many changes of colour take place because of affections. When a man is ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. So true is this, that when a man is by nature liable to such affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the corresponding complexion of skin.
Aristotle. Aristotle: The Complete Works (p. 50). Pandora's Box. Kindle Edition.
Aristotle then discusses how things can be said to be opposite. There are four - or perhaps five - ways of opposition. They are:
1. Correlative, e.g., Father/Son; Double/Half.
2. Contraries, e.g., Good/Bad; Health/Disease; Black/White.
3. Privation, e.g, Sighted/Blind.
4. Affirmation/Negations, e.g., "Socrates is ill"/"Socrates is well."
Correlatives have reference to each other; we can't have a son without a father. Privations reference a common subject ordinarily existing in the subject, such as the quality of sight. Privation of sight is blindness. Privations may have intermediates. Contraries are not interdependent and may have intermediate states. Affirmations and Negations are qualities of statements and have the quality of "truth," unlike the other opposites.
As with other features of the Categories, these distinctions are useful for thinking. Categorizing things correctly into proper oppositions allows for more fruitful thinking.
Aristotle's discussion of movement is like this. Aristotle lists six sorts of movement, four of which are paired. They are:
Aristotle is wonderfully diagrammable. The felicity of this quality is that his key points are more easily memorized. It also provides a structure that permits a fruitfulness of thought. We all know these different aspects of movement but have never structured how we think about motion.
Aristotle is not a light read. His philosophy has much to offer for making one's way. It is a way of unraveling puzzles that we can find ourselves in. It has much to offer those interested in philosophy or understanding the world. However, I don't think anyone reading the Categories would get much out of it. Categories should be read as part of a project of learning Aristotle, preferably with the help of other readers. I read Categories and Metaphysics as part of Online Great Books, which provides a reading schedule and a monthly digital seminar to discuss the reading. If you are interested in Aristotle, think about doing it that way.
[1] But what isn't? Maybe Aristotle's "Meteorology"? Even obscure entries like "The Heavens" get mentioned frequently in subsequent philosophical works, such as St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica.
[2] Also, Categories is shorter and more accessible than Metaphysics. At least, I think so, but that may be because I struggled through Metaphysics before reading Categories.
[3] The Categories does not use "accident," a word in Metaphysics. Instead, the category of accidents in Metaphysics is the category of "Categories" in Categories, not to be redundant.
[4] Perhaps the clue is in the plural verb ("are")?
[5] Subjects are indisputable real things. When we say, "The cat is running," we might wonder about the ontological state of "running," but that cat is real.
The diagrams are here - https://medium.com/@peterseanbradle/a...
The Categories by Aristotle
The Categories is an essential text in Aristotle's body of work.[1] This text seems to be prior to and a foundation for Aristotle's Metaphysics. The Categories does not deal with why "primary substances" are "substances," but it does define "primary substance" and "secondary substance," which appear undefined and unexplained in material form in Metaphysics. A takeaway may be that one should start with Categories before approaching Metaphysics.[2]
One of the interesting features of Aristotle's philosophy is how grammar seems to model reality. Aristotle's categorization of things into "primary substance," "secondary substance," and "accidents"[3] occurs almost as the result of analyzing the grammatical relationship of the subjects of sentences to the predicates of sentences. This is unclear, and Aristotle does not offer an explanation. If we were to speculate, we might wonder if Aristotle assumed that human reason via human language was in sync with the structure of reality. This makes sense from a Christian perspective since reason would be considered "Logos," and language would be regarded as "the word," while Logos created and organized the universe. The Logos connect the universe and reason; language reflects reality for Aristotle like mathematics does for modern science.
Since Categories is about subjects and predicates, we should consider what those terms mean. A subject is the sentence's subject, essentially a noun, a person, place, or thing, e.g., "Peter" or "This bird." A predicate is what happens to the subject or what the subject does, e.g., "Peter kicked the dog" or "This bird has wings. To get a better sense of what "subject" means for Aristotle, we have to read Metaphysics where we learn that subject is a unitary singular thing. "Two dogs" are not a "subject" in this sense[4]; neither is "pile of sand."
