The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East

by Abraham Rabinovich

In this galvanizing account of the most dramatic of the Arab-Israeli hostilities, Abraham Rabinovich, who reported the conflict for the Jerusalem Post, transports us into the midst of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Rabinovich’s masterly narrative begins as Israel convinces itself there will be no war, while Egypt and Syria plot the two-front conflict. Then, on Yom Kippur, Saturday, October 6, 1973, we see Arab armies pouring across the shattered Bar-Lev Line in the Sinai and through the Golan defenses. Even the famed Israeli air force could not stop them. On the Golan alone, Syria sent 1,460 tanks against Israel’s 177, and 115 artillery batteries against Israel’s 11. And for the first time, footsoldiers wielding anti-tank weapons were able to stop tank charges, while surface-to-air missiles protected those troops from air attack

Rabinovich takes us into this inferno and into the inner sanctums of military and political decision making. He allows us to witness the dramatic turnaround that had the Syrians on the run by the following Wednesday and the great counterattack across the Suez Canal that, once begun, took international intervention to halt.

Using extensive interviews with both participants and observers, and with access to recently declassified materials, Rabinovich shows that the drama of the war lay not only in the battles but also in the apocalyptic visions it triggered in Israel, the hopes and fears it inspired in the Arab world, the heated conflicts on both sides about the conduct of the war, and the concurrent American face-off with the Soviets in Washington, D.C., Moscow, and the Mediterranean. A comprehensive account of one of the pivotal conflicts of the twentieth century.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Middle East, Israel, War, Military History, Military Fiction

543 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2004

About the author

Abraham Rabinovich is a journalist born and raised in New York City. A graduate of Brooklyn College and a US Army veteran, he worked as a reporter for Newsday and arrived in Israel on the eve of the Six Day War. After completing his first book, The Battle for Jerusalem, he joined the Jerusalem Post as a reporter and feature writer. His freelance articles have been published in The New York Times, the International Herald Tribune and The New Republic, among other publications. He is the author of six books, including The Yom Kippur War, The Boats of Cherbourg and Jerusalem on Earth. He lives in Jerusalem and has two daughters and five grandchildren.

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

“On the Golan Heights at 1:30, an artillery observer on Mount Hermon reported…that the Syrians were removing the camouflage netting from their artillery and tanks…[The battalion commander] ordered the tanks on his half of the front line to pull out of their regular positions and move some distance away. If the Syrians opened fire they would hit every fixed Israeli position marked on their maps. In the cabinet room, [Moshe] Dayan was nearing the end of his briefing at 2 p.m. when an aide entered and handed him a note. The defense minister announced that Egyptian airplanes had begun to attack in Sinai. Even as [Prime Minister] Meir declared the meeting closed, a siren wail rose in the street outside. At Tasa in Sinai, Colonel Reshef heard the undulating signal for enemy air penetration on the radio net. Emerging from his headquarters, he saw planes diving on a nearby battalion encampment from which black smoke had begun to rise. The desert floor beneath his feet began to tremble. Twenty miles to the west, two thousand Egyptian guns and heavy mortars had opened up on the Bar-Lev Line…”
- Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter that Transformed the Middle East

In October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched joint surprise attacks on Israel that coincided with the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. Just as in the 1967 Six Day War, Israel had inklings of the onslaught before it occurred, as troops massed on their borders. However, unlike in 1967, Israel did not strike preemptively, or even fully mobilize in time, leading to initial disasters that led some of its leadership into apocalyptic visions. In both the Golan Heights and the Sinai, Israeli troops were pushed back, while hasty counterattacks were smashed.

Eventually, however, the Israeli Defense Forces regrouped, re-engaged, and retook the territory they’d lost, an exceedingly swift turnaround almost as surprising as the early failures. Nevertheless, as Abraham Rabinovich notes in The Yom Kippur War, the ultimate successes did not wholly mask the blow to Israel’s psyche and confidence. On the other hand, Egypt – despite losing military – regained much of the reputation it had lost during the Six Day War, and set the stage for the return of the Sinai.

***

Rabinovich begins The Yom Kippur War with an overview of the strategic situation facing Israel, Egypt, and Syria. His focus is on Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, who sought to achieve border changes without recognizing Israel as a state. The plan he settled upon was a thrust across the Suez Canal.

There are lingering myths that upon the outbreak of war, the Israelis were so certain Sadat’s invasion would end in Tel Aviv that they contemplated using nuclear weapons. Indeed, this formed the basis for the Tom Clancy technothriller The Sum of All Fears. Rabinovich finds these tales overblown, and has little time for them. Instead, he makes clear that Sadat never intended for a coup de main, but for a limited penetration into the Sinai that he might then leverage for concessions. Meanwhile, in the north, the Syrians under Hafez al-Assad would push Israel off the Golan Heights.

Overall, Rabinovich does a good job setting out the context for the war, but he does so rather quickly. Though it’s not necessary, I found it helpful to have read a book about the Six Day War before tackling this, as he does not dwell long on the past before getting right into the middle of things.

***

From there, Rabinovich shifts to the Israeli perspective, where he remains for most of the rest of the book. He starts by delivering an account of the ensuing intelligence failures that misread force buildups along Israel’s borders, which is probably the most fascinating part of The Yom Kippur War. Maybe it’s just me, but I find the deconstruction of misassumptions, mistakes, and misplaced certainty to be utterly absorbing. Still coasting on their one-sided triumph in 1967, Aman – Israel’s military intelligence service – ignored a growing mountain of evidence that an attack was coming.

In particular, Rabinovich is critical of Aman head Eli Zeira, who operated under an analytical framework that presupposed there would not be a war unless certain preconditions were met. Not seeing these preconditions, Zeira saw no war. Interestingly, as the warning lights flashed brighter and faster, Zeira hardened his position, so that he was actually defending it, rather than testing it. Meanwhile, Zvi Zamir, head of Mossad, tried to make Zeira see the danger, relying on a well-placed – if shrouded – source within Egypt.

***

All this setup lasts around one-hundred pages in a five-hundred page book. Once the fighting starts, The Yom Kippur War – for better and for worse – slips into a minutely detailed, tactically-based combat narrative. While Rabinovich certainly steps back to view the overall picture, and discusses top-level leadership – especially the controversial Ariel Sharon – the heart of the book is the experiences of the troops on the ground.

To that end, there are some solid set-pieces, including a good reconstruction of the largest tank battles between the Second World War and the Russo-Ukrainian War. There is an especially taut sequence following a bombing mission to Damascus, and the careful maneuvering to avoid surface-to-air missile sites.

That said, there came a certain point when the literary retellings of combat became a bit repetitious, though Rabinovich certainly succeeds in presenting a tactile feeling for these life-and-death encounters.

At least from one side.

***

Probably the biggest flaw in The Yom Kippur War is that it is almost wholly reliant on Israeli sources. Obviously, official documentation from Egypt and Syria might be hard to access, or might not even exist.

Still, in perusing Rabinovich’s endnotes, there are dozens and dozens of interviews with officers, enlisted men, and politicians, encompassing Israel’s northern command, southern command, air force, engineering corps, and military intelligence. On that list, I only found two Egyptians. I find it extremely hard to believe that of the tens of thousands of Egyptian and Syrian veterans who would’ve been around at the time of this book’s 2003 publication, he couldn’t find anyone to talk to him. Maybe I’m wrong, and no one wanted to participate. But if that was the case, Rabinovich would’ve done well to say it.

