The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory

by Iwao Hirose (Editor), Jonas Olson (Editor)

Value theory, or axiology, looks at what things are good or bad, how good or bad they are, and, most fundamentally, what it is for a thing to be good or bad. Questions about value and about what is valuable are important to moral philosophers, since most moral theories hold that we ought to promote the good (even if this is not the only thing we ought to do). This Handbook focuses on value theory as it pertains to ethics, broadly construed, and provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary debates pertaining not only to philosophy but also to other disciplines-most notably, political theory and economics.The Handbook's twenty-two newly commissioned chapters are divided into three parts. Part Foundations concerns fundamental and interrelated issues about the nature of value and distinctions between kinds of value. Part Structure concerns formal properties of value that bear on the possibilities of measuring and comparing value. Part Extensions, finally, considers specific topics, ranging from health to freedom, where questions of value figure prominently.

Genres: Philosophy

456 pages, Kindle Edition

First published May 1, 2015

Reviews

[Teo]

Contents

Hirose I & Olson J (eds.) (2015) Oxford Handbook of Value Theory, The

Introduction to Value Theory :: Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson
• I.1. What Is Value Theory?
• I.2. Foundations
• I.3. Structure
• I.4. Extensions
• Acknowledgment
• Notes
• References

Part I: Foundations

01. Value and Normativity :: Michael J. Zimmerman
• 1.1. Introduction
• 1.2. Accounting for the Right in Terms of the Good
• 1.3. Accounting for the Good in Terms of the Right
• 1.4. Combining the Accounts
• Acknowledgment
• References

02. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value :: Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen
• 2.1. Final and Nonfinal Values
• 2.2. Varieties of Nonfinal (Extrinsic) Value
• 2.3. The Coherence of IE
• Acknowledgments
• Notes
• References

03. Doubts about Intrinsic Value :: Jonas Olson
• 3.1. Introduction: G. E. Moore and His Critics
• 3.2. What Did Moore Think about Intrinsic Value?
• 3.3. Doubts about the Fundamentality of Intrinsic Value
• 3.4. Doubts about the Property of Intrinsic Value
• 3.5. Doubts about the Concept of Intrinsic Value
• Acknowledgments
• Notes
• References

04. Value and Desires :: Graham Oddie
• 4.1. The Apparent Magnetism of the Good
• 4.2. Idealism
• 4.2.1. Subject-Relative Desire-Dependent Values
• 4.2.2. Subject-Neutral Values
• 4.3. Realism
• 4.3.1. Normative Realism
• 4.3.2. Axiological Realism
• 4.4. Conclusion
• Notes
• References

05. Value and Emotions :: Christine Tappolet
• 5.1. Value-Emotion Equivalences
• 5.2. Are Affective Concepts Evaluative?
• 5.3. Conclusion
• Acknowledgment
• Notes
• References

06. Neutral and Relative Value :: Garrett Cullity
• 6.1. Relative Value and “Good for”
• 6.2. Goodness and Fittingness
• 6.3. Consequentialism and Relative Value
• 6.4. Relative and Neutral Goodness
• 6.4.1. Nonindexation
• 6.4.2. Universalization
• 6.4.3. No Agent-Reference
• 6.4.4. The View from Nowhere
• 6.4.5. Impartiality
• 6.5. Is Relative-Value Consequentialism Vacuous?
• 6.6. Is Relative-Value Consequentialism Plausible?
• 6.7. Conclusion
• Acknowledgments
• Notes
• References

07. Value and Time :: Krister Bykvist
• 7.1. The Time of What Has Value
• 7.1.1. Future-Orientedness
• 7.1.2. Double-Counting
• 7.1.3. Momentary Well-Being
• 7.1.4. Atemporal Goods
• 7.2. The Time of Value: The Badness of Death
• 7.3. The Value of Time
• 7.3.1. Duration
• 7.3.2. Life-Periods
• 7.3.3. Temporal Order
• 7.3.4. Historical Axiologies and Future-Orientedness
• 7.3.5. The Value of Tense
• References

08. Monism and Pluralism about Value :: Chris Heathwood
• 8.1. What Are Axiological Monism and Pluralism?
• 8.1.1. Axiological Preliminaries
• 8.1.2. Monism and Pluralism about Value Properties
• 8.1.3. Substantive Monism and Pluralism
• 8.1.3.1. Substantive Monism about Welfare
• 8.1.3.2. Substantive Pluralism about Welfare
• 8.1.3.3. Which Things Are Good versus What Makes Them Good
• 8.1.3.4. Monism and Pluralism about Value Simpliciter
• 8.1.4. Radical Pluralism: The Fragmentation of Axiological Value
• 8.1.5. Further Problems in Understanding Substantive Monism and Pluralism
• 8.2. Arguments for and against Monism and Pluralism
• 8.2.1. The Straightforward Argument for Substantive Pluralism
• 8.2.2. The Argument from the Explanatory Inadequacy of Substantive Pluralism
• 8.2.3. The Argument from Uncompensability for Radical Pluralism
• 8.2.4. Comparability Arguments
• Acknowledgments
• Notes
• References

