In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Wall Street to Washington

by Robert E. Rubin, Jacob Weisberg

Robert Rubin was sworn in as the seventieth U.S. Secretary of the Treasury in January 1995 in a brisk ceremony attended only by his wife and a few colleagues. As soon as the ceremony was over, he began an emergency meeting with President Bill Clinton on the financial crisis in Mexico. This was not only a harbinger of things to come during what would prove to be a rocky period in the global economy; it also captured the essence of Rubin himself--short on formality, quick to get into the nitty-gritty.

From his early years in the storied arbitrage department at Goldman Sachs to his current position as chairman of the executive committee of Citigroup, Robert Rubin has been a major figure at the center of the American financial system. He was a key player in the longest economic expansion in U.S. history. With In an Uncertain World , Rubin offers a shrewd, keen analysis of some of the most important events in recent American history and presents a clear, consistent approach to thinking about markets and dealing with the new risks of the global economy.

Rubin's fundamental philosophy is that nothing is provably certain. Probabilistic thinking has guided his career in both business and government. We see that discipline at work in meetings with President Clinton and Hillary Clinton, Chinese premier Zhu Rongji, Alan Greenspan, Lawrence Summers, Newt Gingrich, Sanford Weill, and the late Daniel Patrick Moynihan. We see Rubin apply it time and again while facing financial crises in Asia, Russia, and Brazil; the federal government shutdown; the rise and fall of the stock market; the challenges of the post-September 11 world; the ongoing struggle over fiscal policy; and many other momentous economic and political events.

With a compelling and candid voice and a sharp eye for detail, Rubin portrays the daily life of the White House-confronting matters both mighty and mundane--as astutely as he examines the challenges that lie ahead for the nation. Part political memoir, part prescriptive economic analysis, and part personal look at business problems, In an Uncertain World is a deep examination of Washington and Wall Street by a figure who for three decades has been at the center of both worlds.

Genres: Economics, Politics, Business, Biography, Finance, Nonfiction, History

448 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2003

Reviews

[Andrea James · Rating 1 out of 5]

I appear to have quite a different opinion of this book to most of the other reviewers on Goodreads. As much as Robert Rubin may have accomplished both in the private and public sector, he is simply not good at writing or storytelling or indeed at providing insights into how he solves problems and makes decisions, the emotional and intellectual conflicts one faces or any astute observations of what other people might be going through.

The book reads like "I applied to Harvard and then I went there and then I met president Clinton, and he was nice and smart, and then I met my amazing wife and she told me that...and so I...". Much in the style of a speech a 6-year-old might give when under pressure to give a summary of their life (except that Rubin has met high powered people and worked in influential positions).

On the other hand, I thought that the descriptions of economic scenarios were actually plainly written and not hard to follow at all. Boring, like the rest of the book, but easy to follow.

It could have been so much more had he just given a glimpse into thought processes, the political manoeuvring, any personal interests and jostling that may have impacted decisions, irrationalities in assessing situations...anything really that might show the greater depth of analysis that he is very likely to be capable of.

[Greg Talbot · Rating 2 out of 5]

With the snappy title, you'd think this was a much more interesting book. The sad reality is that Robert Rubin's biography does not live up in style, content or IQ level of the writer. Having obtained kingmaker status as CEO of Goldman Sachs, and treasurer of Bill Clinton, it's obvious that Robert has stories and strong opinions about events. At times he approaches topics with nuance like a good storyteller - one example is with the Tequila crisis in the 90s where he brings how Mexico's currency valuation can have a huge impact in the rest of the world. When he does start talking about economics, Robert can swing and hit pretty well. Maybe it's just his self-assured easy going personality, but the book could not be more empty. Reminds me of an aloof uncle telling his niece about his big suit job and those crazy highs and lows of the working world. Platitudes, general conflicts, and some farm wisdom.

[G166188 · Rating 3 out of 5]

A book about Rubin's upbringing and professional experience in banking and politics.

Takeaway
Nothing is for sure. Life is more about odds, choices, and trade-offs. There is no definitive answer. One would be better off focusing on building good process for decision making than judging solely on the outcome because bad decisions can produce good result due to randomness or luck. Conversely, good decisions can produce bad result and one should expect losses as part of the business. Risk taking is unavoidable in life. Think analytically and probabilistically in a mental decision tree. And the only way to refine our odds is through better knowledge and deeper understanding.