At this point, I hasten to add that at no point does Rabinovich denigrate the Syrian or Egyptian soldiers, and remarks often upon both their courage and their efficacy, especially the tank-killer groups using the 9M14 Malyutka antitank guided missile. But in failing to provide any eyewitness accounts of their experience, the entire book becomes imbalanced, and – unintentionally or not – the forces arrayed against the Israelis become little more than clay pigeons, a faceless mass to be destroyed.

***

Another frustrating problem with The Yom Kippur War is its intransigent refusal to provide any information about the military technologies deployed by all three combatants. More than most wars, this one was carefully studied by both the United States and the Soviet Union, as they had provided the weapons systems to the belligerents, and had a vested interest to see how they fared in use.

Rabinovich, though, just doesn’t care. For the most part, he doesn’t even bother to name the type of tank that is in action. If this was a different kind of book – say, a broadly accessible popular history – I could understand this disinclination. However, this is a straight-up military history that's over 500 pages long, with tiny font, and to ignore the role of hardware capabilities – especially when an outnumbered Israel relied so heavily upon it – is just confounding.

***

Having come out over twenty years ago, The Yom Kippur War has nothing directly to say to the ongoing violence and humanitarian crises in the Middle East. Its conclusions are directed solely to the events of the 1970s.

As Rabinovich explains in a brief summarizing chapter, no one emerged the clear winner from the Yom Kippur War. Syria regained some lost ground, and did so without political concessions, but at great human and materiel cost. Since 2011, it has been engaged in a civil war. Egypt was seen as achieving spectacular – if short lived – success, removing some of the 1967 stain. Meanwhile, Israel, though bloodied at the start, gained recognition from Egypt. Some five years later, the Camp David Accords were signed, bringing a measure of peace between Egypt and Israel.

Overall harmony and stability, however, has remained tragically elusive, and while the Yom Kippur War may have reshaped the Middle East, it did not solve any of the underlying problems.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

A broad, thorough history of the Yom Kippur War. Rabinovich succeeds in putting the war into its historical and regional context. He describes how Israel’s stunning victory against all odds in 1967 led to a certain institutional arrogance that hampered Israel’s ability to improvise, and how Israeli commanders bickered among themselves, suffered from intelligence failures, lacked adequate artillery and infantry forces, had overconfidence in their air force and armor (“We’ll have one hundred tanks against their eight hundred. That ought to be enough”) and often underestimated the enemy (“We’re facing Arabs, not Germans”). Rabinovich does a great job showing the war from both the Israeli and Arab perspectives (although, of course, there are less available sources for the Arab side), and how the Arabs were more influenced by realpolitik than ideology.

Rabinovich does not cover the UN response in much detail, and when he does it comes off as completely inept and utterly irrelevant to the course of the conflict. His account of Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy and the reactions of the Soviets is vivid. Both the Soviets and the Americans were convinced that an Israeli victory would be quick. The Soviets had warned the Arabs to avoid war and were unwilling to undermine their new detente with the US by intervening; some Soviet leaders, due to Sadat’s expulsion of Soviet advisors, even looked forward to an Egyptian defeat. Both superpowers eventually decided that the fate of their respective client states would reflect on their status on a superpower, and Kissinger was willing to risk the collapse of détente to maintain US prestige in the Middle East; as soon as the US decided on an airlift of military supplies, the Soviets did the same. Rabinovich also describes how Nixon slept through the crisis, leaving it up to Kissinger to handle, and how Nixon later claimed credit for the US response anyway. Rabinovich also concludes that there was no real winner and that Sadat was able to make the most gains.

An engaging, well-researched and well-written work. Some better maps would have helped, though.

[Derek Weese · Rating 5 out of 5]