09. Prudential Value :: Valerie Tiberius
• 9.1. Introduction
• 9.2. Objective List and Eudaimonist Theories
• 9.3. Hedonism
• 9.4. Desire Theories
• 9.5. Other Internalist Theories
• 9.6. Well-Being in Context
• Acknowledgments
• Notes
• References

10. Kantian Axiology and the Dualism of Practical Reason :: Ralf M. Bader
• 10.1. Introduction
• 10.2. Kantian Axiology
• 10.3. The Dualism of Practical Reason
• 10.3.1. Formal Values
• 10.3.2. Substantive Values
• 10.3.3. Conditional Values
• 10.4. Unindexed Oughts
• 10.5. Incompleteness and Transitivity
• 10.6. Silencing versus Bracketing versus Canceling
• 10.7. Conclusion
• Acknowledgments
• Notes
• References

Part II: Structure

11. Value Incomparability and Incommensurability :: Ruth Chang
• 11.1. Incommensurability and Incomparability
• 11.2. What Is Incomparability?
• 11.2.1. Of Values
• 11.2.2. Of Bearers/Alternatives for Choice
• 11.3. What Incomparability Is Not
• 11.3.1. Parity
• 11.3.2. Indeterminacy
• 11.3.3. Noncomparability
• 11.4. Why Is Incomparability Important?
• 11.4.1. Value, Reasons, Action
• 11.4.2. Maximalism
• Acknowledgments
• Notes
• References

12. Value Superiority :: Gustaf Arrhenius and Wlodek Rabinowicz
• 12.1. Introduction
• 12.2. Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Repugnant Conclusions
• 12.3. Aggregation of Welfare and Non-Archimedeanism
• 12.4. The General Structure of Superiority in Value
• 12.5. Strong Superiority without Abrupt Breaks
• 12.6. Independence
• 12.7. Giving Up Independence
• 12.8. Weak Superiority Is Different
• Appendix 12.1. Strong Superiority without Abrupt Breaks
• Appendix 12.2. The Importance of Independence: Abrupt Breaks
• Appendix 12.3. The Importance of Independence: Collapse
• Appendix 12.4. Convergence to Upper Limits
• Appendix 12.5. Weak Superiority
• Appendix 12.6. Minimal Superiority
• Acknowledgments
• Notes
• References

13. General and Personal Good: Harsanyi’s Contribution to the Theory of Value :: John Broome
• 13.1. Introduction
• 13.2. The Theorem
• 13.3. Interpretation
• 13.4. Examples: Prioritarianism and Utilitarianism
• 13.5. Accepting or Rejecting the Conclusion
• 13.6. Rejecting Completeness
• 13.7. Rejecting Strong Independence
• 13.8. Rejecting the Principle of Personal Good
• 13.9. Utility and Goodness
• 13.10. Conclusion
• Notes
• References

14. Theories of Value Aggregation: Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, Prioritarianism :: Nils Holtug
• 14.1. Introduction
• 14.2. Utilitarianism
• 14.3. Egalitarianism
• 14.4. Prioritarianism
• 14.5. Worries about Aggregation
• Acknowledgments
• Notes
• References

15. Organic Unities :: Erik Carlson
• 15.1. G. E. Moore’s Notion of an Organic Unity
• 15.2. Moore’s Additivity Principle
• 15.3. Alternative Definitions of an Organic Unity
• 15.4. Contextualism versus Moorean Holism
• 15.5. Are There Organic Unities?
• Acknowledgments
• Notes
• References

16. Skepticism about Value Aggregation :: Iwao Hirose
• 16.1. Introduction
• 16.2. The General Definition of Aggregation
• 16.3. Objection from Counterexamples
• 16.4. Objection from the Separateness of Persons
• 16.5. Two Other Arguments
• 16.6. Nonaggregative Theories
• 16.7. Two Nonaggregative Solutions to the Number Problem
• Notes
• References

Part III: Extensions

17. Value and Cost-Benefit Analysis :: Matthew D. Adler
• 17.1. Introduction
• 17.2. What Is CBA?
• 17.3. CBA, Rationality Conditions on Preferences, and the Inference of Monetary Equivalents
• 17.4. CBA and “Remoteness”
• 17.5. CBA and Interpersonal Comparisons
• 17.6. Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency
• 17.7. Social Welfare Functions
• Notes
• References

