The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force

by Eliot A. Cohen

"Speak softly and carry a big stick" Theodore Roosevelt famously said in 1901, when the United States was emerging as a great power. It was the right sentiment, perhaps, in an age of imperial rivalry but today many Americans doubt the utility of their global military presence, thinking it outdated, unnecessary or even dangerous.

In The Big Stick, Eliot A. Cohen-a scholar and practitioner of international relations-disagrees. He argues that hard power remains essential for American foreign policy. While acknowledging that the US must be careful about why, when, and how it uses force, he insists that its international role is as critical as ever, and armed force is vital to that role.

Cohen explains that American leaders must learn to use hard power in new ways and for new circumstances. The rise of a well-armed China, Russia's conquest of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, nuclear threats from North Korea and Iran, and the spread of radical Islamist movements like ISIS are some of the key threats to global peace. If the United States relinquishes its position as a strong but prudent military power, and fails to accept its role as the guardian of a stable world order we run the risk of unleashing disorder, violence and tyranny on a scale not seen since the 1930s. The US is still, as Madeleine Albright once dubbed it, "the indispensable nation."

Genres: Nonfiction, Military Fiction, Politics, War, History, International Relations, Military History

304 pages, Hardcover

First published January 3, 2017

About the author

I am an academic who has been fortunate in many ways - beginning with my family, but to include teaching at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, the country's leading school of international relations; serving in government, most recently as Counselor of the Department of State from 2007 to 2009; and having the freedom to move from political science, my original discipline, to history.

One friend who looked at the manuscript CONQUERED INTO LIBERTY, wrote to me -- "Aha! A love note!" and in some ways it is that. It deals with almost two centuries of battles along the Great Warpath route from Albany to Montreal, and it does, I hope, show some of my affection for this part of the country. A good part of the fun of writing the book was tramping around all the sites that I describe in it. But its purpose is serious: to show how the American way of war emerged from our conflict with an unlikely opponent: Canada. It tells the story of ten battles and shows how they reveal deeper truths about the American approach to war. The title, in fact, comes from a propaganda pamphlet strewn about Canada before the Americans invaded in 1775: "You have been conquered into liberty..." it began, and that notion is one that is still with us.

But the argument of the book, I believe, should not detract from stories that will appeal to readers. I hope that you will be as fascinated as I am not only by the events, but by characters you knew (George Washington, for example) whom I show in rather different lights than is customary, and even more so by characters you will probably meet here for the first time. A personal favorite: La Corne St. Luc, the incredibly wily French aristocrat who fought the British, sided with them, joined the Americans, rejoined the British and died one of Canada's wealthiest men after several decades of terrorizing the northern frontier. But there are others: enjoy discovering them!

Reviews

[Zak · Rating 3 out of 5]

The writer makes a good case for why soft power alone may not be enough but, at the same time, fails to provide a convincing argument (or indeed any type of real argument) as to why hard power might plausibly solve the problem. In an age of nuclear weapons, cyber warfare and (outer) space warfare, I don't see how adding to an already humongous military budget to build more hardware like tanks, planes and warships would provide additional advantages. Sadly, it's in those three areas that he spends the least ink writing about. Unless he means it's merely for attacking non-nuclear 'enemies' and bullying militarily inferior nations. No wonder North Korea and ostensibly, Iran, are rushing to develop nuclear weapons then.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force, by Eliot A. Cohen, is an interesting look at US military theory and a treatise on the necessities of hard force over soft power. Cohen looks deeply at conflicts the United States has run over the past few decades, noting the successes and failures from Vietnam to the third romp in Iraq in a decade currently underway. The United States is an awkward superpower, one that holds up certain ideals, such as freedom of navigation, the ability to choose in regards to politics, and free trade, and yet has crushed democratic regimes, allied with dictators, and is a bit hypocritical on the free navigation thing. These can be viewed as expressions of American exceptionalism, or as ignorance, but Cohen notes that these are the natural projections of power that any superpower would implement. America is not special, but if they are to remain dominant, they need to rethink their military strategy, and counter both immediate threats from national actors, or terrorist groups.

Cohen examines the main threats to US dominance. The first real threat is China, the only state Cohen considers to be a potential great power rival to the US. China has been building up its conventional military forces, and developing innovative anti-ship missiles, anti-satellite missiles, and sophisticated cyber warfare techniques, to name a few. Cohen notes that China has not been as aggressive on the international stage as many other pseudo-great powers. China's principal is akin to building a golden bridge for the enemy to retreat on. Cohen notes they have not engaged in an international skirmish for many decades, have participated in peacekeeping efforts globally, and are generally benign on the international diplomacy stage. Even so, China's aggressive posturing in the South China Sea, and its uneasy relationship with most of its neighbours, makes it a potential threat to US allies in the region, namely Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Cohen feels the US should work to contain China by building up alliances with both its traditional allies (South Korea, Taiwan, Australia etc.), and with old foes or neutrals (Vietnam and India). Cohen also notes China's increasingly close ties old US allies, namely Pakistan and the Philippines. Cohen worries a shooting war is possible with China due to China's prickly nationalism in the South China Sea, and an increasingly belligerent US Navy in the region. He also worries that both sides have nuclear weapons, and are capable of doing great damage to each other. Cohen considers China to be the United States biggest rival state threat.

