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China's Future
China's future is arguably the most consequential question in global affairs. Having enjoyed unprecedented levels of growth, China is at a critical juncture in the development of its economy, society, polity, national security, and international relations. The direction the nation takes at this turning point will determine whether it stalls or continues to develop and prosper.
Will China be successful in implementing a new wave of transformational reforms that could last decades and make it the world's leading superpower? Or will its leaders shy away from the drastic changes required because the regime's power is at risk? If so, will that lead to prolonged stagnation or even regime collapse? Might China move down a more liberal or even democratic path? Or will China instead emerge as a hard, authoritarian and aggressive superstate?
In this new book, David Shambaugh argues that these potential pathways are all possibilities - but they depend on key decisions yet to be made by China's leaders, different pressures from within Chinese society, as well as actions taken by other nations. Assessing these scenarios and their implications, he offers a thoughtful and clear study of China's future for all those seeking to understand the country's likely trajectory over the coming decade and beyond.
Will China be successful in implementing a new wave of transformational reforms that could last decades and make it the world's leading superpower? Or will its leaders shy away from the drastic changes required because the regime's power is at risk? If so, will that lead to prolonged stagnation or even regime collapse? Might China move down a more liberal or even democratic path? Or will China instead emerge as a hard, authoritarian and aggressive superstate?
In this new book, David Shambaugh argues that these potential pathways are all possibilities - but they depend on key decisions yet to be made by China's leaders, different pressures from within Chinese society, as well as actions taken by other nations. Assessing these scenarios and their implications, he offers a thoughtful and clear study of China's future for all those seeking to understand the country's likely trajectory over the coming decade and beyond.
191 pages, Kindle Edition
Published March 11, 2016
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557 people want to read
About the author
David Shambaugh
44 books66 followersDavid Leigh Shambaugh is an American political scientist, Sinologist and policy advisor. He currently serves as the Gaston Sigur Professor of Asian Studies, Political Science, and International Affairs at George Washington University, where he is also the director of the China Policy Program at GW’s Elliott School of International Affairs. He is also a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution (2024—). He was previously a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Shambaugh served in the Department of State, and on the White House National Security Council staff during the presidency of Jimmy Carter. As an author, Shambaugh has authored 12 and edited 21 books, and over 200 scholarly articles and newspaper op-eds. (Source: Wikipedia)
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December 24, 2016
This book was named among The Economist’s Best Books of the Year, but if you’ve ever heard that end-of-year podcast, you’d know that list is not exactly discriminating. However, I did not know that when I ordered this, and I also did not know that The Economist also named Shambaugh's 2013 China Goes Global as Best of the Year. Frankly, I am not impressed, either with this book or The Economist’s list.
This book was actually a speech that Shambaugh had been schlepping around various outlets for a couple of years until he discovered that, with a little tweaking, he could actually sell it as a book. It is, thankfully, brief. That is the best thing that can be said about it.
Shambaugh is an academic who, although he has been studying China for forty years, has never actually put himself in the leader’s place, and therefore cannot adequately convey the feeling Chinese leaders must have of sitting atop an active volcano, knowing changes are necessary, and handling some while stomping out flames as their pants catch on fire.
Shambaugh is dismissive and arch when contemplating the difficulties and constraints facing China’s leaders, while not for a moment considering that every country, even the “free market” democracies in the West, are facing enormous issues with crippling debt, infrastructure, wage-gap, health delivery systems, education and innovation. I really hate his smug attitude.
Now that I have gotten that off my chest, it’s a wonder that we still have under-innovating academics like Shambaugh still peddling their tired lectures at universities and think tanks when the world has actually changed in forty years, and we can sit around and discuss, with innovation and rationality, what one would do if one were facing China’s issues, without the attitude. Since the West clearly doesn’t have it all worked out perfectly, why couldn’t we try to imagine a system that uses some state control and unleashes the creativity of the populace without allowing the wide gaps that appear in, say, America?
I find it astonishing that Shambaugh is worried China’s universities are not good enough or that China doesn’t have enough innovation. China is going to eat our lunch in twenty-five years, as anyone who has spent any time there will be happy to tell you. The entire economy has enormous vitality because these folks have known scarcity, and are extremely cunning in knowing how to get by. More than I have ever seen anywhere, it is a nation of entrepreneurs. The leaders’ problem stems from trying to keep it all under control.
Which is the best thing to address first? Deregulating the banking and financial system will cause a vast economic unbalancing, but not doing so is also a problem. Corruption may be endemic, no matter whether leaders are appointed or elected, or how free or tight the central control of the business relationships. Addressing it straight on, and sharing its devastating impacts via a freer press may actually bring more social goods.
The dissidents? They clearly care enough to speak out and see things that the center is avoiding. Rather than jailing them, put them to work coming up with solutions with the brightest poli-sci students, giving them real-life constraints and limited scope, e.g., a province may privatize their largest glass factory. What are the political, social, economic implications, and can it be done discretely within one province? How can the enormous job of introducing needed changes be done piecemeal if moving one piece shifts an entire economy?
Yes, China has to deal with rising expectations. Don’t we all? Shambaugh raises all the moving pieces China must address, but he seems out of touch. His lecture is drowning in very old-fashioned platitudes and attitudes towards “the communists” and he has no apparent enthusiasm for the experiment China undertook in their revolution and since. This is exciting stuff, folks, but you’d never know it from Shambaugh.
The most interesting observations were made by other authors that Shambaugh was quoting:
The other legitimately interesting idea Shambaugh tells us about is a book published in 1989 (!) by Zbigniew Brzezinski, called The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century. In it Brzezinski apparently discusses communist party-states in the “post-communist authoritarianism” stage:
This book was actually a speech that Shambaugh had been schlepping around various outlets for a couple of years until he discovered that, with a little tweaking, he could actually sell it as a book. It is, thankfully, brief. That is the best thing that can be said about it.
Shambaugh is an academic who, although he has been studying China for forty years, has never actually put himself in the leader’s place, and therefore cannot adequately convey the feeling Chinese leaders must have of sitting atop an active volcano, knowing changes are necessary, and handling some while stomping out flames as their pants catch on fire.
Shambaugh is dismissive and arch when contemplating the difficulties and constraints facing China’s leaders, while not for a moment considering that every country, even the “free market” democracies in the West, are facing enormous issues with crippling debt, infrastructure, wage-gap, health delivery systems, education and innovation. I really hate his smug attitude.
Now that I have gotten that off my chest, it’s a wonder that we still have under-innovating academics like Shambaugh still peddling their tired lectures at universities and think tanks when the world has actually changed in forty years, and we can sit around and discuss, with innovation and rationality, what one would do if one were facing China’s issues, without the attitude. Since the West clearly doesn’t have it all worked out perfectly, why couldn’t we try to imagine a system that uses some state control and unleashes the creativity of the populace without allowing the wide gaps that appear in, say, America?
I find it astonishing that Shambaugh is worried China’s universities are not good enough or that China doesn’t have enough innovation. China is going to eat our lunch in twenty-five years, as anyone who has spent any time there will be happy to tell you. The entire economy has enormous vitality because these folks have known scarcity, and are extremely cunning in knowing how to get by. More than I have ever seen anywhere, it is a nation of entrepreneurs. The leaders’ problem stems from trying to keep it all under control.