In Categories, Aristotle observes that subjects can be coordinated with predicates in two primary ways:
1. The predicate can be said of the subject, e.g., "Peter is a lawyer" or "Peter has two legs."
2. The predicate can be in the subject, e.g., "Peter is a lawyer" or "Peter knows how to type." The "in the subject" criteria pertains to things "incapable of existence apart from the said subject." [Peter's head can be a subject if separated from Peter's body, and, maybe, grammatically and less violently as part of Peter while still attached.]
In "Aristotle: A Guide for the Perplexed," John Vella explains the distinction as follows:
"A predicate that is in a subject cannot have its definition predicated of the subject; a predicate that is said of a subject necessarily has its definition predicated of the subject."
"Being a lawyer" is "passing the bar exam." Peter has passed the bar exam, but he is not "passing the bar exam." Thus, "being a lawyer" is something we can say OF Peter, but it is not IN Peter. Similarly, a mammal is warm-blooded and a member of species capable of producing milk. Peter is warm-blooded and a member of a species capable of producing milk. So, "Peter is a mammal" can be said OF Peter, but cannot be IN Peter, since "mammal" is a word for a group and not an individual. ("Mammal" is also not an "accidental" feature of Peter; it is part OF the definition of Peter.)
Put this together and we have this diagram:
This may be less than overwhelming, but it is incredibly insightful when it comes to Metaphysics[5] because it identifies a way of thinking about "accidents" and "subjects." The "subject" falls into the "double No" category because a subject is not in itself (It is itself), nor is the subject said of the subject. A subject cannot be predicated of anything, according to Aristotle. This seems to make sense - how would we make "Peter" a predicate of some other subject?
Aristotle then moves into a discussion of the categories themselves. Categories are those things that are in a subject in the sense that they cannot exist without the subject but cannot be said of the subject. In my chart, this group - Category (III) is what Aristotle calls "accidents." Accidents are things that can be changed without changing the essence or substance of the subject. If we say, "Peter is a lawyer," we are speaking about something that cannot be separated from Peter and made to exist separately. Peter's quality/status as a lawyer lives in Peter; it cannot be carved out and displayed separately from Peter. The classic example is "Socrates is white." Socrates' whiteness is something that cannot be separated from Socrates. "Whiteness" cannot exist as a free-floating thing separated from the thing it makes white.
However, the definition of these things cannot be predicated directly of the subject. I can't do a better job of explaining this than John Vella does in Aristotle: a Guide for the Perplexed:
"The definition of white is the following: reflected light of a certain wavelength. The definition of a human being is the following: a rational animal. Now try substituting each of these definitions into the sentence Socrates is x. For the latter predicate, this would result in the following sentence:
Socrates is a rational animal. This is a true predication with respect to Socrates. With the former predicate, the following sentence results: Socrates is reflected light of a certain wavelength. This is a flatly false predication with respect to Socrates; he is not light of a certain wavelength. He is a human being whose body reflects light of a certain wavelength. What Aristotle illustrates here are two fundamentally different ways of predicating with respect to any given subject. A predicate that is in a subject cannot have its definition predicated of the subject; a predicate that is said of a subject necessarily has its definition predicated of the subject.
Vella, John. Aristotle: A Guide for the Perplexed (Guides for the Perplexed) (p. 36). Bloomsbury Publishing. Kindle Edition.
Aristotle offers a list of ten categories - one is "substance" (Group (I)), and the other nine fall into Group (III). The nine are:
Aristotle discusses Quality, Quantity, and Relation quite extensively. He gives a summary treatment of the other categories because they are self-explanatory. The one category that may not be for moderns is "affection." I think "affection" is contrary to "action." Subjects take actions to impose effects on other things. Subjects are subjected to the actions of others by which they are "affected." "Affection" means the things to which subjects are "passive recipients." The Latin word for this is "Passions." Aristotle explains:
"Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not said to be affective qualities in this sense, but - because they themselves are the results of an affection. It is plain that many changes of colour take place because of affections. When a man is ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. So true is this, that when a man is by nature liable to such affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the corresponding complexion of skin.