Things I enjoyed
o The Powell Doctrine: use overwhelming force in military intervention to secure certainty of result
o Write things down: Rubin often carried a legal pad to keep notes and wrote his analysis down. This is a good practice to keep track of things and hone one's thinking. He said often when a point of clarity is reached, a correct answer would present itself.
o A Way of Life by William Osler: deal with fear of failure by living life in "day-tight compartments"
o Rubin also handled stress and uncertainty by thinking of a failsafe fallback position.
o He also tried to adopt the right frame of mind by focusing on the job in hand instead of worry about the outcome. i.e. mindfulness of present moment
o His philosophy teacher Demos taught: not only to understand the logic of an analysis, but to find the point at which the edifica rested on hypothesis, assumption, or belief.
o Always be skeptical. Never take propositions at face value.
o Find fulfillment within oneself instead of searching outside
o The importance of being sincere: Gus vs. Clinton
o Clinton has unusual listening skill: he made the person not just heard but understood with great sincerity
o Alan Greenspan a master in Q&A
o Even a trader as good as Rubin has no ability in knowing where the market will go short term. The only rational way to profit is to invest based on long term prospect. Example: he felt the market was too high years before the Internet Bubble.
o Company performance is judged by short-term result. This is not ideal but net benefit still over downside because it can avoid longterm cheaters. (I think just like democracy not ideal but can avoid dictators)
o Free trades forces America to become more competitive.
o Overreaction is part of human nature.
o Take profit while the market is good because market sentiment can change very quickly.

[May Ling · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is an interesting book in which many people glean different gems given their background.While a lot of people enjoyed Chapter 2 about risk, I get a little upset when they quote this book as a risk management book. Indeed, what is discussed here shows most clearly why merger arb is one of the single riskiest strategies. The hedge that is taken will actually magnify the lost in the way that options do. Those often engaging find themselves in really bad circumstances when deals break. Rubin does not speak this flawed understanding. Instead, the point that I gleaned was that even a seasoned, professional will underestimate the risk of something that seems a "tail" event, i.e. the deal breaking. Hence, one should have some flexibility with what one believes to be absolute.



I do however like the idea that one should "maintain optionality". The way that Rubin has implemented through his career and life are remarkable. Moreover, you get a real sense for the type of moral fiber this person has, regardless of whether you agree or disagree. You get the sense that this was a man who wanted to learn from everyone, younger, older, etc...



I greatly enjoyed hearing about the differences between politics and business environments. It was fascinating how one delivers messages. It was also interesting to hear insights into the many amazing characters that he met during the Clinton administration.



Sadly, you also get a sense for the changes in the market place. The shorter term orientation, which is a sign of the times of computational improvements, have with it certain types of flaws as discussed in Chapter 13-15. While he defends Citi as properly implementing the orientation toward short term (addressing the immediate needs of the business) it's hard to know the degree to which that got extended post Weill's leadership.



I also found his commentary on corporate leadership fascinating. In light of the manner in which corporations have grown and the need for succession plans, 2 CEOs which Goldman has historically been able to maintain, seems ideal. One would think the very nature of CEO is teamwork and a certain ability to work with others. I would love to know more thoughts on that.

[Brian Fisher · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great book and a unique perspective (a wall streets risk arbitrager and secretary of the treasury - Robert Rubin). He applies his free market mentality to some of the most pressing international and domestic economic issues. Similar to the World is Flat or the Lexus and the Olive Tree (with a stronger economic bend), but told by someone with more expertise and experience

"The best social program is a strong economy"
-Bill Clinton

" A change-oriented culture has been central to America success and will be critical to its future economic progress"

[geoff · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is fine. I like Rubin, but the past decade hasn't been great to his reputation. Spends a lot of time talking about Clinton years, which would be interesting - except that he wasn't really part of the inner circle. His views on uncertainty are good. But just read Black Swan instead.

[m · Rating 2 out of 5]

Two-and-a-half stars.
158,000 words (sigh).

Rubin comes across as a reasonable, sober-minded nice guy who has lived an absolutely charmed life. His wife and kids make numerous, sometimes odd, cameos in these pages.

For many observers Bob's employment in the Clinton administration signaled the advent of what has since become pejoratively labeled "neo-liberalism," a supposed economic paradigm that is now blamed for having inadvertently given rise to its aftershock, populist Trumpism.

Unfortunately Rubin published this book too early in his career, before the most interesting chapter of his career: the 2008 financial crisis that nearly forced the closure of his employer Citicorp.