Which is the best thing to address first? Deregulating the banking and financial system will cause a vast economic unbalancing, but not doing so is also a problem. Corruption may be endemic, no matter whether leaders are appointed or elected, or how free or tight the central control of the business relationships. Addressing it straight on, and sharing its devastating impacts via a freer press may actually bring more social goods.
The dissidents? They clearly care enough to speak out and see things that the center is avoiding. Rather than jailing them, put them to work coming up with solutions with the brightest poli-sci students, giving them real-life constraints and limited scope, e.g., a province may privatize their largest glass factory. What are the political, social, economic implications, and can it be done discretely within one province? How can the enormous job of introducing needed changes be done piecemeal if moving one piece shifts an entire economy?
Yes, China has to deal with rising expectations. Don’t we all? Shambaugh raises all the moving pieces China must address, but he seems out of touch. His lecture is drowning in very old-fashioned platitudes and attitudes towards “the communists” and he has no apparent enthusiasm for the experiment China undertook in their revolution and since. This is exciting stuff, folks, but you’d never know it from Shambaugh.
The most interesting observations were made by other authors that Shambaugh was quoting:
"Thus, I see China as currently stagnating in what scholar Minxin Pei very astutely and presciently described in 2006 (!) as a ‘trapped transition.’ In this wishful and visionary book [Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy], Pei…describes…economic foundation is inevitably constrained by its political superstructure. Without fundamental and far-reaching political reforms, China’s economy will stagnate and the regime may well collapse…I did not agree with his argument at the time, but have come around to agree with him now. The reason for my changed assessment is that China has changed in the interim."Good god, folks. Just read Minxin Pei. I plan to. He has a new book just out, called China's Crony Capitalism.
The other legitimately interesting idea Shambaugh tells us about is a book published in 1989 (!) by Zbigniew Brzezinski, called The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century. In it Brzezinski apparently discusses communist party-states in the “post-communist authoritarianism” stage:
"In this phase, the communist leadership loses confidence, evinces a deep insecurity, and tries to reassert control."I don’t think China is in this stage, but just about anything Brzezinski writes about the Soviets is interesting, and this one sounds just about as relevant as you're going to get.
August 19, 2017
Trong cuốn sách này, Shambaugh phân tích các vấn đề Kinh tế, Xã hội, Chính trị và Quan hệ của Trung Quốc với Thế giới trong hiện tại, từ đó nêu ra dự đoán của mình về tương lai Trung Quốc. Cuốn sách được viết dễ hiểu, khách quan. Cách lập luận của ông không hoàn toàn áp đặt một tiên đoán nào. Với Shambaugh, tất cả khả năng đều có thể xảy ra. Tuy nhiên, cũng có những khả năng dễ xảy ra hơn khả năng khác. Vì vậy, bạn đọc có thể yên tâm về cuốn sách này. Nó là một cuốn sách đáng đọc, cho ta cái nhìn khái quát về TQ trong khoảng 40 năm trở lại đây.
Ngoài ra, còn một điểm mình rất thích ở cuốn này: tính cập nhật. Cuốn sách được viết xong năm 2015, được dịch sang tiếng việt năm 2016. Ta có thể bắt gặp rất nhiều sự kiện mang tính thời sự ở trong cuốn này, như cuộc cách mạng dù Hong Kong, việc Nga chiếm Crime, can thiệp Syria,v.v... Vì chính trị có thể thay đổi hàng ngày. Nên tính thời sự của cuốn sách thực sự là một điểm cộng lớn.
.
.
.
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Trước năm 1978, Trung Quốc nằm dưới quyền cai trị của Mao Trạch Đông, bị tàn phá trong các cuộc thanh trừng trong cải cách văn hóa và cải cách ruộng đất. Mao qua đời, tạo cơ hội cho Đặng Tiểu Bình lên nắm quyền và tiến hành một loạt các cải tổ kinh tế, tận dụng tốt nguồn cung lao động dồi dào, thu hút đầu tư nước ngoài vào các ngành công nghiệp chế biến, giúp cho nền kinh tế TQ tăng trưởng thần kì trong 30 năm. Chính điều này đã gây ra những biến đổi lớn về xã hội Trung Quốc.
Tuy nhiên, nền kinh tế dựa trên sản xuất hàng giá rẻ đã bắt đầu chững lại. Nguyên nhân quan trọng là dân số Trung Quốc đã bắt đầu già đi, cung lao động giảm, giá lao động tăng. Sự thay đổi cơ cấu dân số không chỉ gây sức ép lên nền kinh tế, mà lên cả hệ thống phúc lợi xã hội vì số lượng người già đang tăng. Thêm vào đó, tăng trưởng kinh tế tạo ra một tầng lớn trung lưu lớn trong xã hội, ngày càng cảm thấy bất mãn với chính quyền Cộng sản vì tình trạng tham nhũng, ô nhiễm môi trường, bất ổn an ninh. Các vùng Tân Cương, Tây Tạng, Hồng Kong đang trở thành những điểm nóng bất ổn đe dọa sự ổn định của chính quyền Đảng trị. Trung Quốc Cộng sản hiện đứng trước rất nhiều vấn đề nghiêm trọng , và việc giải quyết các vấn đề ấy hiệu quả tới đâu sẽ quyết định tương lai Trung Quốc.
Theo Shambaugh, Trung Quốc hiện nay đứng trước 4 ngã rẽ: Dân chủ nửa vời (với tòa án độc lập, báo chí độc lập tương đối, có bầu cử đa đảng, nhưng ĐCS vẫn nắm quyền - tương tự Singapore); Chuyên chế mềm (Cải cách mạnh mẽ kinh tế, mở rộng tự do xã hội, cải cách chính trị từ từ có kiểm soát); (Chuyên chế rắn - Cải cách kinh tế, nhưng bóp nghẹt tự do xã hội, đàn áp tổ chức dân sự, kiểm duyệt mạnh mẽ internet và báo chí - đây là đặc điểm của TQ từ sau 2012 khi Tập Cận Bình lên nắm quyền); và cuối cùng là Toàn trị mới (kiểu như Bắc Triều Tiên).
