The Framers' Coup: The Making of the United States Constitution

by Michael J. Klarman

Americans revere their Constitution. Few, then, would describe the writing of it as a process fraught with highly improbable circumstances, coincidences, compromises, and largely unexpected outcomes. As Benjamin Franklin keenly observed, any assembly of men, no matter how talented, bring with them "all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests and their selfish views." One need not deny that the Framers had good intentions in order to believe that—inevitably—they also had interests. Based on prodigious research and told largely through the voices of the participants, Michael Klarman's The Framers' Coup: The Making of the United States Constitution tells the story of how the Framers' interests shaped the constitution, and what that means for our use of the document today.

The Philadelphia convention could easily have been a failure, or not happened at all. Without the heroic efforts of James Madison, George Washington's last-minute decision to attend, and the countless negotiations in the midst of debate and gridlock, the constitution we know today may never have been ratified. Had anything gone wrong and the convention been dissolved without consensus, any number of events may have occurred, such as a civil war, or reversion to monarchy. Klarman's narration of these events is full of colorful characters and riveting stories: the rebellion by debtor farmers in Massachusetts; the deal that induced John Hancock to support ratification; the secretive dealings of Alexander Hamilton and John Jay at the New York ratifying convention that produced an improbable victory. The constitution, he shows, was not created by rousing national consensus—an impractical concept at the time—but by the personal preferences of its creators. Moreover, the convention produced a constitution very different from what most Americans anticipated. How did the Framers convince Americans to approve a scheme so unrepresentative of national opinion? And to what extent should Americans rely on it today?

Towards the end of his life, Thomas Jefferson noted that each generation has "a right to choose for itself the form of government it believes most promotive of its own happiness," and that constitutions should not be deemed, "too sacred to be touched." As Jefferson would have recognized, and as Klarman depicts in this captivating retelling of one of America's most famous stories, the Constitution is and has always been used as a tool to defend particular interests, and its sanctity should not go unchallenged.

Genres: History, Politics, Law, American History, Nonfiction, American Revolution, American

880 pages, Hardcover

First published October 14, 2016

About the author

An American legal historian, and constitutional law scholar, Michael Klarman is the Kirkland & Ellis Professor at Harvard Law School.

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 3 out of 5]

“In the final analysis, the Constitution – like any governmental arrangement – must be defended on the basis of its consistency with our basic…political commitments and the consequences that it produces. That is has been around for a very long time or that its authors were especially wise and virtuous should not be sufficient to immunize it against criticism. Toward the end of his long life, Thomas Jefferson, who played no direct role in either the drafting or the ratification of the Constitution, sagely observed that because ‘laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind’ and because each generation has ‘a right to choose for itself the form of government it believes most promotive of its own happiness,’ constitutions ought not to receive ‘sanctimonious reverence’ and be deemed, ‘like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched.’ As Jefferson would have recognized, those who wish to sanctify the Constitution are often using it to defend some particular interest that, in their own day, cannot in fact be adequately justified on the merits…”
- Michael J. Klarman, The Framer’s Coup: The Making of the United States Constitution

The United States Constitution is a fascinating document. It is not super long – with all its amendments, it is less than eight-thousand words – yet very few people ever read it start to finish. Its language is arcane, ambiguous, and open to varied meanings, yet everyone thinks they know exactly what it says. It governs a modern global superpower, yet is over two-hundred years old.

Since its very inception – long before its ratification – every aspect of the United States Constitution has been hotly debated. Its meanings, the limits of its powers, the rights it bestows, all have been the subject of constant argument, from the days of quill and parchment, to the age of artificial intelligence.

That the Constitution is flawed should be self-evident. Unfortunately, both the charter and the framers who wrote it are gilded by myth. Instead of being viewed as a work-in-progress, it is often portrayed as American scripture, a thing – in Benjamin Franklin’s words – “so near to perfection” as to be astonishing.

Michael J. Klarman’s The Framer’s Coup offers a very different view. In methodically accounting for every step of the Constitution’s creation, he describes an instrument that – far from divine – is actually a work of contingency, competing interests, and antidemocratic elitism.

***

I know I’m a bit preoccupied with book size, but this is a monster, with 631 pages of small-font text, followed by a further 181 pages of endnotes.

This material includes an introduction and conclusion sandwiching seven mega-chapters that – with one exception – proceed chronologically. Given that Klarman is a Harvard law professor, it is not surprising that this thing has the systematic layout of a legal brief.

***

Klarman begins The Framer’s Coup with the problems of the Articles of Confederation, which had provided a loose system of governance since 1781. The Articles had many problems. So many, in fact, that it takes Klarman over a hundred pages to discuss them all. However, two main issues rise above the rest. The first had to do with Congress’s inability to collect taxes, relegated instead to making unenforceable requisitions. The lack of taxing authority made it difficult to redeem debt. And following the American Revolution, there was a lot of debt.

More damaging than its structural flaws, though, was the Articles’ immutability, as it could only be changed by unanimous consent. Even though everyone recognized the shortcomings, nothing could be done. No matter the reasonableness of proposed solutions, one state would always say no.

***

After diagnosing the ailments of the Articles of Confederation, Klarman moves onto the cure, the famed Constitutional Convention from May 1787 to September 1787. This is where the “coup” of the title comes from, for the Confederation Congress had given the deliberating body power to fix the Articles, not scrap it and start over. The men who attended the Convention, especially the Virginians, and in particular James Madison, decided not to throw good money after bad, and started anew.

Klarman’s chapter on the Convention is 131 pages all on its own, though even this feels inadequate to the task, since there is a lot going on. He further subdivides this mass with subheadings that break down the sausage-making into its component parts. Klarman starts with the Virginia Plan, which provided the foundational blueprint, and then proceeds through the various solutions proposed for the Article’s failings. Ultimately, this took the form of three roughly coequal branches with expanded federal power.

The nature of this expansion – and the discussion it engendered – is the subject of the balance of The Framer’s Coup.

***

Writing the Constitution was one thing; getting it ratified turned out to be another. Importantly, as Klarman notes, the framers dispensed with unanimity. This decision proved of utmost importance, because Rhode Island existed, and you can’t have absolute agreement when it’s involved.

The ratification fight pitted the Federalists, who were for the Constitution, against the Antifederalists, who were not. Even though the Federalists had a number of advantages, the fight still proved difficult. Eventually – spoiler alert! – the Constitution received the requisite approval from nine states. Even Rhode Island eventually caved in.

***

The chronological sequence closes with a chapter on the Bill of Rights, the name given to the Constitution’s first ten amendments. Federalists were initially against the Bill of Rights, finding it redundant. Since the Constitution only gave the government enumerated powers, they argued, there was no need to protect individual rights. Antifederalists – and some Federalists too – called shenanigans, and the promise of a Bill of Rights eased the ratification process. Madison finally took control of the matter, despite initially being against amendments, and helped to craft them.

I wish that Klarman spent more time on this issue, if only because the tortured syntax and artfully abstruse language of the Bill of Rights still animate so many political quarrels today.

***

As noted up top, there is one chapter that stands alone thematically: the role of slavery in the Constitution. It is not surprising – or should not be surprising – that slavery had a huge impact in shaping the Constitution’s structural provisions. After all, as Klarman notes, nothing propelled the framers more firmly than protection of property rights, and enslaved men and women were considered property.

The Constitution had to balance a lot of different factors, of course. Big states versus small states. North versus south. The extant states versus the states not yet in being. With that said, slavery weighed heavily on the question of representation. It also provided some particularly odious language that – because the Constitution is changed by appendation, not interlineation – has never been erased.

***

Substantively, The Framer’s Coup is great. Artistically, it is not. This is not narrative history with its emphasis on individual personalities or dramatic scenes. Early on, Klarman provides biographical footnotes, but these are nothing more than a curriculum vitae. There is no sense of being there, which I appreciate in histories.

Furthermore, this is a book built on repetitions. We hear the arguments at the Constitutional Convention. Then we hear about them after the Convention. Then we go through them again during the ratification process.

I got a lot out of this book, just not literary enjoyment.

***

Over the years, various interpretational theories have arisen, mediated by a Supreme Court that has always – from the time of Federalist John Marshall – been politically driven. Part of the reason the Supreme Court plays such a big role is that the Constitution is nearly impossible to alter.

That’s a problem for a couple of reasons.

First and foremost, the Constitution is really old. It was written at a time when monied white men wore pantaloons and made all the decisions; women had no rights; and Indians and black people were treated as a species less than human. It was written in the belief that George Washington would always be president, and that political parties would never exist. It was written when the United States had roughly four million inhabitants.

Things are different now. This is a country of nearly 350 million inhabitants, with technologies that would make Washington and Madison crap their pants if they were brought back to life. Yet we keep trying to twist the Constitution to fit a changing reality, torturing language already tortured to begin.

The Constitution is also incredibly undemocratic, as intended by its creators. The Electoral College and the Senate enshrine weighted votes, so that a person voting in Wyoming is more important than a person voting in California or Texas.

The bummer of it all is that – like the Articles of Confederation before it – the Constitution has become stone-set. According to Klarman, just 7% of the United States population can block an amendment. It makes the Constitution feel less like a miracle, and more like an unbreakable pact with the ghosts of a dead epoch.

[robin friedman · Rating 5 out of 5]

A New Study Of The Formation Of The Constitution

Americans continue to be fascinated by the early history of our country and by the Framers of the Constitution. The Founding era has always presented a fertile area for scholarship as well. Michael Klarman's new book, "The Framers' Coup: the Making of the United States Constitution" (2016) presents a history of the making of the constitution remarkable for its breadth and depth. Klarman, Kirkland Ellis Professor at Harvard Law School, teaches Constitutional Law and American Constitutional History. His book "From Jim Crow to Civil Rights" received the 2005 Bancroft Prize.

