On What Matters: Volume 3

On What Matters #3

by Derek Parfit

Derek Parfit presents the third volume of On What Matters, his landmark work of moral philosophy. Parfit develops further his influential treatment of reasons, normativity, the meaning of moral discourse, and the status of morality. He engages with his critics, and shows the way to resolution of their differences.

This volume is partly about what it is for things to matter, in the sense that we all have reasons to care about these things. Much of the book discusses three of the main kinds of meta-ethical theory: Normative Naturalism, Quasi-Realist Expressivism, and Non-Metaphysical Non-Naturalism, which Derek Parfit now calls Non-Realist Cognitivism. This third theory claims that, if we use the word 'reality' in an ontologically weighty sense, irreducibly normative truths have no mysterious or incredible ontological implications. If instead we use 'reality' in a wide sense, according to which all truths are truths about reality, this theory claims that some non-empirically discoverable truths-such as logical, mathematical, modal, and some normative truths-raise no difficult ontological questions.

Parfit discusses these theories partly by commenting on the views of some of the contributors to Peter Singer's collection Does Anything Really Matter? Parfit on Objectivity. Though Peter Railton is a Naturalist, he has widened his view by accepting some further claims, and he has suggested that this wider version of Naturalism could be combined with Non-Realist Cognitivism. Parfit argues that Railton is right, since these theories no longer deeply disagree. Though Allan Gibbard is a Quasi-Realist Expressivist, he has suggested that the best version of his view could be combined with Non-Realist Cognitivism. Parfit argues that Gibbard is right, since Gibbard and he now accept the other's main meta-ethical claim. It is rare for three such different philosophical theories to be able to be widened in ways that resolve their deepest disagreements. This happy convergence supports the view that these meta-ethical theories are true. Parfit also discusses the views of several other philosophers, and some other meta-ethical and normative questions.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

484 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2017

About the author

Derek Parfit was a British Professor of Philosophy at Oxford University specializing in personal identity, rationality, ethics, and the relations between them.

Reviews

[Andrei Khrapavitski · Rating 5 out of 5]

Derek Parfit died in January 2017. I had heard of his great contributions to philosophy quite a lot. His thought experiments come up regularly in specialized literature. But I have to confess I started reading Parfit only after he passed away. Now I finally finished reading the last of his published books: Volume Three of On What Matters. Since January I’ve read all of his published works. And I have to tell you. This is when I really went back to appreciating philosophy again.

There was a point (after reading a bunch of European continental authors) when I thought that this field kind of lost itself. With great philosophers long dead, there was a sort of an existential crisis in the field. Some scientists went as far as to claim that philosophy was no longer necessary. I believe such claims are too bold.

One reason why philosophy should come to the fore in the XXI century is because more and more humans are losing their religion. This is not happening across the board, but it is especially noticeable in the West. There are concerns that without belief in god(s) we humans will lose our moral compass. I don’t believe it is the case. But the void must be filled by good moral philosophy. Related issue is search for meaning and some sort of spirituality without dogmas is a challenge for many people. Enter Parfit. His works are hard to read for non-philosophers, but he not only left his mark on the field of secular moral philosophy but motivated some people to become a part of growing effective altruism movement.

Second reason is that we humans need global thinkers able to persuade more of us that no matter what race or nationality we are born into we share common destiny and responsibilities to share our wealth, to try to diminish suffering in this world and improve the wellbeing of all sentient species. And we have those responsibilities not just for the living but also future generations.

Third reason for relevance of philosophy, especially moral philosophy is the great advances in the field of artificial intelligence. Some AI experts agree that one of the major problems in building artificial general intelligence in the value alignment problem. In this context, the death of Parfit is a big blow, since his seminal work On What Matters tries to resolve major disagreements between three schools of moral philosophy: Kantian deontology, Contractualism and Consequentialism. No other author had attempted anything of that kind. No other author proposed anything closer to a Unified Theory.

Of course, apart from Parfit, there are still brilliant living philosophers. But guess what? Many of those who make a lot of sense (for instance, Peter Singer, William MacAskill, Toby Ord, Sam Harris) are influenced by Parfit.

OK, now to Parfit’s books. If you want a true philosophical masterpiece, by all means read Reasons and Persons. Originally published in 1984, it is still relevant and influential in normative moral philosophy.

