Military historians tend to focus on the performance of armies in battle and pay little attention to casualties, other than to consider the impact in terms of force reduction. But, of course, for the casualties themselves and their families, the experience may be traumatic, with permanent consequences. Even where casualties are considered, it tends to be the physically harmed who receive our focus - the amputee or the burns victim. Yet the scars of war can be equally great when they are not outwardly visible, but are in the mind of the injured.
Taylor Downing's study of shellshock in the Battle of the Somme is therefore a valuable and welcome contribution to the literature. Starting with the formation and training of Kitchener's New Armies in 1914-1916, Downing then explores the very limited understanding among military medics of the nature and causes of the unexpected emergence of 'shell shock', showing how some were convinced it stemmed from physical trauma to the brain, while others thought it reflected inherent debility on the part of some soldiers. Although there was a gradual appreciation that any soldier, if exposed to the awesome threat and grinding carnage of modern warfare, would in the end give way, this was not a view widely supported, especially by the military establishment.
This all provides the basis for a examination of the impact of the experience of the Somme on the British troops engaged, especially the men of the New Armies, where Downing shows that shell shock cases sometimes represented some 20% of all casualties, with in some cases the survivors of whole battalions being declared unfit to continue following severe losses. Downing also shows how the military establishment fought against shell shock, primarily by denying its validity, treating it as a sickness rather than as a wound, and then by adjusting the ways in which it was recorded, in order to reduce the incidence in the records. He also demonstrates that many of the men executed for cowardice were almost certainly suffering from shell shock.
The combination of new recording systems and better treatment led to a dramatic reduction in the number of shell shock cases notified from 1917 onwards, such that the problem essentially disappeared, though there remained tens of thousands of veterans after the war, who either remained debilitated by the condition or else sought disability pensions as a consequence. The book concludes with a brief summary of the numbers of cases in other armies (the French, Germans and Americans all seem to have experienced about 5% of all casualties as being due to shell shock), and subsequent understanding of what is now termed PTSD.
In many ways, the book is well written and provides a good introduction to an important subject. However, it left me feeling dissatisfied in two ways. First, Downing makes a number of references to the fact that it appeared that a well-led battalion, with good morale, tended to suffer far fewer shell shock cases than a badly-led one with poor morale, but he does not really explore this any further. To be, this seems a vital question. Second, he notes that the rate of shell shock fell significantly after the Somme, but broadly suggests this was primarily due to changes in reporting. I was left wondering whether there was, in fact, a change in the professionalism of the army and the troops, as it and they ascended the famous 'learning curve'. Was the high incidence of shell shock on the Somme in fact in large measure a consequence of units of men, who had not really made the transition out of civilian thinking and into a military paradigm, who had been barely trained and who were thrown into the battle almost as helpless cannon fodder by commanders who had minimal faith in their military usefullness? It would have been interesting for Downing to have compared the British experience on the Somme with that of the newly-formed German Reserve Corps, which were hurled into the First Battle of Ypres in October 1914. Almost untrained, these innocent volunteers too suffered massive casualties and, I believe, experienced very high rates of shell shock.
Nonetheless, while perhaps not exploring the topic as deeply as might have been wished, Downing has produced a valuable work, which sheds new light from an important perspective on a key aspects of what makes men continue to fight. If only for that, the book is recommended.