18. The Value of Health :: Daniel M. Hausman
• 18.1. Evaluative Views of Health
• 18.2. Naturalistic Views of Health
• 18.3. Why Is It Better to Be Healthier?
• 18.4. Preferences and the Value of Health
• 18.5. Do Health States Have Values?
• 18.6. Valuing Token Health States
• 18.6.1. Health and Well-Being
• 18.6.2. Health and Opportunity
• 18.6.3. Health and Capability
• 18.7. Conclusions
• Acknowledgments
• Notes
• References

19. Freedom and Its Value :: Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Yongsheng Xu
• 19.1. Introduction
• 19.2. The Concept of Freedom
• 19.2.1. MacCallum’s (1967) Conceptual Framework
• 19.2.2. Freedom to Do/Be/Have What?
• 19.2.3. Freedom from What?
• 19.2.4. Contingent Freedom
• 19.3. The Value of Freedom
• 19.3.1. The Instrumental Value of Freedom
• 19.3.2. The Intrinsic Value of Freedom
• 19.4. The Measurement of Freedom and Its Value
• 19.4.1. Some General Conceptual Issues Relating to the Measurement of Freedom and Its Value
• 19.4.2. The Cardinality Rule for Assessing Freedom and Its Limitations
• 19.4.3. The Value of Freedom
• 19.4.4. Diversity and the Value of Freedom
• 19.4.5. Interpersonal Comparisons of Individual Freedom
• 19.5. The Concept of an Opportunity Set
• Acknowledgments
• Notes
• References

20. Value in Nature :: David Schmidtz
• 20.1. What to Expect from Moral Theory
• 20.2. Valuing Nature
• 20.2.1. Instrumental versus Intrinsic
• 20.2.2. Relative versus Instrumental
• 20.2.3. Valuing for a Reason
• 20.3. Value without Valuers
• 20.4. Moral Standing
• 20.4.1. What Kinds of Things Have Moral Standing?
• 20.4.2. Anthropocentrism
• 20.5. Species Egalitarianism
• 20.5.1. Individualism and Holism
• 20.6. Incommensurate Values
• 20.7. Conclusion
• Notes
• References

21. Population Axiology :: M. A. Roberts
• 21.1. Introduction
• 21.2. Problems with the Traditional Formula
• 21.3. Clarifications of the Person-Based Approach
• 21.4. Inclusion and the Basic Person-Based Result
• 21.5. The Person-Based Intuition and the Nonidentity Problem
• 21.6. The Repugnant Conclusion and the Impersonal Approach
• 21.7. Conclusion
• Acknowledgments
• Notes
• References

22. The Value of Existence :: Gustaf Arrhenius and Wlodek Rabinowicz
• 22.1. Introduction
• 22.2. The Person-Affecting Restriction and the Existential Question
• 22.3. Neither Better nor Worse to Be Than Not to Be
• 22.4. The Argument from Absurdity
• 22.5. The Argument from Welfare Level Comparisons
• 22.6. Guardian Angels and Fitting Attitudes
• 22.7. The Issue of Value Bearers
• 22.8. The Person-Affecting Restriction Revisited
• Acknowledgments
• Notes
• References

Index

[Rory Fox · Rating 5 out of 5]

Written for an Academic Audience.

This is a book for professional philosophers and ethicists. It covers a lot of territory but few, if any, of the essays are easy or straightforward, for anyone other than graduate level students of the relevant subject areas.

The range of essays is fairly comprehensive and detailed, and the essays themselves explore a range of views on teach topic. They provide the kinds of overviews and discussions which are ideal for reading lists for essay writing.

However the focus is a little mono-cultural, focusing on the authors and styles of language most familiar to the modern Analytic (Anglo-American) style of Philosophy. This means, for example, that teleology is not a main focus. The first essay opens by contrasting evaluative (good/bad) and deonitic (right/wrong) approaches, but the very use of the word ‘deontic’ tends to elide deontology and teleology as a single set of right/wrong making issues. Later in the volume there is an entire essay devoted to Kant and issues arising within what is normally considered to be his deontology, but there is no equivalent essay exploring the very different approach of those following a more Aristotelian style.

Perhaps this is because Teleology is considered to have died and been buried by the Analytic Tradition? If so, then that illustrates the point again, that the book is a little insular in its assumptions and thus its consequent focus.

Another example is European and Existentialist styles of philosophy. There is a nod towards that kind of approach, in that there is an essay exploring ideas of Freedom and there is an essay exploring ideas of Existence, but both frame those questions entirely within the language and thought of Analytic Philosophy. A critic might say that that is about as adequate as analysing French poetry by reading it purely in English.

Overall however, in terms of the book’s analytic focus and its intended professional readership; it does well, what it sets out to do. I only wish it had been a little more ambitious in terms of its breadth.