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Towards the Flame: Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia
'As much as anything, World War I turned on the fate of Ukraine.'
The decision to go to war in 1914 had catastrophic consequences for Russia. The result was revolution, civil war and famine in 1917-20, followed by decades of communist rule. Dominic Lieven's powerful and original book, based on exhaustive and unprecedented study in Russian and many other foreign archives, explains why this suicidal decision was made and explores the world of the men who made it, thereby consigning their entire class to death or exile and making their country the victim of a uniquely terrible political experiment under Lenin and Stalin.
Dominic Lieven is a Senior Research Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge University, and a Fellow of the British Academy. His book 'Russia Against Napoleon' (Penguin) won the Wolfson Prize for History and the Prize of the Fondation Napoleon for the best foreign work on the Napoleonic era.
The decision to go to war in 1914 had catastrophic consequences for Russia. The result was revolution, civil war and famine in 1917-20, followed by decades of communist rule. Dominic Lieven's powerful and original book, based on exhaustive and unprecedented study in Russian and many other foreign archives, explains why this suicidal decision was made and explores the world of the men who made it, thereby consigning their entire class to death or exile and making their country the victim of a uniquely terrible political experiment under Lenin and Stalin.
Dominic Lieven is a Senior Research Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge University, and a Fellow of the British Academy. His book 'Russia Against Napoleon' (Penguin) won the Wolfson Prize for History and the Prize of the Fondation Napoleon for the best foreign work on the Napoleonic era.
429 pages, Paperback
First published May 28, 2015
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About the author
Dominic Lieven
19 books102 followersDominic Lieven is Professor of Russian studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science, a Fellow of the British Academy and of Trinity College, Cambridge.
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April 23, 2022
Dominic Lieven has produced a very deep analysis of the actions and opinions of the (so called) elites in Tsarist Russia in the decades leading up to and including The Great War. Lieven interspersing of his opinions also makes fascinating reading.
I base the following opinion on my own recent research into general Russian history, along with Lieven’s analysis and opinions in Towards The Flame. Lieven’s commentary on the opinion makers in Russian newspapers of the day, of the thoughts of the aristocratic classes and the actions of the various governments under Tsar Nicolaus I, what has stood out to me can be defined by Tsar Nicolaus II’s doctrine, that of Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy.
Lieven uses different terminology than that of Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy. Security, Interest and Identity is his maxim. In my opinion, both are one and the same thing. They are intertwined and still are the values today, seemingly. The Russian people will accept autocracy on the condition it is stable, that the majority of people are generally safe and fed, but if not? The autocracy changes hands. Interest/ Nationality added to Orthodoxy/Identity are a heady mix that has seems very ingrained in Russian DNA, DNA that sees non Slavs as possible enemies to the point of paranoia, with the people themselves seeing their leader as a bulwark against those not of their identity. In a recent review on another Russian history book I received a very good comment by a GR friend who stated “Russian society more bends toward community values like Asian societies than Western individualism. Family ties are very important to Russians. Traditions go deep into history when two-three generations of peasants lived under one roof. In the Western world, you choose a president as one of yours. In Russia, the tsar or ruler was always somebody above ordinary people; a fatherly figure, and fathers, like in many patriarchal societies, have always extracted great power over family, they could grant privileges or punish without mercy. Tsars were called Tsar-Father. The more strict 'father,' the more people believe in his power.” Therefore, Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy is a top to bottom doctrine.
From all strata of Russian society Lieven gives a compelling discussion on Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy / Security, Interest and Identity, being the essence of Russia. Even when he reaches the breakdown of Aristocratic control late into The Great War, this ingrained doctrine replaced the vacuum, examples being the Communist Revolution. Later regimes such as that of Stalin and even as of now, Putin can be considered to be filling the vacuum.
This may seem a long way from the mention in the subheading of Empire, but from the early days of the Rus the growth of the Empire came from the autocracy of the rulers/Tsars and even after their demise just about all leaders since the end of the civil wars of the 1920s. The need to protect the people from outside influence against non-Slav nationalities and non-Orthodox Christianity has played heavily in Russian history. What Towards The Flame discusses is that as multi-ethnic empires of Europe became dysfunctional, Nationalism took root. In terms of a catalyst that started The Great War, due to Russian instincts towards Nationality and Orthodoxy / Interest and Identity there could be no other outcome than defence of Serbia, a bastion of Serb Orthodoxy, at the start of the Great War. Naturally, fear of other events such as the rise of Germany was very much in the mind of the elites. Add to that the fact that the home of Slavic Orthodox Christianity, Constantinople, was held by the Ottoman Empire and that empire also controlled the Straits of Bosphorus led to much angst. Lieven makes the point that we can hardly accuse Russia of those times of being particularly expansionist in terms of the straits, they were more than aware of historical colonial expansion by Europe and beyond and were very aware of then “imperial” control that assisted various ”empires” trade such as the Suez Canal under the British and the Panama under the US. There was a belief in “balance of power” and hardly an unusual trait viz a viz great powers.
There is obviously a lot more to this book than my thoughts mooted above. It is very deeply researched, with a useful set of maps, the many pictures in the general text finely placed, has outstanding footnotes that make the lack of a bibliography a nothing for any reader to concern themselves with. This is not an easy read in terms of narrative. The names and events, along with the various debates, are dense and very easy to get lost in. I found I had to reread various passages.
Lieven is also very gentle in his criticism of Tsar Nicolaus II, but even he had to admit to his shortcomings late into the book as the situation got out of control.
The Balkans and Ukraine are a presence. The Afterword makes interesting reading and shows how fast a history such as this can make a point that seems relevant at the time but could soon become redundant, and I quote the following; “Unlike Nicolaus II Vladimir Putin does not rule over a vast multinational empire inhabited by semi-literate peasants. Ukraine was, is, and always will be important to Russia, but extrapolating from 1914 and imagining that Russia will once again be a great empire if it reabsorbs the east Ukraine rust belt is moonshine. Ukraine is no longer at the heart of European geopolitics, and Europe is no longer at the centre of the world” I am not sure that I think that the Russian people from top-down think this as present circumstances indicate Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy is very much to the forefront even if subconsciously. Leading up to The Great War the Austro-Hungarian Empire was in the fore when it came to Ukrainian nationalism, the Russians were aware of that then, and they see NATO/EU as just another replacement of a previous rival empire.
If I have a criticism it is that Lieven tends to use the “it was not inevitable” opinion on events that do in fact happen, the fall into chaos in Ukraine at the end of the Great War, for example. I tend to not like saying that a historical event was “not inevitable” when in fact it actually happened.
Recommended to only those with a genuine interest in the subject.
I base the following opinion on my own recent research into general Russian history, along with Lieven’s analysis and opinions in Towards The Flame. Lieven’s commentary on the opinion makers in Russian newspapers of the day, of the thoughts of the aristocratic classes and the actions of the various governments under Tsar Nicolaus I, what has stood out to me can be defined by Tsar Nicolaus II’s doctrine, that of Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy.
Lieven uses different terminology than that of Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy. Security, Interest and Identity is his maxim. In my opinion, both are one and the same thing. They are intertwined and still are the values today, seemingly. The Russian people will accept autocracy on the condition it is stable, that the majority of people are generally safe and fed, but if not? The autocracy changes hands. Interest/ Nationality added to Orthodoxy/Identity are a heady mix that has seems very ingrained in Russian DNA, DNA that sees non Slavs as possible enemies to the point of paranoia, with the people themselves seeing their leader as a bulwark against those not of their identity. In a recent review on another Russian history book I received a very good comment by a GR friend who stated “Russian society more bends toward community values like Asian societies than Western individualism. Family ties are very important to Russians. Traditions go deep into history when two-three generations of peasants lived under one roof. In the Western world, you choose a president as one of yours. In Russia, the tsar or ruler was always somebody above ordinary people; a fatherly figure, and fathers, like in many patriarchal societies, have always extracted great power over family, they could grant privileges or punish without mercy. Tsars were called Tsar-Father. The more strict 'father,' the more people believe in his power.” Therefore, Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy is a top to bottom doctrine.
From all strata of Russian society Lieven gives a compelling discussion on Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy / Security, Interest and Identity, being the essence of Russia. Even when he reaches the breakdown of Aristocratic control late into The Great War, this ingrained doctrine replaced the vacuum, examples being the Communist Revolution. Later regimes such as that of Stalin and even as of now, Putin can be considered to be filling the vacuum.
This may seem a long way from the mention in the subheading of Empire, but from the early days of the Rus the growth of the Empire came from the autocracy of the rulers/Tsars and even after their demise just about all leaders since the end of the civil wars of the 1920s. The need to protect the people from outside influence against non-Slav nationalities and non-Orthodox Christianity has played heavily in Russian history. What Towards The Flame discusses is that as multi-ethnic empires of Europe became dysfunctional, Nationalism took root. In terms of a catalyst that started The Great War, due to Russian instincts towards Nationality and Orthodoxy / Interest and Identity there could be no other outcome than defence of Serbia, a bastion of Serb Orthodoxy, at the start of the Great War. Naturally, fear of other events such as the rise of Germany was very much in the mind of the elites. Add to that the fact that the home of Slavic Orthodox Christianity, Constantinople, was held by the Ottoman Empire and that empire also controlled the Straits of Bosphorus led to much angst. Lieven makes the point that we can hardly accuse Russia of those times of being particularly expansionist in terms of the straits, they were more than aware of historical colonial expansion by Europe and beyond and were very aware of then “imperial” control that assisted various ”empires” trade such as the Suez Canal under the British and the Panama under the US. There was a belief in “balance of power” and hardly an unusual trait viz a viz great powers.
There is obviously a lot more to this book than my thoughts mooted above. It is very deeply researched, with a useful set of maps, the many pictures in the general text finely placed, has outstanding footnotes that make the lack of a bibliography a nothing for any reader to concern themselves with. This is not an easy read in terms of narrative. The names and events, along with the various debates, are dense and very easy to get lost in. I found I had to reread various passages.
Lieven is also very gentle in his criticism of Tsar Nicolaus II, but even he had to admit to his shortcomings late into the book as the situation got out of control.