Cohen goes on to discuss the most immediate threat to US interests; Islamic terrorist groups. Cohen first makes note of the difficulty US administrations have in deciding whether terrorism is a crime, or warfare. Cohen is firmly in the latter camp, and most Jihadist's certainly would say the same. He notes the United States unpopularity in the Middle East, due to bungled wars in Iraq, traditional support for Israel, and a lack of understanding of the inner workings of Islamic Jihad. He notes the sophisticated innovation terrorist groups have used to counter the US's overwhelming technical superiority (such as human shields, low tech communications, improvised explosives, and sheer ideological drive). Cohen does not agree that terrorists are "cowards," but that they are individuals and groups willing to die and kill to achieve specific political/ideological ends. Cohen decries the lack of boots on the ground against the Islamic State, and notes the increasing willingness of other regional actors (Russia and Iran), to prop up moderate states (Syria, Iraq), that the US is increasingly unwilling to support. He also notes the failure of US military trainers to recruit moderate rebel groups in Syria. Out of 1200 Syrian rebels enrolled in an officer training corps in Syria, only 54 graduated, for example. Their is no easy way out of these conflicts. Cohen notes former President Obama was keen on pulling out of Iraq, but was forced back in anyway during his last years in office. These are conflicts that will not end soon, and may last for decades or even generations. These are not conflicts that can be won like traditional wars, with peace treaties and such.

Cohen examines a few other factors, which I will mention in brief. Hostile states, like Russia, Iran and North Korea receive a full chapter. These are states that are nuclear armed (or could be soon), unfriendly to the US, and aggressive toward their neighbours. These states seek to overthrow US hegemony in their regions, and assert themselves on the international stage. Russia is increasingly willing to use semi-conventional techniques, cyber warfare, and covert operations to exert its influence on its former subjects. North Korea is aggressive in its region, and seeks to assert itself on the Korean Peninsula and protect itself from its hostile neighbours. Iran seeks regional power and internal stability, and is keen to use rebels in other nations to achieve its aims. All of these states are potential threats to the US, and all are capable of delivering a nuclear strike (except possibly Iran). Other spheres, like international waters, the internet "commons", and the Earth's orbit are increasingly important components as well.

Cohen ultimately argues that it is important for the US to have a large and sophisticated military, and a strong system of international alliances and coalitions to counter threats to its hegemony. It should build a NATO style coalition in Asia, with the guarantee that an attack on one, is an attack on all. It needs to normalize relations with states like Vietnam and India, to help contain China. The US is also lacking in military sophistication. Although it is by a large margin the most powerful state in the world, China, Russia and others are increasingly finding innovate techniques to counter expensive American equipment, and may even be more sophisticated than the states in certain aspects of traditional warfare. Cohen notes this is not uncommon (Germany had better firearms in WWII, China more men in Korea, etc.), but the gaps need to be considered, and filled rapidly. Cohen also notes the blunders in US military strategy in the past, and argues for a harder and smarter approach to warfare and counter-insurgency techniques.

This was an interesting read that communicated the struggles the US faces as the sole superpower in the world. The US is seeing increasing competition from other nations across the globe, and increasing hostility from friend and foe alike. Nobody likes a global power (think Great Britain in 1763), but the US seems to think it is operating at a different level. Cohen shows this is probably not the case, and offers a realistic and thoughtful analysis of US strategic thinking into the future. This was a well thought out book, with interesting points and analysis. I can easily recommend this for anyone looking to read about US strategic thought, as it provides an excellent counter to US soft power. Although I may not agree with all of his points, I still enjoyed this book.

[Marks54 · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a general book about US military policy in the post-9/11 era. The author is a conservative policy wonk who likely will not see much time in the policy shops of the new US regime. The orientation of the author is not critical, however, since his perspective is largely consistent with lots of thoughtful analysts across the policy spectrum.

The general orientation of the book - as indicated by the title - is that the most productive way to think about military policy is to consider the military as one of many instruments of US foreign policy - hence the allusion to Teddy Roosevelt. This is another way to employ Clausewitz in the context of the US experience and suggests that policy makers thought think long and clearly about how and when the military is employed. The author's perspective on this is clear and useful.

The book then proceeds to provide a summary of US military history up through the first Gulf War and the lead up to 9/11. Most of the book is concerned with a review of the military horizon following the 9/11 attacks. This is well done and useful, both to refresh readers on Iraq and Afghanistan and to identify the current issues but general and location specific that will occupy planners going forward. Discussions on the evolving role of technology and how warfare will change with new technology are good. There are also good discussions on the evolution new principal actors (China, Iran, India), the rebirth and renewal of old actors (Russia), persistent problems with weak, failing, and dangerous states, and other topics such as cyber-warfare and the exercise of authority in the world's commons areas - for example the sea and in space.

This is a general treatment and will seem basic to active readers although many will find it sufficiently thoughtful and challenging to be very rewarding. There are lots of references, both to books and online sources, for those who with to read further.

This book will be essential to a healthy diet preparing readers for coming policy debates. It is well worth reading.

[Relstuart · Rating 3 out of 5]

The author asks a lot of great questions and provides a significant amount of historical context to the use of hard power and soft power in America history. His conclusion is that both soft and hard power are vital to protecting both America and the world and efforts to discount the use of hard (military violence) will not lead to safe outcomes or a safer world.

I liked this quote from Theodore Roosevelt that the author used in his introduction: "Boasting about what we have done does not impress foreign nations at all, except unfavorably. But positive achievement does; and the two America achievements that really impressed foreign peoples during the first dozen years of this century were the digging of the Panama canal and the cruise of the (American) battle fleet around the world."