It isn't often that I read a book about a historical subject that I know little about. Usually I tend to read about events that I already have a lot of passion for, this book was not one of such books. The 'Yom Kippur' or October War is an area of history I always found interesting yet never bothered to read more than a magazine article on. To anyone who wants to read a well written, dramatic yet not over done book that is for the common masses yet still delves deep into a very complex and fascinating event filled with high stakes known as the 'Yom Kippur War' then this is that book. Abraham Rabinovic is a remarkable writer, he is a professional journalist and his prose shows his profession. I can honestly say that few books on military history I've read since entering college have been half as good as this one was, and this is one I read just for myself and I consider it time very well spent.
Following their dramatic victory in the 67' 'Six Day War' the Israeli Military became complacent, very much so. The average feeling in both the ranks and amongst the top brass concerning Arab soldiers from any nation was that they were pushovers who couldn't fight and that tiny Israeli forces could mop the floor so to speak with much, much larger Arab formations without breaking more than a little perfunctory sweat. Oh how this line of thought would come to haunt the Israeli's.
In Egypt President Nasser's regime lost credibility following Egypt's thrashing at the hands of a much smaller IDF in the 'Six Day War'. He was replaced by one of the truly great statesmen of the 20th Century: Anwar Sadat. Sadat rebuilt the Egyptian Army with the best Soviet equipment money could buy, and more importantly, he had the Army train, and train, and train again and if there was any free time left well than damnit they trained again. The end result was an Egyptian Army which had more than just a new facelift, they were virtually a new entity. The Syrian Armed Forces were rebuilt and revamped as well although they, unlike Egypt, didn't kick out their Soviet advisers.
By booting the Soviets from Egypt Sadat had signaled to an ultimate degree his faith in his country and his armed forces to handle affairs on its own. Secretly he and President Assad of Syria had been formulating a plan to reverse the political situation on the Middle East following the disaster of the 'Six Day War'. The armies of Egypt and Syria would launch a simultaneous surprise offensive against the Israeli holdings in both the Sinai (Egypt) and Golan (Syria). Neither Arab force was aimed at the annihilation of the Jewish state, rather both Sadat and Assad had hoped to defeat the IDF in a quick campaign, regain lost territory and restore the Arab dominance of Middle Eastern politics and strategic position.
But neither Arab force had an easy task ahead of them. In the north the Syrians would have to assault head on against an army that believed in marksmanship far more than even the Wehrmacht did. Israeli tank crews prided themselves on being the best shots in the world and like the Wehrmacht Panzer crews of WWII the IDF boys could back up their boasts with results. If the Syrians managed to breakthrough the Israeli lines (thin though they might be) it was a gamble whether or not enough Syrian mobile forces would have retained enough strength and cohesion to push the assault inland and even drive into northern Israel itself. In the south the Egyptians had to cross the Suez Canal, under fire from dug in Israeli troops entrenched along the Bar-Lev Line that ran the length of the canal. If successful they still had to absorb the counter punch of the Israeli armored reserve brigades that were sure to follow.
Underlying both concerns was the Arab realization that their own Air Forces were simply not up to the standards of the IDF's Air Force. And it was the Israeli Air Force that in the first minutes of the 'Six Day War' hit both Egypt and Syria with an air strike that crippled both nations air forces within minutes. Beyond that, the IDF air crews were excellent air to ground tacticians, and any Arab assault could easily be pummeled from the air by Israeli strike fighters. What to do? in both cases the Arabs built an elaborate air defense network that created a virtual 'wall' of overlapping radar fields and missile batteries that in the coming days would do wonders at keeping the Israeli Air Force at bay.
On October 6th, 1973 both Arab states launched their assault...and in both cases they achieved not just total surprise, but they also achieved remarkable success. In the north, albeit with heavy casualties, the Syrians mauled the Israeli defenders along the Golan Heights and pushed inland. It was in Sinai, however, that the greatest Arab success was met. Using an ingenious tactic of building high powered water pumps to erode the massive Israeli sand barriers along the canal the Egyptian Army literally water blasted avenues through the massive barriers and assault teams raced across the Suez Canal and quickly either overran the startled Israeli defenders in their forts or isolated them. As expected, the IDF quickly hit back with an armored counter blow...that was shot to pieces by the Egyptians using heretofore unseen Soviet wire guided ATGM's (Anti-tank guided missiles) called 'Saggers'.
Rabinovic, albeit mostly from the Israeli perspective, tells both a balanced and moving story of one of the greatest conflicts of the late 20th century. Not to be overly emotional about a book, but there were times when I would literally wince or be on the edge of my seat while reading about the fierce fighting and experiencing the events through the eyes of the men who lived the nightmare on both sides. In the end, despite initial successes, the Arab plan fell apart. In the north the superior training and tactics of the IDF paid off, as did the marksmanship of IDF tank crews as the Syrian Army literally impaled itself in wave after wave upon the Israeli stakes. Israeli forces launched a counterattack that pushed the Syrians out of their gains and even got to within artillery range of Damascus itself. If it had not been for the arrival of Iraqi and Jordanian forces that helped the Syrians stabilize their front as well as massive batches of new tanks from the Soviet Union, Damascus itself might have fallen.
In the Sinai, despite tremendous hardships and many agonizing disasters, the IDF finally turned things around when the Egyptian Army made it's one truly horrendous mistake of the war, it launched a massive frontal assault on the Sinai mountain passes out of range of their missile umbrella that protected them from the Israeli Air Force. In a matter of hours the superior gunnery of the IDF's tank crews, again, proved decisive and the Egyptians littered the desert with their burning tanks, vehicles and the broken bodies of her courageous young men. Sadat had been politically pressured into making the assault by Assad who rightfully panicked once his own army was mauled around Nafakh in the Golan and pushed back towards Damascus. In order to save his ally, Sadat sacrificed a large portion of his own army...for nothing.
The Israelis immediately followed up their victory with a sprinting counterattack that pushed some units straight to the Suez Canal where they crossed, under fire, into Africa. To protect the flank of the Israeli bridgehead a rather unlucky Israeli Division literally went though hell in the three day battle of 'Chinese Farm'. Named for a Japanese agricultural colony that both sides assumed was Chinese for the characters on the public displays, the 'Chinese Farm' was one of those places were it seemed the devil himself was holding high carnival. By the end of the three days the Israeli's held the area, barely, and both sides had lost an enormous amount of both equipment and young lives. Having crossed into the African continent itself the Israeli's now cut off and isolated the Egyptian Third Army which was caught between the Israelis on three sides and the Great Bitter Lake on the other. It was in this situation that the two sides ended the war thanks to superpower pressure to force a cease fire.
Although militarily the IDF emerged victorious in the end the real winner was Egypt. Sadat proved himself to be a genius in the departments of both politics and national strategic goals as well as statesmanship. Even if his army was defeated in the field it was not by a long margin, the margins were close and his and the Syrian forces had regained the honor they had lost in the 'Six Day War' through tough fighting and unshakable bravery. The IDF lost forever its aura of invincibility and Golda Meir actively sought peace with Egypt following the war. By signing peace with Israel Anwar Sadat, though offending (and sadly fatally) Islamic radicals, pushed Egypt to the status of leader of the Arab world. It was Sadat, not the Israeli's who had set the future of the Middle East politically.
All in all the 'Yom Kippur War' is not only a fascinating era in history it is also a wonderfully written book and one that I can honestly say is now in my top ten of Military History titles.
On a final note, one thing I found both remarkable and touching was the last few pages where Israeli and Egyptian soldiers began to fraternize after the announcement of the cease fire. Arabs were going up to Israeli's to shake their hands and both sides were pulling out pictures of their girls and lovers and showing them around. In the end, even soldiers who once hated each other are still human, and in the end that might be the greatest legacy of any war in that through shared trauma both sides come to a deep and abiding respect of the other.

[G.d. Brennan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Abraham Rabinovich has written the best kind of history with "The Yom Kippur War": as focused and detailed as the text under a scholar's magnifying glass, as sweeping and cinematic as the landscapes in a David Lean epic.

The Yom Kippur War itself was as dramatic an episode as any in the modern Middle East. Six short years before, Israel had won one of the most convincing military victories any nation has ever won in war; it had captured 42,000 square miles, swelling the country to three and a half times its original size after six short days of fighting. Perhaps inevitably, this easy victory led to self-satisfaction bordering on hubris amongst the Israelis. As Rabinovich relates, the nation's military intelligence officers assumed in 1973 that the Arabs would not attack without long-range offensive weapons with which to threaten Israel's cities. Meanwhile, her combat commanders assumed that if Egypt and Syria did attack, they could easily be defeated by the qualitative superiority of their numerically inferior forces without so much as a temporary tactical retreat from the country's far frontiers. (When told that the Syrians opposite the Golan Heights had 800 tanks at their disposal, one commander offered the blithe reassurance that the Israelis would be fine, since they were defending with 100.) Such thinking led to some of the nation's darkest moments; the Israelis suffered a series of near-catastrophic setbacks on the battlefield before finally turning the tables with some truly audacious feats of arms. But victory came at a heavy human cost: the country suffered casualties that, on a per capita basis, were equivalent to three Vietnams--and in the space of only three weeks.

Rabinovich deftly captures the big-picture blindness that led to such drama while still taking time to zoom in on the map for the worms-eye view. Indeed, his grasp for setting scenes rivals many novelists; he takes the reader into the tank turrets and down among the foxholes with the sleep-deprived tankers and shell-shocked paratroopers who wrote history in blood on the heights of the Golan and the sands of the Sinai. It might have been nice if he'd been able to provide the same level of attention and detail to the Arab side of the conflict--still, what he does provide feels balanced and fair, a compelling picture of a war that ultimately brought some peace to at least one corner of the Middle East, a war where both sides won, and lost.

[Tamim Diaa · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is a very well-written book but completely biased and one-sided so if you are looking for a somehow objective account, this isn't your book. This is no surprise since the writer is a settler zionist himself and has probably killed innocent souls during his military service.

He humanizes the zionist soldiers and officers and makes a big deal of everything they do at the war and romanticizes their battles. On the contrary, Arab troops are an alien species and any achievement they make is by coincidence or due to an error by the zionists or bad leadership. When he speaks of Arab casualties, he details how the tank commander swung the gun and shot one tank after another and how the soldiers and officers died one by one but when it comes to Israeli casualties, you just learn abruptly that the brigade has lost 25 or 50 percent of its force after the battle. very comic indeed. mere propaganda

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

By far the best general narrative on the war of 1973 written so far. Rabinovich's book, while written necessarily from the Israeli point of view (given the paucity of Arab primary sources on the war, especially from Syria) is objective as it can be. The war itself is covered at all levels, from governmental down to the experiences of individual soldiers. But perhaps the best part is the exploration of the pre-war hubris and arrogance of the IDF and of Israel in general after the victories in the 6 Day War of 1967. Rabinovich argues that it was the early victories of the Egyptian Army (successfully carrying out the crossing of the Suez Canal and defeating the Israeli counter-attacks) that restored Arab pride and gave Anwar Sadat the elbow room to make peace with the Jewish State. A fine read and an important work for those who study the history of the Middle East.