The Balkans and Ukraine are a presence. The Afterword makes interesting reading and shows how fast a history such as this can make a point that seems relevant at the time but could soon become redundant, and I quote the following; “Unlike Nicolaus II Vladimir Putin does not rule over a vast multinational empire inhabited by semi-literate peasants. Ukraine was, is, and always will be important to Russia, but extrapolating from 1914 and imagining that Russia will once again be a great empire if it reabsorbs the east Ukraine rust belt is moonshine. Ukraine is no longer at the heart of European geopolitics, and Europe is no longer at the centre of the world” I am not sure that I think that the Russian people from top-down think this as present circumstances indicate Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy is very much to the forefront even if subconsciously. Leading up to The Great War the Austro-Hungarian Empire was in the fore when it came to Ukrainian nationalism, the Russians were aware of that then, and they see NATO/EU as just another replacement of a previous rival empire.
If I have a criticism it is that Lieven tends to use the “it was not inevitable” opinion on events that do in fact happen, the fall into chaos in Ukraine at the end of the Great War, for example. I tend to not like saying that a historical event was “not inevitable” when in fact it actually happened.
Recommended to only those with a genuine interest in the subject.
March 3, 2025
Tsarist Russia And The Great War
Note added on November 20, 2019: I thought about this book and review in light of recent events. The author sees Ukraine and fights for its control as a source of instability that played a pivotal role in the outbreak of WW I.
The centennial of the Great War has been encouraging many scholars and readers to think anew about the conflict. Dominic Lieven's new book, "The End of Tsarist Russia: WW I and the Road to Revolution" examines the factors that brought Russian into the War and that helped precipitate the Russian Revolution. A senior research fellow at Trinity College, Cambridge, and a fellow of the British Academy, Lieven has written extensively on Russian history, including an award-winning 2009 book, "Russia Against Napoleon."
Although the larger portion of WW I books concentrate on the Western Front, Lieven argues that "contrary to the near universal assumption in the English-speaking world, the war was first and foremost an eastern European conflict. ... The great irony of World War I was that a conflict which began more than anything else as a struggle between the Germanic powers and Russia to dominate east-central Europe ended in the defeat of both sides." Lieven's states that the book has a three-fold aim: 1. to offer a history of Russian's descent into WW I, 2, to offer an interpretation of WW I from the Russian perspective, and 3. to offer an introduction to the origins and consequences of the Russian Revolution from an international perspective.
The book is not a military history of WW I. It spends little time on the fighting but rather discusses the events leading up to the Great War. It discusses both events in Russia and events throughout Europe. The book is impressive and thoughtful in its erudition, judgments, and scholarship. Lieven had access to several Russian archival sources that had not earlier been made available to Western scholars. He uses these archival sources extensively to paint a fuller picture of Tsarist Russia and its government than had been possible in earlier studies.
As Liewen points out, the book examines Russia and the Great War from a variety of distances. It begins with what Lieven calls the "God's eye view". Thus, the first two chapters of the study offer broad discussions of the competing empires in Europe at the War's outset and of the history of the Russian Empire. At the other extreme is a "worm's eye view" which examines the actions of a small number of individuals over a critical, short period, sometimes measured in days or hours. An intermediate level of analysis shows how broad, structural considerations were brought together by individual actors to produce important results.
In general, Lieven's book is at its best at the broader and intermediate distances. He has truly insightful things to say about Europe, the nature of Empire, the history of Russia, and the attempts at diplomacy in the years before WW I. He also discusses well the reasons that WW I and the Treaty of Versailles failed to produce a lasting peace. It is in the narrower, "worm's eye" discussions that the book sometimes bogs down. In particular, Lieven writes at endless length about many Russian officials in the Tsar's confidence and out, ministers, diplomats, military leaders, and shapers of public opinion. This information is valuable in that it gives a fuller picture of Tsarist Russia and the complexities of its government structure and people than is generally known. But it slows down the book with information that often is not fully integrated into the broader history. The book offers extended discussions of the Balkans and of the wars which immediately led to the outbreak of WW I in 1914. Here again, Lieven's command of his material is sure and the subject is of key importance. The thread of the narrative of some highly confusing events sometimes is lost in the telling. Following the outbreak of WW I, the book is relatively brief in discussing the fall of the Tsar, the communist take-over and the separate peace between Russia and Germany which gave Germany its best chance to win the War.
In many ways, this is an outstanding history. The author has a passion for his subject and a great deal of importance to say. The writing style sometimes is idiosyncratic but effective. There is a sense of personal involvement in the book. The problem is that some of the lines of the study are not well connected. The book occupies a middle ground between a work for the many lay readers interested in WW I and a work for scholars and historians with a great deal of detailed background. Some of the material is better suited to the latter group of readers although its target audience is the former group. For readers with a strong interest in WW I, this book has a great deal to teach and is more than worth the effort.
Robin Friedman
Note added on November 20, 2019: I thought about this book and review in light of recent events. The author sees Ukraine and fights for its control as a source of instability that played a pivotal role in the outbreak of WW I.
The centennial of the Great War has been encouraging many scholars and readers to think anew about the conflict. Dominic Lieven's new book, "The End of Tsarist Russia: WW I and the Road to Revolution" examines the factors that brought Russian into the War and that helped precipitate the Russian Revolution. A senior research fellow at Trinity College, Cambridge, and a fellow of the British Academy, Lieven has written extensively on Russian history, including an award-winning 2009 book, "Russia Against Napoleon."
Although the larger portion of WW I books concentrate on the Western Front, Lieven argues that "contrary to the near universal assumption in the English-speaking world, the war was first and foremost an eastern European conflict. ... The great irony of World War I was that a conflict which began more than anything else as a struggle between the Germanic powers and Russia to dominate east-central Europe ended in the defeat of both sides." Lieven's states that the book has a three-fold aim: 1. to offer a history of Russian's descent into WW I, 2, to offer an interpretation of WW I from the Russian perspective, and 3. to offer an introduction to the origins and consequences of the Russian Revolution from an international perspective.
The book is not a military history of WW I. It spends little time on the fighting but rather discusses the events leading up to the Great War. It discusses both events in Russia and events throughout Europe. The book is impressive and thoughtful in its erudition, judgments, and scholarship. Lieven had access to several Russian archival sources that had not earlier been made available to Western scholars. He uses these archival sources extensively to paint a fuller picture of Tsarist Russia and its government than had been possible in earlier studies.
As Liewen points out, the book examines Russia and the Great War from a variety of distances. It begins with what Lieven calls the "God's eye view". Thus, the first two chapters of the study offer broad discussions of the competing empires in Europe at the War's outset and of the history of the Russian Empire. At the other extreme is a "worm's eye view" which examines the actions of a small number of individuals over a critical, short period, sometimes measured in days or hours. An intermediate level of analysis shows how broad, structural considerations were brought together by individual actors to produce important results.
In general, Lieven's book is at its best at the broader and intermediate distances. He has truly insightful things to say about Europe, the nature of Empire, the history of Russia, and the attempts at diplomacy in the years before WW I. He also discusses well the reasons that WW I and the Treaty of Versailles failed to produce a lasting peace. It is in the narrower, "worm's eye" discussions that the book sometimes bogs down. In particular, Lieven writes at endless length about many Russian officials in the Tsar's confidence and out, ministers, diplomats, military leaders, and shapers of public opinion. This information is valuable in that it gives a fuller picture of Tsarist Russia and the complexities of its government structure and people than is generally known. But it slows down the book with information that often is not fully integrated into the broader history. The book offers extended discussions of the Balkans and of the wars which immediately led to the outbreak of WW I in 1914. Here again, Lieven's command of his material is sure and the subject is of key importance. The thread of the narrative of some highly confusing events sometimes is lost in the telling. Following the outbreak of WW I, the book is relatively brief in discussing the fall of the Tsar, the communist take-over and the separate peace between Russia and Germany which gave Germany its best chance to win the War.
In many ways, this is an outstanding history. The author has a passion for his subject and a great deal of importance to say. The writing style sometimes is idiosyncratic but effective. There is a sense of personal involvement in the book. The problem is that some of the lines of the study are not well connected. The book occupies a middle ground between a work for the many lay readers interested in WW I and a work for scholars and historians with a great deal of detailed background. Some of the material is better suited to the latter group of readers although its target audience is the former group. For readers with a strong interest in WW I, this book has a great deal to teach and is more than worth the effort.
Robin Friedman
March 21, 2015
In this fascinating read, author Dominic Lieven looks at the history of WWI from the perspective of Russia. Indeed, he suggests that WWI was, essentially, an Eastern European conflict; one in which the initial confrontation between Austria and Russia led to defeat for both sides. Although the author is careful to explain events in some depth, so that you do not need to have any real background knowledge, I would not really recommend this book as a good starting point. However, if you have an interest in either Russian history or the beginnings of WWI, then you should enjoy this excellently researched book.
The scene is set with an initial look at Europe before the first world war – a time when Empire mattered and nationalism became a force. The four continental powers were France, Russia, Austria and Prussia and the relationships between these countries are explored in depth. The author then discusses the Russian Empire and the many problems it faced. Russia ruled over a sixth of the world’s land surface and yet this vast land was essentially an agrarian empire. It was, in effect, both a great power and a poor country, weakened by internal problems and uncertainty. This book looks at what led to the outbreak of war and the consequences for Russia and Europe – both during and after the conflict. This really is a book you can immerse yourself in. I have not read anything by this prize winning academic before, but I look forward to exploring more of his work, as I found this an extremely rewarding read.
The scene is set with an initial look at Europe before the first world war – a time when Empire mattered and nationalism became a force. The four continental powers were France, Russia, Austria and Prussia and the relationships between these countries are explored in depth. The author then discusses the Russian Empire and the many problems it faced. Russia ruled over a sixth of the world’s land surface and yet this vast land was essentially an agrarian empire. It was, in effect, both a great power and a poor country, weakened by internal problems and uncertainty. This book looks at what led to the outbreak of war and the consequences for Russia and Europe – both during and after the conflict. This really is a book you can immerse yourself in. I have not read anything by this prize winning academic before, but I look forward to exploring more of his work, as I found this an extremely rewarding read.
August 19, 2016
Alltough some damn foolish thing in the Balkan would indeed bring about a European war, the role of the two Great Powers situated on the east side of the continent in its origins have received less attention in the English-language historiography than those of Great Britain, its French ally and its infamous main opponent, the German Empire. Dominic Lieven handles the Russian origins of the Great War with gusto.
