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Mere Civility: Disagreement and the Limits of Toleration
Today, politicians and intellectuals warn that we face a crisis of civility and a veritable war of words polluting our public sphere. In liberal democracies committed to tolerating diversity as well as active, often heated disagreement, the loss of this conversational virtue appears critical. But is civility really a virtue? Or is it, as critics claim, a covert demand for conformity that silences dissent?
Mere Civility sheds light on our predicament and the impasse between "civilitarians" and their opponents by examining early modern debates about religious toleration. As concerns about uncivil disagreement achieved new prominence after the Reformation, seventeenth-century figures as different as Roger Williams, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke could agree that some restraint on the war of words would be necessary. But they recognized that the prosecution of incivility was often difficult to distinguish from persecution. In their efforts to reconcile diversity with disagreement, they developed competing conceptions of civility as the social bond of tolerant societies that still resonate.
Most modern appeals to civility follow either Hobbes or Locke by proposing to suppress disagreement or exclude persons and positions deemed "uncivil" for the sake of social concord. Compared with his contemporaries' more robust ideals, Williams's unabashedly mere civility--a minimal, occasionally contemptuous adherence to culturally contingent rules of respectful behavior--is easily overlooked. Yet Teresa Bejan argues that Williams offers a promising path forward in confronting our own crisis of civility, one that fundamentally challenges our assumptions about what a tolerant--and civil--society should look like.
Mere Civility sheds light on our predicament and the impasse between "civilitarians" and their opponents by examining early modern debates about religious toleration. As concerns about uncivil disagreement achieved new prominence after the Reformation, seventeenth-century figures as different as Roger Williams, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke could agree that some restraint on the war of words would be necessary. But they recognized that the prosecution of incivility was often difficult to distinguish from persecution. In their efforts to reconcile diversity with disagreement, they developed competing conceptions of civility as the social bond of tolerant societies that still resonate.
Most modern appeals to civility follow either Hobbes or Locke by proposing to suppress disagreement or exclude persons and positions deemed "uncivil" for the sake of social concord. Compared with his contemporaries' more robust ideals, Williams's unabashedly mere civility--a minimal, occasionally contemptuous adherence to culturally contingent rules of respectful behavior--is easily overlooked. Yet Teresa Bejan argues that Williams offers a promising path forward in confronting our own crisis of civility, one that fundamentally challenges our assumptions about what a tolerant--and civil--society should look like.
288 pages, Hardcover
First published January 2, 2017
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
February 7, 2017
An excellent and scholarly discussion of the early modern toleration and civility debates, and their relevance to our current situation.
Bejan hones in on Roger Williams, founder of Providence, as providing the most radical model of toleration and the titular "mere" civility". Williams welcomed Jews, atheists, and Native Americans to his colony, but not because he thought very highly of them. The paradox of Williams, to modern readers, is that he seems to have combined the most radical tolerance with the most vehement bigotry. Bejan argues that there is no paradox at all; the very point of radical toleration, for Williams, was to extend the reach of vehement evangelizing.
She also offers provocative readings of both Hobbes and Locke, each of whom offers a version of civility that is restrictive in different ways. While Williams is the hero of the book, each formulation is offered up to provide better resources for a debate on civility which she perceives as having stagnated for decades.
It is definitely a worthy read for just that reason. My only complaint would be that it gets a little bogged down in the details of historical retrieval and could be tighter in laying out the conflict between the three models. But it's not wordy---it's around 180 pages minutes the end notes. Definitely recommend it for anyone who wants to engage the subject seriously.
Bejan hones in on Roger Williams, founder of Providence, as providing the most radical model of toleration and the titular "mere" civility". Williams welcomed Jews, atheists, and Native Americans to his colony, but not because he thought very highly of them. The paradox of Williams, to modern readers, is that he seems to have combined the most radical tolerance with the most vehement bigotry. Bejan argues that there is no paradox at all; the very point of radical toleration, for Williams, was to extend the reach of vehement evangelizing.