On What Matters is Parfit’s life work. It is not an easy read. In the first two volumes, as I mentioned before, the author tried to resolve the disagreements between three kinds of systematic moral theory: Kantian, Contractualist, and Consequentialist. In Volume Three, he attempted to resolve the deepest meta-ethical disagreements between Naturalism, Non-Naturalism, and Quasi-Realist Expressivism. Additionally, and this is probably the most interesting part, he tried to resolve some of the disagreements between Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality. Alas, he did not succeed to come up with a Unified Theory he was searching for. But he did outline possible principles for such a theory. Strangely what he proposed, at least in my reading, was closer to a form of revised utilitarianism (even without calling it that name) than to other rival theories. But he was also right to note that philosophers sometimes disagree where they really shouldn’t or where these disagreements were not irreconcilable. Maybe he could’ve progressed further on his path toward the unified theory if he had finished Volume Four.

At the end of Volume Three, Parfit regretted that, in a book called On What Matters, he had said so little about what matters. At least, he briefly wrote on that subject. Here comes the bit that he, I guess, wanted to expand on in the fourth chapter, but, alas, other authors will have to work on that:

“One thing that greatly matters is the failure of we rich people to prevent, as we so easily could, much of the suffering and many of the early deaths of the poorest people in the world. The money that we spend on an evening’s entertainment might instead save some poor person from death, blindness, or chronic and severe pain. If we believe that, in our treatment of these poorest people, we are not acting wrongly, we are like those who believed that they were justified in having slaves. Some of us ask how much of our wealth we rich people ought to give to these poorest people. But that question wrongly assumes that our wealth is ours to give. This wealth is legally ours. But these poorest people have much stronger moral claims to some of this wealth. We ought to transfer to these people, in ways that I mention in an endnote, at least ten per cent of what we inherit or earn.

What now matters most is how we respond to various risks to the survival of humanity. We are creating some of these risks, and we are discovering how we could respond to these and other risks. If we reduce these risks, and humanity survives the next few centuries, our descendants or successors could end these risks by spreading through this galaxy.

Life can be wonderful as well as terrible, and we shall increasingly have the power to make life good. Since human history may be only just beginning, we can expect that future humans, or supra-humans, may achieve some great goods that we cannot now even imagine. In Nietzsche’s words, there has never been such a new dawn and clear horizon, and such an open sea. If we are the only rational beings in the Universe, as some recent evidence suggests, it matters even more whether we shall have descendants or successors during the billions of years in which that would be possible. Some of our successors might live lives and create worlds that, though failing to justify past suffering, would have given us all, including those who suffered most, reasons to be glad that the Universe exists.”

[Vidur Kapur · Rating 5 out of 5]

Derek Parfit responds forcefully and persuasively to many of the criticisms made of the first two volumes of 'On What Matters' in a separate companion book, 'Does Anything Really Matter?'

He resolves many of his disagreements with Railton and Gibbard, which was encouraging to see.

He also attempts to narrow the gap between Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality and defend his view that, at times, we have sufficient reason to either act in a self-interested fashion or act in an impartial fashion. These parts of the book were the least persuasive for me.

He does not grapple much with the Act Utilitarianism advocated for by the likes of Peter Singer. And he acknowledges that arguments in favour of all reasons being impartial reasons - as argued for by Singer and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek - have some force, but does not change his view, despite offering very little in favour of his own view, aside from the fact that "most of us" find it implausible that there aren't cases in which we could rationally pursue our own self-interest, which is a mere observation at the end of the day.

Therefore, while I am still in agreement with Parfit that there exist irreducibly normative truths, independent of our desires or whims, I disagree with Parfit's normative ethical views, finding the Hedonistic Act Utilitarianism of Singer and de Lazari-Radek, eloquently argued for in their 2014 book 'The Point of View of the Universe', to be more persuasive.

Parfit, before his unfortunate death, had planned to write a fourth volume which may have explored these normative disagreements in more depth. As he noted at the end the book, there was much more to say about what actually matters, having spent most of this volume defending the view that there are things that actually matter. It is a shame that he is no longer here to offer what would have been some fascinating views.

[Daniel Hageman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Easily enjoyed this the most of all three volumes, especially Parfit's focus on showing how one can have normative reasons for something (e.g. abolishing suffering) without being motivated to do said thing. There's a relevant distinction to be made between normative and psychological *reasons*.

His focus on language and *pleonastic properties* was also extremely helpful in understanding some of the confusion around moral claims e.g. "Suffering is bad", and how this is more akin to a claim like "Water is H2O" rather than akin to "The sun is bright", the latter example showing a non-necessary property (description-fitting) of an entity and the former utilizing *is* as an *identity-property* (there is no suffering that *isn't bad*). This also led to further explication about how certain truth claims do not carry with him ontological status, and how normative/ethical claims would fall within this category. As he facetiously notes, "Mathematicians, for example, should not fear that arithmetical claims might all be false, because there aren't any numbers."