[John Devlin · Rating 3 out of 5]

(3.7)So Rabinovich writes well. My criticisms are more what I would’ve liked than his deficiencies. I recently read Razoux’s book on the Iraq-Iran war and that work had just the right mix of both sides and a lens that moved from the individual dog fights to the actors in charge…

ARs book is far more Israel and far more granular. This isn’t a criticism since I’m sure the author set out to achieve just that.

The Yom Kippur war really starts with Israel’s blow out victory in ‘67. After they trounced the Egyptians, Israel became convinced not only of their operational greatness but that their intel prowess was so great and the Egyptian’s so humiliated that there was no chance for war unless several set conditions were met.

Israel was wrong, nearly disastrously. As the Egyptian’s and Syrians mobilized for a two front war, israel told itself Egypt was planning war games and Syria was harmless since it would never attack without Egypt…

Two massive armies were at Israel’s doorstep and the Israelis didn’t start mobilizing til 6 hours before war commenced!

Why did the Israelis then survive and end up winning this war. Unlike in ‘67 the Arabs fought, but they didn’t fight well. Israel’s first echelon of fighters showed remarkable resilience even in the face of new technologies like saggers and RPGs that made tanks vulnerable like never before.

The guys in the tanks were the heroes, the guys back in the Pit(command) not so much.

The result of this war had global implications: the Soviets and US squared off…the US going to defcon 3, Arab countries instituted their first real oil embargo and OPEC was formed, Egypt regained enough swagger and Israel was chastened enough for the first real peace agreements between Israel and the Muslim world to reach fruition in ‘79.

[Scottsdale Public Library]

This is a highly readable, yet detailed chronicle of the Yom Kippur War which took place in October of 1973. The war was fought between Israel, and a coalition of Arab states including Egypt, Syria and other expeditionary forces. The book covers a wide range of events, from the political happenings before, during and after the war, to the combat and tactical strategies taken by both sides. I would say the book tends to focus on the actual combat, and strategies of the Israeli military and the Arab coalition. It is written mainly from an Israeli perspective and mostly follows the Israeli soldiers and commanders on the ground. This is a very well-written book that sheds a lot of light on the conflict, both militarily and politically. Highly recommended for anyone interested in one of the many conflicts that shaped the modern Middle-East.
-Tal S.

[Scott Holstad · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was one of the better military history books I've ever read, and I've read a LOT of them over the years. I've long heard of the Yom Kippur War, but didn't really know any significant details, other than the combatants and the outcome (which turned out to be wrong; the outcome was much more complex than I had believed). This book not only filled in the gaps, but had so much detail and even minutiae, that the author really took you into the tanks where shell shocked men survived amidst corpses of their friends and into the foxholes of paratroopers and commandos, and into the the minds and strategies of the two primary countries' leaders, both political and military. The author, Abraham Rabinovich, is a very talented writer with a gift for both prosaic writing and an eye for detail. And while the bulk of this book is told from the Israeli perspective -- in part, because Israel has released historical and former secret documents about the war, while the Arab countries involved largely have not -- it's about as balanced an account as could be, considering it's told largely from the perspective of one of the major combatants, Israel. We are given numerous scenes and dialogue amongst the Egyptians, and less so among the Syrians, but what truly distinguishes this book is the political detail, with Henry Kissinger's strong arm tactics with both the Soviets and Israel to force a peace agreement and to put America in the driver's seat in the Middle East, supplanting Russia and its influence, at least with Egypt, the reigning Arab power.

The Yom Kippur War itself was as dramatic a war as any others to that point in the modern Middle East. Just six years before, Israel had won one of the most convincing military victories that practically any modern country has ever experienced; it had captured some 42,000 square miles in the Six Day War, enlarging the country by roughly 350% of its original size. As a result of this easy victory, Israel was led to self-satisfaction bordering on basic hubris, as well as complacency, concerning its military and the surrounding Arab countries. Israel's military intelligence assumed in 1973 that the Arabs would be crazy to attack again any time in the near future, and certainly not without long-range weapons to threaten Israel's cities, which they didn't have. And both politicians and military commanders assumed that if Egypt and Syria, in particular, did attack, they would easily be beaten again by the superiority of their high quality but numerically inferior forces without not only not losing any territory, but not even having to retreat. They had a series of forts and outposts along the borders manned by anywhere from platoons to companies and possibly several tanks each, KNOWING these would be enough to withstand and ultimately defeat vastly numerically superior Arab armies potentially attacking. I believe the author relates that one general was told Syria had some 800 tanks massed on Israel's borders and stated that their 100 tanks would guarantee victory against those odds. And it was this thinking that led Israel to some of its hardest and darkest periods in its short history, as not only did the politicians and military believe this, but intelligence did as well and all told, the general public did too, assured constantly that they could and would easily whip the Arabs again, just like in the Six Year War, because Arabs were soft, they couldn't fight, and they didn't have "real" soldiers. As a result, the Israelis suffered a series of near-catastrophic disasters and early defeats when Egypt and Syria simultaneously launched a Soviet-armed dual front invasion, before finally turning the tables with some truly awesome and heroic feats of military and individual prowess. The stories of sacrifice told in this book are written so well that you almost want to cry along with the soldiers experiencing mutilation, death, and destruction, but ultimately some satisfaction for not only Israel and its military, but even Egypt and Saddat, who emerged as a victor of honor in recapturing land lost in The Six Year War and going toe to toe with the Israelis for weeks without blinking or retreat. But the author focuses largely on Israel, and its military victory came at a heavy cost: Israel suffered casualties that, on a per capita basis, were equivalent to three U.S. Vietnams -- and in only three weeks' time! I had always heard that Israel "heroically" withstood a tremendous invasion and saved itself through bravery, courage, and with a smaller but superior military, beat the invasions back and ended up with a huge military victory. And to a degree, that's true. But the author makes it clear that there were other winners besides Israel, and argues that Egypt was actually the biggest winner, because it accomplished regaining the honor it had lost in The Six Year War, regained land, and its leader emerged as the Arab leader first to make peace with small, yet formidable Israel, which unfortunately would cost him his life just several years later. But he was viewed now as a statesmen, while Israel was left scrambling at how to explain how unprepared they were, how badly their intelligence had failed them, how mistaken their assumptions were, etc, so even though they technically "won" militarily, Egypt came out ahead, because they regained their prestige while Israel's military and intelligence prestige took such a heavy hit, that it took years to overcome it. And America, thanks to Kissinger, was also a winner, as the hard line peace broker who forced a peace, and then would lead the two countries to sign treaties, although Syria was not party to such, as they could barely tolerate peace with Israel. However, it was Egypt who was the important Arab player in this story, and the author gives us a very balanced and objective analysis of the outcome for all countries, but needless to say, I had not ever heard the perspective that Egypt won anything, let alone came out on top, in this war, and bear in mind that, I believe, the author is Jewish, so it's not like an anti-Semite is writing this. For a Jewish author to state such things, when much of the world and the history most of us know, asserts that Israel was the sole victor by a large margin in this war, is a brave, courageous, and admirable thing to do, because he's giving us an unbiased analysis of the outcome regarding all of the players (including the Soviets), even if it partially stains Israel's historical reputation regarding the outcome. Chalk one up for Rabinovich. That takes guts.