"The cognitive psychologists teach us that human beings tend to underrate randomness and overrate their own competence at many things, including anticipating the future. And this is, if anything, more true about politicians than anyone else which is one of the reasons that British parliamentarian Enoch Powell acidly remarked, "all political careers end in failure.
To make on example: suppose a nuclear weapon is used in anger. It could happen-in a conflict in which Pakistan, for example, feels itself at a mortal threat from India, or Israel from Iran, or even the United States from North Korea. It could happen if Russia were to think that its limited conventional strength was jeopardized by a robust Western response to its aggressive behavior in Ukraine. A world after a nuclear device has been used in anger will likely be very different from the world of today: we may imagine it, but we cannot know its visceral reality. In such a world, having witnessed the massive and instantaneous devastation that only a nuclear weapons can cause, everyone's arsenal, including our own will be on a hair trigger because the penalties of inaction will seem so much greater than those of action. We have seen a lesser version of this before. The notion of mass-casualty terrorism had been amply discussed by academics and within the US government before the multiple attacks of September 11. But the shock of the events themselves transformed American attitudes toward the use of force, toward civil liberties, and even toward the use of assassination and torture against enemies, in ways that few could have fully anticipated."

"...a conflict torn world will drag the United States into its quarrels. This is perhaps the greatest lesson of the Obama administration, which came into office desiring, in all sincerity, to end America's wars-and instead found itself waging them in places it most desired to leave."

"As in all wars, leading personalities made a very large difference in how organization collaborated or failed to do so, and in the relationship with the host governments."

[Gordon Larsen · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is one I wish I'd bought rather than borrowed so I could highlight and annotate. Eliot Cohen—whom a retired naval commander friend of mine described as "a national treasure"— has to be considered one of the preeminent military strategic thinkers of our time, and this book should be required reading for anyone interested in understanding the current and future role of the U.S. in the world. As the (clever) title says, the book lays out the case for continued U.S. military dominance and frames each of the strategic challenges we face. Along the way he dismantles the logic of realists, isolationists, and those who believe soft power should be enough. Fascinating and highly educational.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

Before setting out on a discussion of what The Big Stick teaches it is crucial to briefly describe what it is not. First, it is not a grandiose call for an America that, as John Quincy Adams put it, goes out in search of monsters to destroy. It is, if anything, a reminder that military force is destructive and thus must not be exerted willy nilly. It is a rebuke of complacency and fearfulness, but a treatise on the goodness of violence it is not. Second, it is more than a blinkered explanation on how military power should be utilized. It is rather a broad, if straightforward, attempt to show that the foreign policy of any nation, but especially one with the strength and responsibilities of the United States, must be undergirded by hard power, the means to deploy said power, and, most importantly, the willingness to use violence as a means to achieve a strategic end.

Cohen lays out his argument very logically. First, the United States must use its economic and military power to underwrite the security of the globe and enable partners to contribute to regional security. This power must be chiefly, though by no means exclusively, military strength (which, it must be said, includes such aspects as size, flexibility, organization, forward presence, lethality, and all the other aspects of military power that contribute to the ultimate end sum of strength). Second, Cohen describes how America’s wars of the twenty-first century have inhibited some aspects of US strategic analysis and political and popular will, but should certainly not be seen as complete failures nor as extremely useless learning fields. However, certain aspects of these conflicts must not be seen as the future norm. Third, Cohen explains how the form and function of the US defense sector can and should contribute to the application of hard power to achieve larger geopolitical goals. Inversely, Cohen takes great pains to demonstrate that the US military itself cannot always be relied upon to contribute forward-thinking analysis nor organize itself for institutional excellence.

At this point, Cohen takes the reader through what he considers to be the four most urgent areas in which the US is failing to exert influence and in which US hard power and the threat of military force (or the application thereof) can achieve tangible, positive outcomes. These areas are China and her rise to superpower status and the long-term ramifications of this both globally and regionally, Islamist terror and its immediate capacity for insecurity, dangerous states (primarily Russia, Iran, and North Korea) that in various ways threaten both global and regional security but are challenging to face head-on, and areas over which no one exert much firm control, such as ungoverned territories, the seas, space, and cyberspace.

Finally, Cohen elucidates his own principles for the application of military force. These are, unfortunately, not groundbreaking, but do describe capably what the thought processes must be before, during, and after violence has been carried out.

Cohen never examines American power or the threats facing our nation in a vacuum. The US must underwrite the global security consensus not because that burden has randomly fallen on her shoulders, but because, quite simply, she already has been serving this function. It is for this reason that relative decline should not be fatalistically accepted. Through the stability of her government, the general excellence (though by no means perfection) of her military, and immense economic strength, not to mention her capacity for innovation, the US possesses a unique mixture of capabilities. It is for her decision makers and public to accept the will the accompany these capabilities. Cohen, for his part, goes a long way towards contributing to the intellectual exercises that must accompany all statecraft and military planning. I have some small challenges, chief among them Cohen’s dismissal of grand strategy. Cohen argues that long-term thinking is virtually impossible in geostrategy and thus not worth undertaking. I would argue that even if we are unable to see the future, we must formulate a general matrix of means and ends that as a whole we wish to see accomplished, as well as a broad philosophy of what American foreign policy must look like. However, by and large, Cohen very capably lays out a surprisingly benevolent and optimistic plan for American power and dominance provided by hard power. Those that argue against carrying a big stick often forget the first clause of that maxim: speak softly. In this regard, the limits of military force, the usefulness of diplomacy, and other vagaries of statecraft must be taken into account. Cohen more than accomplishes that in a work that hits all the highlights of many semesters-worth of graduate coursework in defense policy and international relations.

