Steven A. Cook has produced an informative, realistic, and necessary autopsy of the Middle East "democracy movement" of the 2010s and its resultant constipation. From a US Council on Foreign Relations wonk one would expect nothing less, yet for this reason it suffers institutional blinkers of its own. Its breakdown on Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey and Libya is excellent; but Turkey, of course, is not Arab and is technically not part of the Arab Spring. It has, however, been Cook's area of specialty before 2011, hence the book's subtitle as "the New Middle East" beyond the Arab bloc. These particular states, because of their Western involvement, are the most accessible to Western scholars. But this creates a black hole in the narrative as it's left out Morocco, Yemen, and Syria, where the story is much messier and can't be pinned on institutional deadweight.
I also believe his disavowal of US influence is disingenuous. At first it seems modest and realistic; but in looking at the American involvement in Egypt over four decades, of NATO in Turkey, of the US/NATO bombing of Libya that played the decisive role in toppling Qaddafi - with the US occupation of Iraq and the semi-covert intervention in Syria - the US hand is a heavy one, for better or worse. It's certain that the US did not like Morsi of Egypt any more than local opposition: removing him pleased not only Egyptian secular "democrats" and the military but the Beltway too. Libya is just an Iraq rerun, what the latter would have become without US boots filling the vacuum.
My main criticism, though, is his application of his "institutional" analysis. Cook tells us that entrenched interests of private elites, military officers, clergy, etc., can shape public discourse and leverage it to retain power. Once again it has validity, but only up to a certain point, and suffers from an intense American parochialism. Not only does the US suffer the same entrenched institutions that prevent full democracy here - the "1%" and their hired politicos and judges - but Cook's argument suggests an American exceptionalism that is not in its favor.
Why not? Because American settlement was based on an escape from the entrenched institutions of British monarchy, gradually evolving into a locally-based representative system and creating new agencies of its own, like black slavery, unknown in Britain. The American Founders' physical break facilitated the political one; this "dead hand of the past" is why modern parliamentary democracy never developed in the UK until the late 19th century, and why France and Germany went through such see-sawing turmoil well into the 20th. What happened (and is still ongoing) in the current Middle East bears much the same look as Europe of a century and a half ago. Smug platitudes about its "fitness" for democracy given its institutions ignores the historical reality of Europe where most modern democracies are located.
With all my caveats it's still a worthwhile look at a much-hyped but little-understood slice of the globe on which many project their dreams and nightmares, but few perceive in the light of reason.