She also offers provocative readings of both Hobbes and Locke, each of whom offers a version of civility that is restrictive in different ways. While Williams is the hero of the book, each formulation is offered up to provide better resources for a debate on civility which she perceives as having stagnated for decades.
It is definitely a worthy read for just that reason. My only complaint would be that it gets a little bogged down in the details of historical retrieval and could be tighter in laying out the conflict between the three models. But it's not wordy---it's around 180 pages minutes the end notes. Definitely recommend it for anyone who wants to engage the subject seriously.
July 2, 2022
Detailed discussion of tolerance doctrine, comparing and contrasting Hobbes, Locke, and Roger Williams, whose idea of "Meer Civility" is borrowed for the title.
These three philosophers developed their doctrines at a time of frequent verbal religious strife, both between Protestants and Catholics and outside to other faiths. In summary, Hobbes mostly pushed for silence and Locke through legislation, though those views changed over his lifetime. Williams was more in between these two, suggesting that thicker skins were better, and distinguishing between true compromise and mere civility. The conclusion of the book notes that America has generally more freedom of speech and fewer laws related to insults than other societies.
The author teaches political theory at Oxford, and unfortunately this reads more like a textbook than an accessible work of non-fiction. Sentences are long and dense - here is one example from the conclusion:
"Even if one rejects Williams' mere civility, along with the Hobbesian and Lockean alternative, as intolerant or repressive, it is important to remember that all of these positions arose out of a serious and sustained engagement with a truth that modern commentators too often seem determined to overlook."
It took me more than two months to finish this book, and that wasn't time spent in studied contemplation. I chose this book as a follow up to a Williams biography and history read recently. 2½ stars out of 5.
These three philosophers developed their doctrines at a time of frequent verbal religious strife, both between Protestants and Catholics and outside to other faiths. In summary, Hobbes mostly pushed for silence and Locke through legislation, though those views changed over his lifetime. Williams was more in between these two, suggesting that thicker skins were better, and distinguishing between true compromise and mere civility. The conclusion of the book notes that America has generally more freedom of speech and fewer laws related to insults than other societies.
The author teaches political theory at Oxford, and unfortunately this reads more like a textbook than an accessible work of non-fiction. Sentences are long and dense - here is one example from the conclusion:
"Even if one rejects Williams' mere civility, along with the Hobbesian and Lockean alternative, as intolerant or repressive, it is important to remember that all of these positions arose out of a serious and sustained engagement with a truth that modern commentators too often seem determined to overlook."
It took me more than two months to finish this book, and that wasn't time spent in studied contemplation. I chose this book as a follow up to a Williams biography and history read recently. 2½ stars out of 5.
April 24, 2019
Important themes in academic prose. If that's not your cup of tea, skip to the author's TED Talk.
February 21, 2019
Mere Civility considers "civilitarianism". This complex, well written book delves into the history involving three views of civil speech brought to us by the lesser known radical preacher Roger Williams who founded Providence (RI) Plantations in 1636. The other two are from Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke. Each argument essentially rises out of the turmoil of the reformation. Williams was for the most liberal forms of free speech whereas Hobbes was for the most legislation against it. Locke . . ? His ideas changed over time but had no foundation.
For Williams, the free exchange of ideas was necessary for freedom, education and civil tolerance. For Hobbes it was the end of civility and people must be silenced for the good of all. Today we have free speech. Will we prove Williams or Hobbes correct? Today we have plenty of intolerance on the left as well as the right. Sometimes calls for civility effectively silence others.
Whether you, like me, agree with Williams that a high degree of disagreement should not only be tolerated but encouraged and debated (that we have a civil obligation to make our best reasoned arguments with those who disagree), or you think we should keep quiet, a degree of personal responsibility is required to maintain any such freedom. But if speech is intended to bludgeon and inhibit the chance of others to speak freely, this conflict of rights becomes difficult to sanction.
Civility need not be pleasant, particularly peaceful or harmonious but it will be open, and this openness is a foundation that might dispel a lack of trust. Or we can go on ignoring one half of our countrymen by denying their values.
