What do you think?
Rate this book
Elvis's Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield
When the U.S. Army drafted Elvis Presley in 1958, it quickly set about transforming the King of Rock and Roll from a rebellious teen idol into a clean-cut GI. Trading in his gold-trimmed jacket for standard-issue fatigues, Elvis became a model soldier in an army facing the unprecedented challenge of building a fighting force for the Atomic Age.
In an era that threatened Soviet-American thermonuclear annihilation, the army declared it could limit atomic warfare to the battlefield. It not only adopted a radically new way of fighting but also revamped its equipment, organization, concepts, and training practices. From massive garrisons in Germany and Korea to nuclear tests to portable atomic weapons, the army reinvented itself. Its revolution in warfare required an equal revolution in personnel: the new army needed young officers and soldiers who were highly motivated, well trained, and technologically adept. Drafting Elvis demonstrated that even this icon of youth culture was not too cool to wear the army s uniform.
The army of the 1950s was America s most racially and economically egalitarian institution, providing millions with education, technical skills, athletics, and other opportunities. With the cooperation of both the army and the media, military service became a common theme in television, music, and movies, and part of this generation s identity. Brian Linn traces the origins, evolution, and ultimate failure of the army s attempt to transform itself for atomic warfare, revealing not only the army s vital role in creating Cold War America but also the experiences of its forgotten soldiers."
In an era that threatened Soviet-American thermonuclear annihilation, the army declared it could limit atomic warfare to the battlefield. It not only adopted a radically new way of fighting but also revamped its equipment, organization, concepts, and training practices. From massive garrisons in Germany and Korea to nuclear tests to portable atomic weapons, the army reinvented itself. Its revolution in warfare required an equal revolution in personnel: the new army needed young officers and soldiers who were highly motivated, well trained, and technologically adept. Drafting Elvis demonstrated that even this icon of youth culture was not too cool to wear the army s uniform.
The army of the 1950s was America s most racially and economically egalitarian institution, providing millions with education, technical skills, athletics, and other opportunities. With the cooperation of both the army and the media, military service became a common theme in television, music, and movies, and part of this generation s identity. Brian Linn traces the origins, evolution, and ultimate failure of the army s attempt to transform itself for atomic warfare, revealing not only the army s vital role in creating Cold War America but also the experiences of its forgotten soldiers."
- GenresMilitary HistoryHistory
464 pages, Hardcover
Published September 6, 2016
5 people are currently reading
65 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
December 13, 2016
This started out as an excellent book. Linn has written a solid piece on the U.S. Army, primarily between the end of WWII and the beginnings of Vietnam. During this period the Army experimented with the New Look, tried the Pentomic concept, and eventually reorganized the major units of action with ROAD. The author does an excellent job of explaining the contradictory needs within the Army for trained, career-minded technicians and large numbers of draftees. When the U.S. Army tried to give draftees more of an incentive to remain, with education and other benefits, it made it more difficult to keep weapons maintained and to conduct training. When the Army attempted to retain NCO technicians it found that only the least qualified men were staying in.
Linn explored several interesting topics. First and foremost was the role public relations played in the 1950s. The Army was not only redefining itself, it was busy SELLING itself as a branch of the service which still had a role to play in the atomic era. Unfortunately, the same personnel shortfalls in the Army at large made it hard to find and keep good PIOs, but some of the public affairs efforts were really quite good. Other programs, which gave TV and movie companies access to Army stock footage and equipment, allowed the Army to have a "say" on scripts.
Unfortunately, the book does not transition well into the Vietnam era, when ROAD divisions were committed to fighting an insurgency. Instead it winds up going into a critique of the invasion of Iraq (!) which is so inappropriate that it provides an intellectual "jolt." Too bad. If the end of the book was as good as the first 9/10ths I would have suggested it deserved six stars. As it is, the book does have some very good information, much of it statistical but weaved by Linn in a way that makes it engaging.
Linn explored several interesting topics. First and foremost was the role public relations played in the 1950s. The Army was not only redefining itself, it was busy SELLING itself as a branch of the service which still had a role to play in the atomic era. Unfortunately, the same personnel shortfalls in the Army at large made it hard to find and keep good PIOs, but some of the public affairs efforts were really quite good. Other programs, which gave TV and movie companies access to Army stock footage and equipment, allowed the Army to have a "say" on scripts.
Unfortunately, the book does not transition well into the Vietnam era, when ROAD divisions were committed to fighting an insurgency. Instead it winds up going into a critique of the invasion of Iraq (!) which is so inappropriate that it provides an intellectual "jolt." Too bad. If the end of the book was as good as the first 9/10ths I would have suggested it deserved six stars. As it is, the book does have some very good information, much of it statistical but weaved by Linn in a way that makes it engaging.