"The Framers' Coup" is a long, dense book that demands sustained reading. It will reward serious students of the constitutional era but is probably not for those readers with only a casual interest in the subject. Klarman gives the following three goals of his study, all of which are borne out by the text. First, the book tells the entire story of the Founding, from the history of the Articles of Confederation through the enactment of the Bill of Rights. Most prior single-volume studies have not attempted to cover the Constitutional period in this breadth.

Second, Klarman tells the story making heavy use of the writings of the participants. In so doing, the book uses formal speeches and writings derived from the Constitutional Convention and other proceedings. But Klarman also makes extensive use of letters and private correspondence not intended for publication. The book is full of quotations from letters from participants in the Constitutional Convention to one another and to people who were not in attendance, such as Thomas Jefferson. It offers a running private commentary on the course of events. These private communications add a great deal to this book while they considerably slow down the flow of the story. These types of private, candid communications are valuable but probably should be taken with a degree of caution.

Third, Klarman advances an interpretation of the Constitutional Era that he claims "differs somewhat from those previously offered". Klarman does not make icons of the Founders but his interpretation remains within the scope of many studies of the era. Klarman emphasizes the undemocratic, conservative aspect of the Constitution and of those who formulated it. He writes: "I have been especially drawn to the view, long advanced by others, that the Constitution was a conservative counterrevolution against what leading American statesmen regarded as the irresponsible economic measures enacted by a majority of state legislatures in the mid-1780s, which they diagnosed as a symptom of excessive democracy." Klarman further explains that he was drawn by two questions: 1. why the delegates to the Constitutional Convention wrote a constitution that differed from the likely expectations of most Americans and 2. how the Framers (the Federalists) were able to secure the ratification of a document that severely restricted popular participation in government.

The book is indeed remarkable for its broad scope, its detail, and its interpretation. Klarman begins with a through exploration of the Articles of Confederation and its flaws. He describes early divisions in America focusing on an abortive treaty with Spain regarding the navigation of the Mississippi River and on Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts. He explores the difficulties resulting from the lack of a strong central government. Klarman also describes the conflict in the states between debtors and creditors over the issuance of paper money. He argues that the Founders became alarmed at what they perceived as the threat to property by the poorer classes of people. His interpretation of the Constitution makes a great deal of the Founders efforts to protect private property. In this regard, Klarman maintains throughout his study, the Founders might have made different choices than they did as there were good, reasonable arguments on the other side.

The middle chapters of this extensive study discuss the drafting of the Constitution and the Constitutional Convention. The book offers a detailed discussion of the issues faced by the Convention, how the Convention came close to breaking-up without reaching a decision, and how compromises were reached. There are extensive discussions of the role of the Senate, the Judiciary, the president, the coining of money, and much else. The discussion includes much in the way of both process and substance. It emphasizes the compromises that were reached, and the over-arching interest in property and skepticism about broad, popular democracy. An extended separate chapter of the book explores the many issues in the Constitution related to slavery. Klarman is properly skeptical about claims that the Founders could have agreed to a Constitution without accepting the role of the "peculiar institution" in the South.

The book proceeds with two lengthy chapters about the ratification of the constitution. Particularly valuable was the discussion of the antifederalists, the opponents of ratification. Klarman makes a great deal of how the antifederalists tended to be from the backcountry, less well-educated, and less articulate than the Federalist supporters of ratification. In addition, the Federalists had the support of the media. Still, Klarman argues, the antifederalists had important criticisms to offer and came near to defeating ratification. The contrast between elite, educated Americans and their less sophisticated countrymen continues to resonate in American politics, as shown, perhaps in the 2016 presidential election. Klarman offers a lengthy, individualized discussion of the ratification process for the constitution in each of the thirteen states. The process frequently was not pretty or elevated but instead involved the sharp politicking that will be familiar to modern students.

In the final chapter of the book, Klarman describes the period immediately after the ratification of the Constitution, with George Washington as president and the enactment of the Bill of Rights. The Federalists had at first opposed the Bill of Rights, but the importance of amendments came into focus during the ratification process. Klarman shows that the Bill of Rights did not change the structure of the strong Federal government, as opponents had hoped, but instead were regarded at the time as soft provisions with no lasting import. History would show differently.

If there is a single hero and main character in this study, it would be James Madison. Klarman describes his role in the Confederation period, his persistence in calling for the Convention and for focusing its agenda, his role in the ratification process, and his almost single-handed role in securing enactment of the Bill of Rights. Madison is not made an icon in this book but rather, as are the other participants, is shown as moved by day-to-day political concerns more than by political philosophy. If there is a lack of coverage in this book, it is in the scant treatment of "The Federalist" which receives only relatively brief, passing mentions rather than sustained treatment.

The book is organized into eight chapters with factual discussion in the early sections of each chapter followed by more interpretive sections at the conclusion of each chapter. The book is critical but not deflationary or mocking. I came away from my reading with, I think, more sympathy and appreciation for the Federalists and their achievement in constitution-making than the author's. I learned a great deal from this massive book. It requires patience and slow reading but the effort will be rewarded by those who wish to think closely about the constitution and about the Founders.

Robin Friedman

[Mark · Rating 5 out of 5]

The drafting and ratification of the Constitution of the United States is one of the most heavily mythologized parts of American history. For many people, what happened in Philadelphia was nothing less than a divinely-inspired blueprint for a national government, with the wise men who created it lionized as the "Founding Fathers" with all of the majesty implied by the use of the capital letters. Though this image has not gone unchallenged, it's endurance reflects its patriotic usefulness, an example of the national exceptionalism of which Americans are so proud.

Michael Klarman's book offers a very different view of the creation of our nation's governing document. Drawing upon a vast range of contemporary writings, he argues that the creation of the Constitution was driven by fears for the effects of democracy on economic policy. The key concern was debt. During the American Revolution the states and the Continental Congress had accumulated an enormous amount of debt in their fight against the British. Though the United States had won the war, in its aftermath the country was plunged into a severe economic depression that exacerbated the economic problems of thousands of Americans. Pressured by high taxes to service the debts, voters in several states elected officials who pursued a variety of measures designed to ease tax burdens and make debts easier to pay off, many of which threatened to destabilize national unity.

It was concerns over this which Klarman sees as driving the push for a new national governing structure. As he explains, the government provided in the Articles of Confederation lacked authority to address the problem, and was itself virtually prostrate from the burden of debts and the lack of any reliable means of paying them off. For many of the people behind the push for a stronger national government, the heart of the problem lay with the disproportionate power possessed by the smaller states, which enjoyed equal representation in the Confederation Congress. It was this problem which James Madison's Virginia Plan sought to address by creating a new legislature with power residing in a lower house with representation apportioned by population. His efforts to bully the delegates from the smaller states failed, though, and after a compromise was reached establishing an upper legislative house that maintained the principal of equal state representation, the desire of Madison and his allies to empower the embryonic government waned considerably. It was a fortuitous failure, though because such were the concerns of many people about the final document that even with all of the advantages the Constituion's advocates possessed, ratification was a close-run thing, with the support of the smaller states (who never would have gone along with a structure that would have diminished their representation to the degree Madison proposed) decisive to its success.

Deeply researched and clearly argued, Klarman's book is a masterpiece of historical writing. While his argument echoes the one famously advanced by Charles A. Beard in his book An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States , Klarman makes a more convincing case by nuancing his arguments in ways that acknowledges the complex range of factors involved. Contingency is at the heart of his tale, as he shows the interplay of arguments and how decisions played off of each other in ways that determined the outcome. It makes for an origin story for the Constitution that is more akin to the grimy details of sausage making than the high-minded debates of demigods, but it is one that is truer to the reality of politics than we would like to admit. For that reason alone it is essential reading for anyone interested in learning about the history of our country's founding or how our national government came to be what it is today.

[Ryan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Recommended. My key takeaway is that the Constitution was, to a huge degree, the product of the specific political issues that were relevant to the colonies in 1787. We'd like to think of it having taken a very long view, but it really didn't. Once it became clear that the Articles of Confederation were inadequate to handle the hot-button issues of the day, the framers moved to scrap them.

In addition to the obvious problem of slavery, the contemporary issues that played a huge role what the framers wrote down included:
- Recent fights about John Jay nearly giving away Mississippi River navigation rights to Spain as a representative of the Confederation Congress.
- Shay's rebellion and populist desire for debt forgiveness.
- Excessive money printing by several states, most notably Rhode Island. Seems like everyone was mad at Rhode Island.
- Prewar debts to the British.
- Inter-colony tariffs used by states with good ports--mainly New York--to make money off other states--mainly New Jersey and Connecticut. There's a reason the Constitution turned the colonies in a free trade zone. Greatest trade agreement of all time.

For all the high-minded talk, the Constitution emerged from competing interests of the framers and the constituents they needed to convince for ratification. Moreover, it was largely a product of east coast intellectual elites and in fact was not very popular (at least before ratification) with much of the country--the "real Americans" we might say today. In some states, the only path to ratification was aggressive misapportionment of the state ratification conventions, since majorities of state citizens opposed the Constitution (most notable in South Carolina). The Federalists seeking ratification had control of most of the press and managed to locate most of the ratifying conventions in coastal cities where ratification was popular.