Between the defeat of the tsarist forces in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 and the assassination in Sarajevo, Russia was closely involved in every pan-European war scare, to an almost annual rythm if one adds the two Morrocan crises (1906/11) and the tension with Great Britain over spheres of influence in Persia (settled provisionally in 1907). The annexation of Bosnia by the Habsburg empire (following a de facto occupation since 1878) comes close to being a turning point in Russian Great Power politics; not a weight usually attributed. The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 are understood in terms of the questionable Serbian and Bulgarian allegiance to Russia.
Throughout, themes of tension run through the minds of Russian diplomats, ministers and generals. Pan-Slavism towards the rapidly shaping Balkan nations was popular with the press and the middle classes, but difficult to translate into foreign policy without the responsibility of war. Closely related was a form of Russian nationalism that seeked to orientate the towards Europe and its liberal modernism, to restore the country to the strength it possessed prior to the confrontation in the Far East. The defeat had been a clear signal that tsarist autocracy and semi-serfdom were no longer a reliable basis for an economically secure Russia. In terms of the industrial demands of modern warfare, this was undoubtedly true. Diametrically opposed was a desire to focus on the development of Russia's "empire in Asia", exploiting the economic resources of the Siberian landmass without crossing the sphere of influence that Japan was carving out in Northern China. Regaining strength by minding one's own business often also seemed like a good idea.
This divergence was never solved. The only element in foreign policy that nobody wanted to neglect was the alliance with France and its investment in the development of Russia's infrastructure. Russia was not fully prepared to declare war on Austria-Hungary over the Balkan states, but proved equally unable to reign in their mutually incompatible nationalist expansionism. Ironically, Germany was often the voice of mediation and instrumental in reigning in the Vienna hawks whenever they pushed for war against Serbia lest it stirred Habsburg Slavs into revolt and separation. Most importantly, no motive was strong enough for Russia to actively seek war. By july 1914 however, the Tsar and his advisers were tired of backing down in the face of Austrian challenges towards Belgrade and honoured their commitment to France.
Lieven is clear and elegant, breathing life in the individual decision makers, who merit a whole chapter which takes up a fifth of the book. Lined up, they can all be ranked by the degree of their Pan-Slavism and their familiarity with European diplomacy. As a general rule, experience gained through postings in European capitals tempered jingoism with realism. He profits from previously unmined Russian arches (some closed again at present) to challenge convential views on the Russian role in the last decade of peace, which were more often than not glanced at through the published memoirs of White exiles.
In the first sentence of the preface he drops a bombshell right away, presenting the fate of Ukraine as pivotal to the outbreak of WWI, alltough he doesn't return to this line of thought until the very end, where he combines it with the proposition that Germany could've won the war by settlement if it had been able to hang onto the annexations of Brest-Litovsk to counterbalance the might of the United States. This in itself is worth another book. It's also a pity that the war and revolution can't be discussed with the same clarity and depth as the outbreak period. "Empire, War and the end of Tsarist Russia" only covers the first third of its subtitle. I wish for a sturdily boxed trilogy that runs op to 1920.
Between the defeat of the tsarist forces in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 and the assassination in Sarajevo, Russia was closely involved in every pan-European war scare, to an almost annual rythm if one adds the two Morrocan crises (1906/11) and the tension with Great Britain over spheres of influence in Persia (settled provisionally in 1907). The annexation of Bosnia by the Habsburg empire (following a de facto occupation since 1878) comes close to being a turning point in Russian Great Power politics; not a weight usually attributed. The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 are understood in terms of the questionable Serbian and Bulgarian allegiance to Russia.
Throughout, themes of tension run through the minds of Russian diplomats, ministers and generals. Pan-Slavism towards the rapidly shaping Balkan nations was popular with the press and the middle classes, but difficult to translate into foreign policy without the responsibility of war. Closely related was a form of Russian nationalism that seeked to orientate the towards Europe and its liberal modernism, to restore the country to the strength it possessed prior to the confrontation in the Far East. The defeat had been a clear signal that tsarist autocracy and semi-serfdom were no longer a reliable basis for an economically secure Russia. In terms of the industrial demands of modern warfare, this was undoubtedly true. Diametrically opposed was a desire to focus on the development of Russia's "empire in Asia", exploiting the economic resources of the Siberian landmass without crossing the sphere of influence that Japan was carving out in Northern China. Regaining strength by minding one's own business often also seemed like a good idea.
This divergence was never solved. The only element in foreign policy that nobody wanted to neglect was the alliance with France and its investment in the development of Russia's infrastructure. Russia was not fully prepared to declare war on Austria-Hungary over the Balkan states, but proved equally unable to reign in their mutually incompatible nationalist expansionism. Ironically, Germany was often the voice of mediation and instrumental in reigning in the Vienna hawks whenever they pushed for war against Serbia lest it stirred Habsburg Slavs into revolt and separation. Most importantly, no motive was strong enough for Russia to actively seek war. By july 1914 however, the Tsar and his advisers were tired of backing down in the face of Austrian challenges towards Belgrade and honoured their commitment to France.
Lieven is clear and elegant, breathing life in the individual decision makers, who merit a whole chapter which takes up a fifth of the book. Lined up, they can all be ranked by the degree of their Pan-Slavism and their familiarity with European diplomacy. As a general rule, experience gained through postings in European capitals tempered jingoism with realism. He profits from previously unmined Russian arches (some closed again at present) to challenge convential views on the Russian role in the last decade of peace, which were more often than not glanced at through the published memoirs of White exiles.
In the first sentence of the preface he drops a bombshell right away, presenting the fate of Ukraine as pivotal to the outbreak of WWI, alltough he doesn't return to this line of thought until the very end, where he combines it with the proposition that Germany could've won the war by settlement if it had been able to hang onto the annexations of Brest-Litovsk to counterbalance the might of the United States. This in itself is worth another book. It's also a pity that the war and revolution can't be discussed with the same clarity and depth as the outbreak period. "Empire, War and the end of Tsarist Russia" only covers the first third of its subtitle. I wish for a sturdily boxed trilogy that runs op to 1920.
April 8, 2022
Another Home Run by Dominic Lieven.
Towards the Flame is a view of Tsarist Russian foreign policy leading up to the First World War and the Russian Revolution that followed. The book explains this in the context of international relations, social and domestic politics of Russia, national feeling, military strategy and the impact of the war itself.
Lieven was fortunate to have access to Russian National Archives in the Kremlin Palace, which have not been readily available to western scholars. This has allowed him to open up and challenge the current accepted views of Russia in the lead up to the disaster of 1914. What is great about this book is that Lieven actually gives his opinion on the events, the reasons why and the challenges that faces the Russian government, army general staff and Tsar. This for me is invaluable as Lieven is balanced and although has a clear sympathetic view of Russia, is able to show where mistakes were made and offers reasons for how they could have been avoided. He instantaneously rejects the outdated Marxist views that is was an imperial strive for power or domination, as he says ‘no serious historian today would write this.’ The situation was more complex, in fact politicians on all sides greatly feared a war and its consequences.
Foreign policy is greatly explained, why Russia went to war with Japan in 1905, how the breakdown in relations with Austro-Hungry occurred, the importance of the events in Balkans 1908-1913 and why Russia had to support Serbia. It also discusses Russian wars aims and the alternatives to their strategy (which as he explains failed in WWII anyway) and why the monarchy fell and the revolution ensued.
We are reminded that the First World War was first and foremost and Eastern European conflict which dragged in central and Western European powers and subsequently the rest of the world. Lieven important discusses the alternatives available to the decision makers and why they were not taken. This is fascinating as I, with many others I imagine, ponder over what I would have done in order to prevent the conflict with my great hindsight, lack of pressure, full sleep and time to establish all of the facts. What is compelling about this book is that, these alternatives were considered and efforts were made to avert a war. Nicholas II did not want the war and knew it would lead millions of Russians to their death. Of course, the tragedy of this story is that the wrong decision in combination with the right decision poorly executed occurred all too often and too many times in a row.
I have to say the book is truest excellent in the analysis, however I often found it difficult to follow and had to constantly revisit what had previously been written. As a result I feel like I need to re-read chapters as some of the arguments and facts are complex. I think only a true expert would come away with a full understanding after one read of this book. That follows into my question, who is the boon aimed at? It seems to fall between the academic student and the causal reader. This is for the serious casual historian, who’s catchment is still large, but will prove that the book is not for everyone. As for me, I’ll be here with this again in the future as there is more to offer from this book that I have definitely missed first time around.
Towards the Flame is a view of Tsarist Russian foreign policy leading up to the First World War and the Russian Revolution that followed. The book explains this in the context of international relations, social and domestic politics of Russia, national feeling, military strategy and the impact of the war itself.
Lieven was fortunate to have access to Russian National Archives in the Kremlin Palace, which have not been readily available to western scholars. This has allowed him to open up and challenge the current accepted views of Russia in the lead up to the disaster of 1914. What is great about this book is that Lieven actually gives his opinion on the events, the reasons why and the challenges that faces the Russian government, army general staff and Tsar. This for me is invaluable as Lieven is balanced and although has a clear sympathetic view of Russia, is able to show where mistakes were made and offers reasons for how they could have been avoided. He instantaneously rejects the outdated Marxist views that is was an imperial strive for power or domination, as he says ‘no serious historian today would write this.’ The situation was more complex, in fact politicians on all sides greatly feared a war and its consequences.
Foreign policy is greatly explained, why Russia went to war with Japan in 1905, how the breakdown in relations with Austro-Hungry occurred, the importance of the events in Balkans 1908-1913 and why Russia had to support Serbia. It also discusses Russian wars aims and the alternatives to their strategy (which as he explains failed in WWII anyway) and why the monarchy fell and the revolution ensued.
We are reminded that the First World War was first and foremost and Eastern European conflict which dragged in central and Western European powers and subsequently the rest of the world. Lieven important discusses the alternatives available to the decision makers and why they were not taken. This is fascinating as I, with many others I imagine, ponder over what I would have done in order to prevent the conflict with my great hindsight, lack of pressure, full sleep and time to establish all of the facts. What is compelling about this book is that, these alternatives were considered and efforts were made to avert a war. Nicholas II did not want the war and knew it would lead millions of Russians to their death. Of course, the tragedy of this story is that the wrong decision in combination with the right decision poorly executed occurred all too often and too many times in a row.