This book is full of tactical detail, political intrigue, and awesome battle scenes, especially armor battle scenes, as this was the overall biggest tank battle in history, aside from perhaps the Allied invasion of Europe in WWII. Thousands of tanks were involved and thousands were destroyed and tens of thousands of men were killed and wounded. The end of the book tells the tales of some Israeli survivors, their feelings of guilt, hatred, bitterness, sadness, etc. It's heartbreaking and touching in many ways, in part, because I know that our U.S. military veterans who have been in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past 15 years have also suffered what we now called PTSD, and I think it's damned tragic for any soldier of any nation.

This was truly an excellent book, and not only told a fascinating part of history that I lacked sufficient knowledge of, but also described compelling battle scenes and, again, tales of heroism and courage. Five stars, easily, and strongly recommended to ALL!

[Gary Klein · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an amazingly comprehensive book on the Yom Kippur War. It does a great job analyzing the conflict from the strategic to the tactical level and from international and domestic viewpoints. There's a lot to learn from this conflict.

[Jon · Rating 4 out of 5]

Rabinowich provides one of the best tactical-operational accounts of a major modern war I've ever read. Accounting for the fact that only the Israeli archives have been opened or perhaps even kept in the first place, the author does an amazing job of describing the combat and decision-making on the ground in the Sinai and the Golan. Furthermore, he gives an excellent account of the technological, doctrinal, and tactical changes that allowed the Egyptians to make stunning gains in the beginning; as well as the operational and organizational shortcomings of the IDF in the wake of their overwhelming victory in the Six Day War. Perhaps the author's only real shortcoming is the relatively limited shrift given to the grand strategic and geopolitical ramifications of the conflict: while the elements of superpower and regional confrontation and diplomacy are detailed, the vital importance of Sadat and his (it was in fact his masterwork) Yom Kippur War as the casus vitae of the resultant Camp David Accords and thus a fundamentally and forever altered Middle East are treated quickly. Otherwise, this book is a highly useful narrative of an often-overlooked war.

[Neil Gussman · Rating 5 out of 5]

I just finished the book "The Yom Kippur War" by Abraham Rabinovich, about the 1973 war that Israel almost lost, then won, defeating Egypt and Syria, along with units from Jordan, Iraq and several other Arab countries.

The Middle East was the test lab of NATO and Warsaw Pact weapons during the Cold War.

Of the 3,000 dead and thousands more wounded, half were tankers, especially on the first two days of the battle, when the Israeli Pattons and Centurions were hit by suitcase SAGGERS at long range and RPGs in close.

At the end of the book, American General Don Starry, a Tanker, made an extended visit of the battlefield and revised American doctrine for fighting the Soviets based on what the Israelis learned with their own blood.

I became a tanker in 1975, and heard about Yom Kippur war in tank training at Fort Knox.

This book is fantastic, both a compelling story and full of detail.

https://armynow.blogspot.com/2016/07/...

[Sleepy Boy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Perhaps the most thorough book on the subject matter. Despite this fact it is tremendously readable. It is a step above 'No Victor, No Vanquished' by Edgar O'Ballance (Which I loved as well) due to the fact it presents more information that is now available that O'ballance didnt have access to when he wrote his book so close to the end of the conflict. Personally I think the pair go together perfectly, No Victor, No Vanquished as an excellent intro laying the ground work and this for the follow up, building and expanding that ground work.

[Max Taylor · Rating 4 out of 5]

Gripping on every page. As a former reporter for Jerusalem Post, Abraham Rabinovich packed an overwhelming amount of details in this account from the personal lives of Egyptian soldiers, heated arguments that almost came to blows among Israeli generals, and the shrewd diplomacy of Kissinger. I most enjoyed the final chapter “Aftermath” for its description of the Agranat Commission, international repercussions from the war like the Soviet Union glasnost and their opening to the west (there’s something I’d never heard before), and accounts of Egyptian and Israeli soldiers sharing coffee and playing soccer during the ceasefire. To quote Rabinovich, “The Yom Kippur War had begun with a surprise attack but history, that master of paradox, provided an even more surprising ending, one that left behind on the furrowed battlefield the seeds of peace, however fragile.”

Reading this book in 2024 during the war against Hamas following October 7th has hit differently. Some takeaways include the fact that (1) God fights for Israel against all of her enemies, (2) in war, the one who seized the initiative, improvises the most, and hangs on the longest wins, and (3) every modern war Israel has faced has been between Russia and America in the background. Without going into detail, it saddens me that even in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, America squeezed Israel in order to gain an international political advantage over the Soviet Union. And in 2024, not much has changed (other than the fact that Kissinger was much better at shuttle diplomacy that Blinken is today, but I digress).

I applaud Rabinovich for capturing the lead-up to the war, narrating each step of the war on both fronts, and sprinkling exquisite quotes throughout like this one by Moshe Dayan: “Recalling the Australian cavalrymen lost in the battle for Gaza in the First World War, he said, ‘We generally understand these things a generation later.’” This book is the most peerless and comprehensive work on the Yom Kippur War I have come across.

[Jake Pettit · Rating 4 out of 5]

An exciting, novel-like narrative of the Yom Kippur War, covering all the key events of the conflict according to the most up-to-date and careful research available. Rabinovich's extremely well-told story of this earthshaking event uses the perspectives of Soldiers, generals, politicians and diplomats to weave a sweeping, dramatic, and highly-accurate history.

Rabinovich includes several new pieces of evidence that have only emerged in recent years, and which lend fascinating insight to several key events of the war including the IDF's intelligence failure--good enough reason in-and-of-itself to pick up this book. Additionally, Rabinovich is an excellent writer. While many historians relating similar information get bogged down in dry military language, Rabinovich manages to capture all the key details, including many that other historians omit, while keeping his narrative focused, exciting, and even moving.

I have only two real criticisms. First, while Rabinovich does provide the perspectives of one Egyptian sergeant, one Israeli tank gunner, and a few junior Israeli officers, in general his narrative focuses on the wave-top decisionmaking of the highest generals and politicians involved. We get fascinating insight into Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Chief of Staff "Dado" Elazar, PM Golda Meir, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Egyptian Chief of Staff Saad el-Shalzy, and others of the like, but pivotal figures just one level of influence down like division commanders "Bren" Adan or Kalman Magen get comparatively short shrift. Secondly, while Rabinovich's tone does create the page-turning drama of a heroic story, his use of positive and even upbeat language to describe events which were and still are some of the darkest in the history of Israel creates the impression that Rabinovich has skimmed-over some details to preserve a "plucky hero will always win" tone.

Nonetheless, this is absolutely NOT a one-sided or Israel-mythologizing account. Rabinovich has done impeccable research here looking honestly at all three combatant nations, and managed to write an extremely engaging version of this story while including all the key details. Someone looking to learn about the Yom Kippur War for the first time, or who wants the broad outlines of the conflict without minute detail, cannot do better than this book. A must-read for Yom Kippur War novices and experts alike.

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

A really solid overview of a war that I have never read too much about. The author's writting style flows seamlessly between politics and the battlefield and makes for a very easy to read, yet informative narrative.
Highly recommend as a first stop for someone who wants to know more about this short yet vicious war.