[David Husband · Rating 2 out of 5]

More a global overview of the threat environment in 2016. Not a complete waste of time to read it in 2017, but will quickly become outdated. The author engages a straw-man like argument (that there is a serious argument against hard power and that it should be replaced by soft power) and convincingly demolishes this argument, because there is no much substance there. Cohen is far more concerned about big military (tanks, planes, hardware, etc) and less aware of how the nature of warfare is changing--ironic, in a book that is focused on the need to perpetually examine what war we are fighting today. The fact that Germany has gone from having 1700 Leopard tanks to 400 now doesn't really tell us much by itself--especially since tanks are less utilized in pretty much all the scenarios he discusses, other than possible war with Russia and possibly war in Iraq (and not even necessarily much then). To have just 3 pages discussing cyber power is almost criminally negligent (p189-192) and when you look at his footnotes, its clear he has read about 3-4 commentators on the issues posed by cyberpower. Part of the problem is a careful examination of the footnotes shows the writing process has been undertaken from 2013-2016 and a great many of his resources are from his accumulated intellectual hoard over his career (a lot of citations to pieces first published in the 1980s). Unlike his book on the solider and the statesmen, this is not destined to become a classic, and in a few short years, will be yet another book on military affairs gathering dust in the library.
I give it two stars only because for a survey, its a good survey, and his basic assessments are generally decent--but for someone who is supposed to be a much bigger strategic thinker, this was disappointing.

[James Devereaux · Rating 3 out of 5]

“I call it the law of instrument, and it may be formulated as follows: Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find that everything he encounters needs pounding.” Abraham Maslow, 1964

“A good many of you are probably acquainted with the old proverb: ‘Speak softly and carry a big stick- you will go far.’ ... Whenever on any point we come in contact with a foreign power, I hope that we shall always strive to speak courteously and respectfully of that foreign power. Let us make it evident that we intend to do justice. Then let us make it equally evident that we will not tolerate injustice being done to us in return...that we use no words which we are not prepared to back up with deeds…” Theodore Roosevelt, National Duties address at Minnesota State Fair, Sep. 2, 1901

Around 2006 I recall driving through the relatively small town of Orem, Utah. At the corner in front of the city offices was a very small protest. “End the War” the signs read. Protests like these dwindled, nearly disappeared, when power switched parties in Washington, though the course of war was only altered not abandoned despite promises to at least narrow the scope of conflict. Per Eliot Cohen, in his defense of military action titled The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force, military conflicts and hard power are often justified, serving both security interests and the promotion of global peace. Cohen suggests the war plan shifted little between administrations despite promises to the contrary because the reality of the security needs required further involvement (p. 26-28). End the war protests may have disappeared but the war did not.

Cohen doesn’t necessarily argue that every conceivable military action is required to maintain the peace, his concern that in the wrong hands military action may be unnecessarily escalated is highlighted in his disappointment at the election of Donald Trump as President and his unfitness for office. Instead, Cohen primarily argues that the “United States will need more and better military power in the future.” (p. xii). Quantitative and qualitative improvements would, per Cohen, ensure stability for the United States and world more broadly, as he subscribes to the hegemonic-stability view of peaceful world order.

Cohen is not unaware of the costs, which he openly acknowledges and rightly agrees that they have not “been negligible” (p. xiii). Yet he rejects a narrow view of defense, arguing that more than protecting the borders of the United States, military involvement is required overseas. Cohen warns against the rise of China, defends U.S. involvement in the Mideast, and expresses concern over a number of “dangerous states” and governing the global commons. Each demands, in Cohen’s view, a different response and level of involvement, including plans for offensive strikes should the need arise.

Unintended Consequences
Alas, his exposition of the relevant threats is too narrow despite his detailed analysis of each situation. His examples are not weighed against counterexamples, and though he recognizes the costs in terms of lives and dollars he fails to address the full costs of hard power. Neither does he wrestle with the unintended consequences of foreign intervention, of which he is somewhat aware, at one point noting, “In war unintended consequences predominate” (p. 187). That was the only explicit recognition of this central issue, and though some counterexamples are given, in policy it should remain at the forefront. Overall the discussion of alternatives is overwhelmed by the exposition of the perceived threats. But in weighing options knowing the threat is only one piece of determining a course of action.

One of the more important unintended consequences, not mentioned, are the long term consequences of meddling in other governments and regions which may prepare the ground for political upheaval and further backlash against American interests. At the least this creates tension between the United States and other countries, at the most, full out enemies. Iran is one such example. Described as a religious movement rather than a political, Cohen examines the terse relationship between the United States and Iran, and he’s not wrong. The United States is wary of the pursued and stated ends of Iran and it’s leadership, which is an illiberal order quite opposite of the United States. But, such a polarization should be no surprise when considering the current political system of Iran was sown in a ground made fertile by foreign meddling. Cohen claims the current government is not a political regime but primarily religious and should be understood on those terms (p. 130-134; 145-147) but the reality is the current regime arose from political circumstances made possible, in part, by U.S. involvement in their affairs. This meddling makes illiberal and dangerous political choices appealing and friendlier, often fragile, governments are abandoned in a political response to our associated interventions.

Many factors contributed to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, all blame cannot be laid before the feet of American interventionism. But interventionism no doubt contributed to the unpopularity of America and her allies. It helped foment anti-western sentiments and gave the opposition legitimacy in the hearts of the people. How much this and other interventions played a factor is a matter of dispute, but it has certainly set the stage for the current geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and continues to shape the narrative in hostile territory. This is but a single example of a worrying trend going back at least since the end of the second World War.