Vậy Đảng CS sẽ lựa chọn ngã rẽ nào? Để trả lời câu hỏi này, tác giả tiến hành phân tích hành vi của Đảng CS. Shambaush chỉ ra rằng: từ 1978 đến 2015, TQ luân phiên chuyển từ Chuyên chế rắn sang chuyên chế mềm và ngược lại. Cụ thể, từ 1978 - 1989, dưới sự cầm quyền của Đặng Tiểu Bình - một tay cải cách và có đầu óc cởi mở, TQ được hưởng một bầu không khí tương đối tự do. Điều này đã dẫn đến cuộc biểu tình ủng hộ dân chủ của sinh viên Bắc Kinh tại quảng trường Thiên An Môn. Do e sợ trước kinh nghiệm của Đông Âu, phe bảo thủ trong ĐCS đã ra tay đàn áp sinh viên. Sự kiện này đã gây ra một cuộc đảo ngược thế cờ. Những tay có đầu óc cải cách bị cách chức. Giới bảo thủ mới lên nắm quyền, tăng cường đàn áp và kiểm duyệt. Mãi đến năm 1997, trong những nỗ lực cuối cùng của đời mình, Đặng Tiểu Bình đã tận dụng thành công uy tín của mình, đưa nhóm cải cách mới gồm Giang Trạch Dân, Ôn Gia Bảo, Tăng Khánh Hồng,... lên nắm quyền. Nhóm lãnh đạo mới này đã tiến hành nhiều cải cách kinh tế và chính trị, thử nghiệm nhiều cách thức mở rộng tự do để làm cho ĐCS thích nghi được với tình hình mới, tránh rơi vào trạng thái trì trệ, thoái hóa của ĐCS Liên Xô trước kia. Tuy nhiên, đến năm 2009, xu hướng cải cách chấm dứt khi đạo diễn của tiến trình cải cách là Tăng Khánh Hồng về hưu. TQ đối diện với nhiều cuộc bạo động ở Tân Cương, Tây Tạng. Điều này đã thúc đẩy cho nhóm bảo thủ trở lại. 2012, Tập Cận Bình với tích cách cứng rắn, mạnh mẽ của mình lên nắm quyền, đã ngay lập tức thực hiện đàn áp mạnh mẽ, tiến hành chống tham nhũng để loại bỏ đối thủ chính trị, tung ra Trung Hoa mộng làm mê hoặc chủ nghĩa dân tộc Trung Hoa. 5 năm sau thời điểm Tập lên cầm quyền, Trung Quốc có vẻ như sẽ tiếp tục đi theo con đường Chuyên chế rắn. Tuy nhiên, điều này chỉ làm các mâu thuẫn trong xã hội TQ ngày thêm trầm trọng. Trừ khi Tập bị loại bỏ trong Đại hội Đảng năm 2017 (rất ít khả năng), thì những mâu thuẫn trong nền kinh tế, xã hội của TQ sẽ có thể bắt đầu "cắn". Khi đó, TQ rơi vào một tình trạng suy thoái mới. Nếu bất ổn nổ ra, giới bảo thủ thậm chí có thể còn đàn áp mạnh hơn, cố đưa TQ vào tình trạng Toàn trị mới. Tuy nhiên, xã hội TQ đã quá tự do để có thể quay lại chế độ toàn trị, nên điều này sẽ chỉ làm tương lai Đảng CS thêm bất định. Mặt khác, nếu trong tương lai tới, TQ đột ngột chuyển sang chuyên chế mềm, thậm chí là Dân chủ nửa vời, nền kinh tế có thể chuyển từ chế biến, sang nền kinh tế sáng tạo (như Hàn Quốc, Đài Loan, Nhật Bản đã từng thành công). Khi đó, các mâu thuẫn có thể được xoa dịu. Mặc dù vậy, để làm được điều này, cần có một nhóm lãnh đạo tự tin, dám chấp nhận sự chỉ trích từ xã hội và tiếp cận các bất đồng theo cách khoan dung hơn. Quan trọng hơn cả, nhóm cải cách này phải nhận được sự ủng hộ lớn trong Đảng. Điều này khó, nhưng không phải không khả thi, vì TQ đã từng trải qua các thời kì cải cách.
Đại khái đó là nội dung cuốn sách.
Ngoài ra, còn một điểm mình rất thích ở cuốn này: tính cập nhật. Cuốn sách được viết xong năm 2015, được dịch sang tiếng việt năm 2016. Ta có thể bắt gặp rất nhiều sự kiện mang tính thời sự ở trong cuốn này, như cuộc cách mạng dù Hong Kong, việc Nga chiếm Crime, can thiệp Syria,v.v... Vì chính trị có thể thay đổi hàng ngày. Nên tính thời sự của cuốn sách thực sự là một điểm cộng lớn.
.
.
.
.
Trước năm 1978, Trung Quốc nằm dưới quyền cai trị của Mao Trạch Đông, bị tàn phá trong các cuộc thanh trừng trong cải cách văn hóa và cải cách ruộng đất. Mao qua đời, tạo cơ hội cho Đặng Tiểu Bình lên nắm quyền và tiến hành một loạt các cải tổ kinh tế, tận dụng tốt nguồn cung lao động dồi dào, thu hút đầu tư nước ngoài vào các ngành công nghiệp chế biến, giúp cho nền kinh tế TQ tăng trưởng thần kì trong 30 năm. Chính điều này đã gây ra những biến đổi lớn về xã hội Trung Quốc.
Tuy nhiên, nền kinh tế dựa trên sản xuất hàng giá rẻ đã bắt đầu chững lại. Nguyên nhân quan trọng là dân số Trung Quốc đã bắt đầu già đi, cung lao động giảm, giá lao động tăng. Sự thay đổi cơ cấu dân số không chỉ gây sức ép lên nền kinh tế, mà lên cả hệ thống phúc lợi xã hội vì số lượng người già đang tăng. Thêm vào đó, tăng trưởng kinh tế tạo ra một tầng lớn trung lưu lớn trong xã hội, ngày càng cảm thấy bất mãn với chính quyền Cộng sản vì tình trạng tham nhũng, ô nhiễm môi trường, bất ổn an ninh. Các vùng Tân Cương, Tây Tạng, Hồng Kong đang trở thành những điểm nóng bất ổn đe dọa sự ổn định của chính quyền Đảng trị. Trung Quốc Cộng sản hiện đứng trước rất nhiều vấn đề nghiêm trọng , và việc giải quyết các vấn đề ấy hiệu quả tới đâu sẽ quyết định tương lai Trung Quốc.
Theo Shambaugh, Trung Quốc hiện nay đứng trước 4 ngã rẽ: Dân chủ nửa vời (với tòa án độc lập, báo chí độc lập tương đối, có bầu cử đa đảng, nhưng ĐCS vẫn nắm quyền - tương tự Singapore); Chuyên chế mềm (Cải cách mạnh mẽ kinh tế, mở rộng tự do xã hội, cải cách chính trị từ từ có kiểm soát); (Chuyên chế rắn - Cải cách kinh tế, nhưng bóp nghẹt tự do xã hội, đàn áp tổ chức dân sự, kiểm duyệt mạnh mẽ internet và báo chí - đây là đặc điểm của TQ từ sau 2012 khi Tập Cận Bình lên nắm quyền); và cuối cùng là Toàn trị mới (kiểu như Bắc Triều Tiên).