The 1990s-era financial crises in Mexico and SE Asia get in-depth reports in these pages. Bob says, in effect, that whenever a financial crisis occurs there will always be a federal government bailout because the alternative is too terrible to contemplate.

In the early naughties he reports that he's very worried by the Bush administration's large budget deficits, sums that when measured against today's deficits are chump change.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan makes a cameo in a scene Bob recollects this way:

My job didn’t require congressional confirmation, but I took the opportunity nevertheless to pay a couple of courtesy calls in the Senate. When I visited New York’s senior senator, Democrat Daniel Patrick Moynihan, he offered a bit of historical perspective. Anything truly important in Washington took thirty-five years to accomplish, he said. Obviously Moynihan was speaking figuratively, but he was also making a useful point about the difficulty of making major changes through the political system—a lesson we would learn for ourselves when trying to reform health care.

———————————————————
During the late 1990s Ruben worried that the stock market was wildly overvalued. He makes the interesting observation:

Another problem [with overvalued assets] is that there could be irresistible political pressure to make up for shortfalls in accounts for people who retire when market conditions are adverse.

———————————————————
Rubin states repeatedly that he'd like to ameliorate the suffering of America's urban, inner-city poor, but he never describes his understanding of the problems nor his ideas on how to ameliorate them. Nonetheless, I was struck by his repeated mention of inner-cities. What follows are his riffs on inner-cities:

I had some direct exposure to the problems of inner cities at meetings of a neighborhood group called the 28th Precinct Community Council in central Harlem in the 1970s.

. . . it is just wrong that a country as wealthy as ours does not provide the resources to successfully address poverty that passes from generation to generation. The more I learned about these issues, the more I was convinced that there were approaches that would work if adequately supported. I also came to believe that the problems of the inner cities greatly affect all of us—no matter where we may live or what our incomes may be—through crime, the deterioration of public schools, the costs of social ills, and the lost productivity of a large group of people who are not being equipped to realize their potential. The belief that affluence can insulate is illusory. And that helps explain why I am a Democrat.

The country remained in denial about serious social issues as well. Our public education system was deeply troubled, and life in the inner cities was getting worse. I wondered whether the country would muster the political will to address its problems. The alternative to facing up to these problems, as I discussed at a dinner Bob Strauss held for me in Washington after I became co-head of Goldman Sachs, was the risk of inexorable national decline.

In addition to health care, which we took as a given, my memo listed five “legacies”: (1) an effective human capital program of high-quality education and training; (2) progress on the problems of the inner city; (3) deficit reduction; (4) an expansion of global trade; and (5) implementation of a rational approach to regulation.

The strong economy made a real difference for inner cities, and our policies, including the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and increased funding for Head Start, helped reduce poverty. (In the view of many, welfare reform had a significant impact as well, although I had serious reservations about this legislation.) But the fundamental problem of an urban underclass cut off from the mainstream of American society remains, and we still lack a federal effort commensurate with the problem.

. . . if we wanted to talk about spending money on education and programs for the inner city, people weren’t going to listen to us unless we talked about those programs in the context of a balanced budget.

Another focus of mine, which was less typical for a Treasury Secretary, was poverty and the distress of inner cities as critical economic issues.

I learned very quickly, however, that advancing programs to help the poor—especially for minorities living in inner cities—was very difficult. Many people object to the idea of government assistance for the poor on principle; even well-designed programs meant to encourage work instead of welfare faced strong opposition.

All sorts of groups could bring great pressure to bear when their concerns were at stake: environmentalists, labor, the elderly, business, and many, many others—but not the poor. You couldn’t count on a major letter-writing campaign in support of food stamps or inner-city job programs.

The CRA required lending institutions, when seeking regulatory approval, to demonstrate that they had invested in their communities. This measure had greatly increased the availability and flow of credit in inner cities. After the 1994 election, however, we faced constant efforts to roll the program back in one way or another. One argument was that the CRA was simply a way for community and political groups to extort money from lending institutions. CRA almost surely had been misused in some instances—and we were again fully supportive of reforms.

[Upon retiring from Treasury] I knew I wanted to stay involved with issues relating to the inner cities, and LISC, which provides funding and technical assistance for urban and rural community development....

[Al Gore] also had a strong focus on inner-city problems.