I have to say the book is truest excellent in the analysis, however I often found it difficult to follow and had to constantly revisit what had previously been written. As a result I feel like I need to re-read chapters as some of the arguments and facts are complex. I think only a true expert would come away with a full understanding after one read of this book. That follows into my question, who is the boon aimed at? It seems to fall between the academic student and the causal reader. This is for the serious casual historian, who’s catchment is still large, but will prove that the book is not for everyone. As for me, I’ll be here with this again in the future as there is more to offer from this book that I have definitely missed first time around.
September 23, 2018
I conceived and wrote this book partly while contemplating the world from my home halfway up a mountain in Japan. (from the Afterward)
After reading The Russian Empire and Its Rivals and Russia Against Napoleon, I came to anticipate in any Lieven work judiciously generalized aphorisms on power and decline. In The End of Tsarist Russia I wasn’t disappointed. As he begins narration of the July 1914 crisis, Lieven laments that the Russian and Austrian elites lacked sufficient awareness “of many common traits and problems, and not least a common vulnerability to nationalism” – though, he shrugs, even had the two empires come to see their “shared interests and threats,” this might well not have been enough to avert the mutually suicidal spiral into war, revolution, unfettered irredentism and genocide; into that chaos in which the common people do not know who to obey, to paraphrase Pushkin. “A cynic might argue,” Lieven sums up, “that empires are tigers, and tigers do not necessarily cooperate even when their species faces extinction.”
Such remarks abound in what Lieven calls his “God’s eye” analysis of long-term, structural forces like geopolitics and globalization (forces he says no Russian monarch, let alone one with the weaknesses of Nicholas II, could have controlled). His other levels of analysis he calls the “intermediate,” taking in the institutions and systems that determined who made decisions in Tsarist Russia, and the “worm’s narrative,” the story of what the decision makers thought and said. This “worm’s narrative” is deepened by Lieven’s years of work in Russian diplomatic and military archives. Two decision makers struck me. Petr Durnovo (1845-1915) was the minister of Internal Affairs who played a key role in crushing the 1905 revolution. In 1914 he was a leader in the upper house of the State Council, a position gained after an amusing disgrace:
Though at first glance a Gogolian grotesque (and aren’t we all), Durnovo wrote for Nicholas II a famous memorandum on the consequences for Russia of a long European war that Lieven calls a brilliant work, one whose clarity, insight, and accuracy of prediction are “unrivaled by any other document written from within the ruling elite in these years.” His predictions? Exhaustion, financial chaos, the delegitimization and demise of tsarism leading to anarchy followed by some version of extreme revolutionary socialism. And Durnovo predicted this would happen even if Russia won.
Nikolai Maklakov (1871-1918) was another Minister of Internal Affairs and reactionary secret police type who had a fine sense of tsarism’s fragility and the dangers of war. Lieven’s last image of Maklakov is haunting:
Maklakov was one of the first Tsarist officials the Bolsheviks put against a wall.
After reading The Russian Empire and Its Rivals and Russia Against Napoleon, I came to anticipate in any Lieven work judiciously generalized aphorisms on power and decline. In The End of Tsarist Russia I wasn’t disappointed. As he begins narration of the July 1914 crisis, Lieven laments that the Russian and Austrian elites lacked sufficient awareness “of many common traits and problems, and not least a common vulnerability to nationalism” – though, he shrugs, even had the two empires come to see their “shared interests and threats,” this might well not have been enough to avert the mutually suicidal spiral into war, revolution, unfettered irredentism and genocide; into that chaos in which the common people do not know who to obey, to paraphrase Pushkin. “A cynic might argue,” Lieven sums up, “that empires are tigers, and tigers do not necessarily cooperate even when their species faces extinction.”
Such remarks abound in what Lieven calls his “God’s eye” analysis of long-term, structural forces like geopolitics and globalization (forces he says no Russian monarch, let alone one with the weaknesses of Nicholas II, could have controlled). His other levels of analysis he calls the “intermediate,” taking in the institutions and systems that determined who made decisions in Tsarist Russia, and the “worm’s narrative,” the story of what the decision makers thought and said. This “worm’s narrative” is deepened by Lieven’s years of work in Russian diplomatic and military archives. Two decision makers struck me. Petr Durnovo (1845-1915) was the minister of Internal Affairs who played a key role in crushing the 1905 revolution. In 1914 he was a leader in the upper house of the State Council, a position gained after an amusing disgrace:
For all his current eminence, Durnovo had never entirely shed the shady reputation he had acquired from a decade’s service as head of Russia’s police forces. Secret policemen seldom have the cleanest of hands, though by the standards of his twentieth century successors Durnovo was a lamb. His career as director of the Police Department had come to a spectacular end when he used his agents to purloin letters of his mistress from the home of a foreign diplomat, a competitor for her affections. The story reached Alexander III, who was enraged. Gogol could have written a fine comedy about the tsar’s decision to boot his miscreant police chief into the Senate, the body responsible for upholding the rule of law in the Russian Empire.
Though at first glance a Gogolian grotesque (and aren’t we all), Durnovo wrote for Nicholas II a famous memorandum on the consequences for Russia of a long European war that Lieven calls a brilliant work, one whose clarity, insight, and accuracy of prediction are “unrivaled by any other document written from within the ruling elite in these years.” His predictions? Exhaustion, financial chaos, the delegitimization and demise of tsarism leading to anarchy followed by some version of extreme revolutionary socialism. And Durnovo predicted this would happen even if Russia won.
Nikolai Maklakov (1871-1918) was another Minister of Internal Affairs and reactionary secret police type who had a fine sense of tsarism’s fragility and the dangers of war. Lieven’s last image of Maklakov is haunting:
When General Serge Dobrorolsky visited Maklakov on July 29 to collect his signature on the orders for mobilization, he found the minister in his office, which contained so many icons that it appeared more like a chapel than a government bureau. Maklakov spoke to Dobrorolsky about how greatly the revolutionaries would welcome war, adding that “in Russia war cannot be popular with the mass of the people and revolutionary ideas are dearer to the masses than a victory over Germany. But one cannot escape one’s fate.”
Maklakov was one of the first Tsarist officials the Bolsheviks put against a wall.
September 12, 2016
Can't say it wasn't well-researched, but this "worm's eye" account of intragovernmental and diplomatic minutia was endlessly dull. I kept waiting for the narrative to kick in, but this was just a 300 page Wikipedia article.
April 3, 2017
Unbelievably dry and dull. Goodness.
January 6, 2016
A magisterial history of the diplomacy and grand strategy during the period from the Russo-Japanese War to the fall of the Romanovs and the rise of the Bolsheviks. As the title indicates, the focus is on Russia, but the Great Powers dance is covered in detail. I’ve never read Lieven before, but his knowledge of the period, the personalities, the domestic scene, and the international political situation is encyclopedic. The book can be dry at times, I’ll admit, and I wouldn’t recommend this to anyone as an introduction to either WWI or Russian history.
Lieven’s book opened my eyes to the importance of two things I’d glossed over or neglected when thinking about WWI: the importance of Eastern Europe, and the pivotal role played by the disintegration of the Ottoman state. If you’re interested in 20th century Europe and you haven’t read much about the various Balkan wars, the state of the Austrian and Turkish empires before the war, or the various political crises in the decades before 1914, I can’t recommend this highly enough.
As I was reading, I highlighted some of the interesting bits, and there were a lot of them. These are some of the ones that jump out at me as I flip through the book.
* The Russo-Japanese War caused WWI, sort of. The 1904/5 war was a humiliating defeat for Russia, and revealed that the Tsar’s empire lagged behind his European rivals in military power. Over the next several years, the Russians rearmed and reformed as quickly as possible. This “…dramatic eclipse and then resurrection of Russian power between 1904 and 1914 destabilized international relations in Europe. In the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, Berlin and Vienna pursued policies that took for granted Russian impotence, and the intelligent “management” of Russia’s recovery as a great power proved beyond them.”
*The French set a trap for themselves. In the fall of 1912, contrary to the French position during an earlier Balkan crisis, the French prime minister and soon-to-be-president promised “…that if an Austrian military advance into the Balkans brought on first Russian and then German intervention, France would not hesitate to go to war in defense of its obligations under the Russian alliance.”
*Don’t blame the patricians. Lieven writes, “It is often stated – even indeed assumed – that a key cause of World War I was the survival of aristocratic elites and their atavistic values at the center of power. Professional, intelligent, and “modern” middle-class men are somehow presumed to have been more liberal and pacific. This is a comforting view for twenty-first century observers but often a false one. Genuinely reactionary aristocrats were usually far less dangerous then intelligent professionals and intellectuals with “modern” views about power, history, race, and even masculinity, especially if these “new men” were skilled at playing popular politics.” Note that he’s not just talking about Russians.
* Modernity and Empire don’t mix. “The basic point was that modernity in general and ethnic nationalism in particular were making empires ever harder to manage. Probably contemporary opinion exaggerated the power of nationalism. No doubt the domestic political systems in Austria, Russia, and Britain often exacerbated this problem. It is also true that political leaders in Vienna, Petersburg, and London frequently responded to the nationalist challenge unskillfully. But the threat – Serb, Ukrainian, Irish, and other – was already very real in 1914 and was likely to become worse as modernity took hold. Although it is currently unfashionable among historians to make this point, in my opinion it remains true. Nationalism was in some cases already a major threat to empire in 1914, and it was a great long-term challenge to the stability of a global order dominated by empires.”
-
*Conrad von Hotzendorff, the Austrian Chief of Staff, was a boob, but Russia blew it. Conrad sent 1/3 of his army to crush the Serbs, 1/3 into Galicia to hold off the Russians, and held 1/3 in reserve. When the Serbs showed they could take a punch – mainly by being willing to explode – Hotzendorff committed his reserves. He soon panicked and turned them about to face the Russians. They achieved little on either front, writes Lieven: “In essence, Conrad’s incompetence had wrecked Austrian offensive capability almost before the war had begun. This contributed greatly to devastating losses and a major defeat for the Habsburg armies. If the initial plans of the Russian chief of staff on the southern front… had not been watered down by Petersburg, the Russians might actually have destroyed the Austrian forces and the eastern front in the autumn of 1914, which would have had enormous implications for the war’s outcome, tearing the Central Powers’ southeastern front wide open at a time when German forces were entirely committed elsewhere.”