So, what we got was a Constitution that produced a very strong executive, a strong national government, and a number of anti-democratic elements explicitly designed to avoid the empowerment of people like Shay or the Rhode Island money printers.

From the perspective of 2021, we can see a lot of ways in which the short-sighted origins of the document have failed us. We can see major blind spots among the framers. One particularly obvious one is their failure to anticipate the power of political parties; they largely thought they were designing a system with serious checks and balances between the legislature and the executive (and within the bicameral legislature). They didn't anticipate that Congress could be controlled (or half controlled) by people who are loyal to a political party and its president above all.

That said, it is a pretty impressive accomplishment relative to other outcomes we could imagine--there was nothing inevitable about it, and the alternatives could have been much worse. This book raises my opinion of Madison, who did much of the intellectual heavy lifting as well as managing the strategic dimensions of writing and ratifying a new constitution when people just wanted some reforms to the Articles. He also gave us the Bill of Rights, which seemed unimportant at the time--it was a sop to antifederalists who wanted much more serious structural amendments--but, with the (also not well foreseen) empowerment of the courts since that time, has taken on much more importance.

I really enjoyed the book. It left me both more impressed and less impressed with the Constitution and the Framers than I was before, depending on the dimension.

[Christopher · Rating 4 out of 5]

Deadbeats and Rhode Islanders, but I repeat myself.

Klarman's "The Framer's Coup" is an exhaustively detailed history on the development and ratification of the Constitution. Karman does three things that most histories of the ratification don't do: (1) he extensively covers the problems with the Articles of Confederation. Whereas most histories just kind of assume that the Articles were defective/deficient, Klarman really helps the reader understand the frustrations of those living with it. One of the major sources of problem was the requirement for unanimity for any significant action, and Rhode Islanders was a consistent holdout. This became increasingly problematic as the question of war debts started to increase. Those creditors that wanted their debts honored became largely Federalists while those debtor farmers largely became the anti-federalists and were mostly happy with an inefficient central government that wouldn't be able to require payment.

This really helps explain the Constitutional Convention as a collection of men who all basically agreed on the goal (ditching the articles) but were quibbling about the details. It also helps explain in part Hamilton's desire for the assumption of state debts and a funded national debt.

(2) The second thing Klarman does is take us to each of the states and covers in great, primary source, detail, their efforts at ratification. It's a great and systematic approach that is very enlightening especially as you see how certain states delays in voting (Rhode Island) inhibited their ability to affect changes to the Constitution since by then the momentum towards full ratification was already moving ahead.

Klarman does all this while relying nearly exclusively on primary sources which is a wonderful way to understand how the Feds and Anti-Feds really viewed things. Also of note is the way both sides argued for/against ratification. They each thought they were arguing from dispassionate reason and logic while the other side was being irrational or had ulterior motives. Also amusing is the insight that both sides would make whatever arguments they thought would persuade their readers to vote up or down, even if they personally didn't advance or believe those arguments themselves. It had a very kitchen sink vibe to the endeavor.

As it's still a history of a bunch of guys debating fine points of governmental structure, it can get a little dry and sometimes hard to track precisely what the difference at issue is or its relevance, but as a comprehensive single volume history with loads of primary sources, it's one of the best.

[Berin Szoka · Rating 5 out of 5]

Superb. A must read for any student of the constitution or American history.

[Chris Damon · Rating 4 out of 5]

I can’t imagine a more informative one-volume treatment of the reasons for the drafting of the US Constitution to replace the Articles of Confederation, the issues at debate in Philadelphia over major provisions of the new Constitution, the process of ratifying the Constitution in each of the 13 states, and the reasons for the first ten amendments – the Bill of Rights. The book is very clear in its assertions, documents them, and quotes liberally from the writings and speeches of the important political actors of that time. It explains the how and why of the original US Constitution and Bill of Rights: why our federal governmental structure looks like it does and how it was intended to operate.

The principal point emerging from the book is that absolutely nothing about the Constitution that has formed the basis of the US government for over 200 years was assured to be the way it ended up, including its very existence. Important sections of the document and specific words and mechanisms could have easily been very different. Economic interests were a big factor in the positions men took. Circumstances and luck played a role in the final outcome, as well as political shenanigans. In general, urban, coastal, educated elites favored the new Constitution, while backwoods, less-educated, rural interests in in the hinterland opposed it. But there were exceptions, especially Virginia, where many in the educated urban elite also opposed it.
Those who wished to cure the defects of life under the Articles of Confederation ended up creating a government much more national than state-oriented in nature, and less democratic than what was happening in the states under the articles. The author argues, convincingly, that not only was the new Constitution one that bestowed much more power on the national government and was much less democratic in its features than the system it was replacing, but it was more national and undemocratic than most Americans would have preferred at the time. But it was also clear that continued existence under the Articles was not feasible, and the only option the Framers gave the people was the new Constitution as it was drafted in Philadelphia: no intermediate middle-ground system nor any conditional amendments agreed to in advance (other than what ended up being the personal liberty amendments of the Bill of Rights; but none of those amendments related to the structure of the new government.)

I was heartened to learn that the number one divisive issue at the Philadelphia convention, reported by participants at the time to be a bigger issue than all other issues combined, was the notion of giving small states like Delaware and Rhode Island the same representation in the US Senate (2 Senators) as much more populous states like Virginia and Pennsylvania. Most of the convention delegates HATED this, and it was clearly non-democratic as it did not accurately reflect numbers of voting citizens in the various US states. But they had to swallow it as a necessary compromise to get the Constitution approved by the small states (the author does not say this, but I guess we can blame the British for establishing colonies that ended up so unequal in size and population.) Why was I heartened to learn of the widescale detestation of two senators per state? Because in my view that is one of the chief defects of our current system of federal government, and I’m glad that at least our revered Founders recognized the problem back at the beginning. Depressingly, however, the author points out that it is virtually impossible to foresee this provision of the Constitution ever being changed since the process of amending the Constitution requires supermajorities in Congress and among the states for ratification and any such amendment would always be blocked by the smaller states who would lose representation in a Senate proportioned by population as the House is.

While I don’t regret that I had the perseverance to plow through this door-stop of a book (880 pages), I really cannot recommend it to the general reader, or frankly anyone beyond professors of Constitutional Law and federal judges, and Supreme Court Justices and their clerks. The book is a tough row to hoe. While it is written in clear and concise lawyerly prose, the writing style is very dry and wooden – like reading a very long encyclopedia article. It lacks any verve or sparkle or wit. One could make a drinking game out of the frequency of the author’s beginning a sentence with the word “Moreover.” Similar frequency is found with “Thus” and “To be sure.” It can become a little mind-numbing.

[Scriptor Ignotus · Rating 5 out of 5]

By the mid-1780s, it was widely acknowledged that the United States of America had become a shitshow. The federal government, which possessed no independent revenue-raising authority under the Articles of Confederation, was on the verge of defaulting on its foreign debts, unable to pay a nearly mutinous army, and impotent to even offer ransom for commercial ships and sailors taken prisoner by the Barbary pirates. Congress relied for funds on requisitions from the states which were never fulfilled (most states never came close) and which Congress had no power to enforce. States relied on the liberal issuance of government securities that they could not redeem without the imposition of steep poll and property taxes and draconian enforcement measures. With no federal authority to regulate foreign or interstate commerce, the United States was unable to retaliate against punishing British tariffs with the unified protectionist measures that would have enabled it to negotiate a more favorable commercial treaty. American exports declined precipitously—the country was virtually excluded from the international carrying trade—and this, combined with the end of wartime demand, the exodus of wealthy loyalists, and the lack of money in circulation, engendered one of the worst economic depressions in American history.

Negotiations between John Jay and the Spanish minister Diego de Gardoqui over a prospective commercial treaty, undertaken in the hope of opening Spanish markets to American exports, became an object of such contention between the northern and southern states that many feared the union would divide into separate confederations. In exchange for opening its ports to American goods, the Spanish wanted the United States to relinquish its claim to navigation rights on the Mississippi River. Because the Mississippi was the main artery through which western settlers—most of whom were from the south—transported their goods to the international market, its closure would depress the southern economy and reduce the value of the western lands that the southern states hoped to sell to pay their debts. Furthermore, most of the American goods that Spain was offering to buy were only produced by the northern maritime states; tobacco, still the south’s primary cash crop, would have been excluded. Unable to reconcile the disparate regional interests, Congress tabled the treaty, leaving both sides of the issue feeling mistreated.

Since Congress had the power to make treaties but not to enforce compliance with them among the states, there was a perpetual danger that errant states could drag the entire union into international conflict. Southerners pressed for war with Spain over the Mississippi question. When American diplomats confronted their British counterparts over Britain’s failure to vacate its northwestern forts as agreed under the Treaty of Paris, the latter pointed out that the American states had violated the treaty first by ignoring provisions requiring them to make restitution for confiscated British and loyalist property and to repay prewar debts to British creditors. With no federal courts of general jurisdiction, nearly all legal cases—including those pertaining to potential treaty violations—were tried in state courts under judges who relied on the state legislatures for their pay and tenure in office, and thus had little incentive to side against their state when its practices conflicted with federal law.

Nor were substantial corrective legislation or amendments forthcoming, since the Confederation Congress consisted of a unicameral legislature in which each state delegation cast a single vote. Many legislative items required a two-thirds majority, and amendments to the Articles required unanimous state consent.

But as severe as the structural deficiencies of the Articles were, nothing so imbued America’s political and economic elite with an urgent sense that drastic measures needed to be taken to save the country than the armed populist insurgency of 1786-87 that became known to history as Shays’ Rebellion.