[Bjorn Vang · Rating 5 out of 5]

I knew the story of this war. Or rather, I thought I did, until I read this.

Written with remarkable detail, and a keen eye for the personal stories, this is one of the finest books I've ever read on warfare (and that's an awful lot of books). If you're into that, this book is a total Must-Read!!!

[Benjamin Pierce · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a fantastic read on the Yom Kippur war & the events leading up to it. I appreciate the amount of research that went into the text and the fact that the author writes in such a way that it's not overly-sensationalized, but not a dry account either. The Yom Kippur war was a major event that helped shape the middle east we see today, and I would highly recommend this to anyone who wishes to gain a better understanding of the war itself, or the consequences this semi-modern war had on global warfare as a whole.

[Mac · Rating 5 out of 5]

Buy.

An absolutely wonderful read, I cannot recommend this enough. Written in depth, detail and with flow that instantly ranks Rabinovich among the best military history writers.

[Michiel Van R. · Rating 5 out of 5]

4.5/5

[Tom Nixon · Rating 5 out of 5]

The history of the modern Middle East is complicated enough to begin with- but when you throw in this rich, detailed examination of one of the most complex and curious wars ever fought between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the word 'complicated' doesn't even begin to do it justice- and one thing is for certain- Abraham Rabinovich, US Army Veteran and journalist in both the United States and Israel has managed to produce what may well be the definitive account of a very complicated war.

So what happened? Well, in a sense, the Yom Kippur War (or October War, as it's known in the Arab world) was made almost inevitable by Israel's stunning triumph in the Six Day War of 1967. (Quick history lesson: June 1967, Israel launches a pre-emptive surprise attack on pretty much all of its neighbors, destroys the mighty Egyptian Air Force ON THE GROUND and gets The West Bank, Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights as a result. A total military disaster for Egypt, Syria, Jordan and company. For all the geography involved, kids, check this out here.)

Any-hoo, after 1967 Israel had no reason whatsoever to negotiate with the Arab world. It had won, it had gotten a lot of territory and frankly, the Arabs had nothing to offer Israel that would entice them back to the negotiating table. New Egyptian President Anwar Sadat came up with an answer: deciding that getting all of the Sinai Peninsula back by force was a pipe dream, he figured that if he struck hard and fast enough to push Israel back from the Suez Canal, he could win a limited enclave and keep fighting long enough for the US and USSR to intervene to force a cease fire. Negotiations would follow for the rest of Egypt's land.

And in the end, that's pretty much what happened. Egypt got together with Syria and planned a devastating two front attack that contained a number of truly innovative and brilliant military tactics. To blunt the power of the Israeli Air Force (IAF), Egypt would advance under an umbrella of surface to air missiles, which proved effective. To counter Israel's tactical doctrine of 'armor shock' (massed tank charges and the like) Egyptian infantry was armed with Sagger anti-tank missiles and RPGs which were so effective that many people (prematurely as it turned out) proclaimed 'the death of the tank'. I wish I could say I saw similar levels of innovation on the part of the Syrians, but there wasn't really a lot of indications that there were.

The intelligence failure on the part of the Israelis was both stunning in the fact that every major organ of their military intelligence AMAN stubbornly clung to the strategic notion that their Arab neighbors simply lacked the backbone to launch a strike at Israel. This belief continued to permeate the Israeli government almost right up to the start of the war- providing a stunning example of the dangers of group think, given the number of naysayers in the run up to the war that were ignored. (Interestingly enough, it wasn't technically a surprise attack- Israeli intelligence confirmed that the attack was coming through a source (The Source) in the Egyptian government the night before- but too late to fully mobilize their military forces.)

In the end, Israel was caught with its pants down and quickly became embroiled in a struggle for its own survival. Egypt and Syria threw everything they could into this war (interesting factoids: 10,000 artillery shells fell on Israeli lines on the Egyptian front in the first minute of the opening barrage. On the Syrian front, Syria sent 1,460 tanks at Israel's 177 and 115 artillery batteries against Israel's 11.) Overwhelming odds don't really accurately describe what Israel was facing. The situation on the Egyptian front was bad enough, but Syria came very, very close to breaking through Israeli lines in the Golan and was, in fact, at one point, faced with an open road down into Northern Israel, but didn't (bizarrely enough) take it.

Overall: a surprise attack, an epic struggle for Israel's survival and it all ended with Israeli armies on the roads to Damascus and Cairo respectively- but more importantly still, what happened in 1973 lead to the Camp David Accords of 1979 and eventually the Oslo Accords of 1993. Abraham Rabinovich has managed to produce what should be the definitive account of this most complex of wars for some time to come.

[Tiago Relvão · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book, reads like a novel and depicts one of the great conflicts of the middle east, that despite less famous than the 6 days war, was an incredible tale of bravery & tragedy for both sides and ultimately started shaping the middle east of today.

[Robert P. Hoffman · Rating 4 out of 5]

The first 60% of the book is a masterpiece. The author does an extraordinary job of discussing the background to the war, the reasons Egypt expelled the Soviets, the strategies that Sadat pursued, and, most importantly, how the Israeli political and military leaders overlooked clear and compelling evidence of an imminent attack by Egypt and Syria.

The author makes clear that Israelis had contempt for the quality of the Arab armies and leaders. The did not believe Israel would be attacked because of how quickly Israel would destroy the attackers.

The author's discussion of the first few days of the war is wonderful. He does an excellent job of discussing, primarily from the side of Israeli soldiers, how the war progressed and the immense suffering that the war caused. He also does an excellent job of discussing how shocked the military and political leaders in Israel were--especially Dayan who in the early days of the way believed that Israel might cease to exist.

The author dismisses the claim made in another book about the 1973 War that Israel considered using nuclear weapons. The author has access to so many sources that I believe his interpretation.

For me the book began to be of less interest as the author went through detailed accounts of the battles. I have no doubt the battles were important and they changed the course of the war but after a while things tended to all blur together.

And I thought the last part of the book was excellent. His discussion of the superpowers getting involved was clear and compelling and his account of the nuclear alert was insightful.

Overall an excellent book.

[Scott L. · Rating 4 out of 5]

I found this to be an excellent book, that tells the story of the Yom Kippur war from the strategic all the way down to the tactical level. The book is very clear about the mistakes that both sides made, and how the Yom Kippur war lead to the later Israeli - Egyptian peace pacts. The only downside to the book is that the Egyptian-Syrian side of the story is not given a lot of the story, Rabinovich preferring to tell the story from more of the Israeli viewpoint. He is, however, very fair when it comes to not sugar-coating the story; he certainly tells both the good and the dark sides of all the Israeli commanders. I would recommend this book to anyone wanting to discover the whole Israeli story of the 1973 war.

[Antonio · Rating 4 out of 5]

I finished a couple of books this week. First was The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed The Middle East by Abraham Rabinovich. It was significantly better than The Eve of Destruction. If you're interested in the Arab Israeli peace process it is fundamental that you understand this war. This book explains the change in political mindset of the Egyptians and Israelis brought about by this war better than any other I've read. It explains the stalemate created by the 6 Day War and the Wars of Attrition and the effect they had on Israeli policy. It is an earnest and down to earth piece of history without a lot of the character adoration that was in E.O.D. It also gives a lot of insight into the character of Ariel Sharon.