Meddling may often achieve the desired policy ends in the short run but it often begets counter movements and politics which require further meddling to maintain the previous gains. The unintended consequences of intervention in foreign affairs are unpredictable and hard to track, but a thorough discussion addressing the full impact of these policies — or as Bastiat said in a different context, an examination of the “seen and unseen” — is required before determining whether the benefits outweigh the costs.

Weighing the Costs of the Knowledge Problem
Unintended consequences of intervention are related to, and sometimes arise from, the difficulty in using and acquiring relevant knowledge, some of which is internal to relevant state actors and the populace. Hayek wrote of the knowledge problem and demonstrated how price systems coordinate human behavior to solve much of this issue in markets, but in political affairs information surrogates are harder to come by. At the least this knowledge problem, knowing the “particularities of time and place,” should encourage caution when considering the use and accumulation of hard power, at the most a strong presumption against foreign entanglements.

Since WWII the United States has participated in various conflicts, intervened in a myriad of governments, and participated in global organizations which have imposed ruinous plans on vulnerable people and countries, often with benevolent motives. The successes are fewer than expected. Granted, the alternative is difficult to know as a counterfactual. For example, in a war many consider a failed effort, Cohen supposes that the Vietnam conflict would have been worse for the region but for American involvement (p. 20-21). He may have a point, but the neighboring countries were hardly spared the terrors of Communism and genocide. The situation must be dire and road to success clear to overcome the costs of ignorance.

Diminishing Returns
Currently the United States has over 800 overseas bases, the next closest are France and the UK with 12 each. Additionally, total defense spending is several folds greater than China, which comes in at second place. For Cohen, this is insufficient, hence the more and better thesis he defends. This is hard to justify. The most valuable unit of security purchased is the first, after that each unit yields diminished returns. Considering the comparative expenditures and expansive reach of the United States military we likely hit the crossover point for utility many dollars ago.

Cohen argues that the budget should be a fixed percentage of GDP (at around 4%, p. 208), but in light of diminishing returns and economic growth — which doesn’t necessarily reflect security needs — this is largely unpersuasive. Security, in the form of military might, is likely over consumed. This likely reflects the incentives of the American populace as a whole as well as historical trends. Perhaps we over consume security for the psychological benefit of a large active military, as witnessed by the constant rhetoric of preserved freedom adorning every military conflict, and is thus easily consumed at a low individual cost for most voters. The largest costs are not born by Americans themselves, but instead those considered to be hostile nations and organizations.

This appears as a plausible explanation for why we continue to build more security despite passing the point of positive returns. The reality is we could decrease spending with likely little security risk, the amount is a discussion worth having, particularly since we spend a significant portion of our budget on offshore expenditures. Increasing expenditures will yield little real security despite the insistence of Cohen.

Who Watches the Watchers?
Despite my critiques, Cohen doesn’t shirk from the hard realities of national defense. Despite some selection bias, Cohen genuinely engages with the risks he perceives and closes with his concern that the current president would unwittingly provoke a military response from one or more geopolitical foe mentioned in his book.

Which stands as the most worrisome concern with “the big stick.” Once it is picked up who wields it? This problem is not entirely solved with civic engagement. Political ignorance is a substantial hurdle in democratic governments, one exacerbated by a tendencies to rationally remain ignorant or to vote biases. This is further complicated by the incentives of power which tend to appeal to those comfortable using it. Or as Hayek asked, “Why do the worse end up on top?” The appeal of power and the use of force is certainly a factor.

Even with a benevolent actor the incentives of power and constraints of politics makes a large weapon dangerous. There is, in the policy decision making-process, a tension between what is the best course of action — if such a thing can be determined — and what is the politically best course of action. This is a central conflict for all government services, they encourage rent-seeking and pandering, and often shift costs to the politically weak and benefits to the politically powerful. In the case of hard power those costs are often irreversible and deadly.

The use of force tends to spread beyond the confines of military action, as was the case with the CIA in South America and more recently in the Middle East. The expansion of coercion, mission creep, a culture of force, and the multitude of disruptive small scale interventions cannot be completely divorced from the more desirable cases Cohen mentions. These are part of the costs of a big stick in government hands. The political agenda is not a blank slate but brings with it a variety of factors including those which misdirect lethal force.

Ultimately the challenge of hard power is the temptation to employ it when it is best to otherwise avoid it. Amassing more and better military firepower, creating a bigger and better stick, tempts the wielder to use it as a common cure for foreign policy ailments. As is said of those who have an abundance of hammers; everything looks like a nail.

Link: https://medium.com/@jcdevereaux1/when...

[E · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an excellent look at America's role in the realm of world peacekeeping. He begins by looking at what America has to offer that no other nation likewise has, and takes a brief peek at our history of military actions around the globe that have sought to advance our own interests. The next chapter focuses specifically on the Bush 43 and Obama administrations and their three wars--in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and again in Iraq and in Syria against the Islamic State. He is fair in his assessment of how these actions have been prosecuted, although he is a bit harsher on the Iraq War than I would have liked.

He then takes a look at the future, especially as it involves four realms: China, Russia, other "dangerous states" (Iran and North Korea mostly), and "ungoverned space and the commons" (the high seas, lands with very weak governments, outer space, the cyber world). Cohen is frank that we are not currently equipped to deal well with challenges in these areas. For one thing, we have allowed our military to shrink too small. Relatedly, we are far too complacent. Obama was hopelessly naive; Trump is not discussed here but it seems clear he is too preoccupied with other things to maintain the focus necessary for advancing sound policy in these areas).

Cohen concludes with some ground rules for future American actions. They are sensible, if a bit anodyne. But all in all, a very helpful book. It is very grounded in specifics; for more theory of WHY we should we pursuing these things, I'd like to get my hands on The Will to Lead: America's Indispensable Role in the Global Fight for Freedom. But Cohen is a clearheaded, no-nonsense type of thinker, and we'd do well to pay attention to him.