In 1776, just after the United States declared its independence from Great Britain, the Continental Congress asked the colonies to draft their own constitutions. Because the Revolutionary War was ongoing and the states needed to appeal to ordinary Americans—farmers, tradesmen, merchants, soldiers, etc.—for the Patriot cause to succeed, the American states in the 1770s and 80s adopted populist constitutions that made them the most democratic polities in the world. These constitutions generally featured annual elections for governors and legislators (in some states governors served terms of only six months), minimal property qualifications for voting and officeholding, large legislative bodies, secret ballots, the popular election of local officials, legislative proceedings open to the public, mandatory rotation in office after a certain number of consecutive terms, and weak executives who often lacked the power to veto legislation and could only act in conjunction with executive councils tied to the legislature. These constitutions were generally popular with Americans of the lower and middling classes, but for the affluent—including the men who would become the Framers of the 1787 Constitution—they represented a dangerous excess of democracy, an unfounded confidence in the capabilities of most ordinary people, and, perhaps most importantly, a populist threat to their property rights.

The Revolutionary War left the states with substantial debts. During the war Congress had widely issued notes and other securities with a promise to redeem them after peace was concluded; and this responsibility would fall to the states. During the economic depression of the 1780s, many poor farmers and veterans—still unpaid—were obliged by their desperation for hard currency to sell their securities to wealthy speculators for a small fraction of their face value. By the end of the decade, roughly 90 percent of government securities were in the hands of a small cadre of some of the richest men in the country. These same speculators then sought to turn a huge profit by using their wealth and political influence to pressure the state governments to redeem them at face value. With few means of generating the revenue needed to redeem the securities, states sought to impose poll and land taxes; but these efforts were met with widespread popular resistance; and because of the radical democratic responsiveness of the state governments, populist factions took over state legislatures and implemented tax and debt relief measures. States refrained from prosecuting tax delinquencies, allowed private debts to be repaid in kind rather than cash, and—most horrifying to the speculators—issued their own paper currency to increase the money supply and required creditors to accept paper money in place of specie. In the eyes of the affluent, this was an unacceptable infringement on their property rights, since the issuance of paper money would inevitably devalue their financial assets.

Massachusetts was one of the few states that refused to provide tax and debt relief. In 1785, the state imposed heavy poll and property taxes, and began aggressively prosecuting delinquency. The following year, farmers from the western part of the state took direct action: arming themselves, organizing militias, shutting down courthouses to prevent foreclosures (this had become a fairly common practice in the interiors of the states, called “regulation”), and defending their farms from tax collectors. The uprising culminated in January 1787, when Daniel Shays, a former Continental Army captain, led a rebel force to Springfield with the intent of raiding the federal armory there, only for the rebels to be intercepted and violently dispersed by state militia. Because neither Congress nor Massachusetts had the funds to raise an army sufficient to suppress the rebellion, the state had to rely for the purpose on private subscribers: many of whom were the very same speculators who stood to make enormous profits if the insurrection was quelled and the new taxes were wrung out of the farmers.

The rebellion shocked and appalled men of means throughout the country, including those who would become delegates at the Philadelphia Convention. But perhaps even more disturbing was what happened next: just two months after the insurgency was suppressed, John Hancock, who represented the populist faction in Massachusetts politics, crushed the incumbent governor in an election, winning some 75 percent of the vote, while his populist allies—many of whom had participated in the rebellion—swept the legislature. Massachusetts’ experiment with extreme austerity was over.

Meeting at Philadelphia from May to September of 1787 in the shadow of Shays’ Rebellion, sworn to secrecy, with authorization from their respective states to discuss amendments to the Articles (their subsequent decision to propose a new Constitution altogether was itself, ironically, of dubious constitutionality), the Framers overwhelmingly sought to create a Constitution that was as nationalist and antipopulist as it could be while still having a chance of passing muster with the popularly-elected state ratifying conventions. Soured on the ideal of democracy by what they saw as populist mob rule in the states, the primary aim of the most prominent delegates was to create a supreme national government with minimal democratic inputs, thereby stripping the states of much of their power; particularly that to interfere with private property.

One of their first orders of business was to approve a provision that became Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution, barring states from coining money, issuing bills of credit, making anything besides gold or silver legal tender for the repayment of debts, and making any laws “impairing the obligation of contracts.”

The Virginia Plan, endorsed by Madison, called for a Congressional veto over state legislation; a federal power of direct taxation on individuals; a federal judiciary; and the establishment of two houses of Congress, both of which would have proportional representation (rather than equal representation between states): either by population or by “quotas of contribution,” whereby the states that contributed the most tax revenue to the federal government would get the most representatives. The convention’s rejection of the Congressional veto over the states was Madison’s greatest disappointment, but the alternative—proposed by Luther Martin of Maryland—was the provision that became the Supremacy Clause, establishing the constitutional basis of judicial review: a highly controversial practice in an era of legislative supremacy, but one that provided a possible mechanism for invalidating populist state legislation.

The convention created an upper house of Congress—the U.S. Senate—that was appointed by state legislatures rather than popularly elected, and which served much longer terms than most state legislators—with no term limits. More than a few of the delegates would have preferred Senators (and the President) to have lifetime tenure, but the Senate they ultimately approved was nonetheless an avowedly aristocratic and democracy-tempering institution. Even the House of Representatives, the most democratic element of the government under the Constitution, was structured to mitigate populist influences. While the House would represent the entire country, it would have fewer representatives than any of the state legislatures, making the districts very large and thus (in theory) less responsive to popular unrest. Also unlike most state legislatures, there were no provisions for instruction, mandatory rotation in office, or recall of representatives, making the House a far more independent body.

Though the proper “size” of government was fairly uncontroversial—all delegates were proponents of expanded federal power—the question of state representation within the federal government became the most contentious issue. The delegations from the most populous states—Virginia and Pennsylvania—endorsed the Virginia Plan’s provision for proportional representation in Congress, and many delegates spoke of the states themselves with surprising disparagement.

Alexander Hamilton personally desired to get rid of the states altogether and create a single national government, referring to the states as “artificial beings” which interfered with the representation of the American people. Though he acknowledged that complete nationalization would never be supported by the states, he was bold enough to propose that state governors be federally appointed. James Wilson of Pennsylvania—whose main contribution to the convention would be to design a Presidency that was more powerful than the British monarchy had been for at least a century—at one point exclaimed, “Can we forget for whom we are forming a government? Is it for men, or for the imaginary beings called states? . . . We talk of states, till we forget what they are composed of.” The small states, however, continued to agitate for equal representation, threatening to walk out of the convention if this condition was not met.

The compromise, proposed by Roger Sherman of Connecticut, stipulated that the House of Representatives would have proportional representation based on population, while the Senate would have equal representation between states. Contrary to what some have claimed in recent years, the equality of states in the Senate was not a mechanism for defending slavery; all of the smallest states (Delaware, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island—the only state that declined to attend the convention) were in the north, and it was widely assumed at the time that the southern states would rapidly grow and come to comprise a majority of the national population. The Connecticut Compromise was the signature victory of the small states at the convention.

Convention delegates almost unanimously supported property qualifications for voting and officeholding (Benjamin Franklin was the only real dissenter); but because they could not agree on what those requirements should be and feared for the prospects of ratification if they were too strict, they stipulated only that suffrage requirements for Congressional elections would be the same as those of the lower houses of the respective states; and they likewise forwent any uniform qualifications for officeholding, trusting that the states would continue to maintain their own.

The American Presidency was another coup for federal power. Whereas most state governors were extremely weak—elected to terms of one year or less, subject to mandatory rotation in office, powerless to veto legislation, unable to independently appoint officials, and required to act concurrently with executive councils—the chief federal executive would have none of these limitations, wielding a veto power over all legislation, appointing federal judges and cabinet officers with Senate approval, prosecuting wars declared by Congress, and maintaining a cabinet largely independent of Congressional oversight for purposes of advice rather than instruction.

Even with the endorsements of George Washington and Benjamin Franklin—the two most widely revered men in the country—ratification was an intensely contested and close-run affair. In the end, the Constitution was ratified largely because it was seen to be the only viable option. The convention itself had effectively delegitimized the government under the Articles of Confederation, so to reject the alternative it offered would have left the country in immediate danger of disunion and anarchy. Klarman closes his history by enjoining Americans not to worship the letter of the Constitution with a blind fidelity—indeed, many of its authors saw it as a temporary and flawed expedient—but to consider the interests, ideals, and prejudices of its authors and to reflect on how the Constitution they designed has adapted—or failed to adapt—to the transformations of the last 230 years.

[Nick Van Brunt · Rating 5 out of 5]

Michael Klarman has masterfully told the remarkably serendipitous story of the framing of the Constitution, using James Madison as its protagonist. Relying heavily on primary material, but also on an extensive bibliography of secondary sources, Klarman weaves it all into a compelling narrative about the antecedent events that led to the Constitutional Convention, the Convention itself, and the intersection of luck and opportunity that led to its ratification and the subsequent Bill of Rights, and the many characters who had a hand in all or some of the foregoing. Simply put, the Federalists were both lucky and good.

It’s not a read that one can reasonably finish over a weekend, but with slow and steady pacing, the reader might emerge with both an astonishment that such an imperfect document built in principles of compromise and competing transitory interests could be sacralized as it is today and a seemingly contradictory appreciation of its living, breathing and enduring nature, despite its rather messy origins.