[Mohammed · Rating 3 out of 5]

كتاب جيد جدا ومليء بالتفاصيل عن موضوع في غاية الأهمية في تاريخ مصر الحديث وساعدني في معرفة بعض التفاصيل المجهولة بالنسبة لي.
اعتمد الكاتب على المصادر غير المصرية وبالأخص المصادر الاسرائيلية للموضوع فكوّن صورة جديدة وأكثر شمولية بالنسبة لي عن الحرب لما حاولت أدمجها مع اللي قريته في مذكرات الشاذلي.
فيه معلومات كثير متوافقة مع البيانات اللي حكاها الشاذلي في مذكراته، وفيه بيانات غريبة برده زي حوارات مالهاش علاقة مباشرة بالتحركات العسكرية لو كانت اتشالت كان الكتاب هيبقى أخف، عشان كدة عديت بشكل سريع على بعض الأجزاء من الكتاب.
السبب اللي دفعني للقراية عن الحرب دي بالذات هي إني عارف جزء من نتايجها السياسية (زي اعادة سيناء ومعاهدة السلام) بالرغم من عدم معرفتي لتفاصيلها العسكرية واكتشفت ان فيه تفاصيل مختلف عليها بس بشكل عام النتايج العسكرية ما كانتش جيدة للطرفين.

[Rodney Harvill · Rating 4 out of 5]

After its decisive victory in the Six Day War, Israel became convinced that no Arab nation would attack it and that if one did, it would quickly be defeated. In the Yom Kippur War, Israel atoned for its sin of arrogance. Over the course of a three-week war, the Arabs would restore their honor that had been lost in the Six Day War, fighting with extraordinary competence and courage, and Israel would have its battlefield assumptions rebutted and its confidence shaken.

• The leadership of Egypt and Syria had changed since the Six Day War. Anwar Sadat had replaced Abdel Nasser, and Hafez Assad was in charge in Syria. Sadat had reorganized the military and raised its education standards, with a higher concentration of men with high school or university educations. The book doesn’t say anything about similar reforms in Syria although they are conceivable. Regardless, both leaders adopted a similar approach to the war. Set limited goals, determine what is required to meet those goals, set a plan to achieve the goals and work the plan. Very systematic and very unlike the Arab nations’ performance in Israel’s Independence War and the Six Day War. Their goals? Egypt wanted the east bank of the Suez Canal, and Syria wanted to recapture the Golan. To accomplish this, they would need to neutralize Israel’s armor and air force. They equipped their infantry units with concentrated rocket propelled grenade (RPG) and Sagger anti-tank missile firepower. They also concentrated SAM-6 batteries near the battlefields to target Israeli aircraft engaging in close air support.
• As Egypt and Syria were mobilizing and preparing for war, AMAN, Israel’s army intelligence unit and its commander, General Eli Zeira, were so convinced that their Arab neighbors wouldn’t dare attack that they ignored any and all warning signs, including a back-channel warning from Jordan’s King Hussein. It was not until just before Yom Kippur that the warnings were taken seriously, with a small mobilization and increase in armor in the Golan; as a result Syrian armor outnumbered Israeli armor along the Golan front by only eight to one. There had been three weeks of warning prior to the Six Day War, and Israel had been able to mobilize its reserves and prepare them for action. This intelligence failure ensured that Israel was essentially caught with its pants down when Egypt and Syria attacked.
• Sadat and Assad chose Yom Kippur to attack across the Suez Canal and into the Golan, reasoning that the Israelis would be caught off-guard on such an important religious holiday and would not expect an Arab attack during Ramadan, which the Islamic world was observing at the time.
• It turns out that Yom Kippur was a particularly bad choice. Israel relies heavily on its reserves to augment its military in times of national emergency. On Yom Kippur, the reservists were easy to find, either at home or at a synagogue nearby. Furthermore, although the radio was down for the day, the roads were empty, and couriers could easily get to them. Likewise, the reservists could easily travel to assembly points without being bogged down in traffic.
• Because the reservists were essentially going straight to the battlefield, units and tank crews were organized on the fly. It was not unusual for crew members of a tank to not even know each other or even to initially remember what they were supposed to do. The book gave accounts of tank commanders having to remember which switch on their helmet allowed for communication within the tank vs. to other tanks.
• With the high concentration of RPGs and Saggers on the battlefield, the effectiveness of Israeli tanks was reduced until their crews could develop countermeasure tactics of their own. Furthermore, the SAM-6 batteries ensured that Israel’s air force ruled the sky everywhere except right over the battlefield, where its planes were needed most. It wasn’t until ground forces advancing without air cover were able to destroy sufficient SAM sites that the Israeli air force was able to operate freely over the battlefield.
• Egyptian and Syrian armor significantly outnumbered Israeli armor, and the Israelis blunted that numerical advantage in at least two ways. First, their tank crews could get off accurate shots much faster than their Syrian counterparts, as many as two or three shots for ever one shot fired by a Syrian tank. Second, whenever possible, the Israelis towed their disabled tanks from the battlefield, washed out the blood, repaired them and sent them back to the battlefield with new crews.
• Early on, Egypt secured a beachhead on the east bank of the Suez Canal and established strong defensive positions against which the Israeli army threw itself in a vain effort to rescue the troops in observation posts who were surrounded and trapped along the length of the canal. As long as they stayed under their SAM umbrella, the Egyptians faired well. However, when the leadership got overly ambitious and tried to advance beyond it, their forces were mauled.
• After a prolonged and heroic effort, Israeli ground forces were able to punch through to the Suez Canal, position a bridge and cross over. This allowed them to advance quickly through the lightly defended Egyptian rear, attack SAM sites and surround one of the Egyptian armies east of the canal, cutting its supply lines.
• Syrian forces established a salient in the southern Golan and had an opportunity to advance into the lightly defended West Bank; however, they were ordered to remain in the Golan. While they might have done more damage with an advance down the Jordan River, such a move would have taken them out from under their SAM umbrella. At any rate, they were ordered to continue their advance into the Golan against Israeli forces who were growing in strength as reserve units continued to arrive. Finally, Israeli forces were able to push Syrian forces out of the Golan and followed up with an advance into Syrian territory, including Mount Hermon.
• While the war was initiated by Egypt and Syria, it was a pan-Arabic effort war against Israel. Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Iraq and the PLO provided contingents. So, at one level, the war pitted Israel against pan-Arabism, an Arab world united against them.
• Of the Arab states contributing forces to the war effort, Jordan was the most unusual. King Hussein didn’t want to fight; as noted above, he provided Israel with a back-channel warning of impending war. So, he provided armor to the Golan front only for the sake of Arab unity and kept Israel fully informed about their whereabouts. Not only did he instruct his tank crews not to engage the Israelis, he asked Israel not to attack them. Finally, under pressure from the other Arabs to actually do something, he ordered his tank crews to engage while asking the Israelis not to be too hard on them. He needed a few Jordanian martyrs to silence his critics but also wanted to limit his losses.
• Israel’s advances across the Suez Canal and beyond the post-Six-Day-War boundaries in the Golan were motivated by fear. If they sustained a net loss of territory, it might be seen by the Arabs as a sign of weakness, prompting more attacks by their larger neighbors. They had held them off this time but had paid a heavy price in doing so. They couldn’t afford a few more such victories and knew it.
• In three weeks of war, Israel sustained 2,656 dead, on a per capita basis, the equivalent of three to four Vietnam Wars.
• In response to entreaties by Prime Minister Golda Meir, President Nixon agreed to provide Israel with supplemental arms. Initially, this was done by secret El Al flights, but after the Soviets started openly airlifting arms and ammunition to Syria and Egypt, he felt compelled to respond with an airlift using American transports. Outraged by this open display of American support for Israel, the Arab petrostates retaliated with an oil embargo.
• Although the Yom Kippur War was a victory for Israel, the performance of Egypt’s troops restored the honor lost during the Six Day War. His position strengthened, Sadat felt enabled to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel that restored the Sinai to Egypt. Had their been no Yom Kippur War, there might not have been a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

In summary, as traumatic as it was, the Yom Kippur War laid the foundation for peace between Israel and at least one of its neighbors, while simultaneously generating ripple effects beyond the Middle East.