[Nick Lloyd · Rating 3 out of 5]

Cohen is often called a Realist for his fixation on "hard power", but I think this misses the greater part of contemporary Realist arguments. When I was an undergrad I often viewed Realism as being what Cohen portrays here: hawkish and obtuse, attempting to solve all the world's problems with a hammer. In grad school I took a course on Realism with John Mearsheimer at the University of Chicago and realized that Realism can actually be very dovish. The United States, according to Realists like Mearsheimer, has the world's biggest economy, a ton of nuclear weapons, and two huge anti-tank ditches on either side. Having achieved this level of peak safety, there is virtually no reason to ever start a foreign war. What Cohen presents here is far more like Bush-era neoconservatism than what we typically describe as Realism. It was played out when Paul Wolfowitz was hocking it, and it's beyond expired now.

[Spencer]

For a book with a premise I 100% agree with, this book really failed to convincingly make the case that hard power is necessary to perpetuate America's leading role in the international system and the liberal order writ-large. Long digressions into defending the invasion of Iraq left me wondering what it had to do with the thesis and Cohen fails to present honest choices between preparing a military for counterterrorism and building one for countering near-peer competitors.

Also, he set up a really weird "grand strategy" strawman. I appreciate the sentiment that governments almost never operate with an actual specific, written down grand strategy in mind, but I think very few people outside of Congress claim that.

Basically, this book felt like I was reading a thesis for 2017 backed by arguments from 2005.

[Austin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent analysis of National Security and Foreign Policy strategy. Best book so far this year.

[Nick · Rating 2 out of 5]

I am disappointed to give a well-written book with many points that I find insightful, even many of those I disagree with, by an accomplished practitioner/scholar two stars, but this books fundamental flaws are too great to ignore.

Cohen offers a caution against discounting the use of military force, but offers an inconsistent narrative of the use of force since 9/11. On the one hand he criticizes the Obama for deemphasizing the use of force even as he describes several instances where the administration controversially escalated military strikes, namely the drone program and special operations raids in Afghanistan. He also either directly or implicitly criticizes the Obama Administration for withdrawing from Iraq in 2011 and failing to bomb Syria in 2013, but does not address how the US could have negotiated an enduring presence with an Iraqi parliament concerned about maintaining its sovereignty. Regarding Syria, Cohen fails to give the Obama Administration credit for not going against the wishes of Congress, the public, and our allies in not bombing Syria in 2013 in response to the suspected, perhaps likely, use of chemical weapons. Cohen may disagree with these points, but should not fail to address them considering that the memoirs of these architects (such as The Long Game by Derek Chollet) have already been published.

Even as Cohen assumes that these actions regarding Iraq and Syria were mistakes he describes laundry list of predictable consequences that the Bush Administration failed to account for in Iraq and Afghanistan. There can be no doubt that Iraq until 2006 and Afghanistan until 2009 were managed incompetently, but Cohen assumes that starting a war in Syria would have been an exception to a view that the US is often incompetent in applying military force to achieving its national goals, a point he tried to rebut before actually supporting.

Cohen's analysis of al-Qaeda is also incomplete. Cohen criticizes the Obama Administration for discounting the threat from al-Qaeda, but fails to give Obama credit for escalating the drone-strike campaign against al-Qaeda and success of preventing core al-Qaeda from launching any major attacks since 9/11. al-Qaeda's foreign offshoots, particularly in Yemen, and ISIS may seem to be grave threats, but these are fundamentally different actors, even if thy share an ideology, from the organization that attacked the US on 9/11.

There is no way to describe the arguments in the first few chapters of this book other than with the word "strange." Cohen seems to be supportive of the use of military force against Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, but holds himself back in criticizing the policymakers and planners who made the disastrous decisions made that eventually exacerbated each conflict. He then criticizes the relatively softer rhetoric of Obama while not making a connection that his Administration was simultaneously using military force in the exact way Cohen recommends.

Another flaw of this book, written in 2016, is the failure to analyze how the Obama Administration focused on using force in a sustainable manner against ISIS and in Afghanistan. While the Bush Administration waged war in Iraq on a false pretense with borrowed money, poor planning, and a small number of troops, the Obama Administration established a sustainable operations tempo against ISIS that included small numbers of special operations and air forces conducting hundreds of daily missions. These statistics have been published by the DoD since 2014, show that the Obama Administration was very much willing to use military force, and offer an alternative model under which to examine the use of force in the future.

This book will offer some insight to readers who closely follow current events, but is unlikely to change the views of anybody who either believes that the US should be either more or less willing to use military force. Many conservative readers will find much to agree with while readers less inclined to see military force as a necessity will find enough flaws to undermine Cohen's premise. This is unfortunate as Cohen's offers a premise that is worthy of debate.

[Dennis Murphy · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force by Eliot Cohen is a persuasive defense of the need for both confidence in the US role in the world and for it to possess a strong military. Unfortunately, that's about all this book does. Cohen is writing policy advocacy against opponents that are rather well-trotten dead horses. Pinker, Meirsheimer, Fukuyama, and others were highly influential at various stages, but I can't imagine very many people pursuing either's classical works now as a guide to foreign policy. The same is true for those that believe US military force has never been successfully wielded, and that we should simply disengage. These early critics to whom this book is partially addressed serve no real purpose. The limitations of soft power is dealt with very swiftly, so that Cohen can engage in a more detailed advocacy of a strong US forward presence, powerful military capacity, establishment of an effective deterrence, and a willingness to use military force under specific circumstances. He goes in depth on a few topics, but all of them seem to highlight the need for more than just military force, and a need for more expansive definitions of warfare and competition. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the text, he never really effectively engages with that.