* Ludendorff and Hindenburg blew it, too. “In Germany, William II was largely replaced by Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg as regards charismatic leadership, while General Erich Ludendorff increasingly dominated the actual conduct of the war. The Hindenburg-Ludendorff combination was supported – indeed demanded – by most of the German elite and much of the parliament and population. Their leadership proved a catastrophe, losing a war that Germany would probably have won without their miscalculations. This illustrates how a monarch could hand over his power to the heroes of public opinion and nevertheless doom his dynasty and country.”
* Versailles plus normalcy equals WWII. Lieven opines thusly: “A major problem with the European order created at Versailles was that it would never have come into being without American intervention. When the United States retreated into isolation in the postwar years, it undermined the power on which the peace settlement rested. With Britain also half withdrawing from European commitments, the onus of maintaining the Versailles settlement in Europe above all devolved on France, which was much too weak to carry this burden alone.” Lieven goes on to note that the collapse of the Habsburg state would probably have doomed the settlement, anyway, since it created an unstable vacuum in the east.
Lieven’s book opened my eyes to the importance of two things I’d glossed over or neglected when thinking about WWI: the importance of Eastern Europe, and the pivotal role played by the disintegration of the Ottoman state. If you’re interested in 20th century Europe and you haven’t read much about the various Balkan wars, the state of the Austrian and Turkish empires before the war, or the various political crises in the decades before 1914, I can’t recommend this highly enough.
As I was reading, I highlighted some of the interesting bits, and there were a lot of them. These are some of the ones that jump out at me as I flip through the book.
* The Russo-Japanese War caused WWI, sort of. The 1904/5 war was a humiliating defeat for Russia, and revealed that the Tsar’s empire lagged behind his European rivals in military power. Over the next several years, the Russians rearmed and reformed as quickly as possible. This “…dramatic eclipse and then resurrection of Russian power between 1904 and 1914 destabilized international relations in Europe. In the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, Berlin and Vienna pursued policies that took for granted Russian impotence, and the intelligent “management” of Russia’s recovery as a great power proved beyond them.”
*The French set a trap for themselves. In the fall of 1912, contrary to the French position during an earlier Balkan crisis, the French prime minister and soon-to-be-president promised “…that if an Austrian military advance into the Balkans brought on first Russian and then German intervention, France would not hesitate to go to war in defense of its obligations under the Russian alliance.”
*Don’t blame the patricians. Lieven writes, “It is often stated – even indeed assumed – that a key cause of World War I was the survival of aristocratic elites and their atavistic values at the center of power. Professional, intelligent, and “modern” middle-class men are somehow presumed to have been more liberal and pacific. This is a comforting view for twenty-first century observers but often a false one. Genuinely reactionary aristocrats were usually far less dangerous then intelligent professionals and intellectuals with “modern” views about power, history, race, and even masculinity, especially if these “new men” were skilled at playing popular politics.” Note that he’s not just talking about Russians.
* Modernity and Empire don’t mix. “The basic point was that modernity in general and ethnic nationalism in particular were making empires ever harder to manage. Probably contemporary opinion exaggerated the power of nationalism. No doubt the domestic political systems in Austria, Russia, and Britain often exacerbated this problem. It is also true that political leaders in Vienna, Petersburg, and London frequently responded to the nationalist challenge unskillfully. But the threat – Serb, Ukrainian, Irish, and other – was already very real in 1914 and was likely to become worse as modernity took hold. Although it is currently unfashionable among historians to make this point, in my opinion it remains true. Nationalism was in some cases already a major threat to empire in 1914, and it was a great long-term challenge to the stability of a global order dominated by empires.”
-
*Conrad von Hotzendorff, the Austrian Chief of Staff, was a boob, but Russia blew it. Conrad sent 1/3 of his army to crush the Serbs, 1/3 into Galicia to hold off the Russians, and held 1/3 in reserve. When the Serbs showed they could take a punch – mainly by being willing to explode – Hotzendorff committed his reserves. He soon panicked and turned them about to face the Russians. They achieved little on either front, writes Lieven: “In essence, Conrad’s incompetence had wrecked Austrian offensive capability almost before the war had begun. This contributed greatly to devastating losses and a major defeat for the Habsburg armies. If the initial plans of the Russian chief of staff on the southern front… had not been watered down by Petersburg, the Russians might actually have destroyed the Austrian forces and the eastern front in the autumn of 1914, which would have had enormous implications for the war’s outcome, tearing the Central Powers’ southeastern front wide open at a time when German forces were entirely committed elsewhere.”
* Ludendorff and Hindenburg blew it, too. “In Germany, William II was largely replaced by Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg as regards charismatic leadership, while General Erich Ludendorff increasingly dominated the actual conduct of the war. The Hindenburg-Ludendorff combination was supported – indeed demanded – by most of the German elite and much of the parliament and population. Their leadership proved a catastrophe, losing a war that Germany would probably have won without their miscalculations. This illustrates how a monarch could hand over his power to the heroes of public opinion and nevertheless doom his dynasty and country.”
* Versailles plus normalcy equals WWII. Lieven opines thusly: “A major problem with the European order created at Versailles was that it would never have come into being without American intervention. When the United States retreated into isolation in the postwar years, it undermined the power on which the peace settlement rested. With Britain also half withdrawing from European commitments, the onus of maintaining the Versailles settlement in Europe above all devolved on France, which was much too weak to carry this burden alone.” Lieven goes on to note that the collapse of the Habsburg state would probably have doomed the settlement, anyway, since it created an unstable vacuum in the east.
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October 31, 2018Underresearched. It felt as if the researcher first posed the hypotheses and then went busy learning things that could possibly prove them, if interpreted just the way he wanted it to.
I really like how people blame Russia for having Monarchy in the beginning of the 20th century. Monarchy is not evil per se. It the people who surround the Monarch, they are either capable or not, if self-interest or neurosis drives them, then all bets are off.
I also really love how no researcher ever stops to consider the global picture of what the hell Russia had been doing when Europe was stepping into its craft production phase. 1223-1480 Russia was sort of was busy in ongoing wars with the Tatar and Mongol hordes. So, the first economies were delayed. Only logical that if you are in either slavery or at war or you undergo raids then you might have something else on your mind other than progressing to the industrialization. So, blaming the Tsar family for Russia developing in the 18th-19th century along its own track, which brought it forward to the, what? 5th place among the European industrial states as at the 1900-s? I think it counts as doing well enough, if all things are taken under careful review.
TBF later. An interesting, if underresearched reading material.
I really like how people blame Russia for having Monarchy in the beginning of the 20th century. Monarchy is not evil per se. It the people who surround the Monarch, they are either capable or not, if self-interest or neurosis drives them, then all bets are off.
I also really love how no researcher ever stops to consider the global picture of what the hell Russia had been doing when Europe was stepping into its craft production phase. 1223-1480 Russia was sort of was busy in ongoing wars with the Tatar and Mongol hordes. So, the first economies were delayed. Only logical that if you are in either slavery or at war or you undergo raids then you might have something else on your mind other than progressing to the industrialization. So, blaming the Tsar family for Russia developing in the 18th-19th century along its own track, which brought it forward to the, what? 5th place among the European industrial states as at the 1900-s? I think it counts as doing well enough, if all things are taken under careful review.
TBF later. An interesting, if underresearched reading material.
December 30, 2015
Enlightening perspective from the point of view of Russian history. A non-"western" perspective on the bloody 20th century. That said-- for me it was tough sledding through a Russian winter.
March 26, 2018
Just a bit too much detail for me so I got bored with it.
April 19, 2016
The book appears to me as being unbalanced. Reading the cover, one expects to learn more about the prelude of WW I, the war itself and the Russian Revolution. In reality, only the last 40 pages out of 430 relate to the last two topics.
In the end, I must admit the book did not meet my expectations. The prelude is more or less known to me and better covered in books like 'Ring of Steel' (Alexander Watson) and 'The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went into War in 1914' (Christopher Clark). The focus on the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is too detailed while leaving little 'room' left to elaborate on some theories Lieven exposes in the last chapters:
- In what sense did the Russian army perform better than generally considered?
- How would the German annexation of Ukrain impact the Russian economy?
- How could the tsar have politically survived WW I?
- ...
I hope the author finds time to revert on the here above topics and many more as these seems more like no man's land in the world of historians.
In the end, I must admit the book did not meet my expectations. The prelude is more or less known to me and better covered in books like 'Ring of Steel' (Alexander Watson) and 'The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went into War in 1914' (Christopher Clark). The focus on the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is too detailed while leaving little 'room' left to elaborate on some theories Lieven exposes in the last chapters:
- In what sense did the Russian army perform better than generally considered?
- How would the German annexation of Ukrain impact the Russian economy?
- How could the tsar have politically survived WW I?
- ...
I hope the author finds time to revert on the here above topics and many more as these seems more like no man's land in the world of historians.
June 28, 2017
Well researched analysis of the reasons and events leading the First World War from the perspective of Russia. The author went through a lot of the documents in Russian archives which were not previously available. He presents his results in a clear and concise manner. He considers the influence of public opinion on the actions of the governments which was quite interesting.
However, his conclusions are hardly controversial: according to this book, only Germany could have stopped the war in July 2014. But it has chosen not to do it. Russia, on the other hand is depicted a little too rational its actions all way through. This i find hard to believe considering the domestic situation and the national character.
However, his conclusions are hardly controversial: according to this book, only Germany could have stopped the war in July 2014. But it has chosen not to do it. Russia, on the other hand is depicted a little too rational its actions all way through. This i find hard to believe considering the domestic situation and the national character.
March 15, 2019
A tough book to rate. Lieven is quite fair to ideologies, people, and nations in his account. His centering the war not as Germany vs. Britain, but rather Germany vs. Russia is a good rebuttal to Anglo-centered accounts. Yet, the prose did not flow and he would go into extreme detail on one point only to rush by a major event, such as the Russo-Japanese War. Much of the book is just a detailed diplomatic history instead of a broad account. In the end, diplomats count for less than we suppose, for if a nation wants a war they find an excuse for it. What diplomat X said to diplomat Y is less important than other factors. Lieven knows this, yet still gives the reader a frustrating, if informed, account of the war's lead up from Russia's point of view, but one with a lot of diplomatic fluff.
June 4, 2016
Went into a bit more detail about individual diplomats than necessary. Would have appreciated some more detail about the actual revolution. That said, an excellent summary of the geopolitical situation in Central/Eastern Europe leading to WW1.