I also really appreciated Parfit's reframing of Hedonistic Act Utilitarianism, typically summarized as "maximize the total happiness minus suffering", but here framed as "Acts are right when they minimize the total sum of suffering minus happiness", noting that this framing makes this view seem much more plausible (alluding to the clear normative badness of intrinsically *bad experiences*).

A few quotes to come back to and reflect on:

“It is a very simple truth that the nature of agony, or what it is like to be burnt or whipped, gives us a reason to want to avoid such future agony.” -p. 114

“I regret that, in a book called ‘On What Matters’, I have said so little about what matters. I have been trying to defend the belief that some things really do matter. I hope to say more about what matters in what would be my Volume Four.” 3 RIP :(

One thing that greatly matters is the failure of we rich people to prevent, as we so easily could, much of the suffering and many of the early deaths of the poorest people in the world. The money that we spend on an evening’s entertainment might instead save some poor person from death, blindness, or chronic and severe pain. If we believe that, in our treatment of these poorest people, we are not acting wrongly, we are like those who believed that they were justified in having slaves.

Some of us ask how much of our wealth we rich people ought to give to these poorest people. But that question wrongly assumes that our wealth is ours to give. This wealth is legally ours. But these poorest people have much stronger moral claims to some of this wealth. We ought to transfer to these people…at least ten percent of what we inherit or earn.” -p. 436

[Sae-Hwan Park · Rating 5 out of 5]

Disclaimer: This is the review for all the three volumes of On What Matters.

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Review of Derek Parfit’s On What Matters (2011)

In contemporary moral philosophy, few figures are as widely respected—and at times debated—as Derek Parfit. His monumental work, On What Matters, published in 2011, garnered instant attention for its ambitious attempt to reconcile seemingly divergent moral theories and provide fresh perspectives on the foundations of ethics. What follows is a semi-academic, yet accessible review, driven by an enthusiasm for Parfit’s style of rigorous argumentation and a desire to uncover the book’s most distinctive, nontrivial insights and their real-world implications.

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Introduction: Motivation to Read On What Matters

My initial motivation for delving into Parfit’s On What Matters stemmed from an interest in the nature of moral reasoning: how do we justify moral claims, and can diverse moral theories be shown to converge in a meaningful way? Parfit’s reputation as one of the late twentieth century’s and early twenty-first century’s most original moral thinkers sealed my decision to pick up this voluminous yet intellectually invigorating work. Anticipating a deep, meticulous engagement with centuries of ethical thought—from Kant’s deontology to contemporary consequentialism—I was prepared for both careful argumentation and groundbreaking revelations. As many scholars had noted, On What Matters promised a unifying framework for morality, and I was eager to assess whether Parfit’s so-called “Triple Theory” truly bridged the gaps between Kantianism, rule-consequentialism, and contractualism.

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Overview of the Work

On What Matters is separated into multiple parts, each weaving together historical philosophical perspectives and Parfit’s own rigorous reasoning. The core question Parfit addresses is deceptively simple: What kind of things matter morally, and why do they matter? The scope of his inquiry is vast. He delves into metaethical questions about objectivity, reasons, and rationality. Then, he moves into normative territory, carefully comparing and contrasting deontological, consequentialist, and contractualist theories.

A hallmark of the book is its patient, methodical style. Parfit lays out arguments from existing canonical moral philosophers—most notably Kant, Henry Sidgwick, and John Rawls—and then systematically dissects their positions in search of common ground. His precise, almost mathematical approach to moral reasoning underscores his belief that ethics is not merely emotive or conventional but bound up with objective reasons that exist independently of our inclinations.

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Notable and Unusual Insights

The Unification of Ethical Theories (“Triple Theory”)

Perhaps the most striking feature of On What Matters is Parfit’s argument that three historically distinct moral theories—(a) Kantian deontology, (b) rule-consequentialism, and (c) contractualism—are, at a deep level, “climbing the same mountain from different sides.” According to Parfit, all three theories share a common underlying structure and converge upon similar moral principles if correctly interpreted.
- Rationale in the Book: Parfit underscores that Kant’s emphasis on universalizability, rule-consequentialism’s focus on optimal moral rules, and contractualism’s insistence that principles be justifiable to all rational beings ultimately point to overlapping conclusions. He devotes extensive chapters to showing how each theory’s central tenets can be reformulated to align with one another—arguing, for instance, that Kant’s categorical imperative can be understood in a way that harmonizes with the idea of ideal moral rules upheld by rule-consequentialists.
- Why It Is Unusual: Philosophers often pit these theories against each other in textbooks and debates. Parfit’s insistence that they essentially converge is an unusual and bold claim that challenges long-held assumptions of irreconcilable differences.

