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British Generals in Blair's Wars
British Generals in Blair's Wars is based on a series of high profile seminars held in Oxford in which senior British officers, predominantly from the army, reflect on their experience of campaigning. The chapters embrace all the UK's major operations since the end of the Cold War, but they focus particularly on Iraq and Afghanistan. As personal testimonies, they capture the immediacy of the authors' thoughts at the time, and show how the ideas of a generation of senior British officers developed in a period of rapid change, against a background of intense political controversy and some popular unease. The armed forces were struggling to revise their Cold War concepts and doctrines, and to find the best ways to meet the demands placed upon them by their political leaders in what was seen to be a 'New World Order'. It was a time when relations between the Government of the day and the armed services came under close scrutiny, and when the affection of the British public for its forces seemed to grow with the difficulty of their operational tasks. This is a truly unique and invaluable book. For the first time, we are offered first-hand testimony about Britain's involvement in recent campaigns by senior participants. In addition to touching on themes like civilian-military relations, the operational direction of war and relationships with allies, these eyewitness accounts give a real sense of how the character of a war changes even as it is being fought. It will be essential reading for those in military academies and staff colleges, not only in Britain but throughout NATO, and especially in the USA. It also has profound policy implications, as both the UK and NATO more generally reassess their strategies and the value of intervention operations. It will also become a primary source for historians and students of the wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular.
- GenresMilitary Fiction
404 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2011
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
July 5, 2026
https://fromtheheartofeurope.eu/british-generals-in-blairs-wars-eds-jonathan-bailey-richard-iron-and-hew-strachan/
A provocative title for an interesting book, a series of essays by senior British military officers and historians, partly about recent (in 2013) campaigns, but also reflecting on the place of knowledge and knowledge management in military structures and strategy. I have an odd connection with one of the editors, Sir Hew Strachan, which is that back in 1991, when his wife Pamela was a candidate for Cambridge City Council, I was her election agent. They have since moved to Scotland, and she has got ordained.
There is one frankly terrible essay here, but the other twenty-five are at least interesting and some are fascinating. For me personally the most interesting single piece was the second, by Sir Alistair Irwin, reflecting on the British Army’s role in Northern Ireland: “at no stage from start to finish was there anything that recognisably had the features of a campaign plan. I confess that I went through a stage of believing that this was a fatal and incompetent omission. Now I begin to believe that the circumstances were such that it was never possible to have one.”
All of the essays reflect on the importance of the political dimension of military operations, both in terms of political guidance from Whitehall which is clear without micro-managing, and also in terms of sensitivity to the facts on the ground and managing relations with local populations. I found it a lot more grown-up than some of the American analysis that I have been looking at recently. The military (or at least these military writers) recognise that the deployment of troops is normally only a part of solving a wider political problem, which will need to be solved by political means.
More than a third of the essays are about the Basra campaign in Iraq, where the consensus of the contributors is very defensive of the alleged successes of the Brits on the ground (the Chilcot report was a lot more damning). I must say that after reading a fourth essay how the British were really not humiliated by the locals, I was less rather than more convinced. About a quarter of the essays were similarly about the Helmand campaign in Afghanistan, which was obviously failing by 2013 though had not yet come to its catastrophic conclusion, and there even the most optimistic writers found it difficult to be upbeat. But the point made in both cases is that the problems faced by the military on the ground stemmed from political direction (or lack of it) given from London.
There is also some more cheerful analysis of Kosovo and Sierra Leone – the latter generally forgotten now because it was a short and successful operation. But the end of the book comes back to reflect on the British military’s approach to knowledge and learning, as well as its relationship to politics, in a much more reflective mode than I would have (perhaps unfairly) expected.
One of the more interesting works of military analysis that I have read recently, honest about the fact that there are shortcomings, if not always completely clear about what they are.
A provocative title for an interesting book, a series of essays by senior British military officers and historians, partly about recent (in 2013) campaigns, but also reflecting on the place of knowledge and knowledge management in military structures and strategy. I have an odd connection with one of the editors, Sir Hew Strachan, which is that back in 1991, when his wife Pamela was a candidate for Cambridge City Council, I was her election agent. They have since moved to Scotland, and she has got ordained.
There is one frankly terrible essay here, but the other twenty-five are at least interesting and some are fascinating. For me personally the most interesting single piece was the second, by Sir Alistair Irwin, reflecting on the British Army’s role in Northern Ireland: “at no stage from start to finish was there anything that recognisably had the features of a campaign plan. I confess that I went through a stage of believing that this was a fatal and incompetent omission. Now I begin to believe that the circumstances were such that it was never possible to have one.”
All of the essays reflect on the importance of the political dimension of military operations, both in terms of political guidance from Whitehall which is clear without micro-managing, and also in terms of sensitivity to the facts on the ground and managing relations with local populations. I found it a lot more grown-up than some of the American analysis that I have been looking at recently. The military (or at least these military writers) recognise that the deployment of troops is normally only a part of solving a wider political problem, which will need to be solved by political means.
More than a third of the essays are about the Basra campaign in Iraq, where the consensus of the contributors is very defensive of the alleged successes of the Brits on the ground (the Chilcot report was a lot more damning). I must say that after reading a fourth essay how the British were really not humiliated by the locals, I was less rather than more convinced. About a quarter of the essays were similarly about the Helmand campaign in Afghanistan, which was obviously failing by 2013 though had not yet come to its catastrophic conclusion, and there even the most optimistic writers found it difficult to be upbeat. But the point made in both cases is that the problems faced by the military on the ground stemmed from political direction (or lack of it) given from London.
There is also some more cheerful analysis of Kosovo and Sierra Leone – the latter generally forgotten now because it was a short and successful operation. But the end of the book comes back to reflect on the British military’s approach to knowledge and learning, as well as its relationship to politics, in a much more reflective mode than I would have (perhaps unfairly) expected.
One of the more interesting works of military analysis that I have read recently, honest about the fact that there are shortcomings, if not always completely clear about what they are.
December 30, 2015
The book is well written for both an academic and historical text. It is easily read and absorbed which was a pleasant surprise. It is a series of essays written by British Army Generals who served in Iraq and Afghanistan on their experiences and the lessons learnt. These essays are also complimented by several from academics, a psychologist and also one essay by an Air Marshal from the RAF.
There were two disappointing elements of the book. Firstly, the transition between the theatres I felt was too abrupt. Having ensconced my mind in the Iraqi theatre the book quickly transitioned to the Afghanistan theatre which threw my train of thought/mental map of the operating regions in the country. Secondly, there is one chapter from Iain McNicholl on the RAF component and the difficulties of joint operations. This was a very instructive chapter and it was disappointing that there were not more from both the RAF and Royal Navy providing a differing perspective.
Overall a thoroughly enjoyable and insightful book.
There were two disappointing elements of the book. Firstly, the transition between the theatres I felt was too abrupt. Having ensconced my mind in the Iraqi theatre the book quickly transitioned to the Afghanistan theatre which threw my train of thought/mental map of the operating regions in the country. Secondly, there is one chapter from Iain McNicholl on the RAF component and the difficulties of joint operations. This was a very instructive chapter and it was disappointing that there were not more from both the RAF and Royal Navy providing a differing perspective.
Overall a thoroughly enjoyable and insightful book.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews