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Developing the Virtues: Integrating Perspectives
Ethicists and psychologists have become increasingly interested in the development of virtue in recent years, approaching the topic from the perspectives of virtue ethics and developmental psychology respectively. Such interest in virtue development has spread beyond academia, as teachers and parents have increasingly striven to cultivate virtue as part of education and child-rearing.
Looking at these parallel trends in the study and practice of virtue development, the essays in this volume explore such questions How can philosophical work on virtue development inform psychological work on it, and vice versa? How should we understand virtue as a dimension of human personality? What is the developmental foundation of virtue? What are the evolutionary aspects of virtue and its development? How is virtue fostered? How is virtue exemplified in behavior and action? How is our conception of virtue influenced by context and by developmental and social experiences? What are the tensions, impediments and prospects for an integrative field of virtue study? Rather than centering on each discipline, the essays in this volume are organized around themes and engage each other in a broader dialogue. The volume begins with an introductory essay from the editors that explains the full range of philosophical and empirical issues that have surrounded the notion of virtue in recent
years.
Looking at these parallel trends in the study and practice of virtue development, the essays in this volume explore such questions How can philosophical work on virtue development inform psychological work on it, and vice versa? How should we understand virtue as a dimension of human personality? What is the developmental foundation of virtue? What are the evolutionary aspects of virtue and its development? How is virtue fostered? How is virtue exemplified in behavior and action? How is our conception of virtue influenced by context and by developmental and social experiences? What are the tensions, impediments and prospects for an integrative field of virtue study? Rather than centering on each discipline, the essays in this volume are organized around themes and engage each other in a broader dialogue. The volume begins with an introductory essay from the editors that explains the full range of philosophical and empirical issues that have surrounded the notion of virtue in recent
years.
328 pages, Hardcover
Published September 15, 2016
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29 people want to read
About the author
Julia Annas
42 books46 followersJulia Annas is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona and author of several books for Oxford University Press, including An Introduction to Plato's Republic and The Morality of Happiness. She is also series editor for the Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy.
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
June 7, 2017
We read this for a tutorial on moral development and moral education. The purpose of this volume is to stimulate the emergence of a new area of multidisciplinary study, or what they call virtue development studies. Towards that end, the volume collects papers on virtue and virtue development from researchers in the areas of psychology, philosophy, and (rather interestingly), theology. The theology remains largely in the background, however, while the situationist critique of character (or global traits) looms large, as do the ideas of automatic versus controlled processing and evolutionary theory. The quality of the included chapters is pretty uneven, with some solid contributions (by Julias Annas, for instance), and some downright questionable pieces (like Narvaez's opening chapter "Baselines for Virtue").
If you're interested in virtue development, this is a decent work to consult—there are a couple of interesting and worthwhile chapters, while the many references are likely to direct you to better things even in the weaker places.
If you're interested in virtue development, this is a decent work to consult—there are a couple of interesting and worthwhile chapters, while the many references are likely to direct you to better things even in the weaker places.
May 31, 2017
It is well known among academic philosophers that the study of the virtues, a preoccupation among the ancients, has become again a respectable field of specialization and study. The editors of Developing the Virtues concur. “The last thirty years has seen a resurgence of interest in virtue among philosophers” (1). But there has been a parallel growth in interest among psychologists in what has come to be called moral development, how moral thinking changes as individuals age. Just as our scientific thinking changes as we age (how a kindergartener understands and explains the changing of the seasons is very different from how a high-schooler does), our moral thinking likewise changes or develops. What psychologists interested in such moral development, like Piaget, Kohlberg, and Gilligan have been drawn to is not so much what an individual believes to be right or wrong in a given case, but with how one arrives at that conclusion. Until recently these parallel lines of pursuit have not crossed. Developing the Virtues is part of an attitude shift, for it takes as basic that “[v]irtue is by nature an interdisciplinary affair” (1).
The 309-page volume consists of thirteen uniquely authored essays, each with its own bibliography. A helpful index for the whole volume is also included. As described by the editors, “…the impetus for this volume was the recently convened ‘Notre Dame Symposium on Virtue and Its Development’, which brought together over a dozen renowned scholars representing fields of moral philosophy, psychology, and theology, as well as doing applied work in cultivating virtue” (2). Only one theologically themed essay made it into the volume and as interesting as it might be in its own way, it does seem to be a bit out of place here.