For Williams, the free exchange of ideas was necessary for freedom, education and civil tolerance. For Hobbes it was the end of civility and people must be silenced for the good of all. Today we have free speech. Will we prove Williams or Hobbes correct? Today we have plenty of intolerance on the left as well as the right. Sometimes calls for civility effectively silence others.
Whether you, like me, agree with Williams that a high degree of disagreement should not only be tolerated but encouraged and debated (that we have a civil obligation to make our best reasoned arguments with those who disagree), or you think we should keep quiet, a degree of personal responsibility is required to maintain any such freedom. But if speech is intended to bludgeon and inhibit the chance of others to speak freely, this conflict of rights becomes difficult to sanction.
Civility need not be pleasant, particularly peaceful or harmonious but it will be open, and this openness is a foundation that might dispel a lack of trust. Or we can go on ignoring one half of our countrymen by denying their values.
December 9, 2025
This book reads like an extended academic paper, filled with plenty of erudite language, but also lots of jargon, quotations in archaic speech, and of course meticulous citations. As such, the target audience is really Bejan’s contemporary professional philosophers, of which I am not one.
Having said that, the title and description suggest that it would be a worthwhile read for anyone with an interest in the role of civility in current political discourse, so I think it’s fair to review it in that spirit.
If I could briefly summarize Bejan’s main point in this book, it would be the comment in which she says “A more Hobbesian approach that asks people to observe gag rules on contentious topics, or a Lockean request that people sincerely embrace their enemies as friends and brothers, either over- or underreacts to the very real differences between us.” (p. 158) I’m largely on board with this conclusion, but she gets to this point only after more than 150 pages of dense analysis of the history of post-Reformation writings on the topic of civility, with a focus on Hobbes, Locke, and Rhode Island founding father Roger Williams. Her goal is to show us that Williams’ philosophy of “mere civility” comes closer than that of either Hobbes or Locke to effectively capturing how society should be structured in order to allow for peaceful resolution of political disputes. Spoiler alert: it’s a compromise between the two she mentions in the quote above. Williams apparently straddled the line in his thinking by being committed to allowing free speech by all, while not necessarily extending his respect to speakers with whom he disagreed.
One issue I have with most of the book is that religion is at the center of virtually all of the conflict among the thinkers of the 1600s. When atheists are mentioned, it’s only for them to be denigrated along with Catholics, Jews, “Turks” (Muslims), and of course all Protestant sects other than the one the particular writer belonged to. This is perhaps reasonable as an analogy to modern debates, and as a way to gauge the level of tolerance of these men toward those they disagreed with, but the amount of effort expended here to rehash the religious differences seems excessive. A modern philosopher is free to consider all appeals to the supernatural without evidence as completely irrelevant, and since practically no one in the era in question agreed with this, it makes it a bit hard for modern readers to take their positions seriously.
But for me, the worst problem is Bejan’s claim that expecting one’s opponent to argue for their position in good faith is an example of “civility” that goes too far. She says that expecting even this level of integrity comes with “…the cost of a moralizing emphasis on sincerity and the contemptuous exclusion of anyone unwilling or unable to submit to its rigors.” Further, she claims it’s wrong to suggest that “…truly civil disagreement can take place only between good faith partners committed to a just social order…” based on the reasoning that these are people who “…subscribe to the relevant moral principles already.” (p. 148). Bejan then accuses anyone who disagrees as taking “…an elite, and frankly elitist, standard of civil discourse appropriate to particular formalized and limited conversational contexts…” and then applying it to “…others where the rules of civility are more nebulous.” (p. 149)
I’m afraid I can’t possibly agree with this reasoning. And in an endnote, she further adds: “One wonders how many of the theorists who enjoin their fellow citizens to be open-minded, and willing to revise their views would be capable of attaining this level of conversational virtue themselves. And if they did, what such truly civil citizens would disagree about, given that they agree already on the importance of respecting each other’s autonomy and of the value of diversity, is unclear.” (p. 232)
Maybe this makes sense to other professional philosophers, but it makes absolutely none to me. “Arguing in good faith” may be one of the definitions of “civility”, but to me it’s just a foundation of discourse that both sides must demonstrate the level of integrity they expect in return. I’m sure it’s true that many advocates of this would fall short in practice, but that doesn’t mean it’s wrong. And there are absolutely other matters that reasonable people can disagree about beyond the most basic guidelines for social interaction; everything from abortion to economic policies to the likelihood of superintelligent AI taking over the world. Of course people have the right to disagree in the strongest terms, and yes, they should even be (legally) free to be rude, to toss personal insults into their arguments, to disregard facts, and even to be deliberately deceptive. But then they shouldn’t be surprised if their opponents simply dismiss their arguments or ignore them completely. If that’s “contemptuous exclusion” from an “elite”, so be it.
The other major point that Bejan makes is to take the position (following Williams) that speech should be largely unrestricted, including what many might consider to be “hate speech”. This may be the most contentious point for many readers, but I think there are various good reasons for this, so I don’t disagree. Again, those who engage in it should not be surprised if their opinions are not taken seriously if they don’t also engage rationally with their opponents.
I had considered three stars for this book: in recognition that it’s an important topic to tackle; for the well-researched effort made by the author; and to allow for the fact that I’m not exactly the target audience. But given the egregious problem with excusing those who refuse to argue in good faith, I really can’t justify more than two.
Having said that, the title and description suggest that it would be a worthwhile read for anyone with an interest in the role of civility in current political discourse, so I think it’s fair to review it in that spirit.
If I could briefly summarize Bejan’s main point in this book, it would be the comment in which she says “A more Hobbesian approach that asks people to observe gag rules on contentious topics, or a Lockean request that people sincerely embrace their enemies as friends and brothers, either over- or underreacts to the very real differences between us.” (p. 158) I’m largely on board with this conclusion, but she gets to this point only after more than 150 pages of dense analysis of the history of post-Reformation writings on the topic of civility, with a focus on Hobbes, Locke, and Rhode Island founding father Roger Williams. Her goal is to show us that Williams’ philosophy of “mere civility” comes closer than that of either Hobbes or Locke to effectively capturing how society should be structured in order to allow for peaceful resolution of political disputes. Spoiler alert: it’s a compromise between the two she mentions in the quote above. Williams apparently straddled the line in his thinking by being committed to allowing free speech by all, while not necessarily extending his respect to speakers with whom he disagreed.
One issue I have with most of the book is that religion is at the center of virtually all of the conflict among the thinkers of the 1600s. When atheists are mentioned, it’s only for them to be denigrated along with Catholics, Jews, “Turks” (Muslims), and of course all Protestant sects other than the one the particular writer belonged to. This is perhaps reasonable as an analogy to modern debates, and as a way to gauge the level of tolerance of these men toward those they disagreed with, but the amount of effort expended here to rehash the religious differences seems excessive. A modern philosopher is free to consider all appeals to the supernatural without evidence as completely irrelevant, and since practically no one in the era in question agreed with this, it makes it a bit hard for modern readers to take their positions seriously.
But for me, the worst problem is Bejan’s claim that expecting one’s opponent to argue for their position in good faith is an example of “civility” that goes too far. She says that expecting even this level of integrity comes with “…the cost of a moralizing emphasis on sincerity and the contemptuous exclusion of anyone unwilling or unable to submit to its rigors.” Further, she claims it’s wrong to suggest that “…truly civil disagreement can take place only between good faith partners committed to a just social order…” based on the reasoning that these are people who “…subscribe to the relevant moral principles already.” (p. 148). Bejan then accuses anyone who disagrees as taking “…an elite, and frankly elitist, standard of civil discourse appropriate to particular formalized and limited conversational contexts…” and then applying it to “…others where the rules of civility are more nebulous.” (p. 149)
I’m afraid I can’t possibly agree with this reasoning. And in an endnote, she further adds: “One wonders how many of the theorists who enjoin their fellow citizens to be open-minded, and willing to revise their views would be capable of attaining this level of conversational virtue themselves. And if they did, what such truly civil citizens would disagree about, given that they agree already on the importance of respecting each other’s autonomy and of the value of diversity, is unclear.” (p. 232)
Maybe this makes sense to other professional philosophers, but it makes absolutely none to me. “Arguing in good faith” may be one of the definitions of “civility”, but to me it’s just a foundation of discourse that both sides must demonstrate the level of integrity they expect in return. I’m sure it’s true that many advocates of this would fall short in practice, but that doesn’t mean it’s wrong. And there are absolutely other matters that reasonable people can disagree about beyond the most basic guidelines for social interaction; everything from abortion to economic policies to the likelihood of superintelligent AI taking over the world. Of course people have the right to disagree in the strongest terms, and yes, they should even be (legally) free to be rude, to toss personal insults into their arguments, to disregard facts, and even to be deliberately deceptive. But then they shouldn’t be surprised if their opponents simply dismiss their arguments or ignore them completely. If that’s “contemptuous exclusion” from an “elite”, so be it.