The Significance of Practical Reasons and Objectivity

Another central and somewhat provocative insight is Parfit’s view of the objectivity of reasons. He contends that moral reasons are not mere preferences or cultural artifacts but can be discovered through rational inquiry.
- Rationale in the Book: Parfit painstakingly constructs arguments for why we can say we have objective reasons to, for instance, refrain from harming others or to promote certain goods. He draws from Kant’s idea that rational agents recognize a demand for consistency in their principles and merges this with a broadly consequentialist understanding of value.
- Why It Is Unusual: In a philosophical climate where emotivism, subjectivism, or constructivist accounts are prevalent, Parfit’s robust defense of moral objectivity stands out. He invites us to view morality as anchored in reasons that must apply to all rational agents, not just within particular cultural or personal frameworks.

Identity and Personal Perspective

While On What Matters centers on normative ethics, it also touches upon Parfit’s earlier work on personal identity (notably from Reasons and Persons). He implies that our sense of self and the boundaries of personal identity affect how we consider moral duties and reasons.
- Rationale in the Book: By hinting that personhood may be more fluid or less absolute than traditionally thought, Parfit opens the door to moral duties that are not narrowly confined to strict personal boundaries. We may have stronger reasons to prioritize the well-being of future persons or those distant from us in space and culture.
- Why It Is Nontrivial: Traditional moral theories often assume a clear-cut notion of a stable self who bears duties and responsibilities. Parfit challenges that assumption, suggesting that certain debates about self-interest versus altruism lose some traction once we recognize the potential “reductionist” view of personal identity.

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Real-World Implications

Policy and Collective Decision-Making

If Parfit’s “Triple Theory” is correct, then policymakers might find greater unity in moral reasoning than typically assumed. Debates often gridlock when one side champions, say, consequentialist cost-benefit analyses while another side appeals to deontological principles about rights. According to Parfit’s argument, these approaches might not be inherently opposed. Recognizing shared moral ground could encourage more consensus-oriented governance and legislation.

Interpersonal Ethics and Global Cooperation

Parfit’s emphasis on objective reasons and the universalizability of moral principles resonates strongly in a globalizing world. Issues such as climate change, human rights, and global poverty require international coordination. If we acknowledge that our reasons are linked by universal moral demands—rather than local cultural norms—then there is impetus for global ethical frameworks that command respect across nations and ideologies.

Personal Development and Moral Motivation

On an individual level, On What Matters challenges readers to examine the foundations of their moral intuitions. One may find that respecting the agency of others, acting on principles that one can rationally will everyone to adopt, and maximizing good outcomes need not be at odds. Rather, they might be various expressions of a singular moral truth. This insight can motivate deeper reflection on consistent moral practices and reduce cognitive dissonance when faced with tough ethical dilemmas.

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Conclusion

Derek Parfit’s On What Matters is as ambitious as it is meticulous, offering readers a grand tour of moral philosophy’s perennial debates and a confident invitation to see beyond traditional fault lines. He brings forth the startling claim that deontology, consequentialism, and contractualism converge in a larger moral landscape. By underscoring the objectivity of practical reasons and their potential unifying power, Parfit reshapes not only how we discuss moral theories in the academy but also how we might approach ethical decision-making in everyday life, public policy, and international relations.

For anyone wanting to grapple with the building blocks of moral reasoning—and the intriguing possibility of reconciling seemingly incompatible moral frameworks—On What Matters remains a challenging yet deeply rewarding read. It prompts us to look closer at our moral disagreements and find, in Parfit’s words, that we might simply be climbing the same mountain from different sides.

[Ryan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Some remarks (by no means constituting a "review"):

Parfit may be best remembered for his generosity. Here, he is generous to his readers, as he once again provides penetrating, cautious, clear, and brief summaries of everything to follow so one needn't wade through sections that don't hold any special interest. He is likewise generous to his critics/colleagues, with much (perhaps too much?) of this volume taken up with responses to a companion book of essays critiquing the first two volumes of this work.