Vậy Đảng CS sẽ lựa chọn ngã rẽ nào? Để trả lời câu hỏi này, tác giả tiến hành phân tích hành vi của Đảng CS. Shambaush chỉ ra rằng: từ 1978 đến 2015, TQ luân phiên chuyển từ Chuyên chế rắn sang chuyên chế mềm và ngược lại. Cụ thể, từ 1978 - 1989, dưới sự cầm quyền của Đặng Tiểu Bình - một tay cải cách và có đầu óc cởi mở, TQ được hưởng một bầu không khí tương đối tự do. Điều này đã dẫn đến cuộc biểu tình ủng hộ dân chủ của sinh viên Bắc Kinh tại quảng trường Thiên An Môn. Do e sợ trước kinh nghiệm của Đông Âu, phe bảo thủ trong ĐCS đã ra tay đàn áp sinh viên. Sự kiện này đã gây ra một cuộc đảo ngược thế cờ. Những tay có đầu óc cải cách bị cách chức. Giới bảo thủ mới lên nắm quyền, tăng cường đàn áp và kiểm duyệt. Mãi đến năm 1997, trong những nỗ lực cuối cùng của đời mình, Đặng Tiểu Bình đã tận dụng thành công uy tín của mình, đưa nhóm cải cách mới gồm Giang Trạch Dân, Ôn Gia Bảo, Tăng Khánh Hồng,... lên nắm quyền. Nhóm lãnh đạo mới này đã tiến hành nhiều cải cách kinh tế và chính trị, thử nghiệm nhiều cách thức mở rộng tự do để làm cho ĐCS thích nghi được với tình hình mới, tránh rơi vào trạng thái trì trệ, thoái hóa của ĐCS Liên Xô trước kia. Tuy nhiên, đến năm 2009, xu hướng cải cách chấm dứt khi đạo diễn của tiến trình cải cách là Tăng Khánh Hồng về hưu. TQ đối diện với nhiều cuộc bạo động ở Tân Cương, Tây Tạng. Điều này đã thúc đẩy cho nhóm bảo thủ trở lại. 2012, Tập Cận Bình với tích cách cứng rắn, mạnh mẽ của mình lên nắm quyền, đã ngay lập tức thực hiện đàn áp mạnh mẽ, tiến hành chống tham nhũng để loại bỏ đối thủ chính trị, tung ra Trung Hoa mộng làm mê hoặc chủ nghĩa dân tộc Trung Hoa. 5 năm sau thời điểm Tập lên cầm quyền, Trung Quốc có vẻ như sẽ tiếp tục đi theo con đường Chuyên chế rắn. Tuy nhiên, điều này chỉ làm các mâu thuẫn trong xã hội TQ ngày thêm trầm trọng. Trừ khi Tập bị loại bỏ trong Đại hội Đảng năm 2017 (rất ít khả năng), thì những mâu thuẫn trong nền kinh tế, xã hội của TQ sẽ có thể bắt đầu "cắn". Khi đó, TQ rơi vào một tình trạng suy thoái mới. Nếu bất ổn nổ ra, giới bảo thủ thậm chí có thể còn đàn áp mạnh hơn, cố đưa TQ vào tình trạng Toàn trị mới. Tuy nhiên, xã hội TQ đã quá tự do để có thể quay lại chế độ toàn trị, nên điều này sẽ chỉ làm tương lai Đảng CS thêm bất định. Mặt khác, nếu trong tương lai tới, TQ đột ngột chuyển sang chuyên chế mềm, thậm chí là Dân chủ nửa vời, nền kinh tế có thể chuyển từ chế biến, sang nền kinh tế sáng tạo (như Hàn Quốc, Đài Loan, Nhật Bản đã từng thành công). Khi đó, các mâu thuẫn có thể được xoa dịu. Mặc dù vậy, để làm được điều này, cần có một nhóm lãnh đạo tự tin, dám chấp nhận sự chỉ trích từ xã hội và tiếp cận các bất đồng theo cách khoan dung hơn. Quan trọng hơn cả, nhóm cải cách này phải nhận được sự ủng hộ lớn trong Đảng. Điều này khó, nhưng không phải không khả thi, vì TQ đã từng trải qua các thời kì cải cách.
Đại khái đó là nội dung cuốn sách.
March 12, 2025
Offers four possible governance (and hence regime and economic) trajectories which are not incredibly detailed and thus not incredibly helpful, spending a good amount of time on hypothetical positive and negative outcomes that would result should China do what it ‘should’ or ‘shouldn’t’, most of which are nothing new, and with a bit too much confidence in the ‘inevitable decline’ theory without enough to back it up that couldn’t as well be said of many other countries. Some absolute statements are made that make one question what planet the author is on or whether he has actually been to China as much as he has claimed, but this is the case with most anyone writing on politics, especially China watchers. Useful overall for a brief lay of the land and possible futures.
April 28, 2020
It's a perfectly well-written thesis...but reading it feels like paint peeling off the surface of my brain. It certainly makes its case, but it's a reminder of (1) why I didn't specialize in economics, and (2) why reading ANY academic thesis is never-ever what I'd classify as a pleasurable & relaxing reading experience.
March 16, 2025
The author made many bold claims which I thought were outlandish at first but they were backed up with concrete facts and evidence and really changed my prespective! He has also predicted China's current situations (despite the pandemic) with shocking accuracy. The book was very repetitive however in some points, but overall a great read!
May 1, 2022
Silpna. Laiko gaišimas.
September 18, 2018
Very much committed to democratic peace theory.
March 18, 2017
Tương lai Trung Quốc phụ thuộc bốn lựa chọn cơ bản mà David Shambaugh gọi là Toàn trị mới (siết chặt hơn nữa), Chuyên chế rắn (tiếp tục như hiện nay), Chuyên chế mềm (nới lỏng kiểm soát) hoặc Dân chủ nửa vời (cho tranh cử tương đối tự do nhưng bảo đảm quyền lực của đảng cộng sản). Tác giả phân tích các mặt kinh tế, xã hội và thể chế, dự báo tình hình phát triển theo mỗi kịch bản nêu trên.
December 2, 2016
David Shambaugh is a well-known pessimist in debates on Chinese politics. While he recognizes that it is wisest to expect the unexpected when it comes to China, he makes a convincing case that the current economic, political and social model is unsustainable in even the medium term.
In less than two hundred pages, he offers a fairly accessible runthrough of China's stunning transformation since 1978, the numerous bottlenecks it currently faces, and four scenarios for its future development - in itself no mean feat.
The first two of these four scenarios are the most likely: Hard Authoritarianism (what we are currently seeing under Xi Jinping) or Soft Authoritarianism (what was tentatively pushed by reform-minded cadres between 1998 and 2008). Continuing with the former would do little to improve the acute crises of debt, an ageing population, anger in ethnic minority regions, a worried Asian neighbourhood etc. etc. And yet, this seems to be the course that Xi and his associated factions are most inclined to continue at all costs.
Should reformists maneuver their way to a position of strength at the Party Congress next year, it may be possible to return to a course of Soft Authoritarianism. By allowing some breathing space for civil society, higher education, and other key sectors for China's future, this could allow the communist system to survive longer and perhaps even carry out the necessary reforms to once again radically transform the economy.
Shambaugh does not discount the faint possibility of a slide toward Neo-Totalitarianism (akin to the post-Tiananmen repression or even the darkest days of the Mao era) or a transition to Semi-Democracy (akin to Singapore, with a clearly dominant party, but one that submits to genuine limits on its power and allows a slightly more than symbolic opposition). These scenarios, however, he judges to be exceedingly unlikely in the current climate.
This is not the definitive account of Chinese politics, nor does it claim to be. But it is a very good way to get an overview of how China got here and where it might go next.
In less than two hundred pages, he offers a fairly accessible runthrough of China's stunning transformation since 1978, the numerous bottlenecks it currently faces, and four scenarios for its future development - in itself no mean feat.
The first two of these four scenarios are the most likely: Hard Authoritarianism (what we are currently seeing under Xi Jinping) or Soft Authoritarianism (what was tentatively pushed by reform-minded cadres between 1998 and 2008). Continuing with the former would do little to improve the acute crises of debt, an ageing population, anger in ethnic minority regions, a worried Asian neighbourhood etc. etc. And yet, this seems to be the course that Xi and his associated factions are most inclined to continue at all costs.
Should reformists maneuver their way to a position of strength at the Party Congress next year, it may be possible to return to a course of Soft Authoritarianism. By allowing some breathing space for civil society, higher education, and other key sectors for China's future, this could allow the communist system to survive longer and perhaps even carry out the necessary reforms to once again radically transform the economy.