[Levie Galapon · Rating 4 out of 5]

Easy to read and offers a lot of military and diplomatic insights to the Yom Kippur War

[Frank Kool · Rating 4 out of 5]

"Who won?
Egypt did. So did Israel."
(p. 554)

The Yom Kippur (aka the October war, aka the Ramadan war) of 1973 has not gotten a lot of attention, which is a shame because this very brief conflict is fascinating on a personal, political, technological, and not least of all historical level.

And brief it has been, the Yom Kippur war is one that was fought at break-neck speed, with epic turns of events which normally take place over the course of years now happening in less than a few weeks. In fact: reading the book about the war took me almost as long as the war itself. In the span of less than one month the region, if not the world, was greatly upset as a sneak attack by Egypt and Syria almost brought Israel to its knees, recovering only at the last moment like the action hero of a B-movie to end the conflict by threatening both its assailants capitals.

In great detail and superb writing, the book outlines the events day to day, if not hour to hour. Featuring a colourful cast of eccentric (and often butting) individuals on all sides of the fighting, Rabinovitch manages to paint a detailed picture of the many military and political movements.
Some lessons are to be learned here.

On the tactical level: one particular reversal has had a long lasting impact on modern warfare: the 1973 war was the first one in which infantry became the nightmare of armor instead of the other way around. Thanks to the Soviet supplied Sagger anti-tank missiles, the Egyptians left the Israeli without response. Even after the war was won mostly due to the recovered Israeli armor brigades, some analysists would go so far as the sing a mourning hymn to the battle tank, thinking it to be an obsolete relic of the World War 2 days. The tank still roams the field of battle in the 21th century, but tacticians paid attention to what happened in 1973 and updated their modus operandi.

On the political/historical level the book serves as a damned good introduction into just how complicated Middle-Eastern (geo)politics is. For one there are the US and the Soviet Union, both of which strongly urged both sides to refrain from hostilities, yet at the same time realized that since this war was basically a test of strength between their respective armaments, neither wanted to see its proxy face defeat. (Though when the situation did eventually turn sour for the Egyptians, Brehznev would gleefully remark that Sadat got what he deserved for ignoring his pleas not to initiate hostilities).

However, surely one of the most surreal examples of political insanity would be Jordan's participation, or lack thereof, in this conflict. Facing tremendous pressure both from its own society as from its Arab neighbors, king Husein of Jordan found himself obliged to sent a token force to the front, seeking to make a symbolic gesture rather than making a noticeable impact. Before doing so, he held tight correspondence with the Israelis, asking how far he could go before they would strike back. The compromise reached was a brigade of Jordan tanks (ever so slowly) send to the Golan front, in hopes of them staying out of the fight. Achieving peak Cold War lunacy once these tanks fell under Syrian command, the Israelis promised the Jordanians not to attack them too harshly if possible. As Kissing would later write in his memoirs: "only in the Middle East is it conceivable that a belligerent would ask an adversary's approval for engaging in an act of war against it."

Still, the most profound political consequence of the war would be the enduring peace between Egypt and Israel, which has prevented yet another all-out war between Israel and a coalition of its Arab neighbours. By being the first to acknowledge Israel's right to exist, Egypt broke the psychological barrier of the so-called Three No's (No peace, no negotiation, no recognition), an effect we see to this day as many Arab countries, be it reluctantly, would rather side with Israel against the Iranian-Syrian axis.

One final note: though it is true that this book is the Israeli perspective of the conflict, Rabinovitch does not hold back in criticizing Israel on both a personal level (Gonen and Zeira in particular) and a cultural level (lambasting its naivety and arrogance before the attack). Moreover, his description of the Egyptian soldiers in particular paint them as courageous in battle and often courteous to their prisoners.

I'll end this review with a quotation of the book's final words.

"The Yom Kippur war had begun with a surprise attack but history, that master of paradox, provided an even more surprising ending, one that left behind on the furrowed battlefield the seeds of peace, however fragile. Not even Sadat, dreaming under his tree in Mit Abulkum, would have conjured up a vision as surrealistic as his journey to Jerusalem.

For Egypt, the war was a towering accomplishment that enabled Sadat to fly to Jerusalem as an equal, not a supplicant. For Israel, the war was an existential earthquake, but one whose repercussions were ultimately healthier than the euphoria induced by the Six Day War. The trauma was not a nightmare to be suppressed but a national memory that would be perpetuated, a standing reminder of the consequences of shallow thinking and arrogance. Israel's battlefield recovery reflected a will to live and a capacity to improvise amidst chaos. Israel would bear its scars but it would be sustained by the memory of how, in its darkest hour, its young men had mounted the nation's crumbling ramparts and held."
(p. 573)

[Steven Voorhees · Rating 3 out of 5]

For the world, the early 1970s was a perilous time. In the US, the Watergate affair ravaged the Nixon administration. In Britain, Prime Minister Edward Heath combated miners, high inflation and the IRA. But Israel still glowed from victory in the Six Day War in 1967; the country was still in the grasp of an arrogant contentment and peace. But the lull was shattered on October 6, 1973. That day Yom Kippur began. Egypt and Syria combined forces to surprise attack Israel with the goal of retaking the Sinai (lost in the '67 conflict) and forcing a negotiated peace that included return of the entire Sinai. Israel was caught with her defensive pants down and was vulnerable unlike any other time in her 25 year history. Slow to respond at first, it got its strategic and military acts together -- but it took a while. Days in fact. But when it ultimately did, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) came within striking distance of both Cairo and Damascus, forced a tank-heavy showdown in the much coveted Sinai and defeated its attackers. Yet it was a hollow, even pyrrhic, victory. The Arab world regained its swagger, which was lost (along with regional manhood) just six years earlier and won the '73 skirmish by losing it. Rabinovich, a reporter for the Jerusalem Post, has written a gripping and detailed account of the fighting here. He also convincingly reports how it was a proxy war pitting Moscow vs. Washington and details its serious consequences for both the Middle East and the world at large (think oil shock). While he takes the reader into the Pit and Center 10 (the nerve centers for the IDF and the Egyptian forces respectively), into the Sinai's sand and into the hearts and minds of the Israelis, I was troubled by the narrative's weighted more toward the Israelis than to the Arabs. Unfortunately, the book isn't balanced in the way it should be. Rabinovich doesn't go into the Syrian and Egyptian viewpoints on an equal basis with those of Israel's, and this hurts the book's overall impact. In THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, a perilous period's well chronicled. But the chronicle lacks essential equilibrium.