Aristotle. Aristotle: The Complete Works (p. 50). Pandora's Box. Kindle Edition.
Aristotle then discusses how things can be said to be opposite. There are four - or perhaps five - ways of opposition. They are:
1. Correlative, e.g., Father/Son; Double/Half.
2. Contraries, e.g., Good/Bad; Health/Disease; Black/White.
3. Privation, e.g, Sighted/Blind.
4. Affirmation/Negations, e.g., "Socrates is ill"/"Socrates is well."
Correlatives have reference to each other; we can't have a son without a father. Privations reference a common subject ordinarily existing in the subject, such as the quality of sight. Privation of sight is blindness. Privations may have intermediates. Contraries are not interdependent and may have intermediate states. Affirmations and Negations are qualities of statements and have the quality of "truth," unlike the other opposites.
As with other features of the Categories, these distinctions are useful for thinking. Categorizing things correctly into proper oppositions allows for more fruitful thinking.
Aristotle's discussion of movement is like this. Aristotle lists six sorts of movement, four of which are paired. They are:
Aristotle is wonderfully diagrammable. The felicity of this quality is that his key points are more easily memorized. It also provides a structure that permits a fruitfulness of thought. We all know these different aspects of movement but have never structured how we think about motion.
Aristotle is not a light read. His philosophy has much to offer for making one's way. It is a way of unraveling puzzles that we can find ourselves in. It has much to offer those interested in philosophy or understanding the world. However, I don't think anyone reading the Categories would get much out of it. Categories should be read as part of a project of learning Aristotle, preferably with the help of other readers. I read Categories and Metaphysics as part of Online Great Books, which provides a reading schedule and a monthly digital seminar to discuss the reading. If you are interested in Aristotle, think about doing it that way.
[1] But what isn't? Maybe Aristotle's "Meteorology"? Even obscure entries like "The Heavens" get mentioned frequently in subsequent philosophical works, such as St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica.
[2] Also, Categories is shorter and more accessible than Metaphysics. At least, I think so, but that may be because I struggled through Metaphysics before reading Categories.
[3] The Categories does not use "accident," a word in Metaphysics. Instead, the category of accidents in Metaphysics is the category of "Categories" in Categories, not to be redundant.
[4] Perhaps the clue is in the plural verb ("are")?
[5] Subjects are indisputable real things. When we say, "The cat is running," we might wonder about the ontological state of "running," but that cat is real.
March 10, 2023
What can be said about a thing? For Aristotle there are nine things that can be predicated on a subject. This is more than grammar for grammar, rightly understood, reflects how the universe functions.
August 20, 2019
This is a very short treatise, or rather a collection of notes, by Aristotle on his theory of the categories. The work forms the first part of the Organon - a collection of Aristotelean texts that historically has been very influential in the Arab and Medieval Christian worlds. The Organon - literally: tool or instrument - consists of works in which Aristotle sets out the principles of his system of logic. And not only this, the things he has to say about these principles suffice to label the works metaphysical as well.
This last point is especially prominent in the Categories, in which Aristotle explains what the fundamental structure of nature consists of, on a very general and abstract level. Things are either substances or predicates; if substance, then either primary or derivative substance; if predicate, then either one of nine kinds - the kinds being quantity, relation, quality, place, time, position, state, action (doing) and affection (being done).
When we apply this thinking to the world, we end up with a tool to comprehend the world with - a system of logic that is based on categories. This system would be so succesful at explaining things, and due to lack of alternatives, that it would be the primary way of thinking for people living up the nineteenth century (people like Kant, and even - up to a point - Hume).