This book should have been about blending effective military power with other tools of statecraft in order to accomplish an effective national security strategy, and yet the book itself seems to deemphasize that. Grand strategy is considered a problem, and while he argues well that we need an effective and strong military, he doesn't seem to deal too much with the limitations of that power. Toward the end of the book he acknowledges this, but I would rather this book had been a companion to dealing with the future challenges this nation will face, instead of the justification for maintaining a large military presence and robust American international security policy that it provides.

86/100

[Chad Manske · Rating 4 out of 5]

Cohen writes a cogent and timely work on the purpose and use of military power. He starts by ensuring decision makers ask the first crucial question of “whether the expense of blood and treasure is worth it” regarding the employment of the military instrument of power. Through this lens he advances and analyzes four distinct challenges: “China, the jihadi threat, several hostile states of different size and intention, and the problem of the commons and ungoverned space.” After making these arguments and assuming an America that should and will continue tackling these thorny issues he concludes that America needs a much larger military than it has. Further, in articulating the impossibly fantastical Weinberger Doctrine, which he contends is wildly unrealistic, he proposes six alternate rules for using military power. 1. Understand your War for what it is, not what you wish it to be. 2. Planning is important; being able to adapt is more important. 3. You will prefer to go short, but prepare to go long. 4. While engaging in today’s fight, prepare for tomorrow’s challenge. 5. Adroit strategy matters; perseverance usually matters more. 6. A president can launch a war; to win it, he or she must sustain congressional and popular support. Lastly, he concludes “what is needed is a prudent set of reminders to guide American leaders who have concluded...that violence is the least bad policy choice,” and in so doing will allow them to measure the merits of military power on equal par with the other instruments of power.

[Steven Kaminski · Rating 5 out of 5]

You know ever since Trump was elected one of my biggest fears was about foreign policy. And when we invaded Iraq (and also the prison scandal at Abu Ghraib) the biggest loss for us at that time was in terms of 'soft power'...our moral authority. Our moral right to dictate to others that they shouldn't engage in evil because we could tell them we were morally right. And that is no longer the case. Obama tried to right that reputation but Trump obliterated it. It embarrassing when the US goes to a security conference and the President isn't even applauded. That's humiliating.
So what remains? And that's what Cohen gets into with this book because he is trying to articulate the National Security strategy for how we interact with the globe going forward. And it reminds me very much of a argument two characters had on the show the West Wing about how to solve the Middle East (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iZYs2...). They'll like us when we WIN. And the book argues sometimes for our interests we don't have the moral authority so if we want to dictate a peace we may have to do it with boots on the ground. Military might in the face of whoever challenges us. But I don't know how practical that can be or if it can be successful. I do know as Cohen points out its what Russia and China are doing and if we don't step up we are going to be left out. I'm not entirely sure what the way forward is but this book makes some real solid points of what we might have to do...

[Carlos · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book, although informative as to the threats Cohen sees on the horizon for the US, was a bit of missed opportunity in my opinion. Cohen seems to depart from the surprising premise that once a military conflict has been started, “for whatever reason” in his own words, it should be fought effectively and efficiently. This, to me, seems to put the cart before the horse, I was expecting, and looking forward to, an argument for precisely what are the conditions that should end in a US military involvement. Cohen seems to resist an analysis of this sort claiming it is well neigh impossible to foresee the situations that might unfold in the future leading to US military intervention. While there is certainly merit to that argument, it does side step the valuable argument of differentiating when the US, and its allies’, interest would better be served by refraining from using military force. Cohen thus focuses his book more on emphasizing the military threats he sees, from Russia and China to Iran and North Korea, as well as advocating for a reshuffling of priorities in the US’s military alliances, rebalancing from the aging military powers in Europe and to the growing military prowess of Asian and South American allies. He likewise, and perhaps unsurprisingly, recommends an increased military budget and a recognition, and preparation of the citizenry, that the future conflicts are unlikely to be short and decisive but long and protracted.

[Thomas McCullough · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent. Cohen seems to read your mind as he answers the questions you formulate in your head while reading this. Any great IR book nowadays seems to give a brief overview of the threats facing the world and U.S. This book is no exception. Not only does Cohen do an excellent job explaining these threats and putting them within a historical context, he goes one step further and explains how hard power fits into the solution of these threats.

Cohen is, by my estimation, more than fair in his evaluation of these threats and the limits of hard/soft power in these threats. Do not think that the purpose of this book is to make a case against soft power, credit is given where credit its due. Cohen makes the case for soft power in several cases perhaps most convincingly when discussing jihadis and how to counter their ideology with a propaganda campaign like the U.S. did to communism during the Cold War. Perhaps the most shocking thing in this book is Cohen's claim that low-yield nuclear weapons will be inevitable in future conflicts.

Cohen, like the rest of us, see ourselves in a dangerous world. This book is a (successful) attempt at explaining where the necessity of hard power fits into it.