September 19, 2017
The interesting point in the book is Lieven's attempt to argue that WWI was predominantly an eastern European conflict (true) and the real issue was control over the resources of the Ukraine, an argument dependant largely of counterfactual speculation. Beyond that, the book is fairly conventional, although as written from a base in Russian archives it has detail not always contained in other works on the topic. Lieven dislikes the work of Sean MacMeekin, which he describes as 'polemic', is mired in the traditional international relations view of history (ie. trying very hard to avoid an economic determinist and class conflict interpretation, preferring the vagueries of 'national interests', 'imperial prestige' and so on) and adheres to the German responsibility for the outbreak of the war thesis. I think Russia had far more responsibility for escalating the July crisis. Germany's error was to tie itself to the incompetence and irresponsibility of Austrian decision making, rather than just telling them what to do.
December 9, 2015
Lieven is a thorough archival researcher and has produced an exhaustive tome concerning the political decline of Tsarist Russia largely in the period from 1905 to 1917. He is absorbed with the monarchy and aristocracy and their self-destructive decision making and does not much concern himself with subversive movements such as the Bolsheviks. Unfortunately this book is exceedingly turgid and a slow read, nor does it truly unveil new insights on the Romanov regime.
March 17, 2016
A superb look at Russia's role in the lead up to the First World War. The book ought to be sub-titled "Russian Diplomatic History, 1900 to 1914." Lieven is excellent at demonstrating that the Tsarist regime went into the war knowing full well Russia would suffer grievously. I highly recommend this book.
August 23, 2021
This book is compulsively readable, which is impressive for retelling two of the most oft-told tales in history: the road to the Russian Revolution, and the beginning of World War I. The book benefits, however, from an intimate knowledge of the Russian imperial archives, temporarily opened, which were off limits during the height of the "road to war" scholarship, and with just an unparalleled eye for the stakes and motivations for all of the major actors, in Russia and beyond.
The Russian perspective deserves more time than it usually gets in these histories because World War I started as a battle between Austria-Hungary and Russia, of which the later was of course the more important player. The question needs to be why Russia saw the survival of Serbia as of such great importance that it was willing to risk the regime itself, and, as this book makes clear, many of the Russian players understood a war risked everything. Of course the first answer is that Russian pan-Slavism encouraged the nation to see itself as the protector of Serbia. But this book also shows that many in the foreign ministry were not infatuated with this view. Rather the growing "public opinion" represented by newspapers such as Noveie Vreoma, had made retreat on Slavism a threat to the power of the tsar, especially after the Russians seemed to have given up too much to Austria-Hungary and Turkey in the First and Second Balkan wars in the previous two years.
The book also shows the importance of the nationality question to all powers involved. Russia was basically a nation-state, with about 66% of the population ethnically Russian, but that's only if you include the Bel0-Russians and Ukrainians, who were about 20% of the population. Thus the threat of breaking off the Ukraine was prominent in Russians minds, especially because the Ukrainian "Ruthenians" in Austro-Hungary's Galicia were stirring up nationalist fervor in Russia's own territory. The same issue confronted all nations who wanted to expand but worried about absorbing ethnicities, or who worried about agitation across borders. (Of course, losing the Ukraine also meant possible loss of the Straits and Russia's Black Sea warm-water port.)
This book simply provides the best understanding of ancien regime international relations of any book I've read, with peculiar, but not exclusive, insight into Russian politics and foreign affairs.
The Russian perspective deserves more time than it usually gets in these histories because World War I started as a battle between Austria-Hungary and Russia, of which the later was of course the more important player. The question needs to be why Russia saw the survival of Serbia as of such great importance that it was willing to risk the regime itself, and, as this book makes clear, many of the Russian players understood a war risked everything. Of course the first answer is that Russian pan-Slavism encouraged the nation to see itself as the protector of Serbia. But this book also shows that many in the foreign ministry were not infatuated with this view. Rather the growing "public opinion" represented by newspapers such as Noveie Vreoma, had made retreat on Slavism a threat to the power of the tsar, especially after the Russians seemed to have given up too much to Austria-Hungary and Turkey in the First and Second Balkan wars in the previous two years.
The book also shows the importance of the nationality question to all powers involved. Russia was basically a nation-state, with about 66% of the population ethnically Russian, but that's only if you include the Bel0-Russians and Ukrainians, who were about 20% of the population. Thus the threat of breaking off the Ukraine was prominent in Russians minds, especially because the Ukrainian "Ruthenians" in Austro-Hungary's Galicia were stirring up nationalist fervor in Russia's own territory. The same issue confronted all nations who wanted to expand but worried about absorbing ethnicities, or who worried about agitation across borders. (Of course, losing the Ukraine also meant possible loss of the Straits and Russia's Black Sea warm-water port.)
This book simply provides the best understanding of ancien regime international relations of any book I've read, with peculiar, but not exclusive, insight into Russian politics and foreign affairs.
August 1, 2022
Yes, it is dry and heavy with details, as a number of reviewers have said. For that reason I could have made it 3 stars. Went with 4 because sometimes you want/need details to understand what went on and Lieven laid them out well.
They add up to a meaningful pattern. Pre-WWI Russia was caught in several terrible nets: an endless jostling among large powers, exacerbated by reckless actions by small powers and insurgent groups; a militarized way of thinking in many European countries; the rise of nationalisms that were destabilizing both Russia and other empires, especially the Ottoman and Austrian Habsburg empires; corrosive class antagonisms inside Russia; emotional tides of often belligerent public opinion in many countries, often incited by a powerful press; the continued hold of too much power in the hands of Tsar Nicholas II and Kaiser Wilhelm II, neither of whom was fully up to their tasks; the inability of a few clear thinkers in the Russian bureaucracy to move others off long-held positions; conflicts within that bureaucracy and resulting policy drift; a continent-wide atmosphere of suspicion-fed fear, and a gloomy acceptance of the likely inevitability of a major European war (and in the case of the chief of the Austrian general staff an eager urging to wage war, at least to crush Serbia). In the end, the general sense resembles Kafka's The Trial — Russia struggling for survival but consigned by powerful forces to a victim's fate. Among those powerful forces was a simple refusal by many countries and subnational groups to get along with one another; they often were steeped in rivalries and revenge-driven ethnic resentments and hatreds stretching back centuries.
Lieven makes an interesting point about the central importance of the Ukrainian area to the Russian empire and the dangers to Russia of Ukrainian nationalism — a point that resonates strongly in the current Russian attempt to bring much of Ukraine back into a new empire — but his comments on that cover only three or four pages at the start and end of the book.
They add up to a meaningful pattern. Pre-WWI Russia was caught in several terrible nets: an endless jostling among large powers, exacerbated by reckless actions by small powers and insurgent groups; a militarized way of thinking in many European countries; the rise of nationalisms that were destabilizing both Russia and other empires, especially the Ottoman and Austrian Habsburg empires; corrosive class antagonisms inside Russia; emotional tides of often belligerent public opinion in many countries, often incited by a powerful press; the continued hold of too much power in the hands of Tsar Nicholas II and Kaiser Wilhelm II, neither of whom was fully up to their tasks; the inability of a few clear thinkers in the Russian bureaucracy to move others off long-held positions; conflicts within that bureaucracy and resulting policy drift; a continent-wide atmosphere of suspicion-fed fear, and a gloomy acceptance of the likely inevitability of a major European war (and in the case of the chief of the Austrian general staff an eager urging to wage war, at least to crush Serbia). In the end, the general sense resembles Kafka's The Trial — Russia struggling for survival but consigned by powerful forces to a victim's fate. Among those powerful forces was a simple refusal by many countries and subnational groups to get along with one another; they often were steeped in rivalries and revenge-driven ethnic resentments and hatreds stretching back centuries.
Lieven makes an interesting point about the central importance of the Ukrainian area to the Russian empire and the dangers to Russia of Ukrainian nationalism — a point that resonates strongly in the current Russian attempt to bring much of Ukraine back into a new empire — but his comments on that cover only three or four pages at the start and end of the book.
December 27, 2019
This book has some strengths, but was a little over hyped and mistitled. The book focuses on the diplomatic and domestic issues that led up to WWI.
The first two chapters are engaging and lay out the author’s theses about nationalism as a precursor to WWI, each major player’s strengths and weaknesses, and a sense of globalization in that era.
The middle part of the book was hard to get through and provided mini profiles of what felt like every person of marginal importance on Russian politics. None of the historical account is new, and about 200 pages could have been summed up as Russia was facing political dangers domestically and on its borders, didn’t recover from the war with Japan, and wanted to preserve peace as long as possible to regroup without looking weak.
The author than takes us through the Balkan wars that are covered much better by books specifically focused on the Balkan countries, and the lead up to the eastern theater conflict that is much better described (both in detail and style) in other books like the Fall of the Ottomans.
Finally in the closing chapters the author’s scholarship shines by giving us primary source accounts from July 1914 by the key Russian decision makers that was full of good material.
The first two chapters are engaging and lay out the author’s theses about nationalism as a precursor to WWI, each major player’s strengths and weaknesses, and a sense of globalization in that era.
The middle part of the book was hard to get through and provided mini profiles of what felt like every person of marginal importance on Russian politics. None of the historical account is new, and about 200 pages could have been summed up as Russia was facing political dangers domestically and on its borders, didn’t recover from the war with Japan, and wanted to preserve peace as long as possible to regroup without looking weak.
The author than takes us through the Balkan wars that are covered much better by books specifically focused on the Balkan countries, and the lead up to the eastern theater conflict that is much better described (both in detail and style) in other books like the Fall of the Ottomans.
Finally in the closing chapters the author’s scholarship shines by giving us primary source accounts from July 1914 by the key Russian decision makers that was full of good material.
February 18, 2025
A good book, well written and exhaustively researched. I give it three stars because there was too much about the personalities of the Russian Foreign Ministers. This took up the first one third of the book and was terribly tedious. The title is a misnomer as well. It should have been called "Tsarist Russia's march to WWI." There was only half dozen pages at the end about the revolution and the end of Tsarist Russia. I really liked Lieven's conclusions, they were very thought provoking. But given the title, I expected a bit more about the events of 1917 than the page and a half they got.
A marginal purchase or read.
Phil Kuhn
A marginal purchase or read.
Phil Kuhn
October 24, 2020
I loved this book - it hit my personal sweet spot. But I think a lot of people who read it are going to get kind of bored by it.
Read
October 16, 2023It is a good book if you are interested in elite management of the entry into the First World War. Monarchs, politicians, generals, etc. Not to mention newspapers...