The editors identify five “interlocking” themes. The first concerns “general questions of how virtue development might begin in early childhood and continue in adult years,” and about half of the essays in the volume take up some sub-set of these questions. The opening essay, “Baselines for Virtue,” by Darcia Narvaez, is an excellent entrée into the questions making up the first theme of the volume. Her contention is that “virtue learning, like all learning, is biosocial” (15). That is, “moral capacities [are] shaped by social experiences in childhood…” (15). It is what follows from this that is most interesting and most promising for empirical research and indeed application. The implication of Narvaez’s insight is that an individual’s social environment significantly impacts her moral development for better or worse. Identifying a “baseline” for virtue allows Narvaez to highlight a number of ways that modernity has damaged us. And, of course, pointing out sources of damage opens possibilities for remedy.
The second theme, the editors say, “follows naturally from the first” (7), and concerns primarily practical strategies involved with cultivating virtue. In “Virtue Cultivation in Light of Situationism,” Christian Miller takes up a thread that appeared in some of the first series of essays, the so-called situationist debate. As far as I understand it “situationism” (in this context) questions the very existence of a persistent moral character. Is there really such a thing (a virtue?) as honesty such that a person’s character can be accurately described as more or less honest? Or is it the case that one acts as he does primarily because of the specifics of the case, the “situation” in which he finds himself? Miller, as well as the author of the next essay, “Becoming Good: Narrow Dispositions and the Stability of Virtue,” by Rachana Kamtekar, explore the practical implications of the situationist claim for the possibility of virtue development.
The next two essays, representing the third theme, “The Role of Motivation and Wisdom in Virtues as Skills,” by Matt Stichter and “Learning Virtue Rules: The Issue of Thick Concepts,” by Julia Annas, return to more familiar traditional philosophical territory in their conceptual and linguistic analyses of how best to think about virtue. Stichter takes up a debate that featured prominently in the works of Plato and Aristotle. That is, is virtue a skill or is it something else altogether? Obviously, how one answers this question can have significant implications for teaching and learning. Annas does a real service to the potential for empirical research in the area of virtue by trying to sort out the descriptive and the evaluative aspects of virtue terms. She insightfully cautions empirical researchers to not ignore (as they are “scientifically conditioned” to do) the evaluative components to what otherwise seem to be entirely descriptive terms.
The fourth theme in Developing the Virtues is represented by one essay, “Guilt and Shame in the Development of Virtue,” by Jennifer A. Herdt. This is one essay that seems to be in tension with rest given its theological approach to issues of virtue. It seems less an attempt to say what theology has to offer philosophy and psychology as much as it is an attempt to embrace what philosophy and psychology have to offer theology (at least to theological notions of virtue). In this sense, perhaps, it is not as far afield as first appears. In other words, Herdt does raise some interesting thoughts about developing virtue (the theme of the volume).
The fifth and final theme of the volume, the relationship between justice and benevolence, is represented in “Benevolence in a Justice-Based World: The Power of Sentiments (and Reasoning) in Predicting Prosocial Behaviors,” by Gustavo Carlo and Alexandra Davis and “Norms of Justice in Development,” by Mark Lebar. Carlo and Davis take issue with the influential “intuitionist” model developed by Jonathan Haidt and favor a return for the role of cognition in moral action. Lebar, too, moves beyond the Kohlbergian tradition as well as more recent trends as with Haidt’s model, to suggest new possibilities in conceptualizing the components of moral behavior.
Developing the Virtues is a nice example of the benefits of cross-disciplinary dialogue. The essays here do real work. Interestingly, they are surprisingly readable. Perhaps this shouldn’t be so surprising given that they were first presented as talks to an audience (even though an academic one) and that the audience was an interdisciplinary mix of academics. Usually collections from academic conferences are too esoteric for a general reading audience. But I think intelligent general readers interested in what academic have to say about virtue development might find this volume interesting and useful.
© 2017 Ben Mulvey
[This review first appeared in Metapsychology Online Reviews, Volume 21, Issue 22, May 30, 2017.]