It was in the context of thinking about inner cities and poverty here in the United States that I first came to focus on the idea of a “parallel agenda.” What this means is that market-based economics and integration with the wider economy, the fundamental policies for growth, should be allied with a “parallel” set of policies to help fulfill the needs that markets will not adequately meet, such as a reasonable social safety net and retraining programs for those workers dislocated by change.
———————————————————

Maybe in his next memoir he'll proffer some ideas on how to ameliorate inner-city problems, reduce ever-growing budget deficits, and prevent bank collapses like the one that should have culled his employer Citicorp in 2008.

[Dave Schoettinger · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is the autobiography of Robert Rubin who was Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors during the first Clinton administration and Secretary of the Treasury during most of the second Clinton administration. He wrote the book in 2003 so much of his opining on economic matters sounds quaint and dated. He gives detailed accounts of the handling of US guarantees on loans to Mexico and Indonesia in the 90s to prevent economic collapse of those countries. He had no way of knowing that the global economic collapse of 2008 would make everyone forget the third world economic fires he put out in the 90s.

His expressed concern for federal budget deficits sounds archaic, especially coming from a Democrat. He castigates Republicans for squandering the budget surpluses of the last Clinton years on the Bush tax cuts of 2001. He takes a lot of pride in those balanced budgets, not realizing that 20 years later Democrats wouldn't care and Republicans would deny they ever happened. I am sure he is dismayed that currently the only substantive difference in the Democratic and Republican positions on federal budget deficits is that Democrats no longer pretend that they think deficits are bad.

The book itself was fairly interesting, reminding me of a lot of things that I was ignoring during the 90s. He drops a lot of names of the movers and shakers of the last quarter of the 20th century, however, with the exception of Hillary Clinton and Bono, readers under 40 may well struggle to recognize the names.

[Sara · Rating 3 out of 5]

I never knew I was so excited about international finance, banking and being reminded that everyone is DC is still in DC. I knew nothing about this author but enjoyed his story. No footnotes, just personal reflections during the Clinton Admin in the Dept of Treasury. It helped get me ready for Napier's book, The Asian Financial Crisis ('95-98), which is still quite expensive. Would I recommend this book to anyone? Only if they are moving to another world and are using the Total Avoidance Protocol to stay in denial. But honestly, I couldn't put it down - but that was me.

[Gabriel · Rating 1 out of 5]

Ultra boring

[Giles · Rating 3 out of 5]

Hmm, not entirely sure what to make of this.

Rubin is clearly a competent and clever guy, integral to two of the biggest challenges the Clinton administration engaged in, the currency and debt crises in Mexico 1994 and Thailand/ROK/Indonesia 1997.

And while this book has some moments when the drama of those days are well captured (chapters 8 & 9 are particularly good) this is about the driest read since my last college textbook:

"I met the head of the IMF, we discussed the crisis, then I spoke to Alan Greenspan, then I spoke to President Zedillo, then I tried to persuade a republican senator then we had a meeting with the German Chancellor. We agreed on a final figure."

"I was dating a girl, she had a friend named Judy, I thought she was beautiful, we started dating, we got married, we had a one day honeymoon, I went back to work."

Has Rubin had a personality bypass?

How on earth do you meet so many people, craft so much important policy AND work in Wall Street during a massive boom and one of the biggest busts in history and make it about as interesting as staring at TV static?

[Nicholas · Rating 3 out of 5]

It took me a while to slog through this book; the fault was partly mine, and partly Rubin's. While the subject matter is fascinating for me--a remarkable career in both finance and public service--Rubin's prose was passionless. Moreover, his writing was not crisp or energetic.

There were great parts of the book: an insider's look at Goldman Sachs, the Clinton administration, and some of the crucial dilemmas that Rubin faced as Secretary of the Treasury. While I generally concurred with his view of the world--that decisions are difficult and involve estimating a range of uncertain outcomes--he presented it in a rather uninteresting way. As a side point, his decision-making process and underlying philsophy contrasted sharply with that espoused by GWB in Decision Points.

If you're interested in this man's career, it's probably worth the read, but I wouldn't spend time otherwise.

[Forsythbb · Rating 2 out of 5]

Rubin has the most humble and sincere narrative. As an introvert myself, I immensely resonate with a lot of his view points and decisions. The first three chapters of this book offer a lot of genuine advice to intellectually driven yet professionally aspiring people. However, while that kind of narrative is refreshing for the first 100 pages, it gets tiring as one reads on. After all, most people buy this book to gain insights of what happened in the boom and bust of the 90s to 00s, not a prolonged self-analysis on strengths and weaknesses. I actually could not finish the book, as it drags on and on about who did this and who said that, but it always misses the key points of the stories. I think this book should not be read as a history recount, but an unrefined diary that aims at an audience comprised of only Rubin himself.

[Will Byrnes · Rating 1 out of 5]

I found it boring. It might be of considerable interest to those who are adept at macroeconomics, but while I found some interest in his descriptions of the several international monetary crises with which he has been involved, there was little here that held my interest. He does laud Clinton for his intelligence, quick grasp of facts and his willingness to spend personal political capital to take risks and to do the right thing.

[evan pon · Rating 3 out of 5]

a rambling description of rubin's time in business and government. most of his annecdotes aren't fully developed - just a few lines, that often don't seem to have a point. however, the overall subject matter is interesting, as he provides an inside view on what he was thinking/doing when handling things like the asian crisis.

[Ann · Rating 5 out of 5]

A must read if you want to understand the current position of "too big to fail". Rubin was at the place where this trend started and now, knowing how things turned out, this is the place to go for insight into our times and the history of how we got here.

[Helen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Changed how I look at econ and also at the Clinton presidency. One of the first books on politics I read. Awesome first experience!!!

[Sy. C · Rating 4 out of 5]

There is a NY Times article that discusses Rubin's probabilistic approach to thinking - if pressed for time, the article is a good summary of this book.

[Brian · Rating 4 out of 5]

I liked his insight into events I knew about and others that I didn't know about, especially the private sides of public figures.

[隻眼簽到 · Rating 4 out of 5]

不確定的世界：費賓的經濟主張。魯賓著。
統計式決策
這本書的書名契合我的理念。意外的是，作者竟然曾是顯赫一時的政府高官。魯賓在1993年至1995年擔任白宮國家經濟會議主席，1995年至1999年擔任財政部長，自然算得上是影響美國財經政策的重要人物。尤其他還在華爾街所謂的風險套利公司工作長達26年。依我的刻板印象，他該是個滿身銅臭又官僚顢頇的人。這種人而有這種理念，真使我好奇。
一般人可能不知道，這個書名牽涉到近代物理學觀念的大變革，是由量子力學帶來的全新的哲學觀，使用這樣的書名，隱含作者本身可能具備了雄厚的哲學基礎。我買書一向準確，很少挑到不值得買的書。而選書時一個考慮的重點就是書名。一個在相關方面沒有程度的作者，想要提出一個剛好契合的書名真是千難萬難。看過書後也證明我的想法沒錯，作者自述他年輕時曾一度想改投哲學專業，表示他對這方面確有某種程度的涉獵。
本書共分十四章，我有興趣的只是前兩章關於他核心理念的部分。此外其他各章都是魯賓職業生涯所經歷的政治、經濟事件，部分可能涉及總體經濟上的專業，不在本文討論範圍之內。
作者的觀念在某種程度上相當於這樣一個老生常談��“人生中沒有什麼事情是確切不變的”。但雖然是老生常談，卻正如作者所說的：“很多人接受機率決策的觀念，甚至認為自己也這樣做，把這種心態內化的人卻很少。”我的經驗也是這樣。一般人的思維有兩個缺失，第一，他們總是同時接受互相矛盾的觀念而不自知；第二，他們總是很表面的去“想像”一個道理，而不是深刻的去“理解”一個道理，所以從來談不上去“實踐”這個道理。
例如，你跟某個人說“性格決定命運”，他同意；你跟他說“人生中沒有什麼事情是確切不變的”，他也同意。他卻不會去思考，這兩個命題其實是矛盾的。因為，如果人生中沒有什麼事情是不變的，那麼，決定命運的就是機率(統計)，不會是性格。如果性格可以決定命運，那麼人生中就有一件事情是確切不變的，“什麼事情都會變”這件事就是錯的了(當然，“任何事都不確定”這個命題也涉及自我矛盾和循環論證，但這是“哥德爾定理”的限制，這與兩個觀念的自相矛盾自然不同)。就是因為一般人常存在這種思維上的自我矛盾，所以作者會說，把機率決策內化的人很少。
作者的理念，比較準確的表達是：“一切事物都不能證明是確定不變的。”這意��著：好的決策的成功率應該比較高，但不是絕對的。裡面存在無法絕對掌握的變數。正如量子力學的核心原理是“測不準原理”，任何單一決策的成功與否，基本上都“測不準”，機率決策的成功是統計上的成功。
作者拿他從事套利的經驗說：“因為套利像保險一樣，是種精算業務。你預期在某些案子中虧損，但是因為平均率的關係，長期會賺錢。”“即使(某)案子造成龐大而痛苦的虧損，並不表示我們誤判了什麼事情。套利就像任何精算業務一樣，精髓在於如果你正確地計算機率，大部分的交易和所有交易加總起來，你都會賺錢。”雖然，平均上你會賺錢，但作者沒說的是，如果財力不夠雄厚，你可能經不起單一次的虧損。這就是人生的機率意義。
因為一切事物都不能證明是確定不變的，所以，“決策不應該只根據結果來評估。最好的干預決策都可能碰到實際失敗的風險，但是這種失敗不見得代表決策錯誤。”這就表示，一旦進入機率的領域，任何事情都不再簡單。而因為每件事情都是複雜的，因為沒有任何真理可以被確證。所以，“提高機率的唯一方法就是利用更多的知識與加深了解。”這意味著“意見和解釋總是可以修正、總是可以進一步發展。”我們要做的總是更多的分析與尋找自身的盲點。
總的來看，人生就是機率、權衡與選擇，我們不能確證任何事，只能要求自己不斷的做到更好。理論上，只要你方法正確又認真實行，結果就會更好。當然，這只是統計上的更好。