If there is a criticism, I would say that there is some necessary repetition, but also some unnecessary redundancy, which one might expect in 631 pages of text, but which an editor could have even more finely honed. That said, highly recommend this to anyone who is interested in learning (or relearning) about the genesis of the American experiment.

[Mark Baier · Rating 4 out of 5]

Road to the Constitution

We all have learned something about the constitution through school. But like many things, there is so much more to the story than the little we learn in US history classes in high school. The adoption of what we now know as the constitution was a complex undertaking, embarked on by men from different regions of the country with different needs and perspectives on what good government looks like. The Framers' Coup provides a look into the constitutional convention, the influential players, and perhaps just as importantly, each of the state ratifying conventions. A worthwhile read.

[Ryan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Our society typically glorifies the Framers of the Constitution and considers the creation of the Constitution almost as an infallible act of God. But the Framers, while no doubt impressive, were people with their own personal interests, prejudices and moral blind spots. They made mistakes, objectionable compromises and pursued goals that are antithetical to our values of democracy and justice.

The Framers' Coup, while a monster of a book at 631 pages of dense small print, is hands down the best book I have ever read about the creation of our Constitution. It lays out how the Constitution was in many ways a conservative counterrevolution against populist economic measures enacted by a majority of state legislatures in the mid-1780s - which the Framers diagnosed as a symptom of excessive democracy - and was meant to severely constrain democratic influence on government, which was contrary to popular public opinion at the time.

The United States after the Revolutionary War was in a crisis. The Articles of Confederation, created during the war, were proving to be a failure. The Congress of the Confederation did not have the power to raise revenue to pay debts or fund an Army (when they asked states for tax revenue, the states often refused). It was also unable to regulate interstate or foreign commerce and was unable to respond to trade discrimination from Britain and France, all of which was causing volatile disputes between the states. Even for those things the Congress of the Confederation did have authority over, it was unable to enforce its will with the states. Yet, due to competing economic interests, states repeatedly were unable to agree on amendments to the Articles that would address the problems, as the Articles required unanimous agreement among the states.

An incident in 1786 highlights the competing state economic interests and was a major consideration in the drafting of the Constitution. Foreign affairs secretary, John Jay, was tasked with negotiating a treaty with Spain. In order to achieve a deal allowing for importation of New England fish and lumber to Spain, Jay was permitted to temporarily give up claims to navigation rights on the Mississippi River, which was important to southern states. The southern states viewed this as a betrayal and put an end to the treaty negotiations, but the controversy nearly resulted in a split in the union between the north and the south and convinced southern states that they couldn’t trust a government dominated by northern states.

In addition, the U.S. was experiencing an economic depression following the war and there was a severe shortage of hard currency. Wealthy aristocratic speculators had bought up a bunch of debt on the cheap and looked to make a killing on the returns. Average farmers didn’t have the hard currency to pay taxes or debt and were losing their farms as a result. Many states (particularly Rhode Island) responded to the resulting popular political pressure by implementing tax and debt relief and introducing paper money to ease the hard currency shortage. Most wealthy aristocrats, however, were strongly opposed to the relief, especially the paper money because it rapidly depreciated, reducing the value of the debt they held. They saw the states’ actions as a symptom of an excess of democracy.

Massachusetts bucked the trend and actually stepped up tax and debt collection, resulting in numerous farm foreclosures. This prompted Shays Rebellion, an armed insurrection of farmers with the intent of overthrowing the government, erasing all debt and preventing tax collection. The Congress of the Confederation had a hard time responding to the rebellion because they didn’t have the revenue to raise an army. Shays Rebellion was eventually suppressed, but the rebels then won at the ballot box and got most of what they wanted through the state legislature. This convinced the political elite in the other states, where a strong federal government had been opposed, to instead support a strong federal government in order to curb these populist movements at the state level. Some aristocrats who had strongly supported independence were even considering a return to monarchy.

In addition to their experience with the British monarchy; the failures of the Articles of Confederation, the competing economic interests among the states, the populist economic measures at the state level, the populist threat revealed by Shays Rebellion, the concern of smaller states about being dominated by larger states and the rising abolitionist movement in the northern states were the major factors on the minds of the Framers heading into the Philadelphia convention. The Philadelphia convention was supposed to just propose fixes to the Articles of Confederation, not come up with a whole new governmental structure. Most predicted that the Philadelphia convention would end in failure, as the previous Annapolis convention had, and that the Confederacy was headed for collapse and possible civil war. George Washington’s attendance at the Philadelphia convention, when he had been uninvolved in previous amendment efforts and which was motivated in part by his concern over Shays Rebellion, gave the convention crucial legitimacy.

Although most states passed debt relief and issued paper money, the delegates at the Philadelphia convention consisted almost entirely of wealthy aristocrats opposed to such measures. So as the Framers negotiated a new form of government, they agreed to numerous provisions intended to reduce democratic accountability (the Constitution prohibits states from issuing paper money in Article 1, Section 10). For example, the Framers established relatively large congressional districts, indirect elections for Senators (to be appointed by state legislatures) and the President (i.e. the electoral college), relatively lengthy terms in office for Senators (six years) and the President (four years), and staggered terms for Senators. They also rejected provisions allowing for districts to provide instructions for their members of Congress, mandatory rotation in office (i.e. term limits) and the recall of elected officials. They created the Senate to be a check on the populist actions of the House and created a powerful executive with the power to veto populist economic measures, such as land redistribution. The Framers would have gone even further in limiting democratic influence, but they knew they couldn’t because the Constitution would have to pass state ratifying conventions.

With northern states already starting to abolish slavery, southern states were very concerned about protecting slavery in the Constitution and particularly fought to prevent Congress from banning the foreign slave trade for 20 years. They also fought for the 3/5ths “compromise” of counting slaves for apportionment (which they considered fair because they considered it apportionment based on relative wealth) and fought for the Fugitive Slave Clause, requiring states to return escaped slaves from other states. They fought for the Export Clause, which was a ban on export taxes of agricultural products which southern states worried would impact the export of ag products produced by slaves and also advocated for assurances that the federal government would help southern states put down slave insurrections.

In the end, the Philadelphia convention proposed a strong federal government, strong executive and included a number of provisions to curb populist influence. This was all counter to the popular views at the time about how government should be structured and was a product of most delegates in Philadelphia being pro-nationalist, anti-populist aristocrats.

It was fascinating, however, to learn of the different ideas that were proposed but failed to make it into the Constitution, such as an Executive Council that would vote to approve Presidential actions, apportionment based on wealth rather than population, and a guarantee that the votes in Congress of new states could not exceed those of the original states.

Following the Philadelphia convention, attention turned toward the state ratifying conventions.
Fight over ratification was very heated, sometimes even with physical violence, but the Federalists (supporting ratification) had numerous advantages. For example, malapportionment in a few states heavily favored Federalists, the press was overwhelmingly in support of ratification and provided very biased reporting, Federalists were better educated and therefore better speakers and debaters, the ratifying conventions were held in the cities where Federalist support dominated, and Anti-federalist support was dispersed in the country and hard to organize. Yet despite these numerous advantages, the Constitution was only barely ratified in many states, with later states only ratifying because they feared being left out of the union and the first Congress where many important decisions about the government would be made.

Whether one support or opposed ratification of the Constitution generally broke along differences of urban (supported) vs. rural (opposed), creditor (s) vs. debtor (o), East (s) vs. West (o), North (s) vs. South (o), and rich and educated (s) vs. less so (o). Those in support of paper money and debt relief were particularly opposed to ratification.

Federalists supported certain constitutional provisions in Philadelphia in order to reduce populist influence on government, but didn’t dare mention that during the ratification debate and instead gave other reasons for their support. Likewise, both Federalists and Anti-federalists held positions based on how it impacted their personal financial interests, but publicly argued more objective reasons.

The Philadelphia convention also ignored the means by which to amend the Articles of Confederation and just created their own rules for ratifying the Constitution, which Anti-federalists argued made the whole effort extralegal.

During ratification, many saw the flaws in the Constitution that we grapple with today and were heavily debated, such as apportionment in the Senate being by state rather than population or the electoral college electing the President rather than a popular vote. The Constitution was very much seen as a flawed compromise of a document at the time.

Federalists achieved a huge victory by heading off at the state conventions conditional ratification of the Constitution and calls for a second constitutional convention to consider amenments, which would likely have sabotaged the whole effort.

Federalists agreed instead, first at the Massachusetts convention, to recommended amendments (as opposed to conditional amendments) in order to win ratification. Among these recommended amendments was for a Bill of Rights, but at the first Congress dominated by Federalists most didn’t want to honor the promise for amendments. James Madison persuaded them to adopt the Bill of Rights, but expressly avoided consideration of amendments that altered the structure of the federal government, such as restrictions on federal taxing authority or roll backs of the anti-populist measures in the Constitution.

Not surprisingly, the book highlights the huge role Madison played in convincing Washington to attend the Philadelphia convention, setting the parameters of debate in drafting the constitution, crafting the arguments to get it ratified and drafting and passing the Bill of Rights.

Nothing about the adoption of the constitution was inevitable. It nearly failed on numerous occasions and only luck and smart tactical moves by Federalists saved it, especially the oversized efforts of Madison.

Support for Anti-federalists virtually disappeared after ratification of the Constitution, the adoption of the Bill of Rights, and then a subsequent surging economy and reduced taxes.

The Constitution is very much a product of its time. It is the product of the varying interests of the Framers and the issues they were dealing with at the time. It is full of flawed and ugly compromises and the Framers knew it. They would be shocked to learn that the Constitution they drafted was still largely intact 230 years later. There is really no reason not to update it to fix its numerous flaws and the Framers would fully appreciate the need to do so.

[Mike Sigler · Rating 5 out of 5]

Dense but very readable history of the US Constitution. The particular self interests of slave vs free states, small versus large states, and mercantile vs farmers and how they shaped the constitution, the prominent role of James Madison, and how the bill of rights influenced acceptance of the constitution (superficial not substantial).

[David · Rating 5 out of 5]

I doubt if anything this long and this much drawing from primary sources could be any more lively or engrossing. Which is a backhanded way of saying it can sometimes be, shall we say, less than riveting.

On the other hand, this is the only book I have read that drills into the actual debates that people were having at the time about their government.

Rhode Island was a major pariah, very poorly thought of by the framers such as Madison, who were just as happy that they, Rhode Island, sent no one to the Philadelphia convention. The sin of the RI-ers was of a piece, but mores so, with economic experiments being carried out by several states. If you were importing goods into North Carolina from another state, say, you might be expected to pay an Import tax. You might be obligated to accept the State’s paper money in payment, even if the State’s own inhabitants were not obliged to accept the same money. Paper money was just one of several policy examples of “too much democracy” that the framers typically inveighed against, at least when behind closed doors.

Yes, it is good to remember how much people identified with their own State, in those days – to the point where they legitimately feared the prospect of armed conflict.
Good to remember too, how much the ratification was a close thing. Many people understood the document in a frankly classist analysis, and were against the Constitution because they felt it set up the country to be ruled by an aristocracy. The way of electing the President, for one thing, and the Senate, smelled of oligarchy to those of the middle sort.

Interesting too, how everyone, Northern and Southern alike, were of a common assumption that it was the South which was destined to be more and more populous over time – it being bigger geographically and blessed with better arable land. At the time, no one anticipated how big a disincentive it would be for potential immigrants, when contemplating a move to a slave society where a white man would have to compete with slave labor.

The weird thing about this book is how little you get about the Washington administration per se, even though a good deal of the book is concerned with the ratification debates that occurred during his administration. Even more surprising, given the unique focus on ratification debates, is how the writing and publication of The Federalist Papers is merely hinted at, at least, as an event. Once in a while he alludes to a position that Madison took, and that it was in the FP, but the whole FP story was not there at all. Hamilton’s role in the book, despite his dominance of the FP writings, is curiously muted here, and Madison’s role is emphasized to the point where it seems Madison is the one person most responsible for the Constitution from beginning to end.

It was Madison who militated for the Pennsylvania convention. Madison played a central part in the convention itself. And Madison’s strategic crafting of amendments 1 through 12 and his dogged persistence in getting them passed in the first Congress, was probably a decisive factor in squelching agitation for more structural kinds of amendments. His peers in Congress practically mocked him for pursuing this project. Madison stuck with it. He saw what his complacent Federalist elitists failed to acknowledge: that some states (like Massachusetts) had only ratified the Constitution because of assurances that amendments would soon follow. Failure to even consider amendments would confirm the fears of the anti-Federalists: that the Constitution was a major power grab, tantamount to the establishment of tyranny.

Tyranny: an obsession of many, informed by events of their century. Taxation without representation. The intolerable Acts. Nullification of colonial legislation. Even the Zenger trial for sedition from mid-century informed these fears. The perennial lens through which these dissidents saw the world was States Rights. The idea that Congress would have the unique power to regulate commerce was a major power grab for States accustomed to raising revenue from neighboring States, as was the notion that Federal judges would have the final say in inter-state disputes. Madison’s amendments studiously avoided structural changes that might have weakened the Federal position.

The elites embodied by the Framers were motivated to Do Something not just because of State commercial barriers but also because of a rising tide of economic populism. Shay’s Rebellion broke out just around the time of the Annapolis convention, the goals of which typified the sort of thing the monied class feared: debt relief and paper money.

Motivated to create a more effective central government they may have been, but when they came together as representatives of their various State governments, one big sticking point kept things teetering on the edge: the big state / small state divide. How would representation be apportioned in the new Congress and Senate? Strict representation by population sounded eminently fair, but only sounded so if you happened to be from a populous state. Equality of the States was a central principle of the Articles, and the small states were constantly, it seemed, on the verge of walking out of the Convention if the principle were challenged. The issue of slavery was mostly about representation: the Framers of the North may not have liked slavery, but their dislike was mostly about how the institution created economic advantage and especially about how this unique class of property might potentially give slaveholders an advantage of representation in Congress. Why not also grant apportionment based on numbers of cows, carped one Northern representative.

The document the Framers came up with was, then, a miracle of compromise that was unlikely to be repeated, were a subsequent convention to be held, as many anti-constitutionalists called for during the ratification debates. Yes, it had many undemocratic features: such as the Electoral College, and the Senate itself. These were features, not bugs, in the document. Most everyone felt like they had compromised interests or simply important principles of government, in order to achieve the final work product. It was to be ratified as it was – clause-by-clause debate was most certainly not welcome. The whole thing was a house of cards: undo one structural component and the whole precarious compromise could fall apart, the Union dissolved, and to the delight and profit of European powers.

Madison’s amendments, then, were mostly a political ruse, carefully crafted by a man who had previously argued with conviction, that the Constitution as written needed no listing of rights, since the powers of the Federal Government were enumerated. But, there was little harm in listing some rights that were already implicit in the document. It was a way to keep potential meddlers away from the structural framework of the document.

House of cards that it was, the Framers would be astonished to know of its continued existence and vitality a quarter of a millennium down the road. Klarman’s concluding chapter is very good and worth re-reading: he discusses the ways in which the Constitution proved itself adaptable to the needs of subsequent generations, but also the ways in which it is a dead hand – decisions made 250 years ago hanging over us and constraining us, their very constraints virtually guaranteeing their perpetuation. The Framers thought it was a fine compromise that, the most populous state being twelve times the least populous, they should have equal representation. Faced with a 65-to-1 ratio, as with Wyoming and California, it is hard to imagine they would have allowed such ridiculous malapportionment to stand. Lifetime tenure of Federal judges is another thing that would surely have long since been changed, were it not so difficult to amend the Constitution. This is especially so, given the unanticipated role of the courts. The Framers thought federal court was a place to resolve interstate matters, or issues uniquely relevant to federal matters. They would have been astonished to find out that an unelected court would be called upon to decide all manner of contested social and political issues.

Four percent of us can defeat any Constitutional amendment. Klarman tots up a few curious examples of things that would likely be different, absent the fiendish difficulty of amendment: criminalization of flag-burning, prayer in public schools, as well as guaranteed equality without regard to sex.

A very good book, meticulously researched. First half could be tedious, but it got better and better as the welter of primary quotes built a critical mass of context for what came later.

[Brent Moulton · Rating 4 out of 5]

Over the last decade, I've worried about the status and future of the American Constitution. And I've also wanted to learn more about the history that led to its creation. While I've read several chapter-length discussions of the making of the Constitution (for example, in Ron Chernow's Alexander Hamilton and in Alan Taylor's American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750-1804), I've wanted something that goes more in depth. Klarman's book is indeed an in-depth examination of this history.

The author, Michael J. Klarman, is a legal historian and constitutional law professor at Harvard Law School. At 880 pages, this book delivered the thorough, careful discussion of the creation and adoption of the Constitution that I had been looking for. There are eight chapters: 1) Flaws in the Articles of Confederation, 2) Economic turmoil in the states and the road to Philadelphia, 3) The Constitutional Convention, 4) Slavery and the Constitutional Convention, 5) Critics of the Constitution: The Antifederalists, 6) The ratifying contest, 7) The Bill of Rights, and 8) Conclusion.

Klarman views his book as making three unique contributions:
a) In a single volume, it covers the problems encountered under the previous government, the Articles of Confederation, leading up to the Constitutional Convention, the drafting of the document at the convention itself, the contests for ratification in each of the states along with the arguments made for and against ratification, and the drafting and adoption of the Bill of Rights.
b) He writes, "I have tried to tell this story, to the greatest extent possible, in the words of the participants." Thus, much of the text of this book consists of quotations from the participants in the constitutional convention, ratifying conventions, and others engaged in the debate.
c) The book advances an interpretation that the Constitution was a conservative reaction against economic measures that states were taking in the 1780s to provide debt and tax relief, either explicitly or indirectly through issuing paper currency that was subsequently devalued.

This last point is the origin of the book's title - that the framers of the constitution were propertied elite who used their wealth and power to establish a federal government that had the power to prevent states from using their democratic institutions for populist economic goals such as debt relief. While Klarman's argument is interesting, I didn't find it to be entirely convincing, especially because much of his argument consists of statements like "even though the Federalists said they were motivated by X, their actual intent was to do Y." Also, I think it should be said that the Federalists were right on the merits--that is, America's prosperity as a nation has been helped, not hindered, by Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution denying the states the powers to issue paper money or "impairing the obligation of contracts."

Also, the title's use of the term "coup" seems entirely inappropriate, as there was nothing in the process for ratifying and adopting the new constitution that involved the use of force or that would have been outside the bounds of normal democratic politics as it was understood at the time. While it is not clear whether the majority of Americans actually supported ratification of the Constitution at the time, it did win ratification through a process of state ratifying conventions in which the delegates were democratically elected.

While Klarman advances his interpretation of the Constitution as a conservative "coup" in the conclusion of the book, the vast majority of the book is simply a balanced retelling of the arguments for and against the document, mostly told in the words of those who participated in the debate. So even though I don't buy his interpretation, I didn't feel that its inclusion hurt the book. Indeed, I think it often helps the reader to have an historian present their own interpretation of the history after having presented the facts in a neutral manner.

