Kenny offers an insightful reading of a number of questions in the First Part of Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, in the light of more recent developments in analytic philosophy, drawing especially on Ryle and the later Wittgenstein. The author points to a range of tensions within Aquinas's text. Most importantly, Kenny argues, is the tension between the intellectual soul conceived of as the form of the body and the intellectual soul understood as a power capable performing specific actions. The problem, according to Kenny, is that when we think of the soul as the form of the body, we think of it as an abstraction, not a thing but an aspect of the entity that is a human being. In this sense, there can be no question of a soul existing without the body (or the real human being). By contrast, Aquinas's arguments for the soul's capacity to exist without the body hinge upon the the second way of conceiving of the intellectual soul, as a capacity for action that does not depend upon a bodily organ. Because of this capacity for non-bodily agency, Aquinas argues, the soul's being does not depend upon the body. This creates an impossible tension where the soul is on the one hand understood as an entity that is capable of existing independently of its union with the body and on the other understood as united substantially with the body. The problem is that this seems to be essentially a statement of substance dualism where the soul and body are only united accidentally. Likewise, if the soul is not substantially united with a body then it cannot be individuated by its matter. And if this is the case then there is only one human soul or each soul is a different species.