December 11, 2023
It's fine but we get lost in the weeds constantly in the general state of affairs between the Great Powers of Europe as opposed to, you know, the supposed focus of the book ie the Tsardom.
May 24, 2021
Lieven places the decline and fall of tsarism in Russia in a broader context involving the nature of empire, international relations, and personalities. His ability to analyze both the underlying and proximate causes is his greatest strength.
December 27, 2016
* * * * - I really liked this book as a review of the causes of WWI from an Eastern perspective. But despite its title, the information about the Russian Revolution itself was very sparse.
I threw myself over "The End of Tsarist Russia" by Dominic Lieven, hoping this would be a good next step in my self-education about the 1910-1920 era. This turned out not to be quite the case, but well worth my time nonetheless. D.L. uses a distinct touch of geopolitical analysis to his narrative, which feels very modern and relevant.
As a note on the general nature of historical books - D.L. delineates two separate ways of portraying historical events. The God's eye view where an overview can be obtained, an understanding for the big events and "historical currents", but without any personal understanding or knowledge why individuals made the decisions they made. Versus the worm's eye view, where you delve into the personal motives, emotions and reasoning of the people involved in the events. An elegant distinction in my opinion, maybe not new in itself but never so neatly stated aloud.
"The End of Tsarist Russia" turned out to be an in-depth look at the origins of the Great War from a slightly different global perspective than in most other English literature. Whereas the story of the War usually is told by the events concerning Britain - France - Germany, this book tells it from a more Eastern perspective - namely Germany - Austro-Hungary - Russia. In fact, D.L. argues that the entire reason for the War itself was in Eastern Europe. Where there was still possibility for the Great Powers to vie for influence/suzerainty among the Balkan states. Although instead, these states were able to play off the Great Powers against themselves (as becomes even more evident in this book).
D.L. analyses nationalism as a factor in the pre-War/pre-Revolution events. As well as the imperial politics that were in vogue in those times.
There is a negative side to the focus on the First World War. Which is that I get the feeling Dominic Lieven has mixed together the First World War with the fall of Imperial Russia. Granted, the two events are closely intertwined. But I believe the Russian Revolution might very well have occurred without the help of World War I. Even though the War was a catalyst to the Revolution (as it was a catalyst to so many other things), the absence of war would not have made an overthrow of the Imperial powers impossible.
This assumption is based on my personal knowledge. Which may not be of a strictly scholarly nature, but which is slightly more in-depth than the average person's. I have lived in Russia and find it a fascinating country in all aspects and have studied its history at least to some extent.
D.L. avoids the blame-game in regards to the originator of WWI quite well. Although he does mention that Germany is mainly to blame for the start of the War, with the fact that Russia started mobilising first, as only a natural reaction to an unjust accusation from Austro-Hungary.
The downfall of the book in my view, was the rapid end once D.L. arrived to the events of the Russian Revolution. This was practically covered very superficially in half a chapter! After having delved quite a bit into the personalities of Nicholas II, the Russian Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers and other dignitaries - I expected to get a similar expert review of Lenin, Troskij etc. But to my sorrow and astonishing, nothing of the sort. Maybe they are not strictly speaking part of the end, but the beginning of the new Russia. But nonetheless, I really thought they would be more than just mentioned in passing.
Bare in mind, this "downfall" I just described, reflects more my own expectations, rather than a mark of bad quality. This is a splendid, modern analysis of the origins of World War I from a justified non-British perspective.
I threw myself over "The End of Tsarist Russia" by Dominic Lieven, hoping this would be a good next step in my self-education about the 1910-1920 era. This turned out not to be quite the case, but well worth my time nonetheless. D.L. uses a distinct touch of geopolitical analysis to his narrative, which feels very modern and relevant.
As a note on the general nature of historical books - D.L. delineates two separate ways of portraying historical events. The God's eye view where an overview can be obtained, an understanding for the big events and "historical currents", but without any personal understanding or knowledge why individuals made the decisions they made. Versus the worm's eye view, where you delve into the personal motives, emotions and reasoning of the people involved in the events. An elegant distinction in my opinion, maybe not new in itself but never so neatly stated aloud.
"The End of Tsarist Russia" turned out to be an in-depth look at the origins of the Great War from a slightly different global perspective than in most other English literature. Whereas the story of the War usually is told by the events concerning Britain - France - Germany, this book tells it from a more Eastern perspective - namely Germany - Austro-Hungary - Russia. In fact, D.L. argues that the entire reason for the War itself was in Eastern Europe. Where there was still possibility for the Great Powers to vie for influence/suzerainty among the Balkan states. Although instead, these states were able to play off the Great Powers against themselves (as becomes even more evident in this book).
D.L. analyses nationalism as a factor in the pre-War/pre-Revolution events. As well as the imperial politics that were in vogue in those times.
There is a negative side to the focus on the First World War. Which is that I get the feeling Dominic Lieven has mixed together the First World War with the fall of Imperial Russia. Granted, the two events are closely intertwined. But I believe the Russian Revolution might very well have occurred without the help of World War I. Even though the War was a catalyst to the Revolution (as it was a catalyst to so many other things), the absence of war would not have made an overthrow of the Imperial powers impossible.
This assumption is based on my personal knowledge. Which may not be of a strictly scholarly nature, but which is slightly more in-depth than the average person's. I have lived in Russia and find it a fascinating country in all aspects and have studied its history at least to some extent.
D.L. avoids the blame-game in regards to the originator of WWI quite well. Although he does mention that Germany is mainly to blame for the start of the War, with the fact that Russia started mobilising first, as only a natural reaction to an unjust accusation from Austro-Hungary.
The downfall of the book in my view, was the rapid end once D.L. arrived to the events of the Russian Revolution. This was practically covered very superficially in half a chapter! After having delved quite a bit into the personalities of Nicholas II, the Russian Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers and other dignitaries - I expected to get a similar expert review of Lenin, Troskij etc. But to my sorrow and astonishing, nothing of the sort. Maybe they are not strictly speaking part of the end, but the beginning of the new Russia. But nonetheless, I really thought they would be more than just mentioned in passing.
Bare in mind, this "downfall" I just described, reflects more my own expectations, rather than a mark of bad quality. This is a splendid, modern analysis of the origins of World War I from a justified non-British perspective.
August 23, 2015
I really liked the author's Russians against Napoleon book, so i was eager to read this one too; after a great start covering how Russia turned against Austria and later Germany (the first because after saving the Habsurgs in 1849 from the Hungarians, the Austrians cheerfully betrayed them in Crimeea only a few years later, fact that even 50 years later had the Romanov tsar - Nicholas the Last - shouting it to Austrian representatives at one of the "we have common imperial interests, let's be friends" tries on the Austrian part, the second because after crushing France with the tacit backing of Russia, Bismarck was perceived to betray Russia by stripping all her gains in the 1877-1878 war and San Stefano peace at the Berlin conference - here things were more nuanced objectively because san Stefano was unacceptable to London and Vienna, so Bismarck tried to avoid another Crimean like war), the book starts meandering somewhat dealing with the internal politics of the Russian Empire and the disputes between the slavophiles and the westernizers, as well as between the one for which colonizing Siberia with the Trans-Siberian railway was the key to greatness and the ones who still wanted Constantinople, the Balkans and the Straits
ultimately as the book makes it clear, the weakness of the Tsar and the little understood (by the elites of the day) fact that like in France of 1789, only the authority of the state - weak as it was anyway - sat between the vast mass of oppressed peasants (even after they got land in the famous 1860's abolition of serfdom and even after buying a lot of the available land from the gentry in the following decades, the peasantry still lived mostly subsistence lives) and the civil society, while Russia lacked the lower middle class that in France broke the Jacobins in the end, made the imperial collapse inevitable in case of a crisis that broke the state power
overall some very interesting nuggets, but too much emphasis on the internal politics of the pre war years, when the stated conclusion above showed that only a very powerful personality behind the tsar who understood that war with Germany meant the end of the dynasty could have tried to stop the disaster and the set-up of the empire was that such a personality(a Russian Bismarck) wouldn't have been accepted by the elites
ultimately as the book makes it clear, the weakness of the Tsar and the little understood (by the elites of the day) fact that like in France of 1789, only the authority of the state - weak as it was anyway - sat between the vast mass of oppressed peasants (even after they got land in the famous 1860's abolition of serfdom and even after buying a lot of the available land from the gentry in the following decades, the peasantry still lived mostly subsistence lives) and the civil society, while Russia lacked the lower middle class that in France broke the Jacobins in the end, made the imperial collapse inevitable in case of a crisis that broke the state power
overall some very interesting nuggets, but too much emphasis on the internal politics of the pre war years, when the stated conclusion above showed that only a very powerful personality behind the tsar who understood that war with Germany meant the end of the dynasty could have tried to stop the disaster and the set-up of the empire was that such a personality(a Russian Bismarck) wouldn't have been accepted by the elites
April 4, 2023
This book is a tough one to rate, and, since coming across The Storygraph and fractional star ratings being reality, it's the biggest hate I have for Goodreads and the Amazonoids behind it not having at least half-star ratings, even after the overhaul.
Specific to this book, it's right on 2.5 stars, and I hate being associated with people low-rating the book because they think it's boring. Anything but. But, I just can't give it 3 stars.
Let's dig in. And, this one is going to be long.
The End of Tsarist Russia
Having read some of his brother’s essays following the start of the Russia-Ukraine War, and always on the lookout for new WWI reading, I glommed this.
Interesting.
First off, as many other reviewers note, it isn’t about the end of Tsarist Russia at all. That said, the original edition, I think, and I know the original British one, had a different title.
Nonetheless, we do judge books by their covers, and that might be a quarter-star ding right there.
Now, the meat?
This is an interesting book in many ways. It’s in-depth in many ways. The flip side of that is that, when Lieven’s grinding an ax, that means you know it’s very deliberate.
And, yes, he does grind one big one.
First, in the very early pages, rather than Fritz Fischer’s “German war guilt” theory, or a “Serbian war guilt” idea, he seems to plump hard for an “Austrian war guilt” theory. Tosh. I know plenty about the 1903 coup that swapped dynasties in Serbia, Apis’ direct involvement in it, Pasic’s likely knowledge of the 1914 assassination plot and more. Even allowing for Conrad’s “Serbia delenda est” bellows, the idea of Austria war guilt as a primary cause of the war is rot.