As you might guess, some sections of the book got to be tedious--I've now learned more than I ever wanted to know about the Jay–Gardoqui Treaty (a proposed 1786 commercial treaty between the United States and Spain that was never actually completed or ratified). And, as might be expected in a comprehensive book where many of the same arguments are made in the prelude to the convention, at the convention, and again in the ratifying process, there is quite a bit of repetition of these same arguments (even if expressed in different words). I imagine that if an editor had tried to avoid repetitive arguments, the length of the book could have been reduced by maybe 30 to 40 percent. But I kept telling myself that I knew what I was getting into when I started reading an 880-page book written by a constitutional law professor.

But other sections of the book turned out to tell quite interesting stories. In particular, I thought the story of the New York ratifying convention and the story of Patrick Henry's efforts to prevent James Madison from getting elected to the First Congress were especially interesting. And I learned all manner of interesting, random historical facts. For example, the region that we now know as "New England" was apparently not called that in the 1780s and was instead known as the "Eastern states." And it was interesting to learn that at the conclusion of the Constitutional Convention, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, who we now know as the leading proponents of the Constitution, both expressed deep disappointment in the results of the convention.

Another message of this book is that the Constitutional Convention made quite a few consequential tentative decisions that were later changed--that is, many of the decisions were contingent. For example, initially the convention voted to apportion the Senate according to population, the same as the House of Representatives. But the small states continued to vigorously oppose this decision, and eventually the convention agreed to the "Connecticut Compromise", whereby each state was assigned two members in the Senate. It becomes clear from this history that the Constitution was more the result of numerous compromises and deals rather than reflecting some kind of coherent underlying vision from the "framers".

In the debate for ratification, to be frank, many of the arguments presented by the Antifederalists against ratification now seem totally bonkers--fears that if ratified, something awful would happen that never did. (For example, Antifederalists warned that because the Constitution gave Congress the power to "make or alter...regulations" set by state legislatures regarding the time, place, and manner of holding elections for Congress, Congress might require rural voters to travel to cities to vote in order to suppress the rural vote.) But every once in a while, one of the Antifederalists' fears turns out not to seem crazy at all, even if it may have taken a couple hundred years for those fears to be realized. For example, an Antifederalist writing under the pseudonym of "Brutus" warned that federal judges would interpret the Constitution in ways that would "enlarge the sphere of their own authority." That warning now seems to have been quite accurate. Another Antifederalist, writing as "Centinel", warned that ratification would lead to rule by the "wealthy and ambitious, who in every community think they have a right to lord it over their fellow creatures." I wonder what he would think of the billionaires lined up in prominent positions at this year's presidential inauguration. And Antifederalist George Mason objected to permitting the president to grant pardons because he might pardon crimes "which were advised by himself." Does that not sound like the January 6th pardons?

Overall, this was a good book and I'm glad I read it, even though it took me a while to get through it. I continue to worry about the damage being inflicted on the Constitution and about its future, but I now feel like I have a better understanding of this essential document.

[Marty Mangold · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author intends to make a single-volume compendium of the debates around the forming of our Constitution. This may not be a book for people who resolutely finish every book they start, like me: I suffered through repetitions of nearly-identical arguments voiced in each of the states on so many points.

On balance, though, I was moved at how much our current national problems have been baked into the pie from the start: sharp divisions, parochial concerns, tribalism: it's all been there all along. Even gerrymandering, which I thought of as a modern invention: Patrick Henry gerrymandered the state of Virginia to keep James Madison out of the Senate.

The title is misleading - this was not an organized takeover by one group over another, except maybe that every group loathed the other groups. If the author intended to advance the idea that the Constitution was a coup, the details overcame him and he failed.

I was left with the thought that keeping our States intact was one of many fundamental mistakes made in the name of expediency, which does not give me a burst of optimistic patriotism. But I do feel I've lived with the issues and arguments of that day for a good while, and am grateful for that.

[Stephen Harrison · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is monster-long book is incredibly well-researched and correspondingly mind-numbingly detailed. Its main argument is that the framers saw the chaos of democracy in state government in the mid-1780s, so they designed a form of government that would prevent those democratic excesses. That argument is hard to refute, given the monumental amount of primary document Klarman uses to support it. He goes issue by issue in the Constitutional Convention and then the ratification process, looking at what the various sides argued and counter-argued.

Klarman has a second argument that he makes only relatively sparingly, but still very persuasively - we give too much reverence to the Constitution. It was written by men (admittedly extraordinarily talented men) who had their own agendas and interests. In the end, it was a compromise that satisfied no one. So we should be more willing to look into its deficiencies rather than treating it as holy scripture.

There were some surprises for me in the book, even though I've read a fair bit on this subject already. The first was how contentious the issue of the executive was. I knew representation in Congress was a difficult issue, but the convention almost broke up over the executive as well. Another issue was in the ratification process, where the judicial branch was the most attacked.

This is a very interesting book, but you have to be really into the subject. The details Klarman provides are more than enough to support his argument, but he was apparently going for the definitive history of the process. I would almost certainly give it five stars if it were a little more concise. But it is still worth the read, if the creation of the American form of government is something you are passionate about.

[Steven Peterson · Rating 4 out of 5]

The thesis of this book is hardly brand new. Works going back decades have noted that the Constitutional Convention was something, metaphorically, akin to a coup against changes in political power occurring during and after the Revolutionary War and under the Articles of Confederation--with ordinary people seeing an increase in power at that time. Only to see that power slowly ebb. Charles Beard made an early argument consistent with this. Later, historian Jackson Turner Main provided evidence consistent with this perspective. Thus, the book's thesis is not an extraordinary revelation.

Still, the argument is rendered well and in quite readable fashion. As such, this becomes a very useful volume. It covers actions by those opposed to the Articles of Confederation (the American Constitution adopted as a result of the Revolutionary War). After the war, faults of the Articles perplexed many of "the better sort." There were efforts to address the perceived shortcomings of the Articles--culminating in the Constitutional Convention. Then, the ratification struggle, with the supporters of the Constitution ending up winning. A good analysis of why this happened--when in a number of states, a majority of delegates to the state conventions were elected to oppose the proposed Constitution. But the supporters of the Constitution won out in the end.

Recommended for those who want to understand how the Constitution came about. . . .

[Paul Szydlowski · Rating 4 out of 5]

The two most important takeaways I got from this book (your mileage may vary) is that our founders were both deeply flawed and deeply divided. Thus, we make a big mistake in treating them, and the Constitution they gave us, as perfect and sancrosact. The men who wrote the Constitution included those who believed slavery as antithetical to our founding principle that all men are created equal, and those who believed God had placed the white man on earth as supreme arbiter and overseer of God's creation. That such a spectrum of men could come to agreement on a form of government is a testament to compromise. That we now view the document outlining that government as an undebatable work of nearly divine origin, shows us to be every bit as flawed and misguided as some of those who wrote it. That we now view compromise as a sin nearly unforgivable suggests we may be more flawed than they.

[Chainsaw · Rating 5 out of 5]

Outstanding book, beginning to end. Few people probably realize how dangerously close to dissolution our young nation was, a mere few years after gaining independence at the end of the Revolutionary War, or how inadequate were the Articles of Confederation. Likewise, few know how very close were the efforts to draft and subsequently ratify the Constitution. The author does a magnificent job of capturing these historic moments, possibly to a level of detail too high for some readers, but not so thoroughly as to make the text overly boring. Despite occasional repetitive information, this is a superb telling of the fateful early effort to transform a crumbling confederacy of states into a new republic, the likes of which had never before been attempted. Absolutely a "must read!"

[Joe · Rating 4 out of 5]

Covers the history of the conception and ratification of the constitution from the discontent with the Articles of Confederation to the addition of the Bill of Rights. This is the second book I've read recently that shows that petty and partisan politics are nothing new within the United States. Both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists resorted to (or attempted to resort to) every political and procedural device they thought would work to their advantage. The author also refuses to flatten the debate over constitution into a single dimension: the reasons for support and opposition to the constitution were varied, although they were generally tied to the self-interests of the delegates and constituents.

[Dan Cotter · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an amazing book about the constitution from the need for Changes through Bill of Rights. As someone who spends a lot of time reading and writing about the constitution and its origins, even I learned some things from this very thoroughly researched and well written book. Everyone should be required to read this book especially in the current debates.

[Kelly Murmello · Rating 5 out of 5]

The broadest, most detailed account of the creation of the US Constitution that won’t put you to sleep! Really interesting and entertaining insight to the motivations of the framers, the in-fighting involved, and the every day political schemes that went into ratification across the states. Loved it!

[K Steward · Rating 4 out of 5]

It took a really long time to read this book but it was well worth it. Clearly written, but very detailed, it gave me a better picture of the process of creating the US Constitution and Bill of Rights.

[Leew49 · Rating 4 out of 5]

"The compromises undertaken in Philadelphia also illustrate the extent to which the Constitution was a product of clashing interests rather than dispassionate political philosophizing." p. 600

Under the Articles of Confederation what had once been the 13 colonies were in 1787 experiencing a crisis in governance. Congress could not raise money through taxation, regulate trade or even guarantee compliance with treaties with other countries. There were still British forts in the northwest and a powerful Spanish presence in Florida, and the credit of the United States was severely threatened in our dealings abroad, and we were in fact experiencing the equivalent of a financial depression at home, much of it connected to war debt. The convention in Philadelphia that year was tasked with finding ways to correct the shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation, but the men who are now remembered as the Framers of the Constitution went much further than that.