Shambaugh does not discount the faint possibility of a slide toward Neo-Totalitarianism (akin to the post-Tiananmen repression or even the darkest days of the Mao era) or a transition to Semi-Democracy (akin to Singapore, with a clearly dominant party, but one that submits to genuine limits on its power and allows a slightly more than symbolic opposition). These scenarios, however, he judges to be exceedingly unlikely in the current climate.
This is not the definitive account of Chinese politics, nor does it claim to be. But it is a very good way to get an overview of how China got here and where it might go next.
March 1, 2020
It was quite interesting to read this book in light of the fact that is almost 5 years old. In some cases a book might be considered timeless because of the message or stance etc. but in the case of this book it’s clearly a snapshot in time that is no longer accurate in light of what has transpired since it’s publishing.
It very much serves as a time capsule of sorts because the author uses statistics and facts to explain why China is what it is today and then tries to predict what it might become tomorrow.
Reading the book in 2020, we are very much in the “tomorrow” imagined by the author and it is telling that China has proceeded down the path of Neo-Totalitarianism and become more repressive than the author imagined.l it would in 2016.
This to me is another example of how we in the West continue to hold out hope that the richer, more engaged and powerful China becomes, the more open, responsible, and liberal China will become. It hasn’t happened yet, it isn’t happening now and it doesn’t seem likely to happen in the future.
This book does a great job of using statistics, facts and figures to frame an intelligent conversation where other books might approach the topic from an ideological perspective. In that sense I think it’s worth a read by anyone regardless of your respective hawkish or dovish perspective.
It very much serves as a time capsule of sorts because the author uses statistics and facts to explain why China is what it is today and then tries to predict what it might become tomorrow.
Reading the book in 2020, we are very much in the “tomorrow” imagined by the author and it is telling that China has proceeded down the path of Neo-Totalitarianism and become more repressive than the author imagined.l it would in 2016.
This to me is another example of how we in the West continue to hold out hope that the richer, more engaged and powerful China becomes, the more open, responsible, and liberal China will become. It hasn’t happened yet, it isn’t happening now and it doesn’t seem likely to happen in the future.
This book does a great job of using statistics, facts and figures to frame an intelligent conversation where other books might approach the topic from an ideological perspective. In that sense I think it’s worth a read by anyone regardless of your respective hawkish or dovish perspective.
February 5, 2017
Excellent coverage by a long standing student of China. He is measured and crisp here, so much so that the book reads like a set of graduate level course lectures (which they sort of are). Great way to get up to speed on what is happening there today and where they may be going in the future.
December 28, 2016
Shambaugh’s ‘China’s Future’ addresses the question at the core of modernisation theory: do the forces unleashed by a market economy drive a political movement towards democracy? He outlines four possible paths China future will take depending on officials’ appetite for reform:
Neo-Totalitarianism, Hard Authoritarianism, Soft Authoritarianism and Semi-Democracy.
Shambaugh uses pronouncements made in the November 2013 Third Plenum as the baseline for measuring substantive reform progress. The declaration to grant ‘market forces’ a large role in China’s economy is found wanting, and the problem is being compounded by current political centralisation and increased authoritarianism. Unless economic and political reform is undertaken – that is, more market-based and democratic-influenced – the current trajectory is forming a witches brew Shambaugh believes will result in: probable economic stagnation through debt accumulation, an inability to fully transition from investment to consumption-led economic growth, continued declining efficiency in credit, and an inability to unleash China's full capability for innovation.
If China is unable to fully harness economic growth potential and persistently generate wealth, the rank and file will become more vocal in their demands for greater freedoms and quality State-provided services that are typical in developed countries. China’s market-driven economic reforms must be accompanied by loosening systemic political control over society. If the CCP are unwilling or unable to follow this trajectory, Shambaugh predicts eventual regime decay or collapse over the long term.
Worryingly, the current government is showing diminished capacity or visible appetite to undertake political reform. The ideological conviction of influential CCP officials in the current administration and a convergence of domestic events have stifled the Party’s enthusiasm for releasing political control. Shambaugh argues that differing conceptions of the Soviet Union’s collapse is the fundamental point of contention between opposing political factions within the CCP, and the core issue which shapes their respective visions for China's future. Conservative (Leftist) CCP elements hold that the Brezhnev-instigated and Gorbachev-accelerated economic reforms were the fundamental cause for regime collapse; Liberal-minded officials emphasise political institutions’ decay and inadaptability – not the implementation of market-based economic policies – as the source of downfall.
Judging China’s current administration as Leftist and ‘hard authoritarian’, Shambaugh believes that the current path will yield little in terms of reform on either political or economic fronts.
Although Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin's liberal economic and political policies greatly contributed to national prosperity, four factors between 2008-2009 have resulted in a return to political authoritarianism and nullification of their respective reformist agendas: riots in Lhasa and Urumqi during 2008; the coalescence of the Party propaganda apparatus, internal security organs, the SOE sector, military and paramilitary into a unified political front; persuasive liberal reformers like Zeng Qinghong (who Shambaugh sees as the mastermind behind much of the contemporary political reform) manoeuvred from positions of influence (leaving the allegedly ineffectual Hu Jintao open to manipulation from Conservative factions); and hubris resulting from a perceived superiority in the 'Beijing Consensus' after the GFC. Powerful players within the Party 'made the case for abandoning the political reform program, reversing the main elements of it, and instituting tighten security and Party controls in its place.'
This leftist lurch has intensified under the Xi administration, resulting in repression of NGOs, regime-critical academics, lawyers and civil society organisations, and increased internet censorship. Furthermore, the bureaucracy is paralysed in its ability to undertake meaningful reform or dynamic policy solutions through fear of being implicated in Xi and Wang Qishan’s anti-corruption drive.
On an optimistic note, the leadership reshuffle at the 19th Party Congress in 2017 may clear the way for liberal-minded reformers. Four of the seven politburo standing committee and thirteen of the twenty-five politburo members are due for retirement due to age requirements. Shambaugh judges that nine of the twelve who will remain in office have 'politically reformist records'.
Shambaugh is certainly part of the China-watching camp that is sceptical of China’s current global power, and his book paints a rather dire picture. However, one factor he has neglected to examine in detail (understandable because of length) is the CCP’s skill for adaptability. Bruce Dickson’s publication ‘Wealth and Power: The Communist Party’s Embrace of China’s Private Sector’ has demonstrated that the CCP has been resourceful in their adaptability and skilled at bringing capitalist forces into the fold. Further, current research suggests that the populaces’ desire for political participation in China is rather low. Although this may change over time as social and economic malaise exacerbates, if there is no groundswell aspiration towards representative government the CCP will continue to muddle along. Time will tell if China’s dynastic cycle is a remanent of the imperial era or an enduring cultural thread.
Economic Problems:
GDP growth - secular stagnation; middle income trap; wage rises and associated labour costs; an economic model based upon fixed asset investment and low cost manufacturing is delivering lower returns; industrial overcapacity; SOE reform is almost non-existent (flirting with asset sales, mixed ownership, and operational separation), however, ultimate objective is to strengthen SOEs into industry giants despite the fact that they are globally uncompetitive and consuming disproportionate amounts of state finance.
Innovation is the silver bullet to solve China’s economic woes. In terms of feasibility, the questions remain, however, as to how wide and deep it will penetrate the economy, and across which sectors? The type of wide-scale innovation trumpeted by Beijing cannot occur without education reform.