[Reza Amiri Praramadhan · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Speak softly, and carry a big stick”, was a saying of Teddy Roosevelt that I care when it comes to foreign policy and diplomacy. The author of this book argues that despite the shift to the soft power in diplomacy of the 21st century, America must be prepared to use its vast military power, even not as a last resort. The long time it spent as the largest and strongest military power, especially after Soviet Union collapsed had made it complacent, and unready for latest kind of war, which we witnessed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria. Military force was wielded clumsily,its doctrine dated from Cold War era, the post-war occupational forces ended up pissing off the locals, its commitments overstretched around the world, and quite unprepared dealing with non-state actors. The author also pointed that the largest threats to America’s primacy are Jihadists and China, with military power that still cannot match America, but prepared with some tricks in their sleeves. The author interestingly points that a closer relation with Russia is a good strategy in containing Chinese and Islamic jihadists’ aggresion.

[Jeff · Rating 4 out of 5]

I heard the author on Pod Save the World a few months back and liked his take on foreign policy in general, so I sought out the book he was promoting. The book itself is a fairly robust defense of an intelligent-yet-active military policy that, frankly, hasn’t been put forth in the public square in a meaningful way in close to a decade. This book is as important now in the Trump era as it would have been in the Obama years, and, while it has a clear point of view, the book is just as much a starting point for the conversation as it is a persuader.

I learned a lot from this and it got me thinking a lot about my own beliefs on these matters, which is largely what I want from books like this. Worth a look if you’re at all interested in foreign policy discussion from an American perspective.

[Brian · Rating 4 out of 5]

The NYT review of this book was spot on. Author asks a lot of good questions and provides a lot of context. What he does not do is provide any answers other than the use of American hegemonic military power. A lot of the questions and answers in the book do not realistically come down to the appropriate or inappropriate use of US hard power in the world but rather to the dysfunctional government and corrupt political system. E.g. if the Republicans in power really wanted the ability to project hard power in the world, why, when the economy is doing very well by any realistic measure would unfunded tax cuts be passed instead of a program to modernize aging weapons systems?

The thing that hurts the most is the idea that the military academies are not meritocratic institutions training future military leaders but rather designed to produce bureaucrats.

[Will · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book isn't really an argument for against military force in any theoretical sense, but instead looks at specific policy prescriptions for the American military, arguing in favor of increased spending and the development and use of new technologies to counter Russia and China. Since it is unashamedly pro American, it is very forgiving of American wartime atrocities and only looks at things from the American point of view. Rather than looking at trends in world history and conflict, the book focuses solely on the American experience, drawing from American revolutionaries and former presidents for historical precedents rather than events in other armed conflicts. Perhaps interesting to Americans who only want to read about America; but I wouldn't recommend it to anyone else.

[Douglas Meyer · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dr. Eliot Cohen - dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), American political scientist, and published expert - knocks this one out of the park. I absolutely LOVED his book Supreme Command and was excited to read this newest book. Supreme Command discussed the relationship between military and civilian leadership through the lens of previous historical leaders. The Big Stick is a discussion of the role of military force, as compared to other elements of national power across the DI2ME construct, in the modern and future political and threat landscapes. Well researched, engaging prose, and cogent arguments that build a clear thesis for modernization and future design.

[Alva · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent, unapologetic, principled but nuanced and very current case for what was called "neoconservatism" under Reagan but has become the foundation of rational foreign policy under rational but fallible presidents for this century. Cohen was close to the Romney campaign in 2012, and I read this book almost as alternative history under a Republican administration that might have been... as for the one that is, Cohen is a very acerbic critic of Trump on Twitter, so far, and worth following there.

[CHAD FOSTER · Rating 4 out of 5]

Not Cohen’s best work, but still a highly enjoyable read. Chapter 8, “The Logic of Hard Power,” is where this book makes its impression. In the end, Cohen’s main idea is that, despite the wishful thinking of many, hard power remains firmly at the center of US strategy.

The first 2/3 of the book consists of well-articulated ideas and perspectives that one could find in a multitude of other sources. It drags on in a few places, although it never quite loses its momentum. Many of his premises are arguable, but he is practical and sensible in his assessments. It all builds to chapter 8, making the trip worthwhile.

[Paul · Rating 3 out of 5]

The "America can do no wrong" attitude starts to grate very quickly and in the end I can't tell if the author is arguing for or against use of military force. You could argue it's a nuanced stance but it's more to do with how meandering the narrative is.

And how many times is he going to tell us that America's capabilities are surely great but we can't talk about the details because it's a secret. Too late, I'm onto your secrets and will carelessly reveal the existence of the American moon base right here!

[Marc · Rating 2 out of 5]

I wound up making a quick skim of the author's main points. I was able to borrow this book from the digital Army MWR Library and was glad I didn't spend my own money on it. This was a very dry and academic treatise and I was "treated" to many books like this in my professional military education. It makes its points, but this book just wasn't a fascinating read. It would be a great book for a course on the use of hard military power over a period of nine weeks or so.

[Stan Lanier · Rating 3 out of 5]

I became aware of Eliot A. Cohen, a conservative Republican, through his criticisms of Donald Trump and his analysis of the needs of American might against the Russian invasion of Ukraine. I respected his thoughts in both arenas, and I thought I should give him a hearing on the use of military force and the limitations of soft power. One thing I like about Mr. Cohen is that his thought is always clear.

[Nate Campbell · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very sober and objective assessment of US military and strategic power in the current era. Written in 2017, correctly highlights many recent failings of strategy and policy and presciently predicts several problem regions and conflicts that have since come to pass. Very good military and foreign policy expert. Unfortunately not any easy solutions for our current state but he doesn't sugarcoat the challenges we face.

[Brenden Siekman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Military power as a tool for national interests. It's hard to define "winning" wars and to begin with a clear "endstate" and exit strategies are harder to hold to than often predicted. It's also very hard to know what threats will be most pressing 10 years from now. Military power and the actual use of it when necessary are vital.