There were many diverse and often conflicting points of view at the Constitutional Convention. People were split in what often seemed to be irreconcilable ways on a variety of issues and local prejudices including slavery vs anti-slavery, big state vs small state, creditor vs debtor, city vs rural areas, agriculture vs shipping and mercantile interests, and, of course, big vs small government. Compromise was inevitable, and the document that emerged from the convention was more a product of political necessity than of beneficent wisdom. A further complicating factor was the antidemocratic leanings of many of the Framers: wealthy, well-educated and influential men who had been scandalized by recent events such as Shays's Rebellion in Massachusetts and the debtors' relief and paper money experiments in several states, most notably Rhode Island. Their final document reflected many of these disputes and prejudices with its inclusion of the 3/5 clause, the appointment of Senators by state legislatures, the electoral college, lifetime tenure of the Supreme Court justices, and the lengthy and convoluted process for amending the Constitution, among others.

The matter of ratifying the Constitution was complicated by many of the same issues listed above. Federalists, the people in favor of ratification, had several advantages over the Antifederalists: wealth, influence, education, control of the newspapers, and their own determination that the Constitution could be ratified by nine states rather than all thirteen, as had been the case with the Articles of Confederation. The Bill of Rights came about largely because some of the states ratified the Constitution contingent upon its being amended to correct what they viewed as its shortcomings, and these amendments were similarly disputed along lines of special interest groups.

Klarman's book is lengthy, heavily footnoted and at times difficult, but it is well worth the effort. The reader discovers that the Constitution is an often flawed legal document crafted in a heated political climate by admittedly gifted men who were nonetheless limited by their times, their prejudices, and their own self-interest. It is not the Ark of the Covenant, too pristine and infallible to be examined critically.

[Dylan Matthews · Rating 5 out of 5]

I guess I technically told Goodreads that my goal for 2020 was to read 12 books, but my actual goal was to read The Framer's Coup. It's not a simple read. Klarman's intent is to provide a comprehensive, definitive account of the Constitution's creation, from the precipitating factors leading to the convention (requisition conflicts, paper money laws, Jay's negotiations with Spain re: Mississippi navigation, Shay's rebellion) to the ratification of the Bill of Rights. He shares Eric Foner's affinity for including many primary source citations to back up his assertions of what groups ("northern Federalists," "Virginia Anti-Federalists," etc.) thought about certain matters. That adds up, and is not the most compelling prose in the world. Nearly a third of the book is footnotes, so it's only really 633 pages, not 880, if that makes it less intimidating. But it still demands a lot of time and attention.

It's hard to do justice to the richness of the observations in here; the discussions of backlash to paper money, or states' anxieties regarding future population changes, or the small-state tactics that forced the Connecticut Compromise, each could have supported an entire book of their own. My favorite recurring bit was how much every other state held Rhode Island in utter, burning contempt for its embrace of paper money, to the point of the new United States proposing massive trade sanctions against Rhode Island unless it agreed to ratify the Constitution.

In lieu of a full summary I'll simply say the book more than proves its central argument: that the Constitution was a historically contingent compromise made by talented by imperfect individuals pursuing their own personal, regional, and factional interests. That takes the shine off of arguments about the "genius" of the framers, sure, but in some ways it makes the Constitution's ability to survive for over two centuries, across unimaginable changes to the country it governs, more remarkable. If nothing else, the book is an incredible testament to the brilliance of James Madison, not so much as a designer of governments as a political entrepreneur. Klarman clearly believes that Madison foisted an elitist, anti-democratic Constitution that went against the interests of non-elites on a public that didn't particularly want it. But Madison was, at the end of the day, an ambitious 36-year-old who more or less singlehandedly wrote, negotiated, and got ratified a Constitution and a Bill of Rights of his own design. It's one of the most incredible achievements a single individual has ever claimed.

[Lawrence Roth · Rating 3 out of 5]

Michael Klarman has written what must surely be close to an exhaustive volume on the failure of the Articles of Confederation and the making of the Constitution, as well as the political machinations needed to make the Constitution law across the states.

While I will always appreciate an author going deep into the research weeds to provide non-fiction and history readers with accurate info, I can't help but feel that there should be a book that covers the exact topics here in the Framer's Coup, but does it in half the time. I listened to the Audible audiobook version of this book. It clocked in at 33 hours, one of the longest audiobooks I have in my library. At 1.90 speed, it totaled to over 16 hours of listening time.

The problem with such minute details as private correspondences between founding fathers, the records of debates before, during, and after the Philadelphia convention, the political leanings of individuals and states, the economic considerations of federalization, and so many other topics, is that the reader starts to lose the forest for the trees (or perhaps, the author has). I can barely remember a single thing that was said in this book because I was so fried by detail that things started to mush together. I am fortunate that I was able to retain general concepts and answers to the questions I had that caused me to start this book.

If you want answers, they are here, but buried among mountains of background information and political infighting. It's genuinely a shame, because Klarman is obviously passionate about this topic. I don't deny that such an important topic as the writing of the Constitution does not deserve an impressive volume that covers it. But for someone who isn't actually a professor of constitutional history, or is a lawyer in constitutional law, this book is likely not for you. It's too detailed, and unless you have a particularly overriding interest in 1780s American politics/economics/society, the fascinating events of the formation of the Constitution will be lost to you among the detail.

A slight recommend for me ONLY IF you really, really are interested in this topic, so much so that it's your job to know about con law. Or if you're just that much a nerd about constitutional history.

[Al · Rating 2 out of 5]

A complex book with multiple sections including a detailed look at the problems with the Articles of Confederation that lead to the Constitutional Convention, an extremely nuanced report on how that 1787 Convention crafted the Constitution, a blow-by-blow account of the debates over ratification, and a similar account of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. Klarman uses original sources (400+ source references for most chapters) to report in detail how each part of the Constitution was created and gives an almost minute-by-minute account of numerous debates at the Convention. He follows a similar pattern when discussing the other topics in the book. The various chapters are arranged by topic rather than in chronological order letting the reader see how each controversy was resolved but not necessarily how individual contributor’s views evolved, or didn’t, as the Convention and Ratification progressed.

This tome does a service by, essentially, serving as detailed Minutes of the Convention, something even Madison’s famous journals don’t do. And this is the most thorough treatment of the individual State’s ratification debates I’ve ever seen. But the minute attention to detail about each argument gets tedious. By the end of the book, the thematic approach is as much kaleidoscopic as it is edifying. And the author’s summation of the Ratification debates is a complete Anti-Federalist (to use the 18th Century terminology) rant where he all but says ratifying the Constitution was a dirty deal, all but calling it a coup de’ etat (although he doesn’t use the phrase), hence the title

As a record of events, this book is a necessary, but tedious, contribution to the saga of the origins and evolution of American Constitutional Government. Serious students of the American system of Government will profit by plodding through it. But its inflammable tone makes it unsuitable for the casual reader who should embark on reading it at their own risk

[Jeremy · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a very in-depth look at the making of the constitution, covering the debates in the ratification convention at the federal level as well as in many states. There was an immense amount of information contained in this book, which sheds light on the people and hot button issues that formed the times. There were a number of events that could have changed the outcome, not to mention the importance of people like James Madison. If certain states had held ratifying conventions before other states, it could have changed the outcome.

At a high level, deep reading about the making of the constitution removes it from the realm of magical perfection to imperfect document. Those who favored it agreed that it was not a perfect document, but it was better than the Articles of Confederation. Most would probably be shocked that it is still our governing document.

The last few lines in the book are perhaps the best, a conclusion that seems to me to be the natural and correct conclusion to the study of the constitution: That the constitution has been around for a long time, or that its authors were especially wise and virtuous, should not be sufficient to immunize it against criticism. Thomas Jefferson observed that each generation has a right to choose for itself the form of government it believes best promotes its happiness. Constitutions ought not to receive sanctimonious reverence...too sacred to be touched. Those who wish to sanctify the constitution are often using it to defend some particular interest, that in their own day, cannot in fact be adequately justified on its own merits.

[Kirby Broderick · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very capable historical work detailing the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. Although at times dry with dense pages of quotes, it does a good job of demonstrating the issues that motivated each of the parties through the lens of contemporaneous written letters and (occasionally poorly-) recorded speeches. Klarman convincingly shows that the Founding Fathers generally (and Madison specifically) seized on the chaos of the early Republic to orchestrate a coup for a form of government that would tend to protect their interests, often directly in spite of the populist interests of disorganized rural farmers. Although they often made concessions to each other and other groups, their first-mover advantage and comparatively high political and intellectual capabilities allowed them to play a critical role in determining the structure and purpose of modern American government.

One thing that surprised me: how contingent most of their ultimate choices ended up being. The federal judiciary was almost an afterthought, and the amendments that wound up being the Bill of Rights could easily have been nonexistent or completely transformative.

[Justin Evans · Rating 4 out of 5]

To say that this book is detailed is a bit like calling the sun warm or a black hole poorly lit. Klarman (or Klarman's research associates) have read pretty much everything written by anyone important to the creation of the constitution, and have distilled it all down into one lengthy, exhausting book. Do you need to read this? I'd have to say no, unless you're doing research, or you're a junkie. For those two types of people, though, this is a goldmine: very well organized, convincing, and almost Walter Benjaminite in its willingness to tell an entire story through other people's words. It's not really that different from other interpretations, but it does give you all the evidence you'll ever need to show that the constitution and its makers probably aren't as great as everyone says.