Financial reform – banks need to decouple from the Party; tighten lending requirements based on ROI; better lending accessibility for SMEs and private enterprises; capital market reform; and develop RMB internationalisation
Social Problems:
Internal security expenditure larger than defence budget; cracking down on public sphere; Tibet, Hong Kong, Xinxiang, Taiwan all have the potential to provoke instability; income inequality is widening; lack of public services demanded by increasingly affluent classes; adjustment to urbanisation.
Political Problems:
Older influential liberal economic reformers have retired from office. The current trend is towards personalised and centralised decision-making, and conservatism where state will play a larger role in all aspects of life.
Neo-Totalitarianism, Hard Authoritarianism, Soft Authoritarianism and Semi-Democracy.
Shambaugh uses pronouncements made in the November 2013 Third Plenum as the baseline for measuring substantive reform progress. The declaration to grant ‘market forces’ a large role in China’s economy is found wanting, and the problem is being compounded by current political centralisation and increased authoritarianism. Unless economic and political reform is undertaken – that is, more market-based and democratic-influenced – the current trajectory is forming a witches brew Shambaugh believes will result in: probable economic stagnation through debt accumulation, an inability to fully transition from investment to consumption-led economic growth, continued declining efficiency in credit, and an inability to unleash China's full capability for innovation.
If China is unable to fully harness economic growth potential and persistently generate wealth, the rank and file will become more vocal in their demands for greater freedoms and quality State-provided services that are typical in developed countries. China’s market-driven economic reforms must be accompanied by loosening systemic political control over society. If the CCP are unwilling or unable to follow this trajectory, Shambaugh predicts eventual regime decay or collapse over the long term.
Worryingly, the current government is showing diminished capacity or visible appetite to undertake political reform. The ideological conviction of influential CCP officials in the current administration and a convergence of domestic events have stifled the Party’s enthusiasm for releasing political control. Shambaugh argues that differing conceptions of the Soviet Union’s collapse is the fundamental point of contention between opposing political factions within the CCP, and the core issue which shapes their respective visions for China's future. Conservative (Leftist) CCP elements hold that the Brezhnev-instigated and Gorbachev-accelerated economic reforms were the fundamental cause for regime collapse; Liberal-minded officials emphasise political institutions’ decay and inadaptability – not the implementation of market-based economic policies – as the source of downfall.
Judging China’s current administration as Leftist and ‘hard authoritarian’, Shambaugh believes that the current path will yield little in terms of reform on either political or economic fronts.
Although Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin's liberal economic and political policies greatly contributed to national prosperity, four factors between 2008-2009 have resulted in a return to political authoritarianism and nullification of their respective reformist agendas: riots in Lhasa and Urumqi during 2008; the coalescence of the Party propaganda apparatus, internal security organs, the SOE sector, military and paramilitary into a unified political front; persuasive liberal reformers like Zeng Qinghong (who Shambaugh sees as the mastermind behind much of the contemporary political reform) manoeuvred from positions of influence (leaving the allegedly ineffectual Hu Jintao open to manipulation from Conservative factions); and hubris resulting from a perceived superiority in the 'Beijing Consensus' after the GFC. Powerful players within the Party 'made the case for abandoning the political reform program, reversing the main elements of it, and instituting tighten security and Party controls in its place.'
This leftist lurch has intensified under the Xi administration, resulting in repression of NGOs, regime-critical academics, lawyers and civil society organisations, and increased internet censorship. Furthermore, the bureaucracy is paralysed in its ability to undertake meaningful reform or dynamic policy solutions through fear of being implicated in Xi and Wang Qishan’s anti-corruption drive.
On an optimistic note, the leadership reshuffle at the 19th Party Congress in 2017 may clear the way for liberal-minded reformers. Four of the seven politburo standing committee and thirteen of the twenty-five politburo members are due for retirement due to age requirements. Shambaugh judges that nine of the twelve who will remain in office have 'politically reformist records'.
Shambaugh is certainly part of the China-watching camp that is sceptical of China’s current global power, and his book paints a rather dire picture. However, one factor he has neglected to examine in detail (understandable because of length) is the CCP’s skill for adaptability. Bruce Dickson’s publication ‘Wealth and Power: The Communist Party’s Embrace of China’s Private Sector’ has demonstrated that the CCP has been resourceful in their adaptability and skilled at bringing capitalist forces into the fold. Further, current research suggests that the populaces’ desire for political participation in China is rather low. Although this may change over time as social and economic malaise exacerbates, if there is no groundswell aspiration towards representative government the CCP will continue to muddle along. Time will tell if China’s dynastic cycle is a remanent of the imperial era or an enduring cultural thread.
Economic Problems:
GDP growth - secular stagnation; middle income trap; wage rises and associated labour costs; an economic model based upon fixed asset investment and low cost manufacturing is delivering lower returns; industrial overcapacity; SOE reform is almost non-existent (flirting with asset sales, mixed ownership, and operational separation), however, ultimate objective is to strengthen SOEs into industry giants despite the fact that they are globally uncompetitive and consuming disproportionate amounts of state finance.
Innovation is the silver bullet to solve China’s economic woes. In terms of feasibility, the questions remain, however, as to how wide and deep it will penetrate the economy, and across which sectors? The type of wide-scale innovation trumpeted by Beijing cannot occur without education reform.
Financial reform – banks need to decouple from the Party; tighten lending requirements based on ROI; better lending accessibility for SMEs and private enterprises; capital market reform; and develop RMB internationalisation
Social Problems:
Internal security expenditure larger than defence budget; cracking down on public sphere; Tibet, Hong Kong, Xinxiang, Taiwan all have the potential to provoke instability; income inequality is widening; lack of public services demanded by increasingly affluent classes; adjustment to urbanisation.
Political Problems:
Older influential liberal economic reformers have retired from office. The current trend is towards personalised and centralised decision-making, and conservatism where state will play a larger role in all aspects of life.
September 17, 2024
Cuốn sách thứ hai của NXB Hội nhà văn trong thời gian qua về Trung Quốc sau cuốn “ Đạo quân Trung Quốc thầm lặng” . Ngoài việc chung đề tài về Trung Quốc , hai cuốn này đều có nhiều đặc điểm chung khác đó là về người chuyển ngữ, trang trí bìa, loại giấy sử dụng , font chữ gợi nhớ đến những cuốn sách dạng tài liệu tham khảo đặc biệt thường được xuất bản bởi NXB Sự thật, NXB Công an nhân dân hay TTXVN.
Là một chuyên gia am tường về Trung Quốc, David Shambaugh có những thống kê, phân tích và đánh giá khách quan về nước Trung Hoa hiện tại . Dựa trên những đánh giá hiện trạng kết hợp với các yếu tố có tính chất lịch sử , tác giả dự đoán tương lai Trung quốc theo 4 kịch bản khác nhau về đường hướng chính trị từ mức độ cực đoan nhất là toàn trị mới đến mức độ cởi mở nhất có thể là dân chủ nửa vời và 2 mức độ trung gian là chuyên chế rắn (đường lối chính trị hiện tại ) và chuyên chế mềm.
Một điều đáng lưu tâm là hầu hết những khía cạnh tác giả đánh giá về Trung Quốc từ chính trị, kinh tế , xã hội phần nào cũng rất phù hợp với tình hình Việt Nam hiện nay đặt ra câu hỏi độc giả liệu đó có phải là dự đoán chung về tương lai Việt Nam ?