This plays out at the end of Chapter 4, on the Austrian demarche related to annexation of Bosnia. He notes that Russia made clear in 1912-13 in the Balkan Wars that it wouldn’t accept having its back against the wall again, and that Berlin and Vienna listened, but did not in 1914. This too, at least in implications, is rot as an assassination (even given how little Vienna apparently actually knew about Serbian official and semi-official connections) is not the same as third-party warfare.
Second puzzler? A definitional one, around page 130. What is a “liberal conservative”? I assume Lieven is using “liberal” in its European sense, but still, there’s no definition. Such and such a person, whether in the Foreign Ministry, other government service, or outside, is described as such without explanation.
That said, it seems functionally semi-clear from context. These are the people who would have been in the Kadets party after 1905. (Although I am not sure about that.)
There’s lots of good in this book. A biggee is that not nearly all the professionals in Russian government, or formerly in it, were pan-Slavists or Slavophiles in the run-up to 1914. (Lieven says the two are different, and even distinguishes pan-Slavists from pan-slavists no capital, but says this book is not technical enough to dive into that.) These people distrusted “informed” modern Russian opinion, and in turn, they split into two. One branch wanted to focus on the Straits while setting aside the Balkans; the other wanted to focus on Asia while setting aside both.
In other words, we’re getting into a more nuanced, better backgrounded version of Sean McMeekin.
Later reading between the lines indicate that Slavophile stances would include the idea of “fair play” for Poles while pan-Slavism was more of the Russian Slavism is right, period.
Another issue rises up from Lieven later. All Russians have their names rendered in Russian spelling, ie, “Aleksandr” and not “Alexander.” But, “Wilhelm” is “William”? Given what I’ve noted above one could cite this as an example of historian’s bias and I think that’s plausible. I know that other British historians do it, too. Stop it.
Also of note in similar vein? The author doesn’t note the degree of family relationship to Vice Admiral Lieven, nor whether any family memoirs were used in this book.
Finally, a claim that Rasputin had no major influence on foreign policy before the start of war might be acceptable. (That said, Rasputin DID strongly urge Nicholas NOT to go to war; the fact that this argument failed could be, I guess, considered as proof of “no major influence.”) But making that claim after the war started? Tosh. Even before the war, his power to extract bribes argues for some influence. Also, the fact that Lieven makes this claim as an offhand statement further undercuts its likelihood of truth to me. Using military strategy knowledge to help bribers engage in inside trading on the Bourse is another argument against Lieven. And, above all, Rasputin encouraging Alexandra to encourage Nicholas in his neoabsolutism had its influence on Nicholas’ rule in general, and in the war, above all in Nicholas deciding to take direct command of the armed forces.
This cost Lieven a star by itself.
He also only mentions Apis and the Black Hand in passing. Worse, he does not mention at all Narodna Odbrana. He doesn’t mention Pasiç having likely foreknowledge of plot. He then claims that even had Serbia fully accepted the Austrian ultimatum, Vienna would have found an excuse for war anyway, a doubtful at best conjecture.
That’s another half-star, if not moe.
Other issues add up. And, we’re at 2 stars here. (May get 2.5 at StoryGraph. And, yes, I’m going to continue pushing it.)
It’s funny that Lievan calls MacMeekin “polemical.” He is himself, in his own way.
That’s as this book gets WORSE as it stumbles toward the finish line. Claiming the Ludendorff-Hindenburg dictatorship caused Germany to lose a war it “would probably have won” without them in charge is one of the most asinine comments I’ve ever seen in World War I historiography. But he makes it, on page 346. Pushing the renewal of submarine warfare, over Bethmann-Hollweg’s head, was a gamble, ’tis true. But, at this time, Nicholas hadn’t yet been toppled from the throne, let alone Kerensky replaced by Lenin. And, it wasn’t just the H-L duo who invested high potential power in sub warfare. As for the 1918 Kaiserschlacht? Necessary with the growing US presence; necessary to be won quickly, per how fast it was growing. As for the Hindenberg Program of a command economy? Tis true that the amount of horses removed from farms may have contributed to food scarcity in 1918, but this was a damned if you do, damned if you don’t moment and in no way lost the war.
And, the 2-3 pages before that show that Lieven should never write a word about military history.
He concludes by not only stressing Austrian war guilt, but shades of Fischer, throwing Germany in there as well.
The TL/DR summary? Everything here about Russian internal affairs is good. Everything outside of that is at best an unrevealing "meh" (with an exception or two) when purely Russian, but outside the Imperial bounds. Everything not Russian in this book is bad, often mendacious by omission, in my opinion.
Specific to this book, it's right on 2.5 stars, and I hate being associated with people low-rating the book because they think it's boring. Anything but. But, I just can't give it 3 stars.
Let's dig in. And, this one is going to be long.
The End of Tsarist Russia
Having read some of his brother’s essays following the start of the Russia-Ukraine War, and always on the lookout for new WWI reading, I glommed this.
Interesting.
First off, as many other reviewers note, it isn’t about the end of Tsarist Russia at all. That said, the original edition, I think, and I know the original British one, had a different title.
Nonetheless, we do judge books by their covers, and that might be a quarter-star ding right there.
Now, the meat?
This is an interesting book in many ways. It’s in-depth in many ways. The flip side of that is that, when Lieven’s grinding an ax, that means you know it’s very deliberate.
And, yes, he does grind one big one.
First, in the very early pages, rather than Fritz Fischer’s “German war guilt” theory, or a “Serbian war guilt” idea, he seems to plump hard for an “Austrian war guilt” theory. Tosh. I know plenty about the 1903 coup that swapped dynasties in Serbia, Apis’ direct involvement in it, Pasic’s likely knowledge of the 1914 assassination plot and more. Even allowing for Conrad’s “Serbia delenda est” bellows, the idea of Austria war guilt as a primary cause of the war is rot.
This plays out at the end of Chapter 4, on the Austrian demarche related to annexation of Bosnia. He notes that Russia made clear in 1912-13 in the Balkan Wars that it wouldn’t accept having its back against the wall again, and that Berlin and Vienna listened, but did not in 1914. This too, at least in implications, is rot as an assassination (even given how little Vienna apparently actually knew about Serbian official and semi-official connections) is not the same as third-party warfare.
Second puzzler? A definitional one, around page 130. What is a “liberal conservative”? I assume Lieven is using “liberal” in its European sense, but still, there’s no definition. Such and such a person, whether in the Foreign Ministry, other government service, or outside, is described as such without explanation.
That said, it seems functionally semi-clear from context. These are the people who would have been in the Kadets party after 1905. (Although I am not sure about that.)
There’s lots of good in this book. A biggee is that not nearly all the professionals in Russian government, or formerly in it, were pan-Slavists or Slavophiles in the run-up to 1914. (Lieven says the two are different, and even distinguishes pan-Slavists from pan-slavists no capital, but says this book is not technical enough to dive into that.) These people distrusted “informed” modern Russian opinion, and in turn, they split into two. One branch wanted to focus on the Straits while setting aside the Balkans; the other wanted to focus on Asia while setting aside both.
In other words, we’re getting into a more nuanced, better backgrounded version of Sean McMeekin.
Later reading between the lines indicate that Slavophile stances would include the idea of “fair play” for Poles while pan-Slavism was more of the Russian Slavism is right, period.
Another issue rises up from Lieven later. All Russians have their names rendered in Russian spelling, ie, “Aleksandr” and not “Alexander.” But, “Wilhelm” is “William”? Given what I’ve noted above one could cite this as an example of historian’s bias and I think that’s plausible. I know that other British historians do it, too. Stop it.
Also of note in similar vein? The author doesn’t note the degree of family relationship to Vice Admiral Lieven, nor whether any family memoirs were used in this book.
Finally, a claim that Rasputin had no major influence on foreign policy before the start of war might be acceptable. (That said, Rasputin DID strongly urge Nicholas NOT to go to war; the fact that this argument failed could be, I guess, considered as proof of “no major influence.”) But making that claim after the war started? Tosh. Even before the war, his power to extract bribes argues for some influence. Also, the fact that Lieven makes this claim as an offhand statement further undercuts its likelihood of truth to me. Using military strategy knowledge to help bribers engage in inside trading on the Bourse is another argument against Lieven. And, above all, Rasputin encouraging Alexandra to encourage Nicholas in his neoabsolutism had its influence on Nicholas’ rule in general, and in the war, above all in Nicholas deciding to take direct command of the armed forces.
This cost Lieven a star by itself.
He also only mentions Apis and the Black Hand in passing. Worse, he does not mention at all Narodna Odbrana. He doesn’t mention Pasiç having likely foreknowledge of plot. He then claims that even had Serbia fully accepted the Austrian ultimatum, Vienna would have found an excuse for war anyway, a doubtful at best conjecture.
That’s another half-star, if not moe.
Other issues add up. And, we’re at 2 stars here. (May get 2.5 at StoryGraph. And, yes, I’m going to continue pushing it.)
It’s funny that Lievan calls MacMeekin “polemical.” He is himself, in his own way.
That’s as this book gets WORSE as it stumbles toward the finish line. Claiming the Ludendorff-Hindenburg dictatorship caused Germany to lose a war it “would probably have won” without them in charge is one of the most asinine comments I’ve ever seen in World War I historiography. But he makes it, on page 346. Pushing the renewal of submarine warfare, over Bethmann-Hollweg’s head, was a gamble, ’tis true. But, at this time, Nicholas hadn’t yet been toppled from the throne, let alone Kerensky replaced by Lenin. And, it wasn’t just the H-L duo who invested high potential power in sub warfare. As for the 1918 Kaiserschlacht? Necessary with the growing US presence; necessary to be won quickly, per how fast it was growing. As for the Hindenberg Program of a command economy? Tis true that the amount of horses removed from farms may have contributed to food scarcity in 1918, but this was a damned if you do, damned if you don’t moment and in no way lost the war.
And, the 2-3 pages before that show that Lieven should never write a word about military history.
He concludes by not only stressing Austrian war guilt, but shades of Fischer, throwing Germany in there as well.
The TL/DR summary? Everything here about Russian internal affairs is good. Everything outside of that is at best an unrevealing "meh" (with an exception or two) when purely Russian, but outside the Imperial bounds. Everything not Russian in this book is bad, often mendacious by omission, in my opinion.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 127 reviews