March 21, 2017
Fascinating examination of the US Army between conflicts, in this case the period between Korea and Vietnam. Linn uses the induction and service of Elvis Presley as a hook to examine the Army's struggle with relevance in the nuclear age, an attempt at transformation and impediments that kept it from becoming the Army it wanted to be. Along the way, Linn chronicles the Army's attempt at reform of some of it's institutions (West Point, for example by some, was considered a haven for 'draft dodgers' during World War II), it's fighting organizations and experiment with new tactics and techniques (most famously the 'air assault' concept). The centerpiece of this was the highly controversial "Pentomic Concept", a title only a "Sosh-P" could have come up with. He highlights the Army's continued (and frustrated) attempts to move to an all volunteer force, to increase professionalization and make the most efficient use of it's manpower in the face of budgetary and mission challenges. Linn believes you can learn a great deal about Armies in the periods in between conflict -- and with some of the similar debates we hear today -- he goes a long way towards demonstrating that here.
July 12, 2020
BLUF: If you read The Regulars: The American Army, 1898-1941 by Edward M. Coffman, you’ll likely enjoy this historical overview of another important but lesser known period in the Army’s history.
Honestly, I’m surprised that it’s not on more professional reading lists, as there are lessons for all ranks. Through Linn’s exhaustive detailing of the Army’s social challenges in the atomic era, readers will recognize a myriad of themes that remain equally pertinent today. For example, the generational and civil-military divides, racial and gender integration, and deficiencies in requisite technological skills had outsized impacts on recruitment and retention. This dilemma persists today as the Army seeks to market its advanced opportunities and requirements, even as enlistments remain increasingly concentrated from southern and rural communities with less education. Additionally, the evolution of officer and NCO relationships during this period carries over today in how we instruct cadets and junior officers to engage with their future enlisted counterparts.
Most fascinating, though, is the paradox the Army found itself in when attempting to prepare for a potential nuclear conflict. Linn notes that atomic army theorists grappled with three problems: proving the army’s relevancy in the Cold War, transforming existing doctrine/org/equipment/personnel to fight on the atomic battlefield, and reversing the army’s decline in prestige, funding and public support. The strategic context following World War II and the Korean War challenged force management assumptions about the ideal Army composition and disposition, a situation we witness today as the Army strives to build a force capable of handling the broad aperture multi domain operations. It drastically revamped professional military education with an overemphasis on atomic warfare, prioritizing concepts of speed, mobility, and decentralization to attack and defeat the enemy. It did this even as it grappled with the grim realization that in a tactical nuclear exchange, the Army’s only role might simply be to survive.
Honestly, I’m surprised that it’s not on more professional reading lists, as there are lessons for all ranks. Through Linn’s exhaustive detailing of the Army’s social challenges in the atomic era, readers will recognize a myriad of themes that remain equally pertinent today. For example, the generational and civil-military divides, racial and gender integration, and deficiencies in requisite technological skills had outsized impacts on recruitment and retention. This dilemma persists today as the Army seeks to market its advanced opportunities and requirements, even as enlistments remain increasingly concentrated from southern and rural communities with less education. Additionally, the evolution of officer and NCO relationships during this period carries over today in how we instruct cadets and junior officers to engage with their future enlisted counterparts.
Most fascinating, though, is the paradox the Army found itself in when attempting to prepare for a potential nuclear conflict. Linn notes that atomic army theorists grappled with three problems: proving the army’s relevancy in the Cold War, transforming existing doctrine/org/equipment/personnel to fight on the atomic battlefield, and reversing the army’s decline in prestige, funding and public support. The strategic context following World War II and the Korean War challenged force management assumptions about the ideal Army composition and disposition, a situation we witness today as the Army strives to build a force capable of handling the broad aperture multi domain operations. It drastically revamped professional military education with an overemphasis on atomic warfare, prioritizing concepts of speed, mobility, and decentralization to attack and defeat the enemy. It did this even as it grappled with the grim realization that in a tactical nuclear exchange, the Army’s only role might simply be to survive.
December 28, 2018
A fantastic journey through the professionalization of the US Army. From the development of multifunctional formations, centralized schooling and selection of NCOs, the the switch from pinks & greens to Army Greens - the story of change is here.
Like much of history, what is new - is old.
Like much of history, what is new - is old.
October 29, 2021
This book is a must read for army officers today.
November 29, 2023
Very well-researched coverage of a forgotten period in the US Army, between the end of WWII and before the Vietnam War.
January 9, 2017
Brian McAllister Linn describes the evolution of the U.S. Army between the Second World War and the beginning of the Vietnam War. He stresses how the Army embarked on public relations campaigns, dealt with budgetary and personnel cuts during Eisenhower's New Look, and implemented ROAD Divisions under Kennedy's "Flexible Response." The theme that runs throughout the book is that the Army required proficient, skilled technicians in order to maintain and operate increasingly complex technology but could not retain inductees or volunteers past two-three year enlistment terms because of private sector competition for both the rising managerial, white-collar worker and the skilled craftsman. The Army faced perennial personnel shortfalls, fell behind in maintenance of vehicles, batteries, and materiel, and stifled the free-thought and leadership flexibility of its junior officers and junior field grade officers. This book covers wide-ranging topics but generally remains focused on how the Army sought to define itself relative to the Air Force and Navy during the post-atomic era and how senior commanders pushed internal campaigns for revolutionize Army doctrine, strategy, and tactics.