Một cuốn sách tham khảo quý.
Là một chuyên gia am tường về Trung Quốc, David Shambaugh có những thống kê, phân tích và đánh giá khách quan về nước Trung Hoa hiện tại . Dựa trên những đánh giá hiện trạng kết hợp với các yếu tố có tính chất lịch sử , tác giả dự đoán tương lai Trung quốc theo 4 kịch bản khác nhau về đường hướng chính trị từ mức độ cực đoan nhất là toàn trị mới đến mức độ cởi mở nhất có thể là dân chủ nửa vời và 2 mức độ trung gian là chuyên chế rắn (đường lối chính trị hiện tại ) và chuyên chế mềm.
Một điều đáng lưu tâm là hầu hết những khía cạnh tác giả đánh giá về Trung Quốc từ chính trị, kinh tế , xã hội phần nào cũng rất phù hợp với tình hình Việt Nam hiện nay đặt ra câu hỏi độc giả liệu đó có phải là dự đoán chung về tương lai Việt Nam ?
Một cuốn sách tham khảo quý.
October 24, 2019
I gave this book a four star solely because I believe the author should provide some more historical sample of other nation ruled by hard authoritarian or totalitarian model and then how they failed at last. Apart from that, the author did provide a lot of information on the current Chinese society and political structure. I believe the ‘no 9 document’ released by CCP in 2013 mentioned in chapter 4 did highlight the fact that China has decided to stay on hard authoritarian, or even worse , step backwards to totalitarian.
The book was written in 2016, and as we’ve seen events unfolded in these 3 years till now in 2019, unfortunately, things may seem even worse than author predicted. I hope CCP will not repeat the mistake in 60s-70s.
The book was written in 2016, and as we’ve seen events unfolded in these 3 years till now in 2019, unfortunately, things may seem even worse than author predicted. I hope CCP will not repeat the mistake in 60s-70s.
December 16, 2021
This book details present develops in Chinese society, politics, and economics. It provides a good semi-current history of how China developed over the last 40 years to be in its present state, and the author lays out possible futures for the country. Ultimately, he explores the possibilities that lie between hard authoritarianism and semi-liberalism.
It will be interesting to see how China develops over the next decade. With a rise in social tensions and decrease in economic growth, China is definitely at a crossroads that will make its future more clear in the near term.
It will be interesting to see how China develops over the next decade. With a rise in social tensions and decrease in economic growth, China is definitely at a crossroads that will make its future more clear in the near term.
September 22, 2023
My second run on this contemporary work. First read when it came out in 2016. Author spent a considerable amount of his lifetime in China. What a sophisticated and accurate take on the current state of the Republic. Amazed by his predictions on the concentration of power as China slides deeper into authoritarian under Xi, and how its economic downturn unfold.
A bit boring, as all political works are, but worth a read.
A bit boring, as all political works are, but worth a read.
February 26, 2020
Managed to read this whole book about China's future and i still don't understand much about China. I do agree with some of his points though except for his persistant belief that China should become some sort of democracy
August 29, 2017
Cuốn sách đáng để đọc nếu bạn là người quan tâm đến xu hướng sẽ có của thế giới trong nhiều nhiều năm nữa. Mặc dù cuốn sách không tập trung miêu tả về điều đó lắm...
May 8, 2018
Great read for now, with some interesting analysis of China's political paths, but will probably be outdated in two years.
August 3, 2018
not bad. but nothing new. just cliche. sory to say that. but its true.
September 12, 2019
I wish I read this book years ago. Very succint, clear overview of China's economic past and it's potential paths forward.
July 3, 2020
Great overview
Good synthesis of the major issues in China from demographics to investment. Maybe could use an update. Covers up to 2015. Very good short read.
Good synthesis of the major issues in China from demographics to investment. Maybe could use an update. Covers up to 2015. Very good short read.
March 16, 2017
Good overview of China
Author takes a good view of China. Just thought that the consequences of hard authoritarianism could have been fleshed out more. And should also acknowledge the risks of both soft authoritarianism and semi-democracy. Both paths are not without risks.
Author takes a good view of China. Just thought that the consequences of hard authoritarianism could have been fleshed out more. And should also acknowledge the risks of both soft authoritarianism and semi-democracy. Both paths are not without risks.
May 5, 2016
Why does the public taxpayer fund academics? The answer is so that scholars can write books like this.
While increasing numbers of social scientists believe that we need to study the human world as we do the physical - dispassionately, microscopically, and numerically -Shambaugh's book is an important demonstration of the public value of scholars.
In this short and easily readable book, Shambaugh argues that unless the political system of China is reformed, the economic and social systems will stagnate and ultimately collapse. He is forthright in his view that only by moving to a more open political system, will China be able to achieve the economic reform it needs, and in turn avert the social and regional crises that seem to loom.
Shambaugh identifies four possible pathways for China. These are Hard Authoritarianism (the current path since 2009), Neo-Totalitarianism (the direction many fear Xi is taking the country), Soft-Authoritarianism (the 1998-2008 path) and Semi-Democracy (think Singapore but with Chinese characteristics).
Across four major chapters, the author reviews the economic, social, political and regional position of China. As one of the Wests' leading experts on China with dozens of books under his belt, each chapter is a strong summary of the key issues, core trends, and major debates and issues at the heart of the policy and scholarly debates.
In each chapter, Shambaugh returns to his four models and assesses how they would help or hinder China in addressing the almost overwhelming problems it faces to move from the middle income trap to a truely 21st century economy, to manage its internal harmony, declining demographics, struggle to create public institutions like the rule of law and geopolitical challenges.
While keeping the book short was a necessity, I would have liked to see more by Shambaugh on the problems a more democratic (and thus populist) China could pose. Particularly in the international sphere. No doubt the author could reply he didn't do so because the semi-democracy path seems the most unlikely of the four today, but given it is where his sympathies most clearly lie, a reckoning with its own problems would have been welcome.
This book doesn't separate the dependent, independent and intervening variables so as to make a specific scientific claim about China's future. That outcome is of course unknown and unknowable. Yet so much of our public debate, policy choices, spending and prognosis for the world is based on having a sense about what the answer is. Getting the answer wrong would cost more than the total education budget for the United States this century. In providing four decades worth of experience to help inform readers, Shambaugh is proving the public have gotten value for money from their investment in scholarship.
While increasing numbers of social scientists believe that we need to study the human world as we do the physical - dispassionately, microscopically, and numerically -Shambaugh's book is an important demonstration of the public value of scholars.
In this short and easily readable book, Shambaugh argues that unless the political system of China is reformed, the economic and social systems will stagnate and ultimately collapse. He is forthright in his view that only by moving to a more open political system, will China be able to achieve the economic reform it needs, and in turn avert the social and regional crises that seem to loom.
Shambaugh identifies four possible pathways for China. These are Hard Authoritarianism (the current path since 2009), Neo-Totalitarianism (the direction many fear Xi is taking the country), Soft-Authoritarianism (the 1998-2008 path) and Semi-Democracy (think Singapore but with Chinese characteristics).
Across four major chapters, the author reviews the economic, social, political and regional position of China. As one of the Wests' leading experts on China with dozens of books under his belt, each chapter is a strong summary of the key issues, core trends, and major debates and issues at the heart of the policy and scholarly debates.
In each chapter, Shambaugh returns to his four models and assesses how they would help or hinder China in addressing the almost overwhelming problems it faces to move from the middle income trap to a truely 21st century economy, to manage its internal harmony, declining demographics, struggle to create public institutions like the rule of law and geopolitical challenges.
While keeping the book short was a necessity, I would have liked to see more by Shambaugh on the problems a more democratic (and thus populist) China could pose. Particularly in the international sphere. No doubt the author could reply he didn't do so because the semi-democracy path seems the most unlikely of the four today, but given it is where his sympathies most clearly lie, a reckoning with its own problems would have been welcome.
This book doesn't separate the dependent, independent and intervening variables so as to make a specific scientific claim about China's future. That outcome is of course unknown and unknowable. Yet so much of our public debate, policy choices, spending and prognosis for the world is based on having a sense about what the answer is. Getting the answer wrong would cost more than the total education budget for the United States this century. In providing four decades worth of experience to help inform readers, Shambaugh is proving the public have gotten value for money from their investment in scholarship.
February 22, 2017
A timely and insightful commentary on current affairs in China from an expert who has been researching China for a long time. It's not heavy in theory, as I initially expected; rather, Shambaugh uses only relevant tools of analysis in political economy and international relations to provide his projection on China's future. He argues that if China were to avoid decay, it would need to move to a soft authoritarian system or a semi-democracy (as all democracies are unique). Shambaugh shows a proficient use of data and information and synthesises them into an argument that's easy to follow and engaging.
September 7, 2017
David Shambaugh writes a concise overview of the economic, political, and social issues China is facing today. It's brief, but its breadth makes up for the lack of depth.
In summary, Shambaugh argues that without political reform, China will not be able to leave the "middle income trap" it is bound to approach, assuming it isn't there already. Without political liberalization and structural reform, he argues that China will not be able to escape the trap by moving up the value chain and transitioning to a more knowledge- and services-based economy. The forces of innovation and creative destruction that allows for it can only happen under accommodative political institutions that China sorely lacks.
Shambaugh makes the argument very succinctly but I like how he makes the argument that the repression of the Communist Party pervades most economic and social problems that the country is facing right now. For example, innovation in universities can not happen because of restrictions and emphasis on rote education to quell possible dissent, resulting in educational institutions not having an atmosphere conducive for experimentation and creativity. Another is how China's environmental problems can be traced to the party railroading development because the party's legitimacy is based on its ability to deliver economic growth at whatever expense.
Shambaugh discusses potential pathways that China can take, and asserts that political reform and democratization is needed for China to successfully rebalance. It is repetitive at parts, but readers who want to get a cursory overview of where China is now and where it could be headed will find this book informative.
In summary, Shambaugh argues that without political reform, China will not be able to leave the "middle income trap" it is bound to approach, assuming it isn't there already. Without political liberalization and structural reform, he argues that China will not be able to escape the trap by moving up the value chain and transitioning to a more knowledge- and services-based economy. The forces of innovation and creative destruction that allows for it can only happen under accommodative political institutions that China sorely lacks.
Shambaugh makes the argument very succinctly but I like how he makes the argument that the repression of the Communist Party pervades most economic and social problems that the country is facing right now. For example, innovation in universities can not happen because of restrictions and emphasis on rote education to quell possible dissent, resulting in educational institutions not having an atmosphere conducive for experimentation and creativity. Another is how China's environmental problems can be traced to the party railroading development because the party's legitimacy is based on its ability to deliver economic growth at whatever expense.
Shambaugh discusses potential pathways that China can take, and asserts that political reform and democratization is needed for China to successfully rebalance. It is repetitive at parts, but readers who want to get a cursory overview of where China is now and where it could be headed will find this book informative.
April 28, 2016
Following on the heels of China Goes Global, Shambaugh provides an updated analysis of China's domestic and foreign policy trends and transformations over the previous years, and contends that China has several routes it can pursue, Hard Authoritarianism (the current trend since 2009), Soft Authoritarianism (the direction from 1998 to 2008), Neo-Totalitarianism or Semi Democracy.
Shambaugh considers semi democracy to be the most desirable, but also the least likely outcome, but contends that Hard Authoritarianism will lead to long term stagnation, and possible decline, and that Neo-Totalitarianism is obviously the worst route.
Shambaugh is not as bullish as other China authors (such as Martin Jacques) and is critical of the underlying faults in the economy, the lack of innovation, and perhaps the route of it, the nature of the educational system. Shambaugh asserts that China has to revive the political reform that was tentatively implemented between 1998 and 2008, or it will continue on a downward trajectory.
Shambaugh is quite critical of Xi Jinping, regarding him as most definitely not a liberal, and perhaps reckless in the scope and aggression with which he has implemented his anti corruption campaign. This in itself, could possibly be a costly error if it is extended too far upon the military.
As a regular reader of commentary on contemporary China, Shambaugh has provided some useful insight into the nature of Chinese governance that has been lacking in previous books, and sheds some interesting light on Zeng Qinghong, who Shambaugh considers to have been a reformer whose reforms were ultimately undermined.
A very good, up to date study of China, and a much more academic study than many out there. The book avoids the hyperbole associated with much study of China, and instead provides an academic and thoroughly researched study, but at the same time, thoroughly readable.
Shambaugh considers semi democracy to be the most desirable, but also the least likely outcome, but contends that Hard Authoritarianism will lead to long term stagnation, and possible decline, and that Neo-Totalitarianism is obviously the worst route.
Shambaugh is not as bullish as other China authors (such as Martin Jacques) and is critical of the underlying faults in the economy, the lack of innovation, and perhaps the route of it, the nature of the educational system. Shambaugh asserts that China has to revive the political reform that was tentatively implemented between 1998 and 2008, or it will continue on a downward trajectory.
Shambaugh is quite critical of Xi Jinping, regarding him as most definitely not a liberal, and perhaps reckless in the scope and aggression with which he has implemented his anti corruption campaign. This in itself, could possibly be a costly error if it is extended too far upon the military.
As a regular reader of commentary on contemporary China, Shambaugh has provided some useful insight into the nature of Chinese governance that has been lacking in previous books, and sheds some interesting light on Zeng Qinghong, who Shambaugh considers to have been a reformer whose reforms were ultimately undermined.
A very good, up to date study of China, and a much more academic study than many out there. The book avoids the hyperbole associated with much study of China, and instead provides an academic and thoroughly researched study, but at the same time, thoroughly readable.
June 8, 2016
Political scientists David Shambaugh take on four possible future courses for China: neo-totalitarianism, hard authoritarianism (which he argues is the current practice), soft authoritarianism (which they had a decade ago, he argues), or neo Democracy. He considers the middle two options the most likely and works through the implications in the areas of economics, politics and foreign policy in separate chapters devoted to each. It demonstrates Shambaugh's lifelong study of China, thoughtfulness, and ability to change his mind as circumstances change.
December 17, 2019
Very easy to read and understand with relatively little background knowledge regarding China in a contemporary context. With this book having been published a few years ago now. It is already easy to establish some of the predictions made by the author and how many are already proving to be true, and how some are not quite what he thought. An insightful read to be sure.
May 19, 2016
Clear and to the point. Excellent summary for those seeking to understand the key options now facing the CCP. Nice to get past the "China will rule the world" book genre (2003-2013) . Not very optimistic.
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