What Aristotle does in the Categories is study how human beings reason about the world and how an understanding of this reasoning process can point us to certain truths. He lays the foundations for the axiomatic-deductive system of knowledge that he develops further in the Organon (especially the Analytica Priora and Analytica Posteriora), which would be blueprint for, e.g., Euclidean geometry. It was only with Descartes, in the early seventeenth century, that this conception of knowledge started to be refuted and replaced - albeit only gradually.
The most important part in the Categories, for me, is Aristotle's dealings with Substance, since what he says has serious metaphysical implications. Primary substances are the fundamental building blocks of our world. According to Aristotle they exist independently, while derivative substances and predicates only exist in primary substances. This is a radical break with Plato and most of the earlier Greek philosophers - who claimed that true existence can only be ascribed to abstract ideas, not the particular instances. Aristotle thus claims that the individual man Frank can be said to exist as primary substance, while the species 'mammal' and 'biped', and even the genus 'animal', to which he belongs, do not exist independently of the man Frank. So only particular things that we actually perceive through our senses are said to exist primarily, while all abstractions and categories we subsequently come up with only exist on a basis of derivative dependence (Compare this to Plato's notion that the Idea 'Man' is perfect and that Frank is simply an imperfect representation of this Idea!).
So we see how an exposition about categories of thinking can have serious implications about the fundamental structure of the world we live in. This is mind-boggling and I have to admit that I start to admire Aristotle more and more. After reading his Fysica and De Anima - his primary works on Nature - and now delving into his epistemology and logic, I feel all my old preconceived notions about Aristotle being an outdated and rather boring philosopher evaporate, like a waterdrop in sunlight.
Although I have to make one critical remark on the Categories - something I can't seem to wrap my head around, so any answer or reply would be welcome!
Aristotle claims primary substances, the particular things, are the fundamental things that exist. That means they exist independently of any derived substances (like the things' species or genus) or other category (like its qualities, its relations, its time and place, etc.). But later on in the Categories, Aristotle deals with the concept of interdependence, in the sense that two things cannot exist without eachother since both are contraries on a scale (so to speak). But isn't the notion of interdependence applicable to primary substances as well? Since a particular thing, the man Frank, is only perceived by me through these other categories. I have absolutely no idea what it is for a man to exist without the secondary attributes that seem to make him a man in the first place... I can't see Frank without his length, place, clothes, face, expressions, etc. All these things are said to be dependent on 'Frank', but it seems to be simultaneously the other way around as well.
To me it seems a primary substance can only exist in relation to secondary substances and predicates. Where does my thinking go wrong?
This last point is especially prominent in the Categories, in which Aristotle explains what the fundamental structure of nature consists of, on a very general and abstract level. Things are either substances or predicates; if substance, then either primary or derivative substance; if predicate, then either one of nine kinds - the kinds being quantity, relation, quality, place, time, position, state, action (doing) and affection (being done).
When we apply this thinking to the world, we end up with a tool to comprehend the world with - a system of logic that is based on categories. This system would be so succesful at explaining things, and due to lack of alternatives, that it would be the primary way of thinking for people living up the nineteenth century (people like Kant, and even - up to a point - Hume).
What Aristotle does in the Categories is study how human beings reason about the world and how an understanding of this reasoning process can point us to certain truths. He lays the foundations for the axiomatic-deductive system of knowledge that he develops further in the Organon (especially the Analytica Priora and Analytica Posteriora), which would be blueprint for, e.g., Euclidean geometry. It was only with Descartes, in the early seventeenth century, that this conception of knowledge started to be refuted and replaced - albeit only gradually.
The most important part in the Categories, for me, is Aristotle's dealings with Substance, since what he says has serious metaphysical implications. Primary substances are the fundamental building blocks of our world. According to Aristotle they exist independently, while derivative substances and predicates only exist in primary substances. This is a radical break with Plato and most of the earlier Greek philosophers - who claimed that true existence can only be ascribed to abstract ideas, not the particular instances. Aristotle thus claims that the individual man Frank can be said to exist as primary substance, while the species 'mammal' and 'biped', and even the genus 'animal', to which he belongs, do not exist independently of the man Frank. So only particular things that we actually perceive through our senses are said to exist primarily, while all abstractions and categories we subsequently come up with only exist on a basis of derivative dependence (Compare this to Plato's notion that the Idea 'Man' is perfect and that Frank is simply an imperfect representation of this Idea!).