The other major point that Bejan makes is to take the position (following Williams) that speech should be largely unrestricted, including what many might consider to be “hate speech”. This may be the most contentious point for many readers, but I think there are various good reasons for this, so I don’t disagree. Again, those who engage in it should not be surprised if their opinions are not taken seriously if they don’t also engage rationally with their opponents.
I had considered three stars for this book: in recognition that it’s an important topic to tackle; for the well-researched effort made by the author; and to allow for the fact that I’m not exactly the target audience. But given the egregious problem with excusing those who refuse to argue in good faith, I really can’t justify more than two.
February 7, 2024
To call it dry would be an understatement; I couldn't even make it through the introduction.
Uncivil as it might be to say so, the opening of this book reads like so many scholarly papers that seek to aggregate the thoughts of others without daring to offer anything fresh. Never a paragraph goes by without a citation; sometimes many. Where is the value in rehashing so completely. Where is the freshness?
And while there may be value to uncover later, the profound dullness of the prose guaranteed I would never survive the experience to encounter it.
Uncivil as it might be to say so, the opening of this book reads like so many scholarly papers that seek to aggregate the thoughts of others without daring to offer anything fresh. Never a paragraph goes by without a citation; sometimes many. Where is the value in rehashing so completely. Where is the freshness?
And while there may be value to uncover later, the profound dullness of the prose guaranteed I would never survive the experience to encounter it.
January 1, 2022
4,5 excellent book.
August 17, 2022
This is an absolutely excellent book that addresses the contemporary debates about the freedom of speech, civility and whether the two conflict and how through the lenses of the early moderns who framed these issues as they would be implemented by the American Founders. It is remarkable in this day and age to read an academic who considers Western thinkers in their own time and who seeks neither the deconstruct nor to problematize them. What results is a very deeply thought out recontextualization of contemporary debate within the larger conversation on the desirability and limits of civility and toleration in a diverse society. The author uses the three historical thinkers on the question and leaves the context of religious conflict as the over-arching theme as it was for the original thinkers. She uses Hobbes and Locke, who will be familiar to most as well as Roger Williams one of the Founders of Rhode Island as her models for three competing theories of toleration, and does point out the changes in how Locke viewed the issue throughout his career. She uses the historical context to point out the many flaws of the debate by debunking contemporary revisionists and puncturing the claims of contemporary secularists that their contemporary unfalsifiable claims of societal functioning are distinguishable from religions and therefore are above the questions addressed by these authors. It's a great book that will force and honest reader to confront some of their own false assumptions about the nature of the debate. I had some of my views punctured even as I smiled at her skewering the arguments of my opponents. The book is academic, and I did need to consult the dictionary several times but, if you give it the time you need, this is great.
March 1, 2020
A very interesting book, with a message that is very relevant for today. My major issue with it is that it is very academical, and doesn't state it's point nearly as potently as I would have preferred. Still, an interesting read.
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May 6, 2020Religious trends in civility.
Roger Williams, Hobbes (Leviathan) and Locke.
Roger Williams, Hobbes (Leviathan) and Locke.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews