John of Salisbury’s Metalogicon can be recommended for its historical prominence and pedagogical insights, but not as an introduction to logic.
The Metalogicon is important historically for two reasons, the first being its author. John of Salisbury (1115/20-1180) was one of the major figures in “the twelfth-century Renaissance.” He combined the roles of author, philosopher, diplomat and ecclesiast. John studied under some of the leading medieval thinkers of his time, including Peter Abelard, and was secretary to Theobald and Thomas Becket, both archbishops of Canterbury. These widespread connections lead to a great deal of interesting information concerning many key philosophers and educators during one of the principal flowerings of Western thought and civilization.
The second reason for the Metalogicon’s historical importance is its subject. Both John’s title Metalogicon, which means “on behalf of logic,” and the translator’s subtitle, “A Twelfth-Century Defense of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium,” make clear that John’s purpose is apologetic. At the beginning of the founding of European universities, John is writing a defense of the medieval educational system organized in the trivium, which was the study of grammar, logic, and rhetoric. The trivium and university education were under attack by the Cornificius, a name invented by John of Salisbury, and the “Cornificians.” We do not know who the person was, but from John’s writing he appears to have been a leader of monastic opponents to the new learning derived from Aristotle and to the necessity for and utility of formal training in education since, if one has the native intellectual endowments, he does not need the teaching and, if he does not have these abilities, teaching him would do no good.
His apologetic for the trivium results in a permanent contribution to pedagogical theory and practice. I was pleased to discover that John’s views on education are founded upon human nature, which is the concept or reality that we continually try to get our students to base much of their thinking on. Nature has “elevated man by the privilege of reason and distinguished him by the faculty of speech” (9). Following the strain of classical thought in this area, John claims that man has an inborn love of the good and seeks happiness, which cannot be acquired without virtue, and that man is a social being. Reason and eloquence are meant to work together. “Just as eloquence, unenlightened by reason, is rash and blind, so wisdom, without the power of expression, is feeble and maimed” (10). Wisdom without eloquence may “increase one’s personal satisfaction, but it rarely and only slightly contributes to the welfare of human society” (9-10).
Thus, at the very beginning of his treatise, John has clearly stated the connection between human nature and two of the arts of the trivium, logic (reason) and rhetoric (eloquence). An additional point is that man is by nature a social being, which means that his happiness cannot “exist entirely apart from mutual association and divorced from human society” (10). Indeed, the social nature of human beings is a consequence of the creative work of the Triune God who “has so arranged the parts of the universe that each requires the help of the others, and they mutually compensate for their respective deficiencies” (10).
John also strongly supports the emphasis on virtue formation in education. “I am convinced that all things read or written are useless except so far as they have a good influence on one’s manner of life” (6). I am in agreement with this so long as virtue does not become the sole aim, nor a goal that engulfs all other concerns. Related to the second point are the three things John fears: “ignorance of truth, misled or wanton statement of falsehood, and the haughty assertion of fact” (7). In teaching history and philosophy, I want to make sure that I do not remain satisfied with the little truth I know, make false statements about the views and actions of other people and ages, and never exhibit a disdain for my students.
There are several insights into pedagogical practice. While not relating the three subjects of the trivium to the stages of child development as explicitly and extensively as does Dorothy Sayers in Lost Tools of Learning, the Metalogicon recognizes that grammar, which is “the science of speaking and writing correctly,” is “the starting point of all liberal studies” (37). Teachers must not try to teach subjects for which their students are not ready.
On a very practical level there were two reminders for me as a teacher. First, he stresses the necessity of review with the witty expression, “each succeeding day became the disciple of its predecessor” (68). In my eagerness to move on in my subject I can forget that much of what I teach is new to the students and that without review they will not remember what they have been taught. John also cautions against an excessive workload for the students, whose innate ability is “dulled by excessive work” (36). I teach at Cair Paravel Latin School whose mission is to cultivate lifelong learners. This mission has led me to reduce student workload. Not only does an onerous amount of work dull the mind, but it also makes the subject so distasteful that students will quite possibly never want to read or think about it ever again.
John’s general comments on logic are insightful. First, logic is defined and explained as an art. In its broadest sense, logic is “the science of verbal expression and [argumentative] reason” (32). The more restricted sense is “limited to rules of [argumentative] reasoning” (32). In its broadest sense logic “includes all instruction relative to words” (32). Understood in this way it is “highly useful and necessary” (32). One can add to this that man by nature has the gift of reasoning and talking; so, instruction in logic both fulfills man’s nature as an individual and as a social being with its goal of mastering thought and expression.
Unfortunately, for this novice in logic, the third and fourth books of the Metalogicon are mostly summaries of the various treatises of Aristotle and discussions of their relative worth. To learn the actual art of logic one needs to look elsewhere.