So we see how an exposition about categories of thinking can have serious implications about the fundamental structure of the world we live in. This is mind-boggling and I have to admit that I start to admire Aristotle more and more. After reading his Fysica and De Anima - his primary works on Nature - and now delving into his epistemology and logic, I feel all my old preconceived notions about Aristotle being an outdated and rather boring philosopher evaporate, like a waterdrop in sunlight.
Although I have to make one critical remark on the Categories - something I can't seem to wrap my head around, so any answer or reply would be welcome!
Aristotle claims primary substances, the particular things, are the fundamental things that exist. That means they exist independently of any derived substances (like the things' species or genus) or other category (like its qualities, its relations, its time and place, etc.). But later on in the Categories, Aristotle deals with the concept of interdependence, in the sense that two things cannot exist without eachother since both are contraries on a scale (so to speak). But isn't the notion of interdependence applicable to primary substances as well? Since a particular thing, the man Frank, is only perceived by me through these other categories. I have absolutely no idea what it is for a man to exist without the secondary attributes that seem to make him a man in the first place... I can't see Frank without his length, place, clothes, face, expressions, etc. All these things are said to be dependent on 'Frank', but it seems to be simultaneously the other way around as well.
To me it seems a primary substance can only exist in relation to secondary substances and predicates. Where does my thinking go wrong?
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December 17, 2025FROM THE ARISTOTLE BRICK!!!!!!
December 19, 2023
This was my first time ever reading a text of philosophy out loud with friends. It went surprisingly well even without the text always being in front of me. It amazes me just how much of Aristotle’s categorization is still used and taken as common knowledge in Western society. Many aspects of the text seem obvious with more than 2000 years of cultural development, but it still led to some interesting conversations about determining objectivity. Reading texts like this, which give foundational arguments for our taken-for-granted base principles, are an amazing way to combat philosophical nihilism and realize the intense logical scaffolding that went towards landing on this system. Although we may not view it as such, the ideological foundations of the world we live in are not without purpose.
I am excited to read more Aristotle and connect it to my background in Fichte and Hegel.
I am excited to read more Aristotle and connect it to my background in Fichte and Hegel.
May 4, 2013
Categories is the first book in the classical series on logic by Aristotle my copy was translated by E. M. Edghill. As the title makes clear this book is all about classifying different information into categories. Any valid discussion requires that those having the discussion agree on what is meant by the terms that they are using. In this work Aristotle does just that so that the ideas of deduction and induction can be introduced and explored in other works of his. In this work he begins by explaining what he means by categories of facts. These are things that on their own have no falsehood even if they are combined into statements those statements may be either true or false. The discussion starts with how things are named. He describes three types of ways that language names things. First is equivocally where two things have the same name but different definitions, an example he gives of this is a person in a picture as compared to a real live person. The Second type of naming is univocally where the name and the definition are both the same for example he gives the overlying term animal which both a man and an ox both share. The third type of naming is derivatively where the name derives from the other name for example a painter is a person who paints. He then deals with subordinate categories where all objects in one category are a part of a larger category for example all dogs are animals. Then he spends most of this work defining the different categories which an substance may or may not have. The categories are quantity, quality, relation, place and time, position, action, and effect. A substance is a group without degrees of itself. Aristotle uses the example of a human which is still a human even if a part of him or her is removed or altered. He then spends most of the rest of this book describing the different categories and why they are different and yet how they all help us make true or false statements. In many ways this work is very important because it lays the framework not just for Aristotle's philosophy but in truth all philosophy since that attempts to use any reason to discover things about the universe.
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