There are two main themes in this book. One of them I agree with.
The overarching theme is that mind and body are integrated in the sense that, as per her most prominent example, psychological stress generates stress chemicals that affect the body’s health. In making this argument, Sternberg is critical of modern medicine - and the beginnings of science with Bacon and Descrtes - that separates bodily ills from mental causation. Psychiatry is an exception in that it bridges that gap somewhat by chemical treatment for “mental” ills and, somewhat, via deep probing and talk therapy.
In making the argument that mind and body are closely connected, Sternberg also has to, logically, argue that bodily ills can be corrected through various forms of mind control. For example, she quotes Norman Cousin’s mantra that laughter is the best medicine. She also notes the so-called power of prayer and religious belief systems that offer solace and hopes for cures. But her underlying argument here is more about the various forms of Stoic mind control, which is to push back negative thoughts and push forward the positive ones. This part of her argument is problematic. How does one laugh if one doesn’t feel laughter inside? Does fake laughter work? What happens to negative emotions when we deny them? Where does that energy go and, by the way, might that energy fester inside to create bodily ills?
The second theme is that emotions are responses to triggering events. While a standard way to see emotions, this conceptualization of emotions has all sorts of problems. Sternberg’s conceptual model rests on the role of the immune system. Invaders from the outside - germs and such - trigger the body’s defenses. Medically, this is what happens and clearly there is a triggering event. So, by analogy, she takes two standard defensive emotions, fear and anger (though also an offensive emotion), to argue that they are triggered by outside threats, which of course makes total sense – for fear and anger: “Incoming” necessitates an “outgoing” response, which are fear and anger. And, to her theme, these emotions flood the body’s chemicals to do other things, and this, if chronic, starts to eat away at the body’s health (held-in anger and fear).
But any discussion of emotions must also include the so-called positive ones, like love. Sternberg takes on this subject in her chapter on connecting with others. That we, generally though variably, need to do so, is clear enough but, in Sternberg’s model, our love connection is triggered from the outside through various social signaling, beginning with the baby’s cry that “brings in a burst of hormones in the mother.” True to form, humans send signals to each other, so that the others can react in ways that strengthen social connection. And, again, per her theme, when such is missing, we get stressed out from loneliness which has a consequence for bodily health.
All in all, Sternberg has a passive view of humans and their emotional makeup. There is “e-motion,” to be sure but it is reactive movement. Humans are static beings awaiting a triggering event that makes them move against (fear and anger) or toward (via social signaling). Something is very wrong about this picture, beginning with its minimal connection to evolutionary theory. If the baseline ends of being are survival (or the body survives as a vehicle for reproduction), and self-interest (generally, welfare), then certain needs are foundational to make this happen. The body needs nurturing, the social group, and a sexual mate. The body does not want threats or harm to its survival or well-being needs. The body is like a good cell. It’s open to bringing the world into itself to satisfy need, and it’s closed to threats or harm to its body.
Needs are emotions that move us to act in the world. We seek nurture because we need food-energy and bodily well-being and eventually, self-fulfillment (we nurture ourselves that way). We seek to be a group member in good standing because this is the way we survive. We need a sexual mate to reproduce. Likewise, we resist threats and harm to our needs, prompted by fear and anger. We are seeking and defending-resisting beings. We actively seek from the outside world what we need and we actively search for what we need. When we find what we want from the outside, we have so to say, a match. The trigger is only so because the outside speaks to what the inside motive force is looking for. With defending-resisting, the outside harm only triggers because the inside is threatened or harmed. The inside is fundamental. The outside trigger is secondary to that.
Sternberg’s conceptualization of emotion, the motive force is missing, i.e. why does the self care about the outside world. This was Schopenhauer’s point. The self is moved by pain, what we want, what we don’t want, and both are activated by our overarching need for survival and well-being. At the broadest level, pain that moves to act and react is one of two emotions. When we are successful, there is pleasure and movement stops. If we are unsuccessful, pain remains and we try again or we have to deal with the negative consequences.
Seen this way, the commonly-stated basic emotions - for example, the universally recognized facial expressions” as highlighted by Ekman - begin to make sense: we signal anger and fear for what we don’t want (broadly, disgust is a form of anger). When we are successful, there's “enjoyment.” When not, there’s “sadness.” And now we are in Spinoza’s territory, and his lumping of all emotions into three categories: We are moved by desire (pain, what we want, or don’t want, which is sort of an anti-desire). When there’s success we have joy. When not we are sad.
The mind and body connection is integrated in the sense that Ledoux suggests: The body expresses the emotion first, and consciousness follows a fraction of a second later and adds helpful context. Ledoux states that this model might have broader applications to the mind’s role vis-a-vis the emotion, and not limited just to fear: the body responds first and the mind follows by supplying added context.
As a final note, though Sternburg’s argument is to integrate the mind and body, there is in her thinking a mind-body separation nonetheless in the sense that the body is subservient to the mind and its control. The tripartite separation of the mind-body apparatus is emotion, thinking and behavior. Thinking oversees emotion and thereby guides behavior. This, in effect, in the West at least, is the Standard Model. The separation, though, is too severe. Emotions supply the motive force - they explain why and what we do; in a fundamental sense they are about values. With instinct and automatic behavior, the reason for acting/reacting is built into the “how” to act/react and the behavior itself. With humans, the cognitive element becomes, in the Western model, separated from the non-instrumental values that explain, fundamentally why we do X and resist Y. With humans being conscious of their consciousness, they focus on how to do something, including the use of instrumental means and ends, and behavior. In doing so, the value part, in the essential, fundamental sense, recedes into the background and gets lost. By default we then come to think that the overt reasons we act-react are the real reasons we act and react when it’s not nearly as clear cut as that.