[Charles · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is a bit of a curiosity: released between the dot com bust and the housing crisis, some of the centrist policies advocated here sound positively antiquated, judging by the current dialogue playing out in the editorial pages and network news chairs.

Rubin is incredibly smart and accomplished, but so much of the book comes across as reactive to whatever the crisis of the day was. He has so many friends among the global elite that he doesn't want to offend, so most issues are reduced to the anodyne, "I worked with X, who was incredibly smart and capable, about issue Y. It's too complex to discuss here, but it needs more of your (the reader) focus and attention."

Of positive note: the 10 point approach (later expanded to 12) approach to Treasury policy.

[Jacob Goldberg · Rating 3 out of 5]

Wanted to like this book more and enjoyed some stories, but several chapters were repetitive and bland. Three chapters covered foreign markets in danger of collapsing and causing a cascading effect around the world all amounted to essentially the same story and led to a sense of deja vu because of how similar the explanations were. Also too much name dropping/listing which ivy league schools various people attended.

[Narasi Sridhar · Rating 5 out of 5]

Well written with humility and deep understanding

I fundamentally agree that probabilistic thinking is key, but difficult to do. Bob Rubin has written a highly readable book that provides insights into forces that shape our country’s approach to international relations. It is valid especially today, considering the continued myopia of Republicans and the Trump administration.

[Camilo Angel · Rating 2 out of 5]

Could be interesting if you’re into state economics or the Clinton administration. Besides that, it had a couple of good anecdotes about the nineties emerging market busts, and some good insight into what could constitute eficiente macroeconomic policy for developing nations. Not very interesting and not worth the read from my point of view.

[Karl Nordstrom · Rating 4 out of 5]

I found it fascinating to read how someone high in finance handled complicated financial, political and interpersonal challenges. Among his many jobs, Robert Rubin was co-chariman of Goldman Sachs and US Treasury secretary. It was interesting to read his thought processes as he navigated many tough decisions and sticky situations. The book is warmly written.

[Max Cohen-Casado · Rating 3 out of 5]

I enjoyed hearing about Rubin’s time within the Clinton administration. His descriptions of dealing with the various financial crises during that era, as well as the various budgetary battles, were engaging. The last third of the book covering his concerns about deficits, policy recommendations, and advocacy of free trade, was rather drawn-out.

[Joel Gray · Rating 1 out of 5]

MANY PEOPLE CAN ACKNOWLEDGE CRITICSM AND ADVICE, BUT RELATIVELY FEW INTERNALISE IT AND ALTER THIER BEHAVIOUR IN A SIGNIFICANT WAY

Financial models are useful tools. But they can be dangerous because reality is always more complex than models.

[Ethan Lambert · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fun read. Covers his life from GS to White House and then later in Citigroup. Has interesting anecdotes about Financial Crisis that plagued world economy one event after another and how they fought it off.

[Max Lapin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Insightful book on the Treasury work.

[Katherine Sayer · Rating 3 out of 5]

Another book I was told to read by my boss - if you’re v interested in economic policy, probably 4*.

Interesting defence of globalisation.
Clinton is painted in a very flattering light.