Skepticism and the Veil of Perception

by Michael Huemer

Since Descartes, one of the central questions of Western philosophy has been that of how we know that the objects we seem to perceive are real. Philosophical skeptics claim that we know no such thing. Representationalists claim that we can gain such knowledge only by inference, by showing that the hypothesis of a real world is the best explanation for the kind of sensations and mental images we experience. Both accept the doctrine of a 'veil of perception:' that perception can only give us direct awareness of images or representations of objects, not the external objects themselves. In contrast, Huemer develops a theory of perceptual awareness in which perception gives us direct awareness of real objects, not mental representations, and we have non-inferential knowledge of the properties of these objects. Further, Huemer confronts the four main arguments for philosophical skepticism, showing that they are powerless against this kind of theory of perceptual knowledge.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

232 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2001

Reviews

[Ietrio · Rating 1 out of 5]

Another exercise in futility from an academic paper pusher. He does not understand biology and he does not care. After all he is just battling crap arguments with crap arguments waiting for the government pension plan to come. After all perception is not what some people with sinful machines are trying to explain, but some long dead guy, who, like Huemer, could not understand the blood circulation even to save his life.

[Matthew Adelstein · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good case against skepticism. I found various assumptions implausible and various points hard to follow, but it was, all in all, a good read, and said much that was true and important.

[Tyler · Rating 5 out of 5]

I had the pleasure of meeting Professor Huemer over the summer of 2011. He is able to convey his opinions and arguments very clearly. He's got a lot of good opinions and reasoning to back it up. This short book is evidence of that. So much so that I ended up rereading it (and plan to again in case I missed anything) because there is a lot to take in.

In this book he attacks skepticism of both sorts; external knowledge and universal skepticism. He explains the difference between the two. About half of the book is dedicated to his solution to the justification of belief. He builds it upon direct realism and foundationalism. Something which is called phenomenal conservatism. In this book, he explains it as:

If it seems to S as if p, then S thereby has at least prima facie justification for believing that p.

He has since expanded his version of it. I won't go into details, however. This book made me a PC believer and it will be hard for the skeptic to make a successful counter argument. He makes very strong arguments against skepticism, presents his theory, comes up with objections to his theory, and then he answers them. This is a very good epistemology book and I recommend it for anyone who is interested in epistemology rather than just learning what the popular theories are.

[Διόνυσος Ελευθέριος · Rating 2 out of 5]

In Skepticism and the Veil of Perception Michael Huemer aims to undermine skepticism about direct realism and to articulate his own version of direct realism. It's a thoughtful book that is wide enough in scope that it can serve as a useful introduction to the external world realism debate in philosophy. Nevertheless, many of Huemer's most pivotal claims are vague to the extent that his ultimate project is unpersuasive (in my view). His theory of perception—on which his version of direct realism rests—is certainly controversial, and in many places, his presentation of it is far too simple to overcome the long 2,000-plus-year history of skepticism. It just can't be that easy (and it's not). Also, his assault on so-called global skepticism fares fairly well, but then that's too easy of a target; mitigated skeptics and indirect realists of many different stripes will simply be unpersuaded. Recommended for anyone who wants to learn more.

[John Reis · Rating 5 out of 5]

Huemer is a direct foundationalist.

He addresses global skepticism immediately, pointing out that it is self-refuting. He then takes on skepticism about the external world. He begins by listing the four specific skeptical arguments: the infinite regress argument, the problem of the criterion, how do you get outside your head and the brain in a vat problem.

He takes the position that his foundationalism addresses the infinite regress: perceptions are not cognitions and they are where we all begin.

I find this compelling, because I have thought it a long time myself. Humans lived before language. They navigated the world. They certainly engaged in thinking before they had language. They could identify connections if not causes in the world. They knew what to eat. They recognized predators and friends. They invented morality most likely.

His argument against the brain in a vat scenario is that this is only a scenario an indirect realist can find plausible. In a world of direct realists could this idea gain any traction? I guess I refer to Samuel Johnson’s stubbed toe. The evil demon scenario and all of its derivatives relies on a Creator god or a confusion about the difference between perception, imagination and memory. Rememberings are not the same as perceptions. Perceptions anchor our other cognitions. They are not like our mental operations.

[Error Theorist · Rating 5 out of 5]

Huemer's book was a fantastic response to the global skeptic and skeptic about the external world. The direct realist thesis and phenomenological conservatism Huemer espouses are rather powerful tools in the common sense philosopher's arsenal to combat the skeptic's arguments.