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133 pages, Paperback
Published October 17, 1970
Pain, to put it in plain terms, keeps us alive.
the words we use are only an epiphenomenon of a much broader array of gestures and utterances we use to signify our plight.than nuggets of aphoristic wisdom.
As is typical for the VSI series, this entry on pain is interdisciplinary, covering history, sociology, philosophy, psychology, and medicine (and if, like me, you're mostly interested in modern science and medicine, you'll be disappointed by how much space is devoted to history and religion). I want to harp on focus on the philosophy, since it's important and also the area I'm most qualified to comment on. Particularly, this passage:
Pain has been conceptualized as always a malign experience that should be reduced or eliminated. Yet, as we have seen, many cultures and traditions have the pursuit or acceptance of pain as a central part of virtuous existence, from asceticism to the ultimate extreme of martyrdom. And from a functional point of view too, there are compelling reasons why pain is essential and helpful. Without pain, as anyone with congenital analgesia will attest, we are at enormous risk. Pain holds us in check when there is something wrong, causing us to protect injured parts. Limping on a twisted ankle isn’t a sign of injury but a sign of recovery. If we did not feel the pain we would make the ankle bear our load and the ankle, without being guarded, would soon deteriorate. Pain is necessary, from an evolutionary and individual standpoint, for it aids survival. This is not so much the story of our acute reflexes to painful stimuli as it is the story of our ongoing protective reflexes to enduring states of pain after injury. In this most fundamental sense, the potential for dysfunction notwithstanding, pain is an unmitigated good.
This account, conveniently concise and colloquial for common consumption, is inconsistent. It conflates and equivocates. J'accuse: chicanery! Its confident conclusion clearly constitutes a copious quantity of complete uncontaminated copium. Copium's comfort comes at a cost: complacency. The consumer becomes an accomplice to that most callous of concepts controlling the corporeal in this cosmos, that cold culler of critters, that crimson claw, which cares exclusively for copying (commonly accomplished via copulation), considering conscious creatures only qua chromosome carriers and conquerors of computational complexity, never qua containers of contentment or its complement. Consequently quietens the call to overcome the crummy conditions it creates, which I cannot countenance. Quoting Caustic Casanova: "You cowards, you're cowed!" Call me quixotic, citing claims of certainties concerning capabilities and quality of life? Contrarily, consider concrete counterexample called Cameron, currently cooperating with experimenters, including Cox. CRISPR'd conspecifics coming? Could be! Cattle comes first, according to keikaku.
Am I perhaps being unfair to Rob Boddice, in mocking him with memes, and railing against him while alliterating for a whole paragraph? I don't think so. He literally says "pain is an unmitigated good", and I see no way to interpret such a ludicrous statement that comes anywhere near philosophical soundness. The "potential for dysfunction notwithstanding" caveat doesn't help (and not just because he's basically saying "pain is an unmitigated good except when it's not"). He doesn't elaborate on this, but from context I suppose 'dysfunction' must refer to pain that does not correspond to bodily harm, i.e., phantom pain. Very well, is phantom pain bad? I don't see how it possibly could be bad in any way that wouldn't also apply to functional pain and mitigate its alleged goodness. So, pain must at least be neutral in all cases. Seems like Rob should against analgesics (for functional pain, if not all pain), which, going by his treatment of them in the sections on medicine, he isn't.

In order to get off the ground at all, Rob's "pain is an unmitigated good" requires the premise that genetic propagation (or survival, if you prefer) is good and the experience of pain is not bad, which with no argument to back it up (none is offered), is simply committing the philosophical sin of assuming that as things are, so they should be. Now, this might come as a surprise to Rob, but even granting that pain is beneficial in certain situations, this does not entail that pain is good simpliciter, and it's entirely possible to hold that pain is bad actually while acknowledging that there are Darwinian reasons for its existence. (Consider that what we learn from pain, mainly, is how to avoid additional pain. Pain is functional precisely because it is bad.) Is that what he's trying to do by saying "In this most fundamental sense"? If so, he's done a piss-poor job of expressing himself clearly. "Most fundamental" sure looks like endorsement. But I doubt that's what he was trying to do anyway. Elsewhere, he explicitly declares himself opposed to utilitarianism for much the same reasons. He really wants to shill in favor of pain. Still seems like Rob should be against analgesics.
And even if he had distanced himself from shitty axiological assumptions, "pain is an unmitigated good" would still be an utterly idiotic thing to say in that context. If pain were an unmitigated good as far as Azathoth is concerned - literally no downsides at all - there'd be no selection pressure to prevent phantom pain, and I expect it'd be more of a normal experience.
As for the bit about cultures and traditions, they do a lot of shit that we can and should be critical of.
Should I at least give him a pass on saying that congenital analgesia is always maladaptive, considering this book predates scientific interest in Jo Cameron? Again, don't think so. If someone confidently claims that X is always the case and then an example of ~X appears, I count their lack of epistemic humility as a failure. In this case, even before Jo Cameron's condition was discovered, it wasn't that hard to imagine that with our language and learning faculties, and our rapidly advancing medical tech, maybe we could eventually do away with (unwanted) pain altogether without undue risk.
Now that we do know about Jo Cameron, this book is due for a second, hopefully less philosophically terrible, edition.