Linn provides a fairly grim view of the Army during this period. Most new technologies (e.g. Davy Crockett crew-fired atomic weapons, Corporal missiles, and the artillery-fired tactical atomic bomb) were failures. Command culture became a toxic environment of micromanagement and "snoopervision" that forced many bright young officers out of the service. The USMA was racked with poor leadership, cheating scandals, and inadequate faculty. The Pentomic Division envisioned by Maxwell Taylor prepared the Army for the "atomic battlefield" where tactical nuclear weapons were the norm; however, this vision of using tactical nuclear weapons to stop a Soviet onslaught in Western Europe was impractical. The public perception of the Army worsened during the period with ex-Army personnel spreading negative tales about their own experiences. While the Army theoretically desired dynamic, creative thinkers to manage its arsenal and plan for future nuclear wars, the actual climate inspired soldiers, as Elvis Presley put it, to "keep their heads down" and punch their ticket. On the other hand, during the 1960s ROAD Divisions were a success under Kennedy and "Flexible Response" during the Berlin Crisis at Checkpoint Charlie demonstrated that the Army still had crack divisions.
Linn's book is pregnant with insights and potential research topics for the period covered. For example, he suggests that the U.S. Army, in its efforts to improve the entertainment and social life of enlisted personnel, created a web of connections between music and teenage culture during the 1950s. In other words, the blossoming of Rock and Roll, R&B, Country and other genres had much to do with the U.S. Army's efforts to spread music through radio programs, public entertainment, etc. In another undeveloped argument, Linn suggests that junior enlisted culture (especially among inductees) fundamental shifted during the 1950s—men were less patriotic, more cynical, and unwilling to follow orders without some type of logical explanation. Less clear is how, in turn, the Army responded to these changes in enlisted culture (aside from ramping up entertainment and welfare programs on base). Linn also stresses that the Army inducted the most diverse Army in U.S. History during the 1950s by capturing a cross-section of Americans by class, race, and ethnicity. He even contends that overwhelming diversity and the Army's efforts to integrate units helped foster biracial solidarity within units (e.g. Sharing music across ethnic, racial, and class lines). This is an important claim, but not fully unpacked in the context of Linn's study.
I would highly recommend this book to scholars who study the post-World War II Army, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, or civil-military relations. There are also useful arguments and insights in this book that social and political historians of the 1950s/1960s would find useful. Unfortunately, Linn assumes the reader possesses a lot of prior knowledge about this period and thus writes the book in a manner that makes it rather inaccessible to non-specialists.
Linn provides a fairly grim view of the Army during this period. Most new technologies (e.g. Davy Crockett crew-fired atomic weapons, Corporal missiles, and the artillery-fired tactical atomic bomb) were failures. Command culture became a toxic environment of micromanagement and "snoopervision" that forced many bright young officers out of the service. The USMA was racked with poor leadership, cheating scandals, and inadequate faculty. The Pentomic Division envisioned by Maxwell Taylor prepared the Army for the "atomic battlefield" where tactical nuclear weapons were the norm; however, this vision of using tactical nuclear weapons to stop a Soviet onslaught in Western Europe was impractical. The public perception of the Army worsened during the period with ex-Army personnel spreading negative tales about their own experiences. While the Army theoretically desired dynamic, creative thinkers to manage its arsenal and plan for future nuclear wars, the actual climate inspired soldiers, as Elvis Presley put it, to "keep their heads down" and punch their ticket. On the other hand, during the 1960s ROAD Divisions were a success under Kennedy and "Flexible Response" during the Berlin Crisis at Checkpoint Charlie demonstrated that the Army still had crack divisions.
Linn's book is pregnant with insights and potential research topics for the period covered. For example, he suggests that the U.S. Army, in its efforts to improve the entertainment and social life of enlisted personnel, created a web of connections between music and teenage culture during the 1950s. In other words, the blossoming of Rock and Roll, R&B, Country and other genres had much to do with the U.S. Army's efforts to spread music through radio programs, public entertainment, etc. In another undeveloped argument, Linn suggests that junior enlisted culture (especially among inductees) fundamental shifted during the 1950s—men were less patriotic, more cynical, and unwilling to follow orders without some type of logical explanation. Less clear is how, in turn, the Army responded to these changes in enlisted culture (aside from ramping up entertainment and welfare programs on base). Linn also stresses that the Army inducted the most diverse Army in U.S. History during the 1950s by capturing a cross-section of Americans by class, race, and ethnicity. He even contends that overwhelming diversity and the Army's efforts to integrate units helped foster biracial solidarity within units (e.g. Sharing music across ethnic, racial, and class lines). This is an important claim, but not fully unpacked in the context of Linn's study.
I would highly recommend this book to scholars who study the post-World War II Army, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, or civil-military relations. There are also useful arguments and insights in this book that social and political historians of the 1950s/1960s would find useful. Unfortunately, Linn assumes the reader possesses a lot of prior knowledge about this period and thus writes the book in a manner that makes it rather inaccessible to non-specialists.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews