#Fail: Why the US Lost the War in Afghanistan

by Jonathan Owen

Jonathan Owen, in his book "# Why the US Lost the War in Afghanistan," provides a military insider's look at why the US counterinsurgency strategy was doomed to failure. When Owen’s research was first released in 2010, it challenged the flawed strategy of senior leadership and was suppressed. However, since then, the accuracy and predictive power of Owen’s research withstood the test of time and is now being heralded as the first major pioneering work overhauling the US military’s counterinsurgency strategy in the 21st Century.

Owen's research and analysis is a detailed indictment of the entire US military's counterinsurgency strategy, or lack thereof. Owen's research pulls no punches and systematically takes down one sacred cow after another respective of the military's strategy in Afghanistan. Owen doesn't stop there and places blame by name on the likes of General Petraeus, David Kilcullen, and many other "snake oil" salesmen of military strategy. In short order, Owen debunks the key tactics of the US military strategy in Afghanistan as a waste of resources and proves our most senior generals were either willfully ignorant or incompetent when it came to being true military strategists.

Not satisfied with simply pointing fingers, Owen details a truly viable strategy for Afghanistan, which promises actual decisive effects in short order. The beauty of Owen’s strategy is in its simplicity and the fact it can be replicated elsewhere. In it, Owen explains how when fighting insurgents, the US military can turn the tables and force the insurgents to fight against the conventional strengths of the US military. This flies in the face of the current failed strategy of playing by the insurgents’ rules in the vain hope of achieving victory.

To his credit, Owen's prescient analysis accurately predicted the US failures in Afghanistan and Iraq over a half decade before they have now come to pass. Owen's research presented in book form has been briefed to members of Congress, the senior military officers, academia, and the intelligence community and is now available for public release. Owen’s analysis literally rewrites the book on how the US military should conduct counterinsurgency operations. Owen's book is a must read for any serious policy maker, military member, or anyone wanting to know the true reasons for what went wrong with the US's war in Afghanistan. If the US is to avoid repeating the intellectual dereliction that led to the strategic disasters in Afghanistan and Iraq, Owen's research should be mandatory reading.

132 pages, Kindle Edition

Published October 14, 2015

Reviews

[Richard E. Berkebile · Rating 4 out of 5]

#Fail is a compelling comparative case study arguing border security is a necessary but not sufficient condition to defeat cross border insurgency. The book is well reasoned and uses cases from Algeria, Greece, Israel, and Soviet Afghanistan. The book could have done more to erase its masters thesis origins and uses the word "proof" far too freely. #Fail effectively challenges conventional wisdom on the "impossibility" of border security in difficult terrain. It also asserts it is affordable but the supporting evidence is light. This book is vital reading for COIN planners and policymakers prior to intervening in an insurgency.

[Tommy Lee Johnson · Rating 3 out of 5]

Build the Wall!?

This ten year old study advocates the importance of border security in COIN (counterinsurgency) warfare. It has implications not only for COIN around the world, but for immigration security. Of course one would not use pre-sighted, indirect artillery fire to interdict illegal immigration, but it is an interesting read.

[Ravi Rai · Rating 4 out of 5]

Basically a Masters thesis. The central argument is that implementation of effective border security is a necessary, if not sufficient condition for successful counterinsurgency warfare where the insurgent force has a cross-border sanctuary. The author focuses primarily on the Greek Civil War of 1946-1949, and Algeria from 1954-1962. Brief consideration is given to Tibet, Israel's use of border security in the Second Intifada, and the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The argument is sound, and adequate for a monograph. Further development into a significant work would require more case studies, with a wider selection both spatially and temporally. Marred by some poor editing.