Many chapters are filled with attempts to resolve meta-ethical misunderstandings and (perceived) disagreements between Naturalism, Non-Naturalism, and Quasi-Realist Expressivism and their various proponents. I found these sections enlivening for the methods of argument and discussion, though the conclusions were at times difficult for me to sufficiently assess (as an interested layman).

"Trolley problems" continue to abound - while such concrete examples are arguably helpful to compare/assess various ethical theories, the application of such far-fetched, constrained, hypothetical situations to real world conundrums is not always clear or convincing. I doubt Parfit would waste his time watching much television, but I wonder how he would have reacted to The Good Place's gruesome/amusing pillorying of such thought experiments.

Per Parfit, the heart of the book is an attempt to resolve perceived disagreements between Act Consequentualism and Common Sense Morality, largely by effacing the former (or replacing it with elements of Rule and/or Motive Consequentualism). I found this section stronger than other chapters, in part because his examples are more often drawn from the thorny ethical problems of addressing global poverty, wealth inequality, climate change, etc.

I wish Parfit had lived to complete a more thorough explication of his Unified Theory, but he leaves behind a clearer picture of what this project would have consisted of, though its applications and implications remain open for future exploration.

[A YOGAM · Rating 4 out of 5]

Der postum erschienene dritte Band von „On What Matters“ (Oxford University Press, 2017) liest sich wie das philosophische Testament Derek Parfits. Auf Seite 436 formuliert er einen Satz, der wie ein Vermächtnis klingt: “This wealth is legally ours. But these poorest people have much stronger moral claims to some of this wealth.” In dieser schlichten, fast unpathetischen Wendung kulminiert Parfits lebenslanges Denken über Vernunft, Moral und Gerechtigkeit.
War „On What Matters“ zunächst ein Versuch, Kantianismus, Utilitarismus und Vertragsdenken zu einer rationalen Einheit zu versöhnen, so öffnet sich der späte Parfit in Band III der Wirklichkeit globaler Ungleichheit. Eigentum wird hier nicht länger als moralisch neutrale Tatsache begriffen, sondern als Prüfstein der Verantwortung. Der Philosoph tritt aus der Sphäre des Begründens in jene des Urteilens über.
Dieser Band steht im Dialog mit den großen Stimmen der zeitgenössischen Ethik, darunter T. M. Scanlon, Christine Korsgaard und andere, deren Denken Parfits eigene Argumentation spiegelt und herausfordert. Mit Scanlon teilt Parfit die Idee der „reason-giving morality“, mit Korsgaard den Glauben an die normative Kraft der Vernunft – doch er geht über beide hinaus. Sein Blick ist nicht mehr partikular, sondern universal: Er fragt, was wir einander schulden, nicht nur als Mitbürger, sondern als Menschen.
So wird „On What Matters“ III zum stillen Schlussakkord einer Philosophie, die Rationalität und Mitgefühl untrennbar miteinander verknüpft. Parfits letzte Zeilen auf Seite 436 klingen wie eine Aufforderung zur moralischen Selbsterkenntnis – und vielleicht wie seine Antwort auf die Frage, what truly matters.

[Dan Graser · Rating 5 out of 5]

In this final volume of his landmark work, Derek Parfit responds to several of his critics and the result is actually some of his most insightful and potent material in the "On What Matters" collection. Where in the first two volumes, the focus was on Parfit's unification of three different moral theories, those being Kantianism, Contractualism, and Rule Consequentialism; this final volume focuses on resolving the seeming disagreements between Parfit's own views of (Non-metaphysical) Non-Naturalism with the Naturalist and Quasi-Realist Expressivist views of Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton, respectively. This he has done admirably well and the ensuing discussion and commentary is the highlight of the work. There are some whose objections will not be resolved, mainly that of Simon Blackburn who I believe fundamentally misunderstands much of what it is that Parfit was arguing. Parfit actually concludes his chapter on Blackburn by quoting the Queen of Hearts, "Off With his Head!"Parfit also follows these areas with a dense yet productive discussion of the disagreements (or lack thereof) between Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality. In responding to some of his critics Parfit has further elucidated and clarified much of what was taken mistakenly by himself in responding to several philosophers in his first two volumes and also what was taken mistakenly by those responding to OWM. This is a must have for readers of this landmark work.

[ExtraGravy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Wow

I'm still captivated, three volumes in. I feel more capable with this problem domain than I was before beginning Parfit's great work.

[Nicolas Alejandro · Rating 5 out of 5]

Monumental