The 309-page volume consists of thirteen uniquely authored essays, each with its own bibliography. A helpful index for the whole volume is also included. As described by the editors, “…the impetus for this volume was the recently convened ‘Notre Dame Symposium on Virtue and Its Development’, which brought together over a dozen renowned scholars representing fields of moral philosophy, psychology, and theology, as well as doing applied work in cultivating virtue” (2). Only one theologically themed essay made it into the volume and as interesting as it might be in its own way, it does seem to be a bit out of place here.
The editors identify five “interlocking” themes. The first concerns “general questions of how virtue development might begin in early childhood and continue in adult years,” and about half of the essays in the volume take up some sub-set of these questions. The opening essay, “Baselines for Virtue,” by Darcia Narvaez, is an excellent entrée into the questions making up the first theme of the volume. Her contention is that “virtue learning, like all learning, is biosocial” (15). That is, “moral capacities [are] shaped by social experiences in childhood…” (15). It is what follows from this that is most interesting and most promising for empirical research and indeed application. The implication of Narvaez’s insight is that an individual’s social environment significantly impacts her moral development for better or worse. Identifying a “baseline” for virtue allows Narvaez to highlight a number of ways that modernity has damaged us. And, of course, pointing out sources of damage opens possibilities for remedy.
The second theme, the editors say, “follows naturally from the first” (7), and concerns primarily practical strategies involved with cultivating virtue. In “Virtue Cultivation in Light of Situationism,” Christian Miller takes up a thread that appeared in some of the first series of essays, the so-called situationist debate. As far as I understand it “situationism” (in this context) questions the very existence of a persistent moral character. Is there really such a thing (a virtue?) as honesty such that a person’s character can be accurately described as more or less honest? Or is it the case that one acts as he does primarily because of the specifics of the case, the “situation” in which he finds himself? Miller, as well as the author of the next essay, “Becoming Good: Narrow Dispositions and the Stability of Virtue,” by Rachana Kamtekar, explore the practical implications of the situationist claim for the possibility of virtue development.
The next two essays, representing the third theme, “The Role of Motivation and Wisdom in Virtues as Skills,” by Matt Stichter and “Learning Virtue Rules: The Issue of Thick Concepts,” by Julia Annas, return to more familiar traditional philosophical territory in their conceptual and linguistic analyses of how best to think about virtue. Stichter takes up a debate that featured prominently in the works of Plato and Aristotle. That is, is virtue a skill or is it something else altogether? Obviously, how one answers this question can have significant implications for teaching and learning. Annas does a real service to the potential for empirical research in the area of virtue by trying to sort out the descriptive and the evaluative aspects of virtue terms. She insightfully cautions empirical researchers to not ignore (as they are “scientifically conditioned” to do) the evaluative components to what otherwise seem to be entirely descriptive terms.
The fourth theme in Developing the Virtues is represented by one essay, “Guilt and Shame in the Development of Virtue,” by Jennifer A. Herdt. This is one essay that seems to be in tension with rest given its theological approach to issues of virtue. It seems less an attempt to say what theology has to offer philosophy and psychology as much as it is an attempt to embrace what philosophy and psychology have to offer theology (at least to theological notions of virtue). In this sense, perhaps, it is not as far afield as first appears. In other words, Herdt does raise some interesting thoughts about developing virtue (the theme of the volume).
The fifth and final theme of the volume, the relationship between justice and benevolence, is represented in “Benevolence in a Justice-Based World: The Power of Sentiments (and Reasoning) in Predicting Prosocial Behaviors,” by Gustavo Carlo and Alexandra Davis and “Norms of Justice in Development,” by Mark Lebar. Carlo and Davis take issue with the influential “intuitionist” model developed by Jonathan Haidt and favor a return for the role of cognition in moral action. Lebar, too, moves beyond the Kohlbergian tradition as well as more recent trends as with Haidt’s model, to suggest new possibilities in conceptualizing the components of moral behavior.
Developing the Virtues is a nice example of the benefits of cross-disciplinary dialogue. The essays here do real work. Interestingly, they are surprisingly readable. Perhaps this shouldn’t be so surprising given that they were first presented as talks to an audience (even though an academic one) and that the audience was an interdisciplinary mix of academics. Usually collections from academic conferences are too esoteric for a general reading audience. But I think intelligent general readers interested in what academic have to say about virtue development might find this volume interesting and useful.
© 2017 Ben Mulvey
[This review first appeared in Metapsychology Online Reviews, Volume 21, Issue 22